

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**RESTRUCTURING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FOR POST CONFLICT AND
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS**

by

Colonel Patrick M. Hamilton
Texas Army National Guard

Colonel Daniel Jensen
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 15 MAR 2006	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Restructuring the Army National Guard for Post Conflict and Domestic Operations		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Hamilton		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified		22	

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Patrick M. Hamilton
TITLE: Restructuring the Army National Guard for Post Conflict and Domestic Operations
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 15 March 2006 WORD COUNT:6187 PAGES:21
KEY TERMS: Stability and Support Operations
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Unfolding world events including war and extensive natural disasters in the past three years demonstrate that the military element of national power is more responsive and capable than any other even though it is organized specifically for war. However, we ask our combat units to transition almost immediately to post conflict reconstruction and nation building or deploy directly into a security and disaster relief environment. This is a difficult task at best. A potential solution is to organize a portion of our National Guard forces to conduct post major combat operations focused on Reconstruction and Nation Building, which share numerous tasks with domestic and global disaster response. This force would train specifically on Security and Stability Operations, Physical Infrastructure Operations, and Political Infrastructure Operations, and work in an environment that includes interagency, NGO and Coalition support. This paper will explore new National Guard structure and how it will better fit into overall missions that we ask the military element of national power to support.

RESTRUCTURING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FOR POST CONFLICT AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Unfolding world events including war and extensive natural disasters in the past three years demonstrate that the military element of national power is more responsive and capable than any other even though it is organized specifically for war. However, we ask our combat units to transition almost immediately to post conflict reconstruction and nation building or deploy directly into a security and disaster relief environment. This is a difficult task at best. A potential solution is to organize a portion of our National Guard forces to conduct post major combat operations focused on Reconstruction and Nation Building, which share numerous tasks with domestic and global disaster response. This force would train specifically on Security and Stability Operations, Physical Infrastructure Operations, and Political Infrastructure Operations, and work in an environment that includes interagency, NGO and Coalition support. This paper will explore new National Guard structure and how it will better fit into overall missions that we ask the military element of national power to support. To understand the current National Guard organizational philosophy we must first understand its organizational history.

National Guard Organizational History

The National Guard is the oldest of all the uniformed services. Established in 1636 by the Massachusetts General Court, 15 separate towns contributed 1500 militiamen divided into three regiments, North, South, and East. The Massachusetts Army National Guard's 181st and 182nd Infantry, 101st Field Artillery, and 101st Engineers trace their lineage to these regiments.¹ Originally formed to help fight Indians in the newly expanding colonies, these first militiamen saw combat in the same year they were formed. With a successful campaign completed against the Pequot Tribe the soldiers returned home to their farms. However, the Massachusetts General Court saw the need to keep a portion of their militia in a "near constant state of heightened readiness."² This led to the Minuteman concept where the Massachusetts legislators passed a law requiring that one third of the militia "shall be ready at half an hour's warning" to respond to alarms.³ Soon all but one of the other colonies raised formal militias and passed similar legislation. Because they were geographically oriented to their colony or county their mission remained as a local defense force and was therefore limited to short-term emergency operations⁴. Many colonies believed that they could not and should not send their militias beyond their colonial borders except under extreme circumstances. However, during the American Revolution, the militias rallied to support the cause of freedom across the colonies. They fought well, but the level of quality was inconsistent between units. In 1792, congress

passed the first Militia Act that allowed the states to raise and maintain a military force for the purpose of defending their state and providing augmentation to federal forces in times of crisis if agreed upon by the state government. This legislation placed the responsibility of equipping and training these forces squarely on the states creating a substantial disparity in readiness and organization between them.⁵ This problem would plague the militia system for the next one hundred years.

During the American Civil War the state militias fought bravely on both sides and many distinguished units emerged. They are remembered today by monuments at numerous civil war battlefields across the country. An important impact on the organization and capabilities of the National Guard that came from the civil war era did not directly address the National Guard but was a restriction upon the federal forces. Abuses by federal troops during post Civil War reconstruction and specifically during the election of 1876 when they were sent to run polls in some critical southern states prompted congress to pass the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. It restricted federal military forces from aiding civil law enforcement authorities without direct orders from the President. However, it did not apply to the National Guard unless the President federalized them. This ensured that the National Guard would remain the state governor's key asset for civil order in times of crisis. This ability to establish civil order remains a critical capability of the Guard today.

With American expansionism, global industrialization, and political tensions in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, the need for additional capability in the U.S. Military increased significantly. The State Militias were the obvious choice to fulfill this need. However, disparity in unit readiness, capabilities, and equipment prompted a series of legislation resulting in the modern National Guard system we have today. The Militia Acts of 1903 and 1908 made the National Guard a formal part of the U.S. Army reserve forces and therefore the readiness, training, and equipping of the National Guard for their federal mission became the responsibility of the Federal Government.⁶ These acts created the Division of Military Affairs (DMA) the predecessor of today's National Guard Bureau (NGB) with responsibility of overseeing the readiness of all of the state militias for federal service when required.⁷ The National Defense Act of 1916 completed the legislative transformation of the state militias to the National Guard. It gave the Federal Government the ability to mobilize the National Guard as part of the total force and deploy them overseas in times of international crisis or war. It also required the National Guard to organize into units that were like the active component. It standardized the training requirements for officer's commissions bringing it up to the standards of active duty officers.⁸ Fifteen days after the signing of the National Defense Act of 1916 over 150,000 guardsmen, and

for the first time National Guard units, were federalized and sent to Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona in response to the Mexican Border Crisis. As it turned out this became a great test for the massive mobilization to come when only eighteen days after units returned home from the Mexican border, the United States entered World War I declaring war on Germany.⁹

World War I saw the emergence of the National Guard as a truly integral part of our military's capability to fight and win our nations wars. The National Guard provided 17 of the 43 divisions that fought in the war with units from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee receiving the highest number of Medals of Honor.¹⁰ After World War I, the National Defense Act of 1920 again reorganized the Army and established the National Guard as the "primary Federal reserve force" with an authorized strength of 435,000 soldiers. It also divided the Army into integrated corps with active, National Guard, and Reserve divisions organized geographically. The stock market crash of 1929 saw the National Guard return to its state role when on several occasions; governors used their National Guard troops in a law enforcement capacity during labor disputes. Within the corps level commands established by the National Defense Act of 1920, there was significant confusion about the dual role of the National Guard as a state resource. Questions about the National Guard utilizing federal equipment for state emergencies and law enforcement in addition to confusion about officer status during state missions resulted in an amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916. The amendment formally established the dual role of the National Guard and recognized the requirement for officers to hold both federal and state commissions. It also established the NGB to replace the Militia Bureau.¹¹

With the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Army again called on the services of the National Guard to fight abroad. World War II saw the emergence of National Guard divisions as a mainstay to the overall force. However, due to the world economic and political environment in the 1930's, political sensitivities in the United States leaned toward isolationism and a reduction in military expenditures. Overall readiness of our Army was at an all time low and for the National Guard a focus on state and community missions was the priority. The Guard was the last to see any of the Army's technological improvements or new equipment and therefore at the outset of WWII it took time to get new equipment fielded and soldiers trained. However, the Guard was responsive and its service was exemplary. In August 1946, the last of the Guard divisions was released from active duty. The Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson said of the Guard's service during the war:

The National Guard took to the field 18 infantry divisions, 300,000 men. Those State troops doubled the strength of the Army at once, and their presence in the field gave the country a sense that it had passed the lowest ebb of its weakness. Nine of those divisions crossed the Atlantic to Europe and Africa and nine went

to the far reaches of the Pacific. The soldiers of the guard fought in every action in which the Army participated from Bataan to Okinawa. They made a brilliant record on every fighting front. They proved once more the value of the trained citizen-soldier.¹²

With the total mobilization of the National Guard for WWII, the states found themselves without a capability to protect their citizens in time of crisis. This prompted several states to form a State Guard or militia. These units, formed from volunteers who had previous military experience or who were not qualified for service in the active Army, performed well in the absence of the National Guard units. Many states maintained these units after the war as a state reserve in case National Guard Units were deployed and not available. Many still exist today. In most cases, the states' Adjutants General maintain organizational and training oversight of these units for the Governor as part of the overall state military forces. The units perform missions such as traffic control, shelter management, and limited security operations in support of local and state officials. As an example, the Governor of Texas has activated units of the Texas State Guard over fifty times since its formation in 1941. Missions included support to civil authorities for the Beaumont race riots in 1943, support of the 49th Armored Division activation and deployment for the Berlin Crisis in 1961, and Hurricane Rita in 2005.¹³

Immediately following WWII and the emergence of the nuclear age, and with it the Cold War, the U.S. Military underwent yet another reorganization. During this period, the National Guard grew to 325,000 soldiers in 27 divisions and 20 regimental combat teams.¹⁴ The greatest challenge for this expanding Guard force was the lack of adequate facilities for the soldiers to meet and train. In 1950, Congressional legislation called for substantial funding to assist the states in new armory construction. Throughout the 1950s, modern armories sprang up across the country with improved capability for National Guard soldiers to meet and train.¹⁵ In addition, these armories provided a resource for local communities to hold meetings and other events. This re-established the National Guard as a community based organization, which is critical to its success even today.¹⁶

This critical influx of resources for the National Guard was all part of the Army reorganization focused on the Cold War and the potential for a major kinetic conflict in Europe fighting the communists. However, during this reorganization the Army would need the services of the National Guard to fight communism in a far different theater. NGB notified the first National Guard units of their impending mobilization for deployment to Korea in the summer of 1950. Less than one-year later over 100,000 guardsmen were on active duty supporting the war in the Far East.¹⁷ Two National Guard Divisions, the 45th and 40th, deployed to Korea and remained there for the duration of the conflict.¹⁸ The Army mobilized six more National Guard

divisions, two deployed to Europe and four remained in the United States as part of the Strategic Reserve. By the end of the war, the Army mobilized 138,600 National Guard soldiers.¹⁹ This mobilization was the beginning of a force structure policy for the National Guard that lasted for over 30 years. The National Guard as a Strategic Reserve force could provide a large pool of units, personnel, and equipment for the active component to fill global requirements. Major initiatives to improve the readiness of National Guard units such as pay, equipment for training, and new facilities focused Guard units on their role as part of the overall U.S. strategic force ready to deter communist aggression on a global scale. The impact on attitudes of the average National Guard soldier changed as well. Membership in the National Guard became a meaningful second career for many soldiers instead of a leisurely hobby resulting in a more professional and competent force. Fortunately, the additional focus on strategic requirements had little effect on the role of the National Guard units in their communities and states. Even through the turbulent Vietnam era, when the U.S. leadership decided not to utilize large numbers of National Guard troops, the reputation of the National Guard and its role fared much better than that of the active army.²⁰

The next major organizational changes in the National Guard came with the "Total Force" concept during President Reagan's administration in the 1980s. This policy changed the National Guard from a Strategic Reserve force that would train, mobilize, and deploy after the active forces, to the new policy that established "Round Out" units aligned with active component units for training and deployment. It included a rigorous training requirement for these units to complete a major training center rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) in Ft. Irwin, CA, (for heavy mechanized units) or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Chaffee, AR, and then Ft. Polk, LA, (for light units) every three years. The policy ensured that the National Guard would get the most current equipment and training available as part of the total force. In addition, the National Guard began to expand its training from U.S. training centers only to participation in exercises and projects around the world. National Guard units began participating in annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, Bright Star exercises in Egypt, and engineering and humanitarian projects in Central America. The latter created a concern from the governors of several states who argued that they could deny allowing their National Guard units to deploy overseas for training in time of peace. The "Montgomery Amendment" to the 1986 Defense Authorization Act introduced by Congressman Sonny Montgomery of Mississippi established that the governors could not withhold consent for their units to train overseas based on the location of the training. Although lawsuits from several of the Governors ensued, the courts upheld the amendment and the role and scope of the

National Guard continued to expand.²¹ These total force initiatives were part of the Reagan build up to increase readiness and global visibility of our forces that demonstrated our total capability. It forced an economically struggling Soviet Union to pour more money into their military. In concert with brilliant application of the diplomatic and economic elements of national power, the policy led to the collapse of the Warsaw pact and the end of the Cold War.

Although reductions in the armed forces following the end of the Cold War were beginning to take place, the National Guard remained at the highest state of readiness in its history. The total force policies of the 1980s had left a highly trained and deployable National Guard prepared for major combat operations around the world with their active component counterparts. Only one year after the end of the Cold War, in August of 1990, Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army invaded the small country of Kuwait and the National Guard was tested yet again. This time the lessons learned from Vietnam about excluding the National Guard from major operations resulted in the largest National Guard mobilization and deployment since the Korean War. However, active duty divisions deployed initially without their National Guard Roundout Brigades and separate battalions. Instead, they deployed with brigades from other active duty divisions. The initial National Guard contribution was almost exclusively combat support and combat service units. This created significant concern throughout the National Guard leadership and in Congress that the army was abandoning the total force concept and once again, like Vietnam, leaving major National Guard combat units out of the fight.

Finally, in November of 1990, three infantry brigades, one artillery brigade and several separate battalions received mobilization orders. Arkansas's 142d artillery brigade was the first to deploy into the Theater of War with Oklahoma's 1-158th Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion. Mississippi's 155th infantry brigade, Louisiana's 256th infantry brigade, and Georgia's 48th infantry brigade mobilized and began training in preparation for deployment. At the start of major combat operations in January 1991, the 142d artillery brigade with the 1-158th field artillery battalion (MLRS) participated in the opening shots of the war. The infantry brigades were conducting rigorous training at the NTC at Ft. Irwin, CA and preparing to flow into theater as follow on combat units after the initial offensive. However, little did anyone anticipate the ineptitude of the Iraqi Army and its leadership or the devastating capability of the coalition forces. In just 100 hours, the Coalition threw the Iraqi army out of Kuwait and the majority of Saddam Hussein's offensive capability lay burning in the southwestern deserts of Iraq. The unexpected speed of the coalition victory precluded the need for the follow on brigades to deploy and they returned to their home stations shortly thereafter. At the end of the Persian Gulf

War 37,484 Army National Guardsmen in 297 units had participated brilliantly in the campaign.

22

Immediately following the Persian Gulf War reductions in force structure began in earnest. The National Guard would see its end strength cut by over 90,000 soldiers in the next ten years. This included two divisions and the equivalent of eleven combat brigades. The experience of the Army during the Persian Gulf War forced organizational planners and army leadership to question the Roundout policies of the total force concept. If future wars were anything like the one in the Persian Gulf then it took far too long to get major combat formations ready for deployment. The Bottom Up Review (BUR) and the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) were the Department of Defense initiatives to figure out true organizational requirements heading into a new millennium. At the same time, several factors resulted in a changing role for our military and National Guard. The emergence of global peacekeeping operational requirements, increased terrorist activities and domestic operational requirements in the U.S., and the developing need for increased Theater Security Cooperation in Eastern Europe created new opportunities and roles for National Guard units.²³ Force structure changes during the 1990s remained focused on large National Guard combat units (enhanced Brigades and Divisions) as the active army's primary reserve force to meet the combat requirements of two major theaters of war. A realignment of U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) combat units to the Guard and Guard combat service support units to the USAR confirmed this role.

Recent Operational Experience 2000-2005

During the last five years, the US Army has conducted a myriad of missions spanning the spectrum of military operations from domestic disaster relief to limited conventional conflict. The majority of these have either started as peace operations or quickly transitioned from some type of limited conventional conflict into peace operations. Most often, the units required to conduct these mission were not initially equipped or organized for them and adjusted from their normal role and training as a kinetic combat force to that of nation builders, peace keepers, or relief workers. The successes of the last ten years only demonstrate the incredible initiative and flexibility of our force but it certainly is not efficient. Here are some examples since the year 2000 just for the Texas Army National Guard.

During Stabilization Force 7 (SFOR7) in Bosnia Herzegovina, Texas' 49th Armored Division was the first National Guard Division to command Multi-National Division North (MND-N). US forces assigned to the division were four squadrons of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the divisional engineer battalion, signal battalion, military intelligence battalion, and a

army reserve civil affairs battalion. In addition, a Russian airborne infantry brigade, a Turkish infantry battalion, and a combined Nordic/Polish Battle Group comprised the rest of the MND-N. This heavy division headquarters, trained through numerous Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) warfighter exercises at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, was easily prepared to conduct major combat operations but had to completely reorganize and change its tactics, techniques, and procedures to become a peacekeeping force. The Division Commander, MG Bob Halverson, selected specifically to command the division for this mission, was a career military intelligence officer with former state department experience. Not a typical background for a heavy combat division commander; however, for the mission he was absolutely the best suited for the primary job of peace operations and nation building. Instead of coordinating the massive firepower of a heavy combat division at a decisive time and place on the battlefield to overwhelm the enemy with firepower and shock effect he was engaging Bosnian Leaders in bilateral meetings to ensure that they complied with the Dayton Peace Accords and followed the roadmap to a peaceful establishment of a tri-partied government. He spent significant time engaging government organizations and non-government organizations such as United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Doctors Without Borders, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) representatives to ensure their activities were coordinated and synchronized with the ongoing security operations. Certainly a successful mission, but it required substantial resources in time and money to get the division ready for this type of operation.

More recently, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Texas Army National Guard mobilized its 3rd Brigade of the 49th Armored Division to become 5th U.S. Army's Task Force Guardian protecting critical infrastructure and key assets for over 90 installations west of the Mississippi River. Each of the six battalions assigned to the brigade were Armor, Infantry, or Artillery. They each had responsibility for multiple installations covering several states. None of these units deployed with their combat vehicles. Five of the six battalions had responsibility for at least one nuclear or chemical weapons storage facility and had no formal training on specifics of operating in and around those facilities until they arrived at the sites.

In 2005 the Texas Army National Guard's 56th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 36th Infantry Division, deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as the Theater Security Brigade. The 56th BCT is a heavy M1A1 Abrams , and M2A1 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle equipped brigade. However, they trained and deployed as a High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) mounted force securing Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Main Supply Routes (MSRs), and convoys. Additionally, in 2005 the 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry deployed to

Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) conducting the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) security mission. They split between 13 sites to provide security and assistance for civil affairs teams that help rebuild physical and political infrastructure in that country. They deployed with none of their combat vehicles and had less than two months of training for this very unconventional mission. These examples are indicative of the entire National Guard and active force supporting ongoing military missions around the world today²⁴.

Domestically in 2005, as a response to Hurricane Katrina, the Army National Guard mobilized and deployed over 45,000 soldiers within six days to conduct rescue, security, shelter management, and humanitarian operations to support the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.²⁵ These were a mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units that organized and deployed with equipment specifically tailored for the mission.

The Capability Gap

This list of recent examples is to demonstrate that although our military forces have a substantial capability to adapt to a changing environment, they are not organized, trained, or equipped for the mission sets we ask them to do most often. Coalition forces completed major combat operations during OIF in a matter of weeks and the combat units were required to transition on the fly, whereas the ongoing security and nation building activities are taking years. This shortcoming is brought out very clearly in the 3rd Infantry Division's (3ID(M)) After Action Review (AAR) of the initial phases of OIF, "3ID(M) did not have a fully developed plan for the transition to SASO (Stability And Support Operations) and civil military operations in Baghdad prior to entering the city."²⁶ Additionally in Afghanistan, there were similar AAR comments, "The subsequent transition to stability operations and support operations revealed the Army's forte and unique capabilities. Winning the combat was necessary but not sufficient to meet the nation's strategic goals."²⁷ In a compelling paper regarding U.S forces during OIF, British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster states that,

The most straightforward reason why the Army struggled in OIF Phase 4 to achieve the effectiveness demonstrated in the preceding combat phase was that it was, by design, relatively ill prepared for it. In spite of COIN (Counterinsurgency) and S&R (Stabilization and Reconstruction) operations having occupied the majority of the Army's operational time since the Cold War, and their being an inevitable consequence of the GWOT [Global War on Terror], these roles have not been core Army Activities. The Army's focus has been conventional warfighting and its branches into COIN and S&R have been regarded as a diversion, to be undertaken reluctantly, and preferably by Special Operations Forces and other specialist, many of whom are in the Army Reserves.²⁸

A predominant and sometimes controversial author of books on global security and U.S military policy, Thomas Barnett, has some very similar concepts on the role of the military after conventional operations are completed. In his latest book, *Blueprint for Action*, he describes a "System Administrators" approach to the Phase 4 operations. He says conducting continued military kinetic operations such as security and counterinsurgency operations are critical but we must expand our capability into a force which "... likewise provides civil security with its police component, as well as civilian personnel with expertise in rebuilding networks, infrastructure, and social and political institutions."²⁹ He goes on to say that continuing to build capabilities in our military establishment to simply kill insurgents will result in a requirement to stay and keep killing them. He says, "Killing an insurgency starts with the military defeat of the rebel forces, but it never ends there. You either dry up the sources of insurgency recruiting by offering the target population a better life and better deal or you better plan on just killing rebels for the long haul. Better warfighting is not the answer; better peacemaking and nation building is."³⁰

Building a Capability

Reviewing the organizational history of the National Guard reveals some interesting observations. First, with the exception of full mobilizations for WWI and WWII, the National Guard has not deployed more than two divisions into combat. Second, the National Guard, as the Army's primary reserve combat force reorganizes based on requirements of the active army. Finally, National Guard force structure mirrors that of the active component. Taking these organizational observations and combining them with operational shortcomings stated above, there is an organizational alternative that allows the active army to remain focused on major combat operations and takes advantage of the unique strengths of the National Guard. It may be more efficient to organize a portion of the National Guard force more appropriately based on the common tasks of Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) operations to follow the combat forces and assume the S&R (Phase 4 and 5) role as soon as major combat operations are complete.³¹ The organization would provide a flexible force designed with capabilities to go into unstable environments whether in a foreign country or domestically to coordinate and synchronize all aspects of stability and support operations.³² The first step in designing this force structure is to identify the tasks required for these operations.³³

	Nation Building (SASO)	Domestic Ops	Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Ops
Security Tasks	Reconnaissance Intelligence Support C2 Support Systems Counterinsurgency Restore Law and Order Military Training Police Training (limited) Interagency Coordination Planning Support	Reconnaissance Intelligence Support C2 Support Systems Restore Law and Order (Guard Only Title 32) Interagency Coordination Planning Support Search and Rescue	Reconnaissance Intelligence Support C2 Support Systems Restore Law and Order Interagency Coordination Planning Support Search and Rescue
Civil/Political Infrastructure	Civil Administration ³⁴ Elections Rule of Law Judiciary Penal	Civil Administration ³⁵ Rule of Law ³⁶	Civil Administration
Physical Infrastructure	Water Purification Shelter Management Transportation System Roads and Bridges Power Generation Traffic Control Fire Fighting	(Lead) Public Works Water Purification Shelter Management Transportation System Roads and Bridges Power Generation Traffic Control Fire Fighting	Water Purification Shelter Management Transportation System Roads and Bridges Power Generation Traffic Control Fire Fighting

TABLE 1, TASK CROSSWALK

Looking at these tasks in major categories can allow us to organize our forces functionally to better accomplish these tasks (Table 1). The major functions in all of these operations are to

- Provide security and rebuild organic security capability
- Help establish civil infrastructure
- Help rebuild physical infrastructure

Under current transformation plans, the National Guard will retain its eight divisions. The transformation will reduce the number of combat brigades while increasing combat support and

combat service support units such as Military Police, Vertical and Horizontal Construction Engineers, Information Operations, and Logistics Support units.³⁷ However, the transformed modular structure is based on the ability to plug and play brigade-sized units into generic combat division or corps headquarters during combat operations. The following organizational chart demonstrates an alternative structure using National Guard Divisions as the primary Phase 4 and 5 forces for the Army immediately following major combat operations.




FIGURE 1, NATION BUILDING DIVISIONS

The theater contingency campaign plan would include these forces tailored to the scope and scale of the campaign. The number of divisions could range from less than one up to four. The only structure not currently available for this concept is the one that makes the most sense to reside in the National Guard. They are the Civil Affairs Brigades. A limited number of these units currently reside in the USAR. As a community based organization, the National Guard possesses a significant number of personnel with tremendous civil experience. In addition, it

makes more sense for civil affairs units to reside in the Guard for use during domestic crisis as an asset to the state Governors.

Organization and Training

The eight National Guard divisions could easily transform into their modular configuration as planned and still perform the requirements of a Nation Building division headquarters with minimal changes. The main difference has more to do with the training that these units conduct. Instead of focusing on traditional BCTP Warfighter training, they would conduct Phase 4 and 5 exercises incorporating Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI), Relief in Place of Combat Divisions, Security Operations, Integration of Interagency and GO and NGO support activities, Development and execution of Civil Administration Plan, and Development and execution of the Physical Infrastructure Plan.

Each of the eight divisions would have a Combatant Command (COCOM) alignment along with their supporting units designated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Global Force Management (GFM) system. This would ensure that the units train specifically on regional cultures and languages. The COCOM would have these assets to task for Theater Security Cooperation requirements including participation in joint and combined exercises. All of these training activities improve the units' familiarity with the theater and the capability to operate in it as a stabilization and reconstruction, or humanitarian relief force if required. The following chart shows a potential theater alignment for the National Guard divisions.

EUCOM	29 th Division, Virginia 42d Division, New York
PACOM	40 th Division, California 35 th Division, Kansas
CENTCOM	28 th Division, Pennsylvania 34 th Division, Minnesota
SOUTHCOM	36 th Division, Texas 38 th Division, Indiana

TABLE 2, NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION ALIGNMENT

In addition to training conducted in support of theater contingency plans, these units can also cross train many of the same tasks by conducting domestic preparedness exercises with state, local and interagency organizations.

Potential Drawbacks

The risk involved in creating National Guard units that do not mirror active army organization and training is one of perception. Many senior leaders in the National Guard have worked their entire careers to dispel the perception by the active army that the Guard is not a ready and relevant force. MG Michael Taylor, commander of the TXARNG 36th Infantry Division believes strongly that the more National Guard units, “look like, smell like, and train like” the active duty units, the more credibility they will have.³⁸ Making the National Guard divisions different from their active counterparts may lead to increased resource battles between the components and eventual mistrust. However, if appropriately packaged as a concept that allows the two components to focus their organizational and training efforts where they are best suited, then the potential benefits far outweigh the risk.

An additional risk is the perception that the National Guard is no longer good enough to fill major combat roles and must be relegated to peacekeeping. In this nation-building concept, the security brigades remain traditional light infantry combat units or military police units per the transformation model. If during the transition to Phase 4, the National Guard nation building divisions require heavy capability for a period, the active combat units may have to remain in place. Conversely, if necessary, light National Guard infantry and military police units can deploy in support of major combat operations prior to phase 4. However, the truth that the National Guard must face up to is that heavy mechanized combat units do not make sense for the Guard in an army striving for increased lethality and rapid deployability. Heavy units are expensive, difficult to maintain, require substantial training facilities, and require a lengthy post mobilization training period to bring units up to standards. Finally, heavy mechanized combat units in the Guard have significantly less capability to support domestic operations for the states.

Conclusion

The role of the National Guard in the National Military Strategy is at a crossroads. The traditional practice of the using the National Guard as a strategic reserve force organized in large combat formations to help fight major regional conflicts is outdated and impractical. Emerging global trends demonstrate that the world needs the U.S. Military to do more than win decisively in combat. It must have the ability to transition from major combat operations to stabilization and reconstruction operations in rapid succession. The most capable force for this mission lies in the National Guard. The dual role of the Guard in support of domestic operations fits well with the tasks for stabilization and reconstruction. By filling this role, the National Guard

allows active units to focus training and resources on the art and science of warfighting while it trains units on security operations, reconstruction, and nation building. Both are critical requirements supporting overall campaign plans and take advantage of the inherent strengths of both organizations. Nation building divisions in the National Guard make sense to help our nation and the world progress toward better and lasting peace and security.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130-1 (Washington D.C., Michael Doubler, 2001) 16.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 17.

⁴ Ibid., 36.

⁵ Ibid., 74.

⁶ Ibid., 144.

⁷ Ibid., 151.

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs*, 25th ed., A Senior Leader Reference Handbook (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 30 September 2005), 93.

⁹ Doubler, 161,162.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs*, 25th ed., A Senior Leader Reference Handbook (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 30 September 2005), 93.

¹¹ Doubler, 191-194.

¹² Jim Dan Hill, *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1964) 480-81.

¹³ *Texas State Guard Homepage*, available from <http://www.agd.state.tx.us/stateguard/welcome/about.asp>; Internet, accessed 13 February 2006.

¹⁴ Doubler, 229, 230.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid, 230, 231.

¹⁷ Ibid, 232

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs*, 25th ed., A Senior Leader Reference Handbook (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 30 September 2005), 94.

²⁰ Doubler, 266, 267.

²¹ Ibid, 269-299.

²² Ibid, 302-332.

²³ Ibid, 334-368.

²⁴ The references for these mobilizations are my personal first hand experience in assignments directly involved in each. Those included; Deputy G3 and Chief of Operations, 49th Armored Division, Mobilization Readiness Branch Chief in the State Plans, Operations, and Training Directorate, Commander of 5-112 Armor during Operation Noble Eagle, and G3 of the TXARNG during the deployment of units to OIF and OEF.

²⁵ Congressional Research Service, *Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response*, (Washington D.C., Library of Congress, 19 September 2005), CRS-11.

²⁶ 3ID After Action Review (AAR), Chapter 2- Full Spectrum Operations, Topic D- Civil Military Operations, July 2003, available from <https://call2.army.mil/products/aar/asp/3IDAAR/ch2.asp>, Internet; accessed 17 February 2006.

²⁷ COL(Ret) Gregory Fontenot, LTC E.J. Degan, LTC David Tohr, *On Point- The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Chapter 1, Operation Desert Storm to Enduring Freedom- The Army's Continuing Evolution, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/ch-1.htm; Internet ; accessed 15 February 2006.

²⁸ Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations", *Military Review* (November-December 2005): 8.

²⁹ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action, A Future Worth Creating*, (New York, N.Y., G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2005), xix.

³⁰ Ibid, 64.

³¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning*, JP 5-0 (Revision Third Draft)(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, 10 August 2005), IV33.

³² The initial idea for building a "Nation Building Corps" in the National Guard came from LTC William L. Smith (G3, 36th ID) over several informal meetings throughout 2003. It was his initial concept so he must be recognized.

³³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Peace Operations*, FM 3-07.31 Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, October 2003) 1-2, 1-6, 6-3, Appendix A.

³⁴ According to FM 3-07.3 Peace Operations, Chapter VI on Civil Military Operations “Civil Administration” consists of the following types of support: Legal, Administration, Education, Public Health, Public Safety, Economic Development, Civilian Supply, Food and Agriculture, Communications, Transportation, and Public Works Facilities.

³⁵ This is limited domestically depending on the scope of the disaster/attack damage. Military can provide many aspects of civil administration for a limited period until civilian control is restored.

³⁶ Only if Martial Law is declared by the President.

³⁷ NGB-ARF, *Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2008, Troop Structure Program (TSP)*, 2005.

³⁸ MG Taylor said this to me and several others who served with him over the years when discussing division organization and training. His down to earth colorful comments such as this one were always memorable.

