

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD

by

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ABSTRACT

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The United States' traditional use of the National Guard is changing rapidly to an increased reliance upon the citizen soldier. Except for a brief spike during the 1991 Persian Gulf War the annual duty days for a National Guard soldier averaged about 40 days per year. Since 9/11 there has been a sharp increase to 120 days per year. As of November 2004, there were about 150,000 National Guard soldiers on active duty. Lengths of deployment have increased dramatically as well, from four to six months to well over a year and a half. Guard combat loss rates have been relatively the same as active duty soldiers. This paper will address a very important national security question; can the National Guard sustain this demand, meet its recruiting goals, sustain the current deployment rate and still provide homeland security? This paper will also address immediate steps that must be taken to sustain the strength of America's most economical military force, the National Guard. Since 9/11 the only difference between an active duty soldier and the National Guard soldier is a phone call.

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THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD

The United States' traditional use of the National Guard is changing rapidly to an increased reliance upon the citizen soldier. Except for a brief spike during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, of annual duty days for a National Guard soldier averaged about 40 days per year. Since 9/11 there's been a sharp increase to 120 days per year. As of November 2004 there were about 150,000 National Guard soldiers on active duty. Lengths of deployment have increased dramatically as well, from four to six months to well over a year and a half. Guard combat loss rates are relatively the same as active duty soldiers. This paper will address a very important national security question; can the National Guard sustain this demand, meet its recruiting goals, sustain the current deployment demands and still provide homeland security? This paper will also address immediate steps that must be taken to sustain the strength of America's most valuable and economical military force, the National Guard. Since 9/11 the only difference between an active duty soldier and the National Guard soldier is a phone call.

The Army National Guard is America's oldest military force which dates back to pre-revolutionary days. It is made up of civilians who serve the country on a part time basis and was created under the sixteenth clause of section 8, article I of the Constitution. Under the National Defense Act of 1916 the National Guard became the official name. This act authorized training periods and increased overall Federal funding. It also gave the President authority to mobilize the National Guard in case of war or national emergency. The National Defense Act of 1933 further defined the National Guard as the primary reserve force of the Army and also provided the nation a force for disaster relief, maintaining public peace and in state status provided the governors a force for utilization during state or local emergencies.¹ The National Guard has a unique dual mission which consists of both Federal and State roles with a priority to its Federal mission, being trained and equipped for prompt mobilizations for war or national emergencies. For state missions the governor, through the state Adjutant General, commands Guard forces. The governor can call the Guard into action for local or state emergencies such as natural disasters, large public event security, fires or civil disturbance.

The primary statutes governing the activation of the National Guard fall under Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code. Guardsmen are called to active duty under Title 10 for national service funded by the federal government. They serve under the command of the National Command Authority (the President and Secretary of Defense) and receive all of the rights and benefits of active national service. Title 32 is generally used for state related missions.

FEDERAL AND STATE CALL-UP AUTHORITY

Title 10 U.S.C. 12301(a) provides that, in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, the entire membership of all reserve components or any lesser number can be called to active duty for the duration of the war or national emergency plus 6 months. Although this statute normally is viewed as the call-up authority for responding to a major threat to national security, Department of Defense stated that it could be used to activate reservists for a domestic emergency. However, it has never been used for this purpose.

Title 10 U.S.C. 12302 provides that, in time of national emergency declared by the President, up to 1 million members of the Ready Reserve can be called to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months. Similar to the previous authority, DOD stated that this statute could also provide access to reservists for a domestic emergency, although it has never been used for this purpose.

Title 10 U.S.C. 12304 provides that, when the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission, up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve can be called to active duty for not more than 270 days. This is known as Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC) authority. This provision also states that no unit or member may be ordered to active duty under this authority to provide assistance to either the federal government or a state in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe. Thus, this authority cannot be used to access reservists for domestic emergencies.

Title 10 U.S.C. 12301(b) provides that at any time a service secretary can order any reservist to active duty for up to 15 days each year. This authority traditionally has been viewed as the authority allowing the services to enforce the reservists' 2-week annual training requirement. However, DOD's Office of General Counsel provided an interpretation in 1994 stating that this authority could be used for operational missions as well as annual active duty for training. The legal opinion noted that this authority could not be used if a unit or member had already completed 15 days of annual training for the calendar year. DOD stated, however, that this authority has not been used to call reservists involuntarily to active duty for a domestic emergency.

In addition to the involuntary activation of reservists under the above conditions, 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) provides for call-up of reservists who volunteer for active duty. The number of volunteer reservists called to active duty and the length of time they may be kept on active duty generally depends upon the availability of funds and the end-strength authorizations for the active force.²

Missions for state emergencies such as civil disturbance, natural disasters or other local crisis are covered under Title 32 of the U.S. code with a majority of Policy under sections 501 and 502. Additionally, Section 502(f) of Title 32 allows the National Guard to be called up for federal service while remaining under the control of the governor. These missions are funded by the federal government but, depending on the type of activation, may or may not receive many of the benefits of national service.³ Title 32 activations have long been accepted missions for

the National Guard and in general are short term tours of duty lasting for weeks as opposed to current Title 10 deployments which are now often well over a year in duration. Title 32 mobilization is not a significant issue for the purposes of this paper.

Figure 1 illustrates the spectrum of title 10 and title 32 activations and the types of missions requiring title 10 or title 32 mobilizations.⁴ Figure 2 lays out the stages of mobilization, authority limits, types of authority and crisis level required for each stage.⁵



FIGURE 1

Stages of Mobilization					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EXPAND BEYOND THE APPROVED PEACETIME RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY ALL EXISTING RC FORCE STRUCTURE DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 				
AUTHORITY LIMITS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 MILLION ALL SERVICES 24 MONTHS DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 		PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	FULL MOBILIZATION	TOTAL MOBILIZATION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 200K ALL SERVICES 270 DAYS W/ NO EXTENSION PRESIDENTIAL ORDER 				
AUTHORITY TYPE	SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION	PRESIDENTIAL RESERVE CALL-UP			
CRISIS LEVEL	DOMESTIC EMERGENCY	OOTW or Lesser Contingency	2 SDTE or 1 SDTE w/ Regime Change	2 SDTE: 1 with Regime Change	GLOBAL WAR

FIGURE 2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Title 10 has been used throughout history by numerous presidents to call upon the National Guard during times of need. The National Guard has contributed to every major military campaign in the nation's history. For example, during World War II nineteen Army Guard divisions were deployed; 139,000 personnel served on active duty during the Korean War; 149,000 personnel during the Berlin Crisis; 14,000 personnel during the Cuban Missile Crisis; and a very small percentage- 38,000 personnel (1%) during the Vietnam War.⁶

America has relied more heavily upon the National Guard since the total force concept was initiated in the 1970s to integrate active and reserve components of the armed forces. Then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird created the concept in response to pressure from President Nixon to reduce defense expenditures. The Laird Total Force policy referred to informally as the Abrams Doctrine has just exceeded thirty years as a fundamental aspect of Department of Defense force structure and manning policy. The Abrams Doctrine was principally driven by force structure considerations and constraints that General Abrams faced in the post-Vietnam era. General Abrams' actual intention in advocating this policy was an attempt to save force structure and to resource the Reserve Component forces appropriately. Despite this fact the two perceptions most often associated with the Total Force policy today are the necessity of gaining popular support in committing U.S. forces to combat and indirectly limiting presidential powers through the political impact of activating large numbers of citizen soldiers from a particular geographical region. Both of these perceptions were adopted by various constituencies after the fact and are actually fallacies. At the same time a third function - that of limiting prolonged combat - is a desired associated outcome. In December 2002 following the successful completion of Operation Enduring Freedom the Secretary of Defense stated that the Total Force policy (e.g. the existing Active Component/Reserve Component force balance) was hampering his ability to deploy forces and suggested that he would seek changes. Secretary Rumsfeld is correct that some aspects of the Abrams Doctrine should be discarded but it is important that the essential core should be retained in formulating a new Total Force policy. The original Abrams Doctrine was a landmark compromise marked by each constituency achieving some victories, accepting some losses, and the nation benefiting. The spirit of compromise that resulted in the first Abrams Doctrine must guide the development and serve as the enduring foundation for any future Abrams Doctrine. Any new Abrams Doctrine must arrive at a force structure appropriate to today's threat while ensuring the continued relevance of the Reserve Component.⁷

Since the creation of the Abrams Doctrine the National Guard has been called upon with increased frequency. The U.S. Army conducted ten major contingency operations between 1960 and 1991 and conducted 26 such operations between 1992 and 1998 and the National Guard participated in all of these operations. Throughout the 1990s the Guard's percent of the total force increased dramatically as did its frequency of activation. During the Gulf War 238,000 National Guard soldiers were activated. President Clinton's peacekeeping policies further stretched the National Guard - 36,000 personnel during peacekeeping duty in Haiti; 19,000 in Bosnian and 5,900 in Kosovo.⁸ Since the attack of 9/11, the role of the National Guard has been dramatically transformed from an organization on call, to a major operational arm of the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a prime homeland security defender. The policy for use of the Guard Forces has shifted from an on call force to a major portion of long range operations. The Army and Air National Guard with the strength of about 450,000 soldiers have been stretched to its limit. As of October 2004 there were about 144,000 (42%) Army National Guard soldiers deployed throughout the world and roughly 40% of the forces in Iraq were National Guard soldiers.⁹

The historic "business as usual" use of the National Guard, where deployments were generally six months or shorter, has changed drastically. The length of deployment has stretched to well over a year and in many cases up to two years away from family and civilian jobs. National Guard units are not being used in traditional support missions but rather in direct combat. A breakdown of the force structure within the Army National Guard effectively illustrates this point. The Army National Guard has a strength of about 350,000 soldiers, 38% of the Army force structure, 53% of combat forces, 38% of combat support forces and 34% of combat service support forces. All units train collectively. It consumes \$8.1 billion of the Army budget (10%). Figure 3 illustrates the cost effectiveness of Guard forces.¹⁰

The country's dependency on the Army National Guard for defense of the nation and traditional use of the Army National Guard has changed significantly. The Guard has become an integral part of the defense of the nation.

As figure 4 illustrates the United States traditional policy on use of the National Guard is certainly changing to an increased reliance upon the citizen soldier.¹¹ The National Guard provides well educated, motivated, and qualified soldiers at a much lower overall cost. In the short term the National Guard can probably provide enough forces to continue the mission but it must be remembered that many National Guard soldiers have been previously activated in the past five or ten years and with over a third of the force now on active duty this resource is finite.




FIGURE 3




FIGURE 4. LONGER CALL OF DUTY

RISKS OF OVER DEPLOYMENT

The pace at which National Guard units are being activated and deployed has some inherent risks. To sustain the current level of Guard activations approximately 85,000 soldiers would have to be called to active duty each year. Assuming an annual attrition rate of about 18% and that recruiting goals are being met, the National Guard would “mathematically” have called up all its soldiers in approximately five years.

Compounding this problem is that the percent of Guard soldiers called from each state is often disproportionate. As of May, 2004 Idaho was at 81%; Maine-60%; New Hampshire-56%;

Washington-55%; Pennsylvania-46%; while states such as Alaska-5%; Delaware-15%; Hawaii-12%; Texas-12%; and Vermont-13% maintained relatively low deployment percentages.¹²

States with numerous metropolitan areas and a higher likelihood of terrorist attacks or states such as Florida which has recently received unprecedented natural disasters could be left with too few National Guard soldiers needed for state missions, terrorist attacks or other homeland security issues.

The question remains: can the National Guard sustain this demand, meet its recruiting goals, sustain the current deployment demands, and still provide homeland security; a mission that is certainly at its center of mass? Over deployments could conceivably leave certain states with too few soldiers during sudden natural disasters or worse, a terrorist attack. If the pace of the operational environment continues many Guard soldiers will be on their second lengthy activation in the next two or three years. LTG Blum, Chief of National Guard Bureau, predicts that the National Guard can generate approximately 85,000 soldiers a year, (25% of the force) and that "if a few things change" the National Guard can generate that number of soldiers indefinitely.¹³

This prediction is assuming that the National Guard meets its recruiting goal; which as of late has been a challenge. The demands of the second deployment on families and employers are taking its toll. Many soldiers who have already served lengthy deployments are reluctant to deploy again so soon. As of September 2004 the Army National Guard has fallen short of its recruiting goal by about 5000 soldiers for the first time in a decade.¹⁴ As of February 2005 that shortfall had increased to about 7500. Although 5000-7500 soldiers is a very small percent of the total if this trend were to accelerate or even remain the same for a few years there would be a significant loss of strength in the National Guard. To make up for the loss, the Guard strategy for 2006 and beyond will be to focus on retention so fewer new soldiers have to be recruited. A recent study in the Army Times indicates that the reenlistment rate in the National Guard is down by about 10%, into to 60% range.¹⁵ Retention is increasing in the active Army and thus fewer soldiers are coming into the National Guard from active duty. Those getting off active duty are not as likely to join the Guard because it will find them right back on active duty. The result is many potential Guard soldiers stay in the active Army or leave the military altogether.

It is obvious that the National Guard is an integral part of our nation's defense and that a strength of about 350,000 soldiers is essential. Less strength would leave too few soldiers available for deployment and homeland security. From an ends, ways and means perspective the "ends" is a ready force of about 350,000 soldiers.

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action are possible. The first is to continue with the current policy under which about 70,000 National Guard soldiers would be deployed each year for the foreseeable future. Continuation of this policy and still achieving the desired ends of 350,000 soldiers has risks. General Blum predicts that within two years 80% of the National Guard force will be combat veterans.¹⁶ By 2006 a very high percentage of National Guard soldiers will be on their second deployment. Many soldiers in the fifteen to twenty year enlistment range may well be on their third deployment. It is unlikely that employers and families would be willing to tolerate numerous lengthy deployments. The recruiting pool, extremely competitive now, will most likely get smaller if the current trends continue making it more difficult for the National Guard to meet recruiting goals. Current pay and benefits make it more difficult to compete with active duty and private business, especially if a potential recruit envisions two deployments in a six year commitment.

A second course of action is to refocus the National Guard mission exclusively on homeland security. With armories located in numerous communities throughout the state the homeland security mission is a natural one for the National Guard. Because Guard members live and work in the community they are likely to be the first military responders to assist local first responders in the event of an attack on the homeland and in many cases may well be the first responders. This is certainly a good argument but immediate questions would be how can the United States continue to meet its troop demands abroad and would the country need 350,000 soldiers dedicated exclusively to homeland security? Could the country afford a much larger active duty force to compensate for National Guard soldiers devoted solely to homeland security? The current Guard structure, largely comprised of combat and combat support units, would have to be significantly restructured and would certainly be much smaller. Currently the Army National Guard is 38% of the Army's force structure and consumes only 10% of the Army budget, a tremendous bargain.¹⁷ The risk here is an almost certain loss of force structure that would have to go to the active military. This is quite contrary to our nation's traditional use of the citizen soldier whose roots are imbedded in the local community. It would also be devastating to most state economies and would most likely be politically intolerable resulting in a lack of congressional support. Given the current state of deficit spending it is highly unlikely that the country would support or could afford a much larger permanent active Army force.

The active Army has a strength of about 500,000 soldiers. About 320,000 are usually deployable. As of October 2004 there were about 140,000 soldiers in Iraq, 30,000 in Kuwait, 25,000 in Korea, nearly 20,000 in Afghanistan, 2000 in the Balkans and 62,000 in Europe. A

percentage of these soldiers are Guard and Reserve soldiers but the request for active duty forces for 2005 is about 483,000 and the percent of Guard and Reserve forces called to active duty is reaching 50 percent. Even an increase of 20,000-30,000 soldiers in the active Army alone could not meet current demand.¹⁸ Current indications as of October 2004 are that the demand for troops in Iraq in 2005 will be about 100,000, in 2006-75,000, and in 2007/ 2008 about 50,000. These estimates may in fact be on the low side and other sources indicate the United States may need 150,000 troops in Iraq for the next two years. (through 2007).¹⁹ These numbers do clearly demonstrate that an active duty force alone cannot meet the needs of the country's defense for the foreseeable future. Preparing the National Guard for an exclusive homeland security mission would also mean massive changes in equipment and training, which could be accomplished, but would require a great deal of time and money. Remissioning the National Guard exclusively for homeland security is not a practical option, certainly not an option the country can afford in terms of cost and time.

The third course of action for the National Guard is to retain most of the warfighting mission and assume the homeland security mission. The National Guard is a best option for homeland security. There is no other organization that could begin to meet the homeland security needs. The Army National Guard has a community based facility structure of 3,150 facilities located in 2,700 communities in 54 states and territories which provides efficient soldier management. The Guard has a State Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQs), is accustomed to working with the governors' office and is well-situated to oversee the training of state and local first responders in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management. Currently, the National Guard maintains approximately fifty 22-soldier Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), that are trained and equipped to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) event. These units could provide valuable training to state and local first responders.

The Guard also could help state and local authorities understand how to maintain equipment and sustain operations in a CBRNE environment, and to plan for medical treatment after an attack (combat triage). Local health authorities are not adequately prepared to address the mass casualties that would result from CBRNE event. Many would not know, for example, when to enter an environment or stay away, or when to admit patients to a public facility or send them to an off-site, secure facility. The Guard can help them gain that operational knowledge.

The National Guard should help state and local authorities assess their readiness level. These assessments should include the ability to communicate with other state Guard units and state and local authorities as well as to identify interoperability problems. Air National Guard

bases and Army National Guard armories are ideally located to facilitate such cooperative efforts. The Guard units should assess their own ability to work with state and local officials to quickly rebuild "mitigating infrastructure" such as roads, bridges, and water supplies. Further, they should determine their ability to provide backup systems, such as power generation, water distribution, and communications systems, for local emergency facilities.²⁰ The Guard is already doing much of this mission and these activities should constitute as a critical Guard mission but, the warfighting mission is also critical. Simply put the Guard must be ready to execute both missions with some policy modification. This multi mission responsibility cannot be accomplished without a strength of about 350,000 soldiers. Course of action three is an obvious best choice.

MAINTENANCE OF 100% STRENGTH

Policy modification and significant changes in Guard benefits, many of which have been proposed or are in the process of changing, need to become policy now. As previously discussed it is a necessity to maintain the Guard strength and maintain its readiness for the vast array of needs our country requires it to perform. The keys to maintaining 100% strength of the National Guard, an all volunteer force, are discussed throughout the duration of this paper along with research analysis to validate the arguments.

Offering a potential soldier the opportunity to focus on homeland security with predictable and limited deployments as well as increasing benefits more aligned with active duty benefits would be an obvious recruiting enhancement tool. Realigning benefits more parallel to active duty benefits would certainly make the Guard more competitive. Numerous, unpredictable deployments during a six year commitment has a significant negative impact on Guard recruiting and retention. Potential recruits with the desire to deploy are more likely to join the active duty force.

National Guard soldiers are not reluctant to deploy when needed. They are reluctant to deploy too often, such as every two or three years due to the severe impact on their families and employers who are understanding and supportive of predictable and evenly spaced deployments. The National Guard is not the soldiers' primary employer so inconsistent pay, retirement benefits and health insurance become very significant issues to soldiers and their families. Numerous deployments generate great anxiety and hardship, not just to the soldier but more importantly to his or her family.

National Guard Bureau's answer to this challenge is to increase its recruiting force by adding 1400 recruiters to augment the 2700 on duty. This certainly is a positive response but

does not address the key issues. Referring to Lieutenant General Stephen Blum's statement "if a few things change," he believes that recruiting goals, actually retention goals, can be achieved in part through bonuses and benefits that are on par with those that regular Army soldiers receive.²¹ He is absolutely correct in his statement, "a few things changing" and these few changes are the core of recruiting and retention.

SPECIFIC WAYS TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS

The changes or the ways to recruit and retain quality soldiers depends on those "few things." The National Guard must be able to compete with the active duty and private business and offer comparable programs for potential Guard soldiers. Retention is the other half of the issue. The National Guard must be able to offer compensation packages that will considerably enhance retention. Patriotism aside, the National Guard has to be competitive with private business and more importantly, with those on active duty.

MILITARY PAY

Military pay, while on duty, does not seem to be a significant issue for National Guard soldiers. A Wisconsin mobilization survey of two units whose average deployment length was well over a year in Iraq indicated that between 66% and 80% of the deployed soldiers encountered no adverse financial impact during their active duty. In another study of an aviation unit, over half the soldiers who deployed for over seven months indicated that their income increased during active duty. This survey, although a sample of only about 1200 soldiers, does indicate that current military pay does not seem to be a significant issue. Yet the same survey, where the percentage of soldiers who had intended to reenlist before the deployment was 60%-65% indicated that only 18-40 % intended to reenlist after the deployment.²² The actual retention rate nationally for Guard members with very expensive replacement skills such as aviation plummeted from an 80% retention rate in 2000 to about 30% by 2002. ²³ The cost of training one army aviator alone to a mission capable level is certainly in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. If these surveys are accurate and an indication of attrition rates, the National Guard can expect to see a major decrease in reenlistment rates. The Guard has already indicated a decrease in recruiting numbers in America's most valuable and economical military force. National Guard Bureau, the Defense Department and Congress should directly address National Guard issues and do so immediately before the National Guard loses significant strength. David Segal, a military sociologist at the University of Maryland, states that, "if I were the Guard I'd be very worried right now, you would have to look at a couple more

months of data before you could say the sky is falling but the sky is definitely tilting.”²⁴ Active duty pay, however, is not the issue.

MOBILIZATION ISSUES

Mobilization stations need to become more efficient. Consideration needs to be given to home station mobilizations. The cost analysis of shipping soldiers and equipment hundreds or thousands of miles to a mobilization site, validating the unit, shipping that equipment to a port and into theater should be studied. A Wisconsin National Guard mobilization survey executive summary of eight units that deployed either from home station or a mobilization site near their unit location indicated that the mobilization process was not identified as a significant negative issue.²⁵ This is not the case for units who were validated hundreds of miles away from their home station. Unit validation that currently takes months can be done in weeks if done efficiently. Unnecessary time at the mobilization station, followed by a lengthy deployment, adds months to the soldier’s time away from job and family. The Senate has recently proposed several amendments that would limit National Guard deployments. Senator Harry Reid, (D). Nevada called for clear guidelines for deployed reservists. He commented that “these weekend soldiers have become year long soldiers. I believe we need a definite time that they can be obligated to go overseas and how many times they have to go overseas. This must be streamlined. Even if deployments were limited to 180 days for standard deployment, that time does not include preparation and recovery time. When the pre and post deployment periods are added the entire mobilization is about 230 days.”²⁶ This estimate of about 50 additional days is a conservative estimate and in many cases is much longer, often up to 90 day. Most units are currently deploying for 365 days “in country” which in reality takes them away from their family and civilian jobs for 16 months or more. Home station mobilization and validation would shorten the length of deployment by months. The majority of post deployment surveys clearly indicate the length of deployment is a very significant issue and may cause soldiers and families not to reenlist.²⁷

PREDICTABLE DEPLOYMENTS

In a Wisconsin National Guard study of units who have returned from lengthy deployments 49% of redeployed soldiers identified time away from family as the most significant mobilization issue.²⁸ Predictability in deployments as well as frequency of deployments must be defined beforehand so soldiers know what to expect. This allows the soldier, the family and the employer to plan ahead. Soldiers who have been on an extended deployment need to know that they will probably not be called back for five or six years for another long range deployment.

The proposed plan of a six year cycle for guard and reserve forces addresses many of the issues of unpredictable or extended deployments. A six year cycle will allow predictability, focus of funding and greatly reduces the length of mobilization training which adds months to a soldier's deployment time. This plan will provide predictability for the force, identify triggers from partial to full mobilization, focus resources, identify force structure gaps and drive overall resources. It will also identify personnel and material needed to bring the unit to C1 and provide commanders with scheduled timeframes of a planned deployment. Figure 5 illustrates this cycle.²⁹

This plan of the six year cycle must be initiated sooner rather than later. In December of 2004 the Pennsylvania National Guard called 2400 more National Guard soldiers to active duty for what is expected to be 18 months in duration. The soldiers were sent to Mississippi for four to six months of training and then will deploy overseas for a year. This is a prime example of the difference between active duty soldiers and National Guard soldiers. Active duty soldiers deploy from home station, serve overseas for a year and then return home. National Guard soldiers will be away from their family and civilian employment for 18 months. Pre deployment training, training on the proper tasks and home station training would alleviate six months of active duty and six months away from family and civilian job. The result of a lengthy deployment can again be seen. In fiscal year 2004 the Pennsylvania National Guard met only about 40% of its recruiting goal.³⁰ Guard soldiers are willing to be called out tomorrow for a

ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL




FIGURE 5

hurricane, flood or an attack on the homeland and an employer or family will more easily support this type of duty but they will not support continued deployments of 18 months.

Direct deployment from home station is a policy that must be given serious consideration. When about half of deploying soldiers list time away from family as their most significant issue, steps must be taken to reduce this time. Using home station for unit validation reduces stress on deploying soldiers and increases cost efficiency. Utilizing local training areas, standardizing SOPs for all mobilization sites, increasing training funding prior to mobilization, standardizing modern equipment, and reducing duplication of SRP and training would greatly decrease the amount of validation time needed or required. Mobilization sites, generally active duty posts, must also give equal housing priority to National Guard units while they are in the validation process.

Redeployment activities must also be extremely efficient so soldiers are reunited with their families quickly. A Wisconsin National Guard program where families welcome soldiers home as they get off the airplane near home station, as well as a focus of a speedy and efficient demobilization process of six or seven days, seems to be effective. A Wisconsin Demobilization Survey indicated that the demobilization process was not identified as a significant concern for the returning soldier, leading to the belief that Wisconsin's program is working and may well be a model for other states to follow.³¹ Increased National Guard Bureau control of the entire process might increase efficiency because the bureau is directly accountable for strength, has a better understanding of Guard issues, and has a greater vested interest in the success of the Guard in general.

HEALTH CARE

The 2003 General Accounting Office study concluded that 20% of the National Guard force lacks quality health insurance. Within the junior enlisted ranks the rate rises to 40%.³² Current senate legislation extends TRICARE for 180 days after the soldier comes off active duty. Former Senator Tom Daschle, (D) South Dakota, stated that the demand placed upon reservists has grown markedly while the Federal government's commitment to this dedicated group of men and women has not kept pace. He added, "Leaders of the National Guard and reserve are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain top notch individuals. Guard leaders tell me that offering health coverage would be the single most powerful tool we could give them and will help with recruiting and retention."³³ Under a plan attached to the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill, Guard and Reserve members could enroll in a TRICARE Program for individual or family coverage. There would be an annual premium, something not charged to

active duty members, but the fee would be waived during mobilization. The annual premium for individuals would be \$330 for an enlisted member and \$380 for an officer. Family coverage could cost \$560 for enlisted members and \$610 for officers. This cost is between \$100 and \$150 more than what retirees pay. About 80% of National Guard families have health insurance and probably are uninterested in military coverage unless they are called to active duty and their health insurance ends.³⁴ The cost of a TRICARE package is estimated at \$170 million the first year and \$280 million thereafter.³⁵ This benefit would greatly enhance recruiting and especially retention and thus offset the TRICARE cost in the overall Army budget.

It is also difficult for families to switch health care coverage once the soldier is activated. This can be very disruptive. Although TRICARE is enormously helpful once soldiers are mobilized, not enough doctors accept TRICARE coverage. Thus many Guard families must give up their regular practitioners and travel long distances to find doctors and medical facilities that accept TRICARE.³⁶

RETIREMENT PROGRAMS

Congress is eyeing less costly benefits for National Guard soldiers. One of the most discussed changes is in the reserve retirement system that would allow retirement benefits to start before age 60. No plans of this type are currently supported by the Secretary of Defense who believes that any program that addresses retirement pay would not enhance recruiting because soldiers interested in this program are at or near the retirement age and thus this initiative would give little payback in enhancement of recruiting. A program such as this would, however, enhance retention. Mid level officers and enlisted personnel might be more interested in reenlisting if retirement benefits were more closely aligned with active duty counterparts. Under a proposal by Senator Mary Landrieu, (D) Louisiana, for every two years beyond the twenty years served retirement pay would start one year earlier but no one would receive payments before the age of 55, the current minimum retirement age for Federal civilians employees. For example someone who served 22 years could receive retirement benefits at age 59.³⁷ Some form of this legislation might assist in retaining those soldiers at or near the 20 year mark. These are the same soldiers who are the most experienced and in many cases are in leadership positions. Nationally 31% of National Guard soldiers are considering leaving earlier than planned due to deployment issues.³⁸ The cost of an early retirement program is a moving target dependent upon the age at which retirement could be drawn under the age of 60 and whether health care benefits are included in the package. The estimated 10 year cost for Guard retirement benefits to begin at age 55, dependent upon the type of program instituted,

ranges from \$7.6 billion to \$23.59 billion over a ten year period. Other sources estimate the cost at about \$2 billion a year.³⁹ The Pentagon is not certain that this would increase retention since only about 25% of reservists stay long enough to earn retirement benefits. A GAO study suggests early retirement pay would not be a significant factor particularly for high demand skills and indicates that boosting retired pay for all reservists seems unnecessary when bonuses targeted to specific skills such as military police and aviation would solve the problem.⁴⁰

It is entirely possible that some of the soldiers would be retained with a graduated retirement eligibility system. Many of the proposals are tied up in the senate finance committee which is responsible for tax issues, but Pentagon support could help free these bills.

STANDARDIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT

Standardization of equipment such as body armor, up armored vehicles, reliable radios, laptops, satellite phones and the latest survival equipment in aircraft is an important issue which challenges Guard soldiers, especially when going directly into a combat zone. The “you will get it when you get there” attitude doesn’t sell well with soldiers and families. A lack of availability of modernized equipment for training and readiness of Guard units prior to mobilization adds considerable cost and length to post mobilization training. Increasing the length of deployment by several months carries a huge cost in terms of the human factor and is a major factor in decreased retention rates.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

Family support systems are very different for Guard families. Most Guard families live in small communities rather than on a military post and thus can be isolated from other Guard families. Increased funding for family support programs could provide greater assistance to families who are in need. A national survey of redeployed soldiers indicated that 29% felt their family was well cared for by the unit’s family readiness program.⁴¹ A local study of 155 soldiers deployed to Iraq for fifteen months indicated that 58% felt their family was well cared for by the unit’s family readiness program.⁴² This program however was led by a very dynamic family assistance leader and, due to the unusual circumstances of combat losses of that unit, more resources were focused on this particular unit. This is however, a good indication that increased funding and focus of a family program can significantly increase its effectiveness.

OTHER PROGRAMS

Other programs which would enhance National Guard recruiting and retention are proposals such as an adjustment in the 6% interest cap for mortgages, car loans, credit card

balances and other consumer loans for mobilized Guard soldiers. Another proposal would allow a cap of 1% above the prime lending rate or 6%, whichever is lower and promote 401K retirement plans, widely used by the private sector. Other proposals would allow reservists activated for 24 months during a five year period eligibility for the GI Bill. This is an \$800 monthly payment which is currently only available to active duty soldiers. Programs such as Sergeant Shopper with an 800 number offering advice or assistance with auto or home repair, can reduce stress on the families of deployed soldiers and motivate families to continue to positively support the Guard.

Financial discrepancies such as decreased BAH for Guard soldiers activated under 140 days and reenlistment bonuses available to some active duty soldiers but not available to Guard soldiers while serving on active duty need to be made more equitable.⁴³ Typically Guard soldiers who deploy for a year CONUS, a sixteen month deployment when mobilization time is factored in, are served on unaccompanied tours of duty. Allowing families to accompany soldiers, at least in some situations, would certainly enhance retention. When Congress created the Montgomery GI bill in 1985, benefits for reservists were 47% of what active duty members received. Today that figure has dropped to 27%.⁴⁴

The Navy and Air Force will have force reductions over the next few years. A transition from blue to green should be a major recruiting focus for the National Guard with emphasis on efficiency and user friendliness.

The Navy Lodge, an economical lodging opportunity with numerous facilities worldwide is a good example of the discrepancies between active duty soldiers and Guard soldiers. Active duty soldiers can make reservations a year in advance while a National Guard soldier who may have served a lengthy combat tour can reserve a room only 30 days in advance. There are numerous additional small but very significant discrepancies between National Guard soldiers and active duty soldiers. Commissary, fitness center and PX availability, accumulation of leave and payment of unused leave are vastly different from active duty soldiers. Space available travel is available to National Guard soldiers but they are category six, a much lower category than given to category three active duty service members. Re enlistment bonuses and increased GI bill benefits that are available to active duty personnel are not usually available to a National Guard soldier sharing the same foxhole. National Guard Bureau has recently taken a step in the right direction by tripling some bonuses up to \$15,000 to Guard members who reenlist or active duty soldiers who enlist in the Guard.⁴⁵ Availability to a number of programs currently available only to active duty personnel would certainly enhance retention of the

National Guard soldier who may have served many years on active duty. The Guard needs that experienced soldier to reenlist.

CONCLUSION

9/11 has forced the United States to react with massive military force to combat the global war on terrorism. This is a long and sustained conflict which will not subside for the next several years. A long, sustained war, with a high casualty rate, is the first real test of our all volunteer force. The National Guard is a dedicated, well educated and inexpensive military force. Its existence is essential to the security needs of our nation both home and abroad. Maintaining this force at full strength is imperative as we face the defense needs of the 21st century. The Nation must be willing to invest in recruiting and retaining well educated, highly quality soldiers. Patriotism alone cannot fill the ranks of the National Guard. Equitable programs comparable to active duty and private business must be available to Guard soldiers if the Guard is to remain competitive. Major programs have been discussed in this paper. Certainly increased funding will be required but that cost will most likely be balanced by the decreased cost in training new soldiers when we retain the soldiers we have already trained. Health care, pay and equitable allowances, limited and predictable deployments and earlier retirement benefits are major concerns. Modernized equipment which allow Guard units to train as they fight and thus decrease the post mobilization training time and increase the time spent with family and civilian employers will also enhance recruiting and retention. The citizen soldier is really an active duty soldier on call with the same risks and responsibilities as an active duty soldier. It is imperative that we provide National Guard soldiers the same benefits or at least benefits equitable to those of active duty soldiers. They have, after all, the same responsibilities.

The cost of 40,000 additional active duty soldiers will be about \$10 billion a year.⁴⁶ The cost to retain 40,000 National Guard soldiers by implementing some of the previously discussed programs is a fraction of that price tag; probably 10% to 15% based on other Guard compared costs.

The "means" to achieve the "ends" certainly equates to funding. However the "ways" discussed above are more dependant upon sound personnel management and more efficient planning at the highest levels. Proper and timely people management, consideration of family and employer issues as well as the proper "soldier caring" message will take the Guard further in maintaining a force of about 350,000, a force large enough to accomplish its mission.

In the days of an all volunteer Army it must be remembered that quality soldiers are our most important asset. If the end state is a National Guard of about 350,000 well trained and

well equipped soldiers then policy must be developed to ensure that end state. Like their active duty counterparts, National Guard soldiers are dedicated to serving their country both home and abroad. Policy makers cannot be penny wise and pound foolish. Inexpensive programs or “ways” can save millions of dollars in training and recruiting costs. National Guard soldiers are volunteers who differ from active duty soldiers in only one way; a phone call.

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