

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**A REVIEW OF THE ALGERIAN WAR OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION USING THE U.S. ARMY'S
CURRENT COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE**

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ABSTRACT

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The extensive body of historical material on the Algerian War of National Liberation provides valuable information on a major counterinsurgency operation that achieved tactical success, but ultimately failed at the strategic level. The techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) used by the French Army are cited by many military writers as the paradigm for how to conduct an effective counterinsurgency. From this perspective, it is appropriate to examine current U.S. Army doctrine, recently published in FM 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency, in light of the Algerian experience. Such an examination has added value in light of the on-going War on Terrorism.

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REVIEW OF THE U.S. ARMY'S CURRENT COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE USING THE ALGERIAN WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

The Algerian War of National Liberation is a classic counter-insurgency operation.¹ A rebellion arising from within the Algerian population was transformed into an insurgency by the incorporation of an armed political campaign. Underlying this rebellion were socio-economic factors that typically galvanize any political campaign (e.g., distribution of wealth, participation in political intercourse). The catalyst for rebellion and resistance was a popular desire to end the French occupation of Algeria. While the indigenous population of Algeria was overwhelmingly Islamic, religious ideology was not a primary mobilizing factor behind the rebellion, unlike the current insurgencies faced in the War on Terrorism.

This paper reviews the French Army experience during the Algerian War of National Liberation ("War of National Liberation") in the context of the most recent U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency. This review will focus on the French Army's counterinsurgency techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) using a framework that is drawn from the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency doctrine established in Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22, adopted in October 2004.²

THESIS

Among the counterinsurgencies of the last 50 years, the French experience in Algeria is highly relevant to evaluation of current U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine to be followed in the War on Terrorism (WOT). Immediate similarities can be found between the counterinsurgency in Algeria and the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarities include terrain, the TTPs of the current insurgents, and their underlying motivations and ideologies. Additionally, this was a major counterinsurgency involving a Western suppression of a rebellion arising in an Islamic population.³

ROADMAP

Because many readers will have limited familiarity with the War of National Liberation, the paper provides a brief overview of the conflict. Subsequently, current U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency is introduced. Using this doctrine as a framework, the TTPs used by the French Army are reviewed and then analyzed. This analysis seeks to establish two critical points: (1) Whether the current Army doctrine is validated by the French Army's experience in Algeria; and (2) Whether the French Army's experience can be applied to the current campaigns in the WOT.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

After almost 130 years of foreign control, Algeria was among the last of the France's colonies to achieve independence. Many of the colonies in Africa peacefully achieved independence after the European colonial powers recognized that independence movements had achieved "critical mass." Such was not the case in Algeria. Independence from France was achieved only after a brutal war that spanned most the 1950's and produced a staggering number of deaths: estimated casualties range between 250,000 and 1,000,000.⁴ Algeria was initially occupied by France in 1830 in conjunction with a drive to eradicate piracy from the Mediterranean. Many diverse economic, political, and legal factors then fueled the aggressive French colonization of Algeria.⁵ Hundreds of thousands of French settlers, often referred to as either "colons" – the term used in this paper - or "*ped noir*" (the "black feet"), moved to Algeria during the colonial period, eventually accounting for ten percent of Algeria's population.⁶ The French settlers became increasingly powerful economically, but never assimilated into the indigenous population. The "settler aristocracy" in Algeria dictated French policy in the colony with a primary focus on preserving their economic and political control. The colonists' actions were obvious and fostered a strong movement for independence.

Assistance to France by Algerian colonials (especially the widespread military service by indigenous people in "colonial" units) in both World War I and II fostered an expectation that their fidelity would be rewarded with political and economic restructuring to increase inclusiveness. While limited concessions were made, they were insufficient to assuage the pent-up demands of the indigenous people of Algeria. An extremely violent French response to a terrorist incident that occurred on VE Day further fanned the flames of discord.⁷

By 1954 the simmering conflict came to a boil. The indigenous people of Algeria lost confidence in their ability to achieve self-determination through political dialog with France. Instead, military action, coupled with diplomatic outreach efforts to the international community, was embraced as a solution to their predicament. In the forefront of the Algerian independence movement was the National Liberation Front (*Front de Liberation Nationale*) (FLN) whose leaders advocated the establishment of an independent Algeria. The military wing of the FLN was the National Liberation Army (*Armée de Liberation Nationale*) (ALN). The FLN's vision for Algeria was a social democratic nation within an Islamic framework.

The initial military actions of the FLN were limited in scope and failed to secure sizeable support from the indigenous population. However, popular opinion rallied behind the FLN after the French meted out harsh reprisals in response to European casualties. As the conflict escalated, French troop strength burgeoned. Over 400,000 French soldiers were sent into

Algeria, a country with a population of approximately 26 million. With a goal of repressing the Algerian independence movement, French Army operations against the indigenous population were characterized by brutality. The TTPs of the French Army, to include the excesses of mass resettlement of the indigenous population and the use of torture, solidified the desires of the native Algerians for independence and their support for the FLN, and turned world opinion against France. Ironically, these same TTPs alienated the French *colons* from the French Army. A detailed analysis of these TTPs will serve as the primary focus of this paper.

After four years of exhausting military operations, the frustrations of fighting the Algerian insurgency resulted in the coalescence of an amalgamation of senior French Army officers, *colons*, and French right-wing organizations. These factions believed a return of General Charles De Gaulle to power would allow a comprehensive victory. Affecting a cunning transfer of political power, General De Gaulle was able to assume duties as Prime Minister. Paradoxically, upon assuming power, General De Gaulle squelched the initiatives to achieve military victory in Algeria. His decision was based on his conclusion that France's continuing efforts to subdue the Algerian insurgency were simply not worth either the economic expense or the lost domestic and international political capital. De Gaulle also needed forces that were otherwise dedicated to the counterinsurgency to meet French commitments to NATO. He set in motion a process that would lead to Algerian self-determination. From within the ranks of the French military and the *colons* there was an aggressive counter-reaction to General De Gaulle's efforts - an abortive effort to seize power through a coup d'etat.

After the coup failed, the movement toward Algerian independence was unstoppable. In 1962, the Evian Accord signaled France's acceptance of self-determination for the Algerian people and laid out a timetable for Algerian independence that year. With independence a certainty, a mass exodus of most of Algeria's technical and professional class occurred. These emigrants were predominantly *colons* or indigenous supporters of the French. This exodus left Algeria with a severe skill gap. An even more pernicious legacy of the war was a culture of violence that has permeated the Algerian society and still manifests itself today in the ongoing conflict between the current Algerian government and Islamic insurgents.⁸

A DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

As the primary goal of this paper is to develop insights from the French experience with combating the Algerian insurgency for members of the U.S. Army to apply to the WOT, it uses as a framework for analysis current Army doctrine.⁹ Within the Department of Defense doctrinal framework, counterinsurgency operations are a component of foreign internal defense (FID) and

fall under the broad umbrella category of military operations other than war (MOOTW).¹⁰ The doctrinal guidance for counterinsurgency (and FID) is contained in Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense. The doctrinal guidance contained in this publication is broad in order to cover a variety of potential cases, but is binding upon all service components of the DOD.¹¹ Operational and tactical guidance is found in Army Field Manual – Interim (FM) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations.¹² The primary focus of both Joint Publication 3-07.1 and FM 3-07.22 is the application of military power to counter insurgencies. However, both publications recognize the critical necessity for a government (either the supported Host Nation or the United States) to incorporate all aspects of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME)) when combating an insurgency. Both publications recognize the requirement to address the root cause of the insurgency.¹³

Addressing the military aspect of national power, FM 3-07.22 establishes three broad categories of military operations in support of counterinsurgency: civil-military operations (CMO), combat operations, and information operations (IO).¹⁴ Continually refocusing on the interrelationship of all aspects of national power in combating an insurgency, Army doctrine recognizes that “the overall mission of all military operations in support of counterinsurgency is to provide a safe and secure environment within which governmental institutions can address the concerns of the people.”¹⁵ Closest to the focus of the other DIME aspects of national power are CMO conducted to secure the support of the populace in a country. With the goal of destroying an insurgency’s leaders, core constituency or cadre, and combat forces, combat operations are the most readily recognized form of military operation. Doctrinally, depending on the insurgency’s stage of development, military operations are intended to deny insurgents freedom of movement, access to the population, or access to safe havens. Finally, while IO will clearly impact upon audiences other than the insurgents and the populace directly targeted by an insurgency (e.g., the forces conducting the insurgency, domestic audiences, and international audiences), the aspect of IO that is particularly relevant is its “ability to shape the information environment to reinforce CMO and combat efforts.”¹⁶

Doctrinally, CMO has two branches: military civic action and populace and resource control.¹⁷ The objectives of military civic action are to “make substantial contributions to national development . . . and [g]ain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for their government.”¹⁸ To accomplish these objectives, the military works with local civil authorities, the populace, and NGOs to “bridge the gap” between the government and the people, satisfy the aspirations of the people, and create the perception of a responsive and capable government.

In this way the root causes of the rebellion are potentially addressed and the openings for subversion hopefully diminished.¹⁹

Populace and resource control operates on the basis that an insurgency is both rooted in the grievances of the people and draws its sustainability from them. Put another way, the insurgents' primary target is the people. Consequently, counterinsurgency efforts must work to separate the insurgent from the people and the resources they can provide.²⁰ In order to break this linkage, Army CMO doctrine establishes that the military, working with civil law enforcement organizations, will conduct operations sequentially (by phases), of five broadly defined types, to control the population and resources.²¹

- Securing and defending the area internally and externally.²²
- Organizing for law enforcement.²³ This type of operation reflects the overarching concept that civil control measures are in fact very similar to police functions.²⁴
- Executing cordon and search operations, to include securing key government facilities.²⁵
- Screening and documenting the population (e.g., performing a detailed census).²⁶
- Performing public administration.²⁷

The primary objective of counterinsurgency combat operations is to neutralize the insurgents and, together with population and resource control measures, establish a secure environment. To accomplish this objective, doctrine expects that military forces, both of the host nation and a supporting country, will work closely with civil law enforcement authorities to conduct a wide range of offensive and defensive actions.²⁸ Among the specifically identified operations are pursuits, ambushes, operations to clear and hold terrain, and the defense of population centers (as opposed to terrain). One aspect of counterinsurgency operations, given minimal treatment in this doctrinal publication but explored in depth in this paper, is the use of paramilitaries and militias.²⁹

Current Army doctrine recognizes the critical role IO plays in the conduct of a counterinsurgency to win the battle of ideas and the politico-military struggle for power. IO, with its sub-category of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) has the potential to explain what is being done to address the concerns of the people, cripple the insurgents' efforts to discredit the government, and actively work to undermine the legitimacy of the insurgency.³⁰

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

The French Army's operations in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 have received continued, in-depth attention from soldiers and historians for the last 40 years. Interest in the 1960s was stoked by the very real effort of U.S. Army officers to translate the operational successes the French achieved in Algeria to the ongoing Vietnam War. In subsequent years this conflict continued to hold interest as a remarkable study of how the French Army applied the lessons they painfully learned from their defeat in Indo-China to a new counterinsurgency in Algeria and won the military battle.³¹ The materials available on this conflict are vast, but key aspects can be readily placed into the doctrinal framework of CMO, combat operations, and PSYOPS established by FM 3-07.22.

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

French CMO during the War of National Liberation were numerous and varied, but can be best grouped into a framework of military civic actions conducted by special teams, populace control measures, and ancillary CMO measures.

Military Civic Action Conducted by The *Sections Administratives Specialisees*

From the start of operations in Algeria, senior officers of the French Army, acting upon the direction of the in-country French civil leaders, initiated an active set of civic action programs as the centerpiece of CMO. To address basic deficiencies in human services faced by the indigenous population in remote rural areas, the French Army established civil affairs teams called *Sections Administratives Specialisees* (SAS). Civil affairs officers and noncommissioned officers of the SAS were drawn from the best soldiers in the army.³² To prepare these soldiers for their mission, the French Army established a comprehensive counterinsurgency-training program for all ranks, branches, and services in Algeria.³³

The mission of the SAS was to solve the problem of "under-administration" in areas populated only by Muslims with little exposure to French government and culture.³⁴ Small SAS teams provided education, agricultural improvements, infrastructure (e.g., roads), and health care to these indigenous people.³⁵ Between 1956 and 1957, the SAS trebled the number of primary schools providing education to the indigenous population.³⁶ In the later stages of the conflict, the coordination with military operations was readily apparent, with SAS teams being immediately inserted into areas recaptured from the insurgents.³⁷ Histories of the conflict repeatedly point to the effectiveness of these SAS teams as a significant contributing factor in the ALN's inability to use the small villages (*mechtas* and *douars*) as operational and supply bases for launching major operations.³⁸

Populace Control by *Quadrillage*

As either a CMO or combat operation, histories of the War of National Liberation almost uniformly reference the successes achieved in securing rural areas through application of the French Army's concept of *quadrillage*.³⁹ Under this concept, implemented in 1956, soldiers (separate from the SAS) were dispersed throughout the countryside in demarcated zones with the goal of not only securing and defending specific locations, but also of conducting rapid and decisive sweeps with patrols to kill or capture fleeing insurgents.⁴⁰ While *quadrillage* was conceptually viable as a tool to cordon, secure, and then search terrain, it achieved its greatest success when the Army's leadership deemphasized static operations, created a reserve, increased mobility, and reoriented the "garrison mentality" of troops and commanders.⁴¹ In conjunction with military operations to exploit the *quadrillage* concept, additional "pacified zones" were established around military objectives.⁴²

Even the Battle of Algiers, the major French urban campaign of the war, was rooted in the strategy of *quadrillage*. For many, the Battle of Algiers has come to represent the textbook urban counterinsurgency operation. This battle was fought almost entirely in the congested, urban center of Algiers - the *Casbah*. Beginning in February 1957, the elite 10th Paratroop Division cordoned off the *Casbah* on a block-by-block basis. Within each block, the paratroopers meticulously checked the identification of all persons, detained suspected insurgents, targeted known insurgent sanctuaries, engaged targets of opportunity, and then organized a type of neighborhood watch system to discourage reestablishment of insurgent sanctuaries.⁴³ The French success in establishing control over the *Casbah* was one of the major turning points in their counterinsurgency efforts. In the aftermath of the Battle of Algiers the FLN and ALN lost their key urban sanctuary and suffered the death or capture of key leaders. Equally important, they now faced a newly reinvigorated French security apparatus that had established effective TTPs for controlling urban population centers.⁴⁴

Populace Control by *Regroupement*

As previously noted, part of the implementation of *quadrillage* required the relocation or *regroupement* of a significant number of indigenous persons. The underlying notion of the colonial government and the military was that the best way to protect the loyal elements of the indigenous population was to relocate them. Further, a *regroupement* of disloyal and uncommitted persons would, using the phraseology of Mao, accomplish the goal of "emptying the water away from the fish" in order to deny the insurgents refuge and supplies. In many cases, this facet of *regroupement* became divorced from operational objectives and seemingly

became nothing more than an application of “the principle of collective responsibility to villages . . . in any way cooperating with the guerrillas.”⁴⁵ Under *regroupement* over a million Algerians were resettled into protected locations. Deplorably, mismanagement created conditions of extreme privation that further reduced popular support for the government in Algeria, resulted in a loss of international esteem for the French, and provided additional fuel for the insurgency (e.g., radicalized persons ready to fight if released; a sense of national solidarity).⁴⁶ While application of *quadrillage* set the stage for some of the French Army’s greatest tactical successes against the insurgency, the accompanying population relocation efforts created a disproportionately adverse international perception of the Algerian counterinsurgency and were clearly a contributing factor to withdrawal of outside support for France.⁴⁷

Ancillary CMO Measures

In many aspects, CMO during the War of National Liberation occurred in the context of a functioning civil bureaucracy.⁴⁸ For this reason, many of the doctrinally suggested CMO activities (e.g., conducting public administration, managing resources, screening and documenting the population, and performing a detailed census) were either already taking place or the French Army did not have the latitude to make major changes to these civil programs. However, in May 1958, significant challenges to the civilian government from the *colons* came to a head with rioting that included an attack on the colony’s primary administration building. Perceiving the potential for anarchy, the French military leaders established an emergency governing body, the Committee of Public Safety, to unify all elements of government power (civil and military) to include security and defense activities.⁴⁹ Under this Committee of Public Safety, military governance continued until October 1958 when Prime Minister DeGaulle directed military officers to withdraw from the committee.⁵⁰

As Algeria had a functioning civil police, albeit overwhelmed by the rebellion, French military counterinsurgency operations appear to have been complementary rather than supplementary. However, there is limited information on the nature of civil police operations or the extent they were reorganized to meet the threat of the counterinsurgency. In 1960, motivated in large part by a desire to control the influence of radical *colons*, the senior French administrators reorganized civil police forces in Algeria to consolidate their efforts and place them under the direct control of the senior French civilian authority in country.⁵¹

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Throughout the campaign French forces availed themselves of both emerging technical surveillance methods and usual human intelligence exploitation methods. Innovations in the

use of aerial surveillance to develop both tactical and strategic intelligence were noteworthy.⁵² Population surveillance, both overt and covert, was highly developed by the French Army. Successful population surveillance led to the development of collaborators and, in turn, to infiltration of the insurgent's operations. While the greatest attention is usually given to the active phase of combat operations during the Battle of Algiers, the French Army achieved even greater success in its follow-up actions that exploited intelligence and turncoats developed during the operation.⁵³

A review of the French force's intelligence operations cannot ignore the use of torture. Throughout the campaign, elements of the French Army used torture techniques to elicit intelligence on the insurgents' operations and membership. In many cases, the torture techniques were imported into the Algerian campaign by veterans of the Indo-China campaign who had themselves experienced torture. The French press broached the issue that torture was being carried out at the earliest stages of the war. Continuing torture revelations in both the domestic and international press increased the opprobrium directed toward the French Army, undermined the perceived legitimacy of the operation and increased international condemnation of the counterinsurgency.⁵⁴

COMBAT OPERATIONS

In many histories of the War of National Liberation, the aggressive French Army combat operations often are upstaged by the political interplay between Algerians and French government, the revolt of the French military leaders, a fixation on the elite units (e.g., the paras and French Foreign Legion), or even the effectiveness of the previously reviewed *quadrillage* concept.⁵⁵ However, the overall effectiveness of the French Army in combating the ALN allowed French political leaders to avoid a precipitous resolution of the conflict and forced the FLN to pursue a political route that eventually brought independence.⁵⁶

At the start of the insurrection, despite their recent counterinsurgency experience in Indochina, the French Army reverted to classic TTPs of establishing strongpoints in insurgent territory, sending out strong patrols along roadways, and conducting large-scale cordon and search operations.⁵⁷ As counterinsurgency experience increased, the French Army took a more nuanced approach to combat operations. Examples of the more nuanced TTPs include the application of the *quadrillage* concept, employment of paramilitaries, and establishment of the Morice Line. All of these TTPs had roots in the French Army's experience in Indochina.

Morice Line

Recognizing a critical requirement to cut off outside support to the insurgency, the French Army expended tremendous resources of men and materiel to create a *cordon sanitaire* along the entire Tunisian border.⁵⁸ The primary instrument for sealing the Tunisian border was a 200 mile long system of defenses in-depth named the Morice Line in honor of the Minister of Defense. This line of defense included: electrified wire, minefields, ground radar; pre-registered indirect fires, strong points, and mobile response teams (both vehicular and heliborne).⁵⁹ Supporting the Morice Line were 80,000 French troops to include elite mechanized, armored, and “para” units.⁶⁰ The mobility of these forces allowed immediate response to any attack, containment of any breaches, and effective deterrence to attempts to flank the Line.⁶¹ Though the insurgents repeatedly attacked at a great cost in lives and materiel, both for the purpose of transit and to force engagement with the French forces, the Morice Line proved extremely effective at achieving its stated goals.⁶² A similar *cordon sanitaire* was established along the Moroccan border, but it was neither as extensively developed as the Morice Line, nor did the insurgents assault it to the same extent.⁶³ Finally, the land based *cordon sanitaire* was complemented by naval and air interdiction efforts that sealed off the Mediterranean as an avenue for resupply.⁶⁴

Direct Military Operations

The French Army never neglected direct engagement of insurgent forces, even while other, somewhat indirect, approaches to counterinsurgency were ongoing. With up to 400,000 troops on the ground, not counting police and paramilitaries, the French Army had significant forces for conducting a full range of operations.⁶⁵ Small-scale ambushes conducted at the platoon and company level, as well as major ambushes conducted with several regiments, were repeatedly undertaken to destroy the insurgents as they traveled through the rural areas.⁶⁶ The history of the war is also replete with examples of French Army operations to destroy insurgent sanctuaries and to directly target insurgent forces in the field.⁶⁷ This is especially true after initiation of the Challe plan that modified the *quadrillage* concept in order to release additional forces for offensive operations.⁶⁸ With these additional forces the French Army was able to conduct multiple, major operations driving deep into the insurgent territory to destroy the insurgents' internal bases of operations.⁶⁹ Another critical factor in the success of these operations was the priority French forces placed on pursuit of insurgents after completion of raids and major operations.⁷⁰ Planned combat operations also leveraged the successful establishment of the *cordon sanitaire* along the borders. After establishing the Morice Line to

stop border transit, the French Army then conducted sequenced tactical actions to drive the ALN from west to east against it.⁷¹

The overall effectiveness of the French Army in conducting these combat operations forced the ALN to abandon its efforts to engage the French Army directly or to attack and hold population centers. From 1957, the insurgents were generally limited to small-scale raids and ambushes.⁷²

Paramilitaries

The French government provided tremendous manpower to combat the insurgency, but the French Army recognized almost immediately that it would need auxiliary formations like militias or paramilitaries. Such forces would be needed to both augment the regular forces and effectively combat the insurgents through offensive operations. By early 1956, regulations for the establishment of paramilitaries were in place.⁷³ While *colons* and French clandestine organizations, established by both the military and colonial administration, set up extensive, unofficial militias for roughly parallel purposes, the officially formed paramilitaries merit primary attention.⁷⁴

Throughout the countryside, with a specific goal of supporting the French garrisons, the French Army established paramilitary units composed of indigenous troops variously known as *harkis* (offensive units under French Army control) and “*moghazi*” or “*maghzen*” (lightly armed, and primarily defensive units under Bureau of Algerian Affairs control). The persons chosen to man the *harkis* were selected for their ability to provide intelligence on the local populace and knowledge of terrain.⁷⁵ The French entrusted these units, with an estimated strength of 160,000 combatants, with the missions of attacking the guerrillas and their supply networks, as well as occupying and defending set locations (e.g., villages).⁷⁶ The offensive capabilities of the *harkis* came to the fore as targets for conventional operations became less apparent.⁷⁷ Especially noteworthy were units of *harkis* comprised of a homogenous tribal or ethnic group and brought as a whole into the French counterinsurgency by their leaders.⁷⁸ The tribal and ethnic aspects of the *harkis* did not occur by happenstance; the primary proponent for the formation of these units was a French ethnographer.⁷⁹ While the value and reliability of *harkis* units varied, they were generally regarded as a true success. Factors that contributed to the success of the *harkis* include: appropriate missions (e.g., defense of villages); issuing weapons that were both appropriate to the assigned mission and familiar to the paramilitaries (e.g., shotguns); basing the combatants near their homes; knowledge of the operating area; good pay, treatment, and living conditions; integration with the SAS that were conducting military civic action missions;

and strictly limiting rules of engagement (ROE) that provided legitimacy and indigenous popular support.⁸⁰ There are no indications that the French Army gave consideration to the post-war treatment of the *harkis*, and their fate was often ignominious.⁸¹

The French Army also established Territorial Units (*Unites Territoriales* (UT)), Mobile Security Groups (*Garde Mobile*), rural defense companies (*Compagnies Auto-Defense Rurale*) and Protection Battalions (*Battalions de Protection*) made up of part-time militiamen recruited from the ranks of the *colons*.⁸² The largest of these paramilitaries, the UT, composed of up to 130,000 members, performed static security duties, and was commanded by French Army officers.⁸³ After the abortive coup d'etat of 1960, the UT was demobilized based on its support for the coup.⁸⁴

INFORMATION OPERATIONS - PSYOPS

Throughout the war the French Army recognized the value of PSYOPS. It created an exceptionally effective division to conduct these operations.⁸⁵ Specific training in psychological warfare was included at the counterinsurgency training center.⁸⁶ The overarching concept of their PSYOPS was that the "Muslim masses [were] neutral or uninvolved" to the "contagion" [involvement with the insurgents] and needed to be "inoculated" against the insurgents.⁸⁷ Signature PSYOPS campaigns included support for elections, plebiscites, and events that discredited the legitimacy of the insurgents. The French were quick to publicize internecine rivalries between different factions of the insurgency, such as an early incident where FLN forces used a mosque as an abattoir to slaughter 300 people loyal to another group.⁸⁸

ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

In reviewing the many areas of the French military's operational successes in Algeria, one cannot lose sight of the fact that France ultimately lost the war. Extensive reviews of War of National Liberation have clearly identified the dichotomy between France's operational success and its strategic failure. Its defeats in the "international and diplomatic 'theater of operations'" and among its own domestic population were ultimately decisive. Contributing factors in this defeat include a loss of legitimacy resulting from the French Army's use of torture and *regroupement*, the FLN's skilled diplomatic efforts and effective information operations, and other trends in international politics that reduced Western support for France (e.g., a focus on Cold War imperatives and decolonialism).⁸⁹ The previously identified excesses and the military's unwarranted involvement in domestic politics undermined domestic support for the

military. Many observers have suggested this was a natural consequence of the highly politicized type of warfare waged in Algeria.⁹⁰

So, what is the relevance of TTPs used in a losing effort? Stripping away the excesses of mass resettlement, the impermissible torture of detainees, and the attempted usurpation of the civil power, the French military did achieve significant tactical successes in Algeria. Simply put, their successes at the tactical level provide an additional point of reference against which our current doctrine can be compared, and, if carefully applied, some of their TTPs can be used in the WOT.

It is evident that the French Army's CMO operations contained all elements classically identified as requirements for a successful campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of a people challenged by competing interests in a counterinsurgency. With the exception of *regroupement* operations, the elements of their CMO operation either directly mirror the CMO TTPs established in current Army doctrine, or could be adopted within the framework of the current doctrine. Army doctrine characterizes the relocation of populations as "the most severe of restrictive measures" and, seemingly limits the use of relocation to populations too widely dispersed for effective defense or when required to evacuate or populate selected areas.⁹¹ Beyond the PSYOPS, defense, and logistical considerations addressed in FM 3-07.22, the French experience with *regroupement* in Algeria should provide additional caution to avoid the overwhelmingly negative public perception that can result from relocation.

The SAS stands out as a particularly effective civil affairs organization. Fundamentally, the SAS provided a militarily efficient mechanism for providing human services the central colonial government failed to deliver. Its success dramatically undercut the insurgents' criticism of the colonial governments' ability to provide basic services to the indigenous population and in large measure halted the erosion of support to the colonial government. However, to view the SAS initiative as simply "another civil affairs program" ignores the tremendous integration of civil affairs into the full range of French military operations – a level of integration that our Army aspires to but ultimately fails to achieve. Beyond the delivery of services, the SAS performed a unifying role between military operations, security restoration, and development of intelligence on the both the insurgents and the indigenous population. In this regard it seems to occupy a more central role than that accorded to civil affairs in the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency doctrine.

Quadrillage, especially as modified by the Challe Plan's movement away from the earlier static approach, seems to offer the single best concept for the control of both terrain and a population during an insurgency. In its thorough coverage of the country, persistence,

integration with CMO programs such as the SAS, and linkage with combat operations that directly attacked the insurgents, it provides a template that could be readily adapted to other counterinsurgency campaigns.

The *cordon sanitaire* as implemented by the Morice Line also bears consideration as a specific counterinsurgency TTP capable of achieving the interdependent goals of establishing internal and external security and defense. While most readily employed in a desert environment, the determined efforts to cut-off insurgent lines of communication not only significantly weakened the insurgents in the country, but also forced the insurgents to undertake repeated direct combat operations that were doomed to failure.

The most apparent limitations to implementation of either the *quadrillage* or *cordon sanitaire* concepts are the manpower, infrastructure, and logistical costs required to accomplish either mission. Added to these limitations are the difficulties inherent in securing any type of terrain that offers concealment (i.e., anything other than desert). While none of these limitations can be disregarded, they can be minimized through emerging technologies that were unavailable during the Algerian conflict and Vietnam. Further, to the extent these “costs of doing business” cannot be minimized, if they are accepted as inherent to a successful counterinsurgency, they may become drivers for a realistic appraisal of the costs and benefits of involvement in combating an insurgency.

The extent of the paramilitaries’ integration into the French counterinsurgency and the duration of their association is remarkable. Both the paramilitaries drawn from the indigenous population and from the ranks of the *colons* provided effective augmentation to the French Army. However, the more significant of the two paramilitaries was the *harkis*. The significance of the *harkis* is based not only on the number of combatants they provided. It is also based on the extent that the *harkis* gave the French Army irreplaceable knowledge of the operational environment (e.g., the potential for cultural awareness, intelligence, and knowledge of the local terrain), and undercut perceptions that there was uniform popular support for the insurgents.

The ultimate abandonment by the French of the vast majority of the *harkis* and their subsequent fate provides an object lesson on the utilization of locally raised paramilitaries by an outside country. If an outside country endeavors to support a counterinsurgency, it must consider from the start the nature and extent of support (e.g., asylum) to be provided to members of locally raised militias, support personnel (e.g., translators), and their families if the counterinsurgency is unsuccessful.

No significant divergences between French Army combat operations and current areas of doctrinal emphasis were identified. As would be expected of a professional army with recent

combat experience, the French Army aggressively conducted pursuits, ambushes, and operations to clear and hold terrain, as well as the defense of population centers. A cursory examination of the French Army's establishment of the Morice Line and *quadrillage*, especially as it was initially implemented, might lead to a conclusion that the French had a misplaced focus on the defense of terrain – a focus that would be contrary to U.S. Army doctrine.⁹² However, this conclusion would be incorrect. It would overlook the French emphasis on mobile forces that directly attacked the insurgents during operations connected with both the *quadrillage* and the Morice Line.

French Army PSYOPS in the Algerian War of Liberation represent the earliest concentrated effort to use IO in a counterinsurgency. Because of the inclusion of coercive messages and elements of brainwashing, the French Army receives little credit for its development of doctrinal elements of PSYOPS. While there can be no justification for threats against a civilian population or brainwashing, credit should be given to the recognition of PSYOPS's critical role in counterinsurgency and its integration into CMO and combat operations.

Finally, an emphatic warning against any use of torture on insurgents or on resettled people can be drawn from the domestic and international backlash that resulted when the French military resorted to the use of this technique. Current Army doctrine appropriately incorporates the long-standing prohibition on torture of detained persons.⁹³ Beyond a strong underpinning in basic morality and established international law of armed conflict, the wisdom of this prohibition can be seen in the domestic and international backlash that resulted from the revelations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. This backlash was accelerated by public release of the current administration's policy determinations (or at a minimum, their colloquy) on acceptable interrogation techniques.

CONCLUSION

The Army's current counterinsurgency doctrine established in FM 3-07.22 hews closely to the tactical concepts proved successful during the French Army's counterinsurgency operations in Algeria. If studied carefully and vigorously implemented, the Army's TTPs can be successful when applied in the context of the WOT. With a valid counterinsurgency doctrine, the critical elements for the Army in achieving success in WOT counterinsurgencies will be the wide-spread dissemination of this doctrine, rank appropriate training throughout the Army in the skills of counterinsurgency, adequate resources, and the patience to implement TTPs that may not yield immediately apparent success.

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ENDNOTES

¹ An *insurgency* is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1.02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), 207.

² Field Manual—Interim Number 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, 1 October 2004, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. (here after, “FM 3-07.22”).

³ A further avenue for comparison, the ongoing Algerian Civil War, would dramatically expand the scope this research project. This avenue for comparison is obvious and has attracted the attention of others who are studying the Algerian experience. Hugh Roberts' *The Battlefield – Algeria 1988 -2002* (London: Verso, 2003), is a series of his essays and articles written from 1987 to 2002. At multiple junctures, his essays raise the issue of whether the two rebellions have parity or an equality of events. Suggestions for measurement (metrics) include: the extent of the rebellion, terrain held by insurgents, the extent of popular support, duration of actual combatant operations, and the death toll in battles and operations. By any objective measure, the Algerian War of National Liberation clearly eclipses the Algerian Civil War in magnitude. Nonetheless, the Algerian Civil War has had devastating consequences for the Algerian people and has proven to be a challenge to the legitimacy of the current Algerian government that is every bit as great as the challenge made to the French colonial government.

⁴ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 538, provides information on the French and Algerian deaths during the war and the controversy that attaches to the Algerian government's high-end casualty figure of one million deaths.

⁵ Algeria provided France with a large captive market for its expanding industrial production. Additionally, land ownership in the colony was attractive because French law held that its colonies were extensions of France. Because of this, French law was applicable and representation rights in the National Assembly attached. Additionally, recognizing a close and convenient outlet for a burgeoning population, the French government encouraged its citizens to own land and resources in Algeria.

⁶ Multiple explanations for the term “*pied noir*” are given in the literature. Some assert the label was given by the indigenous people who were amused by the traditional black shoes worn by the original colonists. Others assert that the designation was derisively applied by Frenchmen who looked down on the colonists whose feet became tanned while living in Algeria and wearing sandals that exposed their feet to the intense southern sun. See, Horne, footnote on 30.

⁷ The incident that occurred at Setif, Algeria, is often cited as the actual start of the Algerian rebellion, though active insurgency began almost 9 years later. On 8 May 1945, a date that was coincidentally also Victory in Europe Day (“VE Day”), violence against “*colons*” erupted in the predominantly Islamic populated town of Setif. Over 100 “*colons*” were killed and another 100 were injured or wounded. The way many of the “*colons*” were killed or raped and the subsequent mutilation of their corpses provoked an exceptionally brutal response directed at the indigenous population. See, Horne, 26. Also see, Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1967), 33.

⁸ This summary is drawn from the following sources: Horne, Chapters 1 – 3; O'Ballance, Chapters 1 and 2; and "Algerian War of Independence - The Background," available from <http://www.clickafrique.com/0101rpt/history_Algeria_independence3.asp>; Internet, accessed 6 January 2005.

⁹ Marine Corps guidance on counterinsurgency is also relevant, but the addition of a second framework for analysis with the potential necessity to resolve inter-service conflicts in application of doctrine was beyond the scope of this research paper.

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Publication 3.07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), Chapter III, paragraph 2.i.

¹¹ The concept that Joint Publications provide definitive guidance for the U.S. Armed Forces is captured in the application paragraph contained in the preface of each Joint Publication.

The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . has provided more current and specific guidance.

See, Joint Publication 3.07, Preface, paragraph 3.b.; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, Joint Publication 3.07.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 April 2004), Preface, paragraph 3.b. This footnote illustrates the concept of "nesting." Under the concept of "nesting," a Joint Publication covering a specific form of military operation is derived from a Joint Publication covering a broader topic area. In effect, each Joint Publication is "nested" within an overall doctrinal framework.

¹² See, FM 3-07.22.

¹³ These concepts are expressly stated in Joint Publication 3.07.1, Chapter III, paragraphs 1.a. and 5.c.(1)(a):

The national FID effort should involve the integration of all instruments of national power including consideration of the conduct of military operations in support of the FID program.

and,

Threats to HN IDAD. Threats may be specific, such as illicit drugs or terrorism, or they may be more general as in social unrest and instability. Identification of the root cause is key so that military activities in the FID plans may target long-term causes rather than short-term symptoms.

FM 3-07.22, paragraphs 1-34 and 1-38, succinctly addresses the concept:

A successful counterinsurgency results in the neutralization by the state of the insurgency and its effort to form a counter state. While many abortive insurgencies are defeated by military and police actions alone, if an insurgency has tapped into serious grievances and has mobilized a significant portion of the population, simply returning to the status quo may not be an option. Reform may be necessary, but reform is a matter for the state, using all of its human and material resources. Security forces are only one such resource. The response must be multifaceted and coordinated, yet states typically charge their security forces with "waging counterinsurgency." This the security forces cannot do alone.

and,

Counterinsurgency operations must balance elimination of grievances (that is, reform, to include elimination of human rights abuses) and security force action that eliminates the insurgents.

¹⁴ FM 3-07.22, Paragraph 3-1.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., Paragraph 3-7.

¹⁸ Ibid., Paragraph 3-8.

¹⁹ Ibid., Paragraph 3-7.

²⁰ Ibid., Paragraph 3-10.

²¹ Ibid., Paragraph 3-15.

²² Ibid., Paragraphs 3-16 through 3-19. Operations to secure and defend an area, both internally and externally, include measures ranging from defending specific urban population centers to the more consequential measure of relocating populations.

²³ Ibid. Paragraphs 3-21 through 3-24.

²⁴ Ibid. Paragraph 3-11.

²⁵ Ibid., Paragraphs 3-25 through 3-26.

²⁶ Ibid., Paragraph 3-27.

²⁷ Ibid., Paragraphs 3-28 through 3-31. Performing public administration functions includes the mission of resource control. Examples of resource control embrace combining internal security and defense activities under a public safety office, and employing population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage.

²⁸ Ibid, Paragraphs 3-33 through 3-60.

²⁹ Ibid., Paragraphs 3-36 and 3-58, and Figure 3-1. The lengthiest discussions of the use of paramilitaries and militias are found in the following locations: Figure 3-1, a “Leader’s Checklist for Counterinsurgency Operations,” where the following task is included on a “laundry list” of concepts: “Training paramilitary forces for security operations and ensuring continuous support for these forces.” Another reference to militias is found in paragraph 3-58 where, as an aspect of “hold” operations, the following tactic is identified: “Training of local paramilitary forces, including arming and involving them in one or more successful operations against insurgents.”

³⁰ See generally, FM 3-07.22, Chapter 3, Section IV. An even lengthier exploration of the use of PSYOPS in counterinsurgency is contained in FM 3-07.22, Chapter 5, Section I.

³¹ Charles Shrader, *The First Helicopter War* (Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1978), 3 (footnote 1), provides a listing of authors who have addressed the motivations for studying the French Army’s TTPs in Algeria.

³² Horne, 268. *But see*, Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Krieger, *France and the Algeria War, 1954 – 1962: Strategy Operations, and Diplomacy* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002) Chapter 3, describing a second rate transportation unit that is assigned an SAS type mission under the leadership of a dynamic officer and succeeds.

³³ Alexander, Chapter 2, contains a complete article on the French Army’s counterinsurgency training - “The French Army Center for Training and Preparation in Counter Guerrilla Warfare” by Lt. Colonel Frederic Guelton, French Army.

³⁴ Alf Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 191.

³⁵ Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (New York: Longman Group - UK, 1994), 119. Horne references 600 of these teams or administrators in Algeria by the 1957/1958 timeframe, at 254. See also, Edgar O’Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1967), 53, 65, 66, and 95. O’Ballance, at 133 and 135, specifically notes that the roads built as part of the military civic action operations also had the benefit of supporting later military operations.

³⁶ Horne, 220.

³⁷ O’Ballance, 134; and Horne, 338.

³⁸ Horne, p. 254.

³⁹ Shrader, 49, footnote 7:

The *quadrillage* process had been tried in Indochina with mixed results and was imposed in Algeria soon after the start of the rebellion. The program was essentially static and defensive, and it required extensive manpower. On the whole, the results obtained in Algeria were much better than in Indochina, in part because the French had by then greater experience with such programs and the terrain in Algeria was more favorable.

⁴⁰ Alexander, 9. See also, O'Ballance, 64 and 131; and Shrader 45, who provides some insights into the logistical support challenges of support of the *quadrillage*.

⁴¹ As initially implemented, the *quadrillage* concept resulted in the garrisoning of large numbers of troops. This tactic resulted in large "no-go zones" throughout the countryside where insurgents were able to operate with impunity. This freedom of operations and movement allowed the insurgents to exercise control over the indigenous population and support operations with replacement supplies and manpower, undermine support for the government, and position forces for offensive operations. Subsequent French commanders, General Challe in particular, recognized the deficiencies in the *quadrillage* concept. General Challe directed aggressive actions to include: breaking down garrisons into small units (mirroring the size of rebel formations), constant patrolling into all areas of the country to destroy insurgent sanctuaries, mobile search and destroy missions (using heliborne and motorized ground transport), improved communications, airborne surveillance and support, synchronizing operations between sectors, and pragmatic small unit training in counterinsurgency. See, Alexander, 15-17; Horne, 331 – 333; and O'Ballance, 90.

⁴² O'Ballance, 126 and 137. These pacified zones, a days' march in size, were intended to create barren areas where insurgents escaping from raids could be hunted down and killed. The removal of the indigenous population accomplished the goal of removing a potential support network and permitted aggressive targeting.

⁴³ Horne, 192; and O'Ballance, 80.

⁴⁴ O'Ballance, 81.

⁴⁵ Helen Metz, ed., *Algeria – A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 51; Horne, 117.

⁴⁶ Horne, 220 – 221, 338, and 341 (attempts to improve conditions in *regroupement* centers). O'Ballance, 126, 135, and 137, provides extensive details on the *regroupement* centers; with the *regroupement* of persons located near the Morice Line detailed at 118. In a footnote at 163, O'Ballance provides even higher numbers than Horne for the resettled persons: 1.5 million Algerian Moslems in *regroupement* centers, 11,000 Algerians in internment camps, and 500,000 Algerian Moslems displaced to shanty towns near the urban centers. Also see, Alexander, 21, asserting that "many French officers viewed the population resettlements as tactically counter-productive . . . ;" and 178 addressing the larger impact of the human tragedy occurring in the internment camps.

⁴⁷ Horne, 339 and 343 (impact of world opinion). O'Ballance, 130, in a "déjà vu all over again" footnote discusses leaks by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of information relating to torture in the Algerian resettlement camps that is reminiscent of the recent ICRC release of information relating to U.S. treatment of detainees during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

⁴⁸ Shrader, 27, states: "perhaps the most obvious advantage possessed by the French forces in Algeria at the start of the war . . . was that there was already in place in Algeria an established political and military administration"

⁴⁹ Horne, 286 – 287; and Metz, 52.

⁵⁰ Horne, 309.

⁵¹ O'Ballance, 152.

⁵² Alexander, Chapter 4 (Marie-Catherine and Paul Villatoux, *Aerial Intelligence During the Algerian War*).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 6 – 7.

⁵⁴ A review of the use of torture by the French Army and the impact on the War of National Liberation are found at Horne, 117, 172, 195 – 197, 198 – 207, and 232 - 234; Rita Maran, *Torture – The Role of Ideology in the French – Algerian War* (London: Praeger, 1989) is devoted solely to the French use of torture and the repercussions from its use; Alexander, 2, 5, 11, and 19; David C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 63; David L. Schalk, *War and the Ivory Tower – Algeria and Vietnam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), 17, 79, 81, 68 – 69, 100 – 103, and 191 (footnote 58) contains an extensive examination of the response of the French intellectuals and the Catholic Church in France to the reports of torture by the French Army.

⁵⁵ Alexander, 21, in the opening chapter of a collection of essays, states his and his co-editor's goal of examining France's military performance, and specifically identifies two detractors to the study of military operations in the Algerian War of Liberation. They specifically note that this topic "needs rescuing from the fixation of writers on two fascinating but distorting agendas" that are then identified as "the political interventionism of a small number of Army officers" and the divergence between the elite units and the regular units composed of reservists and conscripts.

⁵⁶ Horne, 331, reports that General de Gaulle enjoined General Challe, on his appointment as Commander in Chief of French Forces in Algeria to achieve "undisputed mastery of the field" and not to permit, in political terms, an "untoward incident in which we [came] off worst."

⁵⁷ O'Ballance, 51.

⁵⁸ An excellent overview of the Morice Line is provided by Shrader at 206 – 209, and Figure 7.1 (a schematic of the Morice Line). Unlike many writers, Shrader never loses sight of the significant logistical requirements that were entailed in supporting the operation.

⁵⁹ According to Horne, 230 and 263 – 264, the barbed wire fence was 8 feet high and was charged with 5000 volts of electricity. The fence was augmented with barbed wire aprons and trip lines. A 50 yard wide anti-personnel minefield paralleled the fence.

⁶⁰ Horne, 264.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 265.

⁶² Horne, 230, 264 – 265, 314, 321, 326, on the disastrous All Saints Day attack on the Morice Line. O'Ballance, 92, 117, 129, and 133, includes the detail that ALN fighters sought internment by the Tunisian government to avoid orders to assault the Morice Line. Shrader, 209 – 221, includes a detailed analysis of several major engagements fought along the frontier.

⁶³ O'Ballance, 45 (construction), and 164 (futility of assaults). See also, Schrader, 224, footnote 32.

⁶⁴ To complement the land cordon operations the French Navy conducted a very effective naval blockade that repeatedly interdicted ALN resupply operations. The efficiency of the naval blockade was a significant reason for the insurgents' repeated efforts to breach the Morice Line. See, O'Ballance, 98; and Shrader, 41 – 42 (providing a naval and air order of battle), and 201 – 203 (detailing the conduct of maritime intercept operations and control of Algerian air space). Finally, in Alexander's book, Chapter 5, "The French Navy and the Algerian War," written by Rear Admiral Bernard Estival, a retired French Navy officer, provides significant additional information on naval operations and efforts to secure shore-based facilities.

⁶⁵ Shrader, 38 – 42.

⁶⁶ Horne, 324; and O'Ballance, 118.

⁶⁷ O'Ballance, 65, 78, 90, 119, 122, 130, and 132.

⁶⁸ See Footnote 41.

⁶⁹ O'Ballance, 131 – 143 (reviewing the Challe Plan), and 162 – 163 (reviewing the named operations); and Horne, 335. Among the major operations were Operations Binocular, Turquoise, and Emerald.

⁷⁰ Horne, 330.

⁷¹ Clayton, 159-160.

⁷² O'Ballance, 135 – 136, and 165.

⁷³ Shrader, 42.

⁷⁴ This paper does not cover the militias formed by the *colons* or the almost incomprehensible number of covert militias formed by French intelligence and security organizations. There was insufficient information establishing that they were equipped, trained, and within the operational control of the French Army. These aspects of control of paramilitary operations would be the key areas of a review for a comparison with Army counterinsurgency doctrine. Lacking the information to conclusively establish integration into the French Army's counterinsurgency, I chose not to address these militias. This decision does not in any way downplay the impact of these militias or challenge the accepted position that official efforts to control these militias were ineffectual. Additionally, it is clear that some of these militias conducted brutal repressions of the indigenous population, to include mass lynchings of women, children, and elderly Algerians.

Information on *colon* militias can be found at: O'Ballance, 78 (describing the terrorist arms of the right-wing Committee of the Re-birth of France and the Resistance Organization of French Algeria), and 174 ("*Organization Armée Sécurité* (OAS) that was the military arm of the *colon* extremists known as the "Ultras"). The OAS provided extensive support to the military *coup de etat* occurring in the final days of the French occupation of Algeria. An umbrella

organization for *colon* defense was the *Comité d' Entente*. See O'Ballance, 145. Also see Horne, 351, for information on the initial organization of the Ultras' militias.

Information on the militias formed by French intelligence and security organizations can be found at: Horne, 256 ("*Oiseau Bleu*" or the "Force K" (that subsequently turned against the French)); and Horne, 257, and O'Ballance, 124 (the "private army" of Belhadj Djillal); Horne, 222 and 258 (the "private army" of "Bellounis" (a former insurgent who became a counter-revolutionary and was "managed" by a secret organization referred to as the 11th Shock Battalion)); and Horne, 258 – 260 (the covert organization of CPT Christian Leger that penetrated the insurgency and effectively manipulated and then destroyed FLN operations in Algiers).

⁷⁵ Clayton, 121; and O'Ballance, 65, 164, and 195.

⁷⁶ Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War: 1990 – 1998* ,(New York: Columbia University Press (in association with the *Centre d' Etudes et de Recherches Internationales*, Paris), 2000), 153 (footnote 18) citing M. Hamoumou, *Et ils Sont Devenues Harkis*, (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 46.

⁷⁷ Horne, 254.

⁷⁸ Horne, 223. Horne's description of an Arab *harkis* led by Si Cherif, a former French soldier is especially noteworthy. Si Cherif brought his 330 fighters over to the French side based on his demeaning treatment by the FLN and the sexual misconduct of an FLN "political commissar." The effectiveness of this *harkis* was cited as a counterweight to the ineffectiveness and misconduct of other "private armies." Also see, O'Ballance, 96.

⁷⁹ Horne, 254 – 255. The ethnographer who was a critical consultant on development of the *harkis*, Jean Servier, was no mild-mannered academician. Against great odds, he successfully led the defense of a remote French village on the first day of the war in 1954. Servier accomplished his defense in large measure by identifying ethnic fault lines in the indigenous population, rallying one of the ethnic groups to his side, and then arming these tribesmen.

⁸⁰ Horne, 254 – 255. The ROE are especially noteworthy: (1) "[R]egard every Muslim as a friend, and not as suspect, except when proved to the contrary" and (2) "[N]ever fir[e] first." The first prong of the ROE was intended to overcome counterproductive norms in the French Army forces. The second prong of the ROE clearly placed the *harkis* at risk while increasing the perceived legitimacy of any armed response to provocation.

⁸¹ Martin Stone, *The Agony of Algeria* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 224 – 227; and Horne, 537 - 538.

⁸² Shrader, 42 – 43, and Table 2.4.

⁸³ Horne, 275; and O'Ballance, 146 and 152 (stating that in 1960, 30,000 of the UT were assigned to duties in Algiers).

⁸⁴ O'Ballance, 151 – 152; and Horne, 371 (footnote) (stating that for control purposes, some units of the UT were established as an auxiliary of the French Foreign Legion after the coup attempt).

⁸⁵ The operations of the Bureau Duxime or 5th Bureau are referenced, but not detailed. In some instances this staff section is held to be responsible for PSYOPS, but in other it is held to have had responsibility for “political warfare” to include “brainwashing” of persons in resettlement camps. Horne, 347. Another possible information operations component, operational security (OPSEC) is also referenced. O’Ballance, 95, seems to refer to an OPSEC section, the Detachements Operationnel de Protection, that Horne, at 199, clearly describes as an interrogation unit noted for torturing victims.

⁸⁶ Alexander, 41 – 48. Passages in these pages detail the lack of appreciation for PSYOPS by senior French officers and civilian officials.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁸⁸ O’Ballance, at 127 and 156, details PSYOPS support for elections (“get out the vote” efforts that are extremely evocative of U.S. Army efforts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq). Horne, at 221 – 222, details early French efforts to quickly publicize internecine rivalries between different factions of the insurgency.

⁸⁹ Alexander, 18 – 20.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 111, and 114.

⁹¹ FM 3-07.22, para. 3-19. The following paragraph, 3-20, provides a short review of considerations associated with relocation.

⁹² Ibid., first bullet on Figure 3-1. Leader’s Checklist for Counterinsurgency Operations.

⁹³ The toxic effects of torture on the ability of the force to achieve tactical success are clearly recognized in FM 3-07.22. See, Bullet 8, paragraph C-5 and the “Safeguard” action within Table I-1, “STRESS” Method of Detainee Field Processing (“STRESS” is an acronym for Search, Iag, Report, Evacuate, Segregate, Safeguard).

GLOSSARY

<i>Abu Ghraib</i>	A large prison in Iraq used to detain suspected insurgents
ALN	<i>Armée de Liberation Nationale</i> (National Liberation Army)
<i>Battalions de Protection</i>	Protection Battalions
<i>Casbah</i>	<i>City center; a dense area of markets, mosques, and living areas</i>
<i>Compagnies Auto-Defense Rurale</i>	Rural defense companies
CMO	Civil Military Operations
Colon	Algerian colonists
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (aspects of national power)
<i>Douar</i>	Small village
FLN	<i>Front de Liberation Nationale</i> (National Liberation Front)
FM	Field Manual
<i>Garde Mobile</i>	Mobile Security Groups
<i>Harkis</i>	Paramilitaries composed of indigenous persons
IO	Information Operations
<i>Mechta</i>	Small village
<i>Moghazi</i>	Defensively oriented paramilitaries
<i>Paras</i>	French Paratroopers
<i>Pied Noir</i>	<i>"Black Feet"</i>
<i>Quadrillage</i>	A control tactic of dividing territory into sections
<i>Regroupement</i>	<i>Resettlement by "regrouping" the population</i>
SAS	<i>Sections Administratives Specialisees</i>
TTPs	Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures
UT	<i>Unites Territoriales</i> (Territorial Units)
WOT	War on Terrorism

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