

CARLISLE PAPERS

Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013

The Changing Face of Afghanistan, 2001-08

Deborah Hanagan



Visit our website for other free publication
downloads
<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>

[To rate this publication click here.](#)

CARLISLE PAPER

THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHANISTAN, 2001-08

Colonel Deborah Hanagan

July 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046.

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report may also be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is: *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/*.

ISBN 1-58487-503-8

PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and government civilians to reflect on and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research conducted by Army War College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its “Carlisle Papers” Series.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Antulio J. Echevarria II', with a stylized flourish at the end.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II
Director of Research
Strategic Studies Institute

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DEBORAH HANAGAN, a U.S. Army colonel, is currently assigned as a Professor of Strategy in the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. She was commissioned as a military intelligence officer, and subsequently transferred to the Foreign Area Officer functional area. She was a National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA. She has served in a variety of leadership and staff positions in Germany, Slovenia, Saudi Arabia, and the continental United States. Her most recent duty assignments include Installation Chief of Staff, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Political-Military Staff Officer, Plans and Policy Directorate, U.S. European Command, and Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy to Slovenia. Colonel Hanagan holds a bachelor of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy; a master of arts degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies; was an Olmsted Scholar at the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques*, Aix-en-Provence, France; and is currently working on a Ph.D. in International Affairs from the University of Virginia.

ABSTRACT

The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) were the most catastrophic attacks on the U.S. homeland since Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. They were particularly devastating because they were perpetrated by a small number of lightly-armed religious extremists, and thus brought home to the United States the lethality of ideologically-motivated asymmetric warfare in the 21st century. The attacks were recognized as acts of war by both the George W. Bush administration and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. The President declared the United States would respond to the attacks accordingly, using all of its relevant resources. While the administration recognized the enemy facing the United States and the civilized world was the combination of a global network of Islamic extremist groups (al Qaeda was but one of the groups) and their state and nonstate sponsors, it focused first on Afghanistan.

Shortly after 9/11, President Bush articulated his broad foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and laid out a strategy that included the main instruments of U.S. national power: diplomatic, economic, and military. He also recognized the United States could not achieve its objectives unilaterally; he welcomed and strongly supported cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and the international community. Throughout the entire Bush administration, from 2001 to 2008, the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan was multilateral and multinational.

The overarching U.S. goals for Afghanistan, which remained unchanged throughout the Bush administration, and which were maintained by the Barack Obama administration, were to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its allies, stop their use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and engage in reconstruction to help the emergence of a representative, democratic government so that Afghanistan could never again become a sanctuary for terrorist groups. The achievement of the overarching goals required a strategy of mutually reinforcing political, economic, and military efforts.

The Bush administration's main political objectives in Afghanistan were to encourage the establishment of stable, representative political institutions and the rule of law. Its main economic objectives were to encourage basic human development, critical reconstruction, and the establishment of stable economic institutions and a market-based economy. Its main military objective was to provide security, so that political and economic development could proceed. The administration repeatedly emphasized that security, economic development, stable governance, the rule of law, and human rights were all interconnected, and that continued progress in all areas were necessary to ensure Afghanistan did not again become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist movements. While the overall U.S. objectives remained constant, the strategies to achieve them evolved over time as progress was made, or to account for the sheer difficulty of bringing into the 21st century a country as destroyed and undeveloped as Afghanistan.

While the strategies of the United States and its partners in the international community were never adequately synchronized or coordinated, their efforts were unprecedented in Afghanistan. By 2008, more than 40 countries and hundreds of governmental and nongovernmental organizations were engaged in political, economic, and military efforts. Despite legitimate criticisms of shortcomings and failures, concrete progress was

made in the country between 2001 and 2008. In a short period of time, Afghanistan, with U.S. and international assistance, created the foundations for a representative democracy and market-based economy and it identified clear future goals in various international agreements.

One could argue there was a basis for optimism about Afghanistan over the long term as administrations transitioned from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, due to the massive international and Afghan efforts after 2001, the embrace of representative political institutions by the Afghan people and their rejection of the Taliban. While the struggle had been long and hard, U.S. senior leaders expressed confidence by early 2009 that, with continued international engagement and support, Afghanistan can reach the tipping point where it has enough internal capacity and capability to govern and secure itself, allowing the international community to step into the background. This would mean the definitive achievement of the main U.S. objective in Afghanistan: ensuring it never again becomes a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups.

THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHANISTAN, 2001-08

Introduction.

As the United States changed presidential administrations in January 2009, there was much discussion about what the foreign policy of the new Obama administration would be and how it would differ from its predecessor. For example, several times during the presidential election campaign in 2008, Barack Obama stated he intended to focus more attention on Afghanistan. Based on the reporting of major American news outlets, one could have drawn the conclusion that the Bush administration had paid little attention to Afghanistan for the preceding few years or that its strategy focused mainly on military operations in the country. This conclusion would have been inaccurate. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), President Bush articulated his broad foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and laid out a strategy that included the main instruments of U.S. national power: diplomatic, economic, and military. He also recognized that the United States could not achieve its objectives unilaterally; he welcomed and strongly supported cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and the international community. The U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan was multilateral and multinational from the beginning in 2001.¹ The administration also constantly assessed the progress being made, as well as the challenges, and it was flexible enough to adjust its strategy to address challenges and changing conditions in the country and the region. This paper is thus a review of the broad dimensions of the Bush administration's Afghanistan policy and what was achieved over the course of 7 1/2 years, as well as some of the ongoing challenges.

The 9/11 attacks were the most catastrophic attacks on the U.S. homeland since Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. They were particularly devastating because they were perpetrated by a small number of lightly-armed religious extremists and thus brought home to the United States the lethality of ideologically-motivated asymmetric warfare in the 21st century. The administration quickly recognized the attack as an act of war. In fact, al Qaeda had officially declared war on the United States and the rest of the civilized world several times.² The President called the attacks "despicable acts of war" on September 13, 2001, and declared the United States would respond accordingly, using "all the resources of the United States and our cooperating friends and allies to pursue those responsible."³ Furthermore, the President recognized that the threat facing the United States was greater than a group of extremists ready and willing to engage in jihad to advance Osama bin Laden's vision of establishing a global Islamic caliphate faithful to his extreme ideology. Rather, the enemy facing the United States and the civilized world was a global network of Islamic extremist groups, of which al Qaeda is but one, and their state and nonstate sponsors. On September 15, 2001, President Bush said, "Victory against terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in a series of decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them."⁴

The President met with the full National Security Council (NSC) the day after the attacks to start formulating policy objectives, strategy, and actions. During the course

of the discussions, the President made clear his first two objectives were to protect the United States by preventing subsequent terrorist attacks on the homeland, or other U.S. interests, and eliminating its enemies.⁵ The NSC's senior cabinet members developed a strategy that was based on the following five concepts:

- First, the U.S. response to the 9/11 attack would not be retaliation, but actions to prevent further attacks.
- Second, the United States had to target the global network of Islamic extremist groups and the state and nonstate sponsors who were the key sources of their operational, logistical, and financial support.
- Third, the nature of the terrorist threat represented a significant paradigm shift. Jihadists do not engage in conventional terrorism, but aim to inflict massive destruction.⁶ Given bin Laden's statements that he aspired to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the United States could not rule out the probability that terrorists would use WMD if they attained it.⁷
- Fourth, continued attacks on the order of 9/11 would change the nature of America because subsequent actions taken to provide security to U.S. citizens and defend the country would affect the constitutional system, restrict American civil liberties, and fundamentally change the open nature of the society. Therefore, efforts had to be made to prevent further attacks in order to preserve American liberty.
- Fifth, a purely defensive strategy could not protect the United States. There were too many vulnerable U.S. targets, and it was impossible to secure them all. Therefore, the United States needed to have a strategy of initiative and offense. It had to disrupt the terrorist networks abroad and sever their links to state and nonstate sponsors.⁸ The President and his administration recognized that a global campaign against terrorists and their sponsors would be too broad for the United States to wage alone, especially since the terrorists' objectives threatened allied nations, so it positioned itself to coordinate and cooperate with allies and friends.⁹

The administration focused first on Afghanistan because the Taliban government was harboring al Qaeda, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, as well as the previous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the USS *Cole*, and the first World Trade Center bombing. The overarching U.S. goal for Afghanistan, which remained unchanged throughout the Bush administration, was to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its allies, and stop their use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations. The initial actions were military and were intended to: overthrow the Taliban regime (which had rejected U.S. demands to turn over al Qaeda leaders and to close down terrorist training camps in Afghanistan); destroy the Taliban's military capability; disrupt al Qaeda operations; close down al Qaeda training camps; and kill or capture al Qaeda terrorists.¹⁰ Parallel with the military operations, the President directed the administration to work with the international community to provide humanitarian assistance, mainly food and medicine, to relieve the suffering of the Afghan people, especially refugees, and to ensure their survival through the winter.¹¹ President Bush repeatedly emphasized in speeches that Islamic extremist terror threatened all civilized nations,

and that defeating it required “an international coalition of unprecedented scope and cooperation.” It demands the “sincere, sustained actions of many nations” against the terrorist networks and their bases.¹²

President Bush also recognized that Afghanistan’s status as a failed state in the 1990s, and the radical nature of the Taliban regime had made it a prime candidate for al Qaeda to use it as a sanctuary. Thus, for the United States to achieve long-term success against international terrorism, it could not just intervene militarily, overthrow the Taliban, disrupt al Qaeda, and leave. It, along with the international community, had to address the conditions that had made Afghanistan a failed state that was ripe for exploitation by terrorists. This led into the President’s overall strategic vision for Afghanistan: remove the Taliban, deny sanctuary for al Qaeda, and engage in reconstruction to help the emergence of a democratic government.¹³ The President stated in December 2001, “America and our allies will do our part in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. We learned our lessons from the past. We will not leave until the mission is complete. We will work with international institutions . . . on the long-term development of Afghanistan.”¹⁴ The achievement of the overarching goals would require a strategy of mutually reinforcing political, economic, and military efforts. It would also focus on building and increasing Afghan capacities, including their capacities for representative government, for their military and police forces to provide security, for a sustainable economic and agricultural sector, and for the provision of basic health care for all Afghan citizens, so that the country could not again become a sanctuary for terrorist groups. In 2005, a White House policy statement on Afghanistan summarized the goal and strategy again: to help the Afghan people “build a safe, stable society that meets the needs of its people and eliminates an environment that breeds terrorism.”¹⁵ The U.S. policy was based on encouraging reform and democracy as alternatives to oppression and dictatorship which breed resentment and terror; as the President said in December 2001, “the Afghan people deserve a just and stable government.”¹⁶ Additionally, the U.S. policy encouraged economic and political development to “break the cycle of bitterness and radicalism that has brought stagnation to a vital region.”¹⁷ The administration knew it would not be an easy task. The President acknowledged that “Helping the Afghan people join the modern world would clearly be a long, arduous task.”¹⁸ According to General Richard Myers, “It was obvious from the beginning that this course of action [Afghanistan] would be a complex, frustrating, challenge.”¹⁹

The following four sections will outline the complex nature of the challenge in Afghanistan, and then briefly describe the political/diplomatic, economic/development, and military efforts the United States and international community engaged in between 2001 and 2008.

A Challenging Environment.

Afghanistan, situated in the heart of Central Asia, is a remote country in many ways. Geographically, it is mainly a mountainous desert with isolated fertile valleys, and is about the size of Texas, or approximately 250,000 square miles. The economy has been based on subsistence agriculture for centuries and depends heavily on an extensive irrigation infrastructure. Until the Soviet invasion in 1979, the country had been

self-sufficient in food production, but 2 decades of war and the drought at the end of the 1990s destroyed the irrigation system and the agricultural sector. Afghanistan has a predominantly tribal culture made up of differing ethnic groups, primarily Pashtun, Hazara, Turkoman, Uzbek, Tajik, and Baluch.²⁰ Its population was estimated to be about 29 million in 2011, with 44 percent of the population under the age of 15.²¹

The Soviet invasion (for a chronology of major events, see Appendix I) definitively ended and reversed past efforts to modernize. At the war's height, 115,000 Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan. The Soviet-Afghan war was waged primarily in rural areas where the Russians executed a methodical strategy to depopulate the countryside and destroy the rural infrastructure. Their goal was to "obliterate the rebels' support environment." By the end of the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan was awash in military equipment, from small arms and ammunition to rockets and heavy weapons such as tanks, artillery, and SCUD missiles, for the Soviets left behind anything they did not need to protect their own withdrawal.²² The country was also flooded with land mines. The United Nations (UN) estimated that some five-to-seven million mines had been scattered throughout the country by 1989.²³

The Afghan civil war in the 1990s completed the destruction begun by the Soviets as cities became the primary battlefields between rival groups vying for power. Kabul, in particular, had survived intact in the 1980s, but during the civil war "was destroyed, block by block." The "rubblization" policy of the Soviets was duplicated by the *mujahedin* factions in the cities.²⁴ By the end of the civil war, Afghanistan had suffered complete governmental and economic collapse, and the infrastructure, especially irrigation systems and roads, was completely destroyed. The number of refugees estimated to have fled war-torn Afghanistan was some 3.6 million.²⁵

Although the Taliban was initially welcomed by many Afghans in 1996 because it brought a measure of control and stability to the country, the regime quickly became infamous for its strict Islamic fundamentalist philosophy. "Women were rendered anonymous, refused work or education. Justice was implemented by chopping off people's hands, ears, or heads, depending on the crime. Public stoning was the solution to adultery. Television, music, photographs, whistling, and kite flying were all banned."²⁶ Successive brutal actions by the Taliban regime brought increasing international isolation. Thus, not only did the United States and the international community face the staggering task of helping Afghanistan rebuild literally everything from scratch, but they also had to bring a deeply oppressed population back into the modern world and into the community of nations. There was a need for not only a sustained military effort to bring security to both urban and rural populations, but also for significant and long-term economic and political development and support.

However, Afghanistan's remoteness and the extensive nature of the destruction would complicate American and international efforts. Because Afghanistan is a landlocked country, all equipment and materiel essential to military units and civilian agencies would either have to be flown in, thus requiring the State Department to coordinate extensive over-flight and basing rights in surrounding countries for the staging of materiel and equipment, or trucked in from ports in Pakistan, making the Kyber Pass, the only decent road into Afghanistan, a particularly critical and vulnerable link. Furthermore, the absence of functioning government institutions, much less trained and

experienced Afghans, would make the execution of development projects extremely difficult and slow. This situation meant that, initially, Afghanistan did not even have the capacity to absorb the millions of dollars provided by the international community and the United States for development projects. Thus, long-term efforts in Afghanistan would require constant reevaluation of achievable goals, unprecedented support from neighboring countries, and a great deal of patience and time.

Political/Diplomatic Efforts.

President Bush's main political objective in Afghanistan was to encourage the establishment of stable and representative political institutions.²⁷ To achieve the U.S. objective, the State Department established a large and active diplomatic presence. In fact, by the end of 2008, the U.S. embassy in Kabul was one of the largest U.S. diplomatic missions overseas. The various American ambassadors played a key role in implementing U.S. policy, coordinating international support, and advising the Afghan government.²⁸ One ambassador in particular, Zalmay Khalilzad, had a significant influence on the government and was an important player in keeping respectful, but continuous, pressure on the Afghans to ensure the political process continued moving forward during a critical time.

Senior officials from the departments of state and treasury began to work with international partners in November 2001 to hold the first of what would become annual international coordination meetings. At the November meeting, the participants agreed "that a coordinated assistance plan should be implemented among all parties providing financial aid and technical support."²⁹ They directed the execution of a needs assessment in order to identify the required types and costs of external assistance. The resulting assessment identified the donors' joint objectives and strategies, as well as the desired outcomes and estimated costs. (Initial estimates were that Afghanistan would need international assistance for 10 years, and aid requirements would be about \$14.6 billion.) Donors agreed that the immediate priorities were establishing a national security force, creating basic governance structures at the central and local levels, creating and training a civil service administration, creating economic opportunities, rebuilding the infrastructure, and providing basic services such as education and health.³⁰ The assessment provided the basis for national assistance programs and the international meetings were the forum for coordinating which countries would take the lead for specific issue areas. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) volunteered to act as lead nation for the counternarcotics program, Italy volunteered to act as lead nation for judicial reform, and Japan volunteered to lead the disarmament and demobilization initiatives.³¹

The U.S. administration did not intend to export American-style democracy, and the President stated as much in a joint statement with the president of Russia on November 13, 2001. Both leaders agreed that the Afghans must create their own government and said, "It is up to the Afghans themselves to determine their future." They encouraged a broad-based government that represented all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups and included men and women. They also agreed that the new Afghan government should "adhere to accepted international principles, [and] respect human rights, including those of women and girls."³² Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith reiterated the point in 2005 when he said, "The President has made a point of not urging, let alone

imposing, American-style political institutions on other countries. He doesn't believe that there's a single model of democratic governance that can function everywhere."³³ Democracy in Afghanistan would reflect the Afghan culture.

Rather than create a unilateral, U.S.-led program of political reform in Afghanistan, the President backed a UN effort to create a representative Afghan government that had been ongoing for the previous decade and endorsed the UN's selection of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi to serve as the secretary general's Special Representative for Afghanistan.³⁴ The administration also endorsed the UN's lead role in helping the country establish a transitional government, as well as the proposal for a unique process for the selection of both the transitional government and the adoption of a new constitution, that is, the convening of traditional "grand councils" of notable Afghan tribal and ethnic leaders called *loya jirgas*.³⁵ In just over 2 years, from December 2001 to January 2004, Afghanistan created the institutions for a representative government from scratch.

The UN hosted a conference of Afghan factions in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001. At the conference, the various factions reached a political agreement, called the "Bonn Agreement," which articulated a road map for the political transition process needed for the establishment of a democratic state.³⁶ Under the auspices of the Agreement, the Afghan representatives then created a 30-member interim administration with Hamid Karzai as chairman, which governed until the June 2002 emergency *loya jirga*. The 1,550 delegates (including 200 women) to the June *loya jirga* assembly chose Karzai to serve as Afghanistan's transitional president until national elections could be held, as well as his new cabinet. The new Transitional Authority then appointed a 35-member constitutional commission in October 2002 which subsequently wrote, then unveiled the new constitution in November 2003.³⁷ The constitution was distributed throughout the country so that all Afghans could review it and debate it, and it was subsequently approved and adopted by a special *loya jirga* made up of 500 delegates, of which 90 were women, representing the provinces, in January 2004. The constitution established an executive branch and a bicameral legislature.³⁸

Karzai did not wait for the adoption of the constitution to set in motion preparations for elections. In July 2003, he created a joint Afghan-UN committee to organize elections, and in late summer, the committee announced a \$7.6 million project to register and educate voters.³⁹ More than 10 million Afghans registered to vote in the October 2004 presidential elections, of which 41 percent were women. The actual turnout was unprecedented, at over 80 percent, or 8.1 million. There were 18 presidential candidates including one woman, and Karzai won the election with 55 percent of the vote. During the election, the Afghan government and the UN formed a Joint Electoral Management Body to supervise polling at some 22,000 polling stations. International election monitors came from the United States, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Asia Network for Free Elections. Additional U.S. assistance included the provision of \$78 million or 40 percent of the \$198 million needed to carry out the election.⁴⁰ International monitoring and supervision were repeated for the parliamentary and provincial elections held in September 2005. Turnout for these elections was somewhat lower, at 64 percent, or 6.4 million voters. Some 90 registered political parties competed in the elections, and the new parliament convened for the first time in December 2005.⁴¹

U.S. assistance in the development of new political institutions went beyond the elections. The United States provided constitutional and legal experts to the government to help with the writing and implementation of the constitution and new laws. It also created a training program to educate new administrators and councilmen on effective governing and placed over a dozen U.S. officials in key ministries to act as expert advisors, improve Afghan capacity, and increase bureaucratic efficiency. It “facilitated the establishment of an independent electoral commission, and an electoral complaints commission and provided training for the electoral media commission.”⁴² While Italy was officially the lead nation for reforming the Afghan judicial system, the United States also contributed by building or renovating 40 judicial facilities; training over 750 legal professionals; and compiling, printing, and disseminating over 1,100 copies of Afghanistan’s new basic laws in Dari and Pashto to judges and lawyers throughout the country, as well as distributing over 11,000 copies of the Afghan constitution. The United States also provided assistance to the government in defining the structures for local and provincial government and identifying “their authorities and relations with communities, traditional governance and adjudication bodies (*shuras* and *jirgas*), the National Assembly, and the central government in Kabul.”⁴³ This was a key issue, as Afghanistan historically had never had a strong central government and, according to the National Development Framework (NDF) published by the Interim Authority in 2002, the new democratic Afghan government had no intention of creating a strong centralized state. The NDF stated, “The role of the state . . . is to create a regulatory framework to support the activities of the private sector.” It also “advocated streamlined government as an alternative to the centralized and over-bureaucratic structure inherited from the Soviet period.”⁴⁴ The Bush administration undertook these wide-ranging and comprehensive actions because it understood that a stable democracy requires more than periodic elections. President Bush stated, “I recognized the elections were only a first step. Democracy is a journey that requires a nation to build governing institutions such as courts of law, security forces, an education system, a free press, and a vibrant civil society.”⁴⁵

By 2003, the Bush administration and the Afghan government became increasingly concerned about the strength of some of the provincial governors, also referred to as warlords and who continued to maintain personal militias, to administer arbitrary personal justice, and to resist providing tax revenues to the central government. (Note: obtaining control over tax collection was critical if the central government was ever to have any hope of instituting a regularized and transparent budget process). In 2004, Karzai implemented a strategy to strengthen the national government, improve provincial governance, and reduce the power of the warlords which the Bush administration supported.⁴⁶ With U.S. embassy and UN assistance, Karzai slowly, and peacefully, curbed the authority of the provincial governors between 2004 and 2006. The personal militias were demobilized as part of the UN’s Afghan New Beginnings Program (information about the program is in the section on the military below), and Karzai removed uncooperative provincial governors from office entirely⁴⁷ or gave them a stake in the new Afghan institutions with jobs in the cabinet ministries or positions in parliament.⁴⁸

The establishment of the new government and parliament in late 2005 meant that the political transition process identified in the 2001 Bonn Agreement had been fully implemented, so international concern turned toward improving state institutions and

governance in early 2006.⁴⁹ Representatives of the Afghan government met with donor countries and various international organizations at a conference in London resulting in the Afghanistan Compact, signed on February 1, 2006. While it was not a treaty, the agreement represented a strong political commitment between the Afghan government and the international community. The involvement of key leaders, such as the UN secretary general and the U.S. secretary of state who endorsed the Compact, highlighted the importance of the document, which clearly mapped out a way ahead for the country.⁵⁰ The Compact explicitly recognized that the consolidation of stable, good governance was closely tied to security, justice, the rule of law, and reconstruction and development. This meant that the political, economic, and military efforts could not be separated and had to be mutually reinforcing. The Compact laid out detailed outcomes for over 60 benchmarks in three key areas: governance, development, and security and laid out timelines for their delivery. Afghan adherence to the goals would ensure continued international provision of resources and support. The government also committed itself to issuing regular public reports on the progress of the execution of Compact goals and established a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board co-chaired by the UN to ensure transparency and accountability.⁵¹

As noted above, the various American ambassadors to Afghanistan played the lead role in executing U.S. policy. They worked closely with the Afghan government, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander.⁵² In an effort to assist the ambassador and to improve the coordination and cooperation of U.S. civil and military agencies in the areas of security, diplomacy, and reconstruction, the State Department created the Office of Afghanistan Affairs in 2004. Besides supporting the ambassador and facilitating U.S. interagency cooperation, the office became the focal point for U.S. Government coordination with the UN and international agencies.⁵³ President Bush codified the concept of the State Department as lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign countries in NSPD-44, signed in December 2005. The directive tasked the State Department to prepare, plan for, coordinate, and lead integrated U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts and to harmonize all efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The directive also gave the State Department the responsibility for coordinating all U.S. activities with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector entities. The department's responsibilities were quite broad and included "activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation" in foreign countries in crisis.⁵⁴

In 2008, the Afghan people focused on the future as their attention turned toward the presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections scheduled for 2009 and 2010; voter registration began in October 2008. One significant indicator of progress was the fact that Afghan institutions, primarily the Independent Electoral Commission, were given responsibility for organizing and executing the future elections. International agencies were scheduled to again provide election monitors. There were also plans to apply lessons learned from the previous elections. For example, the Afghan government reviewed and updated electoral laws and instituted an improved process for candidate vetting to ensure there would be no candidates with links to corruption, the drug

trade, human trafficking, or human rights violations. Additionally, there were plans to improve civic education programs to raise citizen awareness of their rights, roles, and responsibilities.⁵⁵

While the overall U.S. objective of encouraging the establishment of stable and representative political institutions in Afghanistan remained constant, the strategy to execute the policy evolved over time as progress was made. The U.S. embassy in Kabul initially focused on the establishment of a transitional government, shifted to supporting the creation and adoption of a new constitution, and then to presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections. After that, it focused on helping the central government increase its authority over the entire country by breaking up the power of the provincial governors and disbanding their personal militias.⁵⁶ The efforts to improve governance by dealing with corruption and improving fundamental competencies and capacities of government institutions, firmly establish the rule of law, and improve the provision of basic human rights would continue into the future because they would take considerably more time to achieve. Over time, the ability of Afghan ministries to operate independently of international assistance would vary, because as the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stated, "It'll happen in different sectors more quickly or more slowly, depending on the ministry and the leadership in the ministry and the qualification of the people who work in the ministries. . . . Some of them are highly skilled. Some of them aren't so skilled."⁵⁷ However, administration officials agreed the consolidation of effective political institutions, good governance, and effective rule of law would not be possible until fundamental economic development was achieved and citizens were secure, thus it considered the economic and military efforts essential.⁵⁸

Economic/Development Efforts.

President Bush's main economic objectives in Afghanistan were to encourage basic human development, critical reconstruction, and the establishment of stable economic institutions and a market-based economy.⁵⁹ To achieve these objectives, key federal agencies, mainly the departments of state and treasury, developed a multifaceted strategy approved by President Bush. The first economic action taken by the U.S. Government was the promulgation of a presidential executive order issued on September 24, 2001 to freeze terrorist assets and financing activities. The primary purpose of this freeze was to disrupt the flow of funds and prevent future attacks. It was also key to tracing the funds' flow so as to identify terrorist groups and their locations. These actions cut al Qaeda off from the rest of the world. John Taylor, head of the international finance division at the U.S. Treasury Department, was responsible for developing and implementing U.S. international financial policy and was the prime U.S. official responsible for financial actions related to the War on Terrorism. Working with his counterparts in finance ministries around the world, Taylor built an international coalition that resulted in the nearly simultaneous freezing of assets. (Note: the State Department's diplomatic effort to have UN Security Council Resolution 1373 passed, which called on member countries to prevent and suppress terrorist financing, was critical to the successful coalition).⁶⁰

Parallel with the effort to freeze terrorist financing, Taylor and his team at Treasury developed the postwar reconstruction plan for Afghanistan, and he was initially responsible for coordinating the plan with military and political efforts. The lead for reconstruction later shifted to the State Department in October 2002.

The key to reconstruction was funding, and Taylor's team built another coalition of donor nations and international agencies. An initial donor's meeting was held in Washington, DC, in November 2001. Secretary of State Colin Powell's opening remarks emphasized the need for a long-term, multinational effort. He said, "All of us know that the international community must be prepared to sustain a reconstruction program that will take many, many years."⁶¹ Subsequent meetings, called the International Conference on Afghanistan, were held in Tokyo, Japan in January 2002, Brussels, Belgium in March 2003, Berlin, Germany in March 2004, Kabul, Afghanistan in April 2005, London, UK in January 2006, Rome, Italy in April 2007, and Paris, France in June 2008. They continued with the new U.S. administration in The Hague, The Netherlands in March 2009 and Kabul in July 2010.

The Treasury Department sent financial experts to Kabul to advise the Afghan government. It coordinated the creation and roll out of the new Afghan currency, the development of new Afghan financial institutions, and constantly emphasized core financial concepts: sound fiscal and monetary policy, transparent budget management, and efficient tax collection. Taylor also traveled to Afghanistan multiple times to assess progress. He used the knowledge he gained to press Afghan leaders as well as donor nations, and to adjust the actions needed to execute U.S. policy. Since President Bush emphasized the importance of measuring results, the NSC instituted regular reports and meetings, as well as a metric system with checklists and timelines, in order to measure reconstruction progress. As Taylor noted, "I am sure that this emphasis on metrics was one of the reasons that progress in Afghanistan continued even as another part of the global war on terror would absorb more and more of our time."⁶²

Development and reconstruction requirements in Afghanistan were immense, and projects varied widely in scope from major efforts such as new natural gas and oil pipelines, power generation projects, and road and irrigation channel reconstruction, to smaller-scale projects such as the building of schools and health clinics and digging wells for clean water. Support for the regeneration of private sector businesses was also a priority. International funds supported the development of industrial zones, and micro-credit financing projects provided hundreds of thousands of dollars to emerging small businesses, such as the Afghan businesses that provided cell phone service and television. To bring the country into the international trading order, the United States signed a bilateral trade and investment agreement with the Afghan government in September 2004, and in December 2004 the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) voted to start membership talks.⁶³ The Afghan Ministry of Commerce formally submitted its WTO accession request in November 2005.⁶⁴

By 2007, some 42 countries, the UN, the EU, the World Bank, and dozens of NGOs were engaged in economic development projects.⁶⁵ The State Department's USAID was the lead agency for coordinating and executing U.S. development and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Andrew Natsios, the administrator of USAID, spearheaded much of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and coordinated personally with international

partners on reconstruction and rebuilding projects. His mission director in Kabul was Craig Buck, and they both reported to the U.S. ambassador. Both the President and Secretary of State directed them to accelerate the reconstruction and development efforts, and the President approved their four major objectives: provide humanitarian assistance; strengthen the capacity of the Karzai government to govern the country; accelerate economic growth, particularly in the agricultural sector; and improve quality of life for the average Afghan. They methodically built their annual development and reconstruction plans by assessing the critical requirements via survey, establishing annual goals, and calculating resource requirements. For example, they established a standard of ensuring every Afghan citizen would be within a 4-hour walk of a clinic when determining how many health clinics to build. Also, when calculating how many radios they would need to distribute, their standard was at least one radio in every village. They submitted their annual plan to the ambassador for approval before it went to the interagency in Washington, DC.⁶⁶ The interagency coordination process was highly bureaucratic, and all reconstruction and development plans and proposals for Afghanistan worked their way through a hierarchical process of federal agency working groups before being forwarded to the Deputy's Committee, then the Principal's Committee, and finally to NSC meetings, chaired by the President, for final approval before submission to Congress for funding.⁶⁷

Substantial economic and development progress occurred between 2001 and 2008, but much remained to be done. The 2004 UN Human Development Index ranked Afghanistan 173 out of 178 nations; only Burundi, Mali, Burkino Faso, Niger, and Sierra Leone were poorer than Afghanistan.⁶⁸ In 2001, half of Afghanistan's population lived in absolute poverty.⁶⁹ The average annual income was less than \$200, one out of six children died before their first birthday, two-thirds of the population was illiterate, only 13 percent of the population had access to uncontaminated water,⁷⁰ and only 6 percent had access to reliable electricity.⁷¹

By 2008, average annual income had quadrupled to \$800, the national gross domestic product (GDP) growth had doubled since 2002 and GDP growth in 2007 was 11 percent. Infant mortality had dropped 22 percent, and 80 percent of Afghans were within a 4-hour walking distance of a health clinic as compared to 8 percent during the Taliban era. Additionally, more than 5.7 million children were enrolled in school, of which 1.8 million were girls as compared to only 900,000 boys enrolled during the Taliban era, and small scale water projects had benefitted over 1.5 million people. USAID worked with the international community to expand the provision of electricity, especially to the rural population. Since large scale energy projects take a long time to complete, USAID provided, operated, and maintained generators to keep the lights on in the large cities while the electricity projects were under construction.⁷² By 2007, Turkmenistan had built a 300 kilometer-long electricity distribution network.⁷³ By 2010, nearly 41 percent of the population had access to electricity due to the import of power from Uzbekistan and the rehabilitation of hydro-electric plants at Mahipar and Sarobi.⁷⁴ This "increased the daily supply of electricity to the capital from about 2 hours to at least 12 hours and, in most parts of the city, to 24 hours."⁷⁵

By 2009, some 60 international donors were active in Afghanistan.⁷⁶ About half of the international pledges for Afghan reconstruction were American. Between 2001 and 2008,

total U.S. assistance was almost \$30 billion. This amount included all reconstruction assistance, demining projects, humanitarian assistance, aid to refugees, human rights assistance, health programs, institution-building programs, counternarcotics assistance, and military “train and equip” programs for the Afghan army; it did not include the cost of U.S. combat operations.⁷⁷ In that time, the United States and international community built 5,000 miles of road (there were only 30 miles of intact paved roads in 2001), including the “ring road” which connected all of Afghanistan’s major cities, as well as a road from Kandahar to Spin Boldak. This key road opened a new truck route all the way from Kabul to the Pakistani border and thereby to the seaport in Karachi, relieving pressure on the Kyber Pass. UN teams destroyed one million mines and began focusing on demining priority use areas, such as residential and commercial areas, in 2007. In the Afghanistan Compact, the government and international community pledged to reduce by 70 percent the land area infested with mines by 2010.⁷⁸ A key indicator of growing confidence in the country was the return of refugees; by 2007, more than 4.6 million Afghan refugees had returned home in one of the largest return movements in history.⁷⁹

Other USAID projects included the rebuilding of communications networks and the creation of 32 independent radio stations. It distributed 30,000 radios, one in every village, and provided satellite equipment to rural communities to expand radio access to the entire country. It also trained and equipped local journalists. USAID built or refurbished over 680 schools, and printed and distributed 60 million textbooks in Dari and Pashto for grades 1 to 12. It trained more than 10,000 teachers through face-to-face training, as well as over 65,000 teachers through a radio teacher training program.⁸⁰ USAID constructed or rehabilitated over 680 health clinics, trained over 5,000 community health workers, 340 midwives, and 700 doctors, and provided guidance and training to administrators in the Ministry of Public Health. In the agricultural area, its assistance (seeds, fertilizer, and funds) and the reconstruction of 1,200 miles of irrigation canals resulted in the doubling of agricultural output.⁸¹

With the lifting of international sanctions, which had been imposed during the Soviet-Afghan war and during the Taliban regime, the U.S. Treasury unblocked over \$162 million in government and private Afghan assets. These assets were used to back the new Afghan currency. Along with the funds unfrozen by allies, more than \$350 million were released to the new Afghan government. The World Bank also reopened its office in Kabul in May 2002 after a 20-year absence, and by 2007 had loaned over \$168 million for reconstruction projects. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) also played a major role by providing over \$1.5 billion in loans and grants for major road, power, and agricultural projects.⁸² Finally, the U.S. administration gave strong support for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide debt relief. In July 2007, Afghanistan was declared eligible for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which meant 92 percent of its debt would be cancelled. The United States, Russia, and Germany further agreed to forgive all debt owed to them once Afghanistan reached a specified completion point under the HIPC program, thus total debt relief would equal more than \$11 billion.⁸³ In early 2010, both the World Bank and IMF agreed Afghanistan had met the completion point conditions for the HIPC program, which meant the country would benefit from significant debt and debt service savings.⁸⁴

The Afghan government committed itself to achieving critical economic and development goals and formally codified them in a variety of international agreements. In March 2004, the government endorsed the UN's Millennium Declaration as well as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).⁸⁵ Starting in 2006, UN agencies then worked with Afghanistan to develop the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which President Karzai approved in April 2008.⁸⁶ The country also identified specific goals, including infrastructure development, water resource management, urban development, agriculture, private sector development, and transparent financial management, in the Afghanistan Compact in 2006.⁸⁷ Afghan achievement of these goals would mean donor countries would disburse pledged funds more quickly because their confidence in Afghan capacity and transparency would increase. As of 2007, less than half of the funds pledged had been released by donor countries.⁸⁸ Each of the formal documents, the NDF, Afghanistan Compact, and ANDS, complemented and supported each other, as well as the UN MDG.

While the overall U.S. objectives remained constant, the strategy to meet them and the actions taken to execute the policy evolved over time, as progress was made, or to account for the sheer difficulty of bringing a country as destroyed and undeveloped as Afghanistan into the 21st century. While the country successfully laid the foundations for a market-based economy, established critical financial and economic institutions, and made progress in basic reconstruction projects and human development, administration officials recognized it still had a long way to go and faced some significant challenges.⁸⁹

A particularly difficult challenge was opium poppy cultivation. The Karzai government banned opium poppy cultivation in January 2002. It developed a national counternarcotics strategy and established institutions to eradicate crops and interdict the drug trade. Prominent Afghan political leaders publicly condemned the opium economy and religious leaders issued *fatwas*, declaring poppy cultivation in violation of *sharia* law. The UK was the lead nation for international counternarcotics assistance and policy, and under British leadership in 2002, the Afghan government, in cooperation with the United States and the international community, built a multifaceted counternarcotics initiative, which included public awareness, judicial reform, economic and agricultural development assistance, drug interdiction operations, and poppy eradication. This initial program was not successful, and poppy production increased. Additionally, the cultivation became closely linked with the insurgency; the Taliban and other insurgent groups used drug money to buy arms and logistics and to pay their militias. As a result, the Afghan government and the international community took new action.⁹⁰

In 2007, the Karzai government instituted an anti-corruption program to tackle drug-related corruption, and President Bush approved a change in U.S. policy so the United States could take the lead role. In March 2007, the administration appointed Thomas Schweich the Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform. In August 2007, Schweich unveiled a new strategy to strengthen Afghan counternarcotics efforts through a renewed focus on promoting rural development, coordinating counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations, and building political will. His plan was a comprehensive U.S. interagency initiative supported by a substantial increase in funding. (British funding during 2005-08 was \$510 million; American funding during 2002-08 was \$3.2 billion.) The strategy was designed to capitalize on achievements made thus far and improve

capabilities in weaker areas.⁹¹ Furthermore, in October 2008, NATO leaders agreed to allow ISAF forces to carry out targeted interdiction operations, as well as operations against facilities and facilitators.⁹² However, administration officials had understood from the beginning that over the long term, successfully stopping the opium economy and eliminating corruption and funding for the Taliban and other insurgents depended on developing alternative livelihoods and sources of incomes for farmers. The administrator of USAID declared:

The only way there is going to be security in Afghanistan . . . is if there's a growing economy with jobs . . . particularly in the agricultural economy. . . . One of the reasons that the militias have been fueled over the last few decades is because there's basically been no economy in Afghanistan. So the economy is not just a matter of family wealth, it's a matter of security of the population.⁹³

In another area, Afghanistan had the potential to become not only self-sufficient in oil and natural gas, but to become a net exporter of energy. In March 2006, the U.S. Geological Survey published a report that estimated the country had 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves.⁹⁴ Additionally, U.S. officials estimated the value of Afghanistan's mineral deposits at more than \$1 trillion in 2010.⁹⁵ Security concerns stymied exploitation of some of the resources, but a notable success occurred in 2007 when the Afghan government awarded rights to China to operate the Aynak copper mine. By mid-2010, China had completed construction of transport and electric power infrastructure and expected to have the mine operational in 2011.⁹⁶ Additionally, the country was in a prime location for a pipeline route from Central Asia to international markets. The leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan signed a protocol agreement for a gas pipeline project in December 2003. This project will undoubtedly benefit Afghanistan economically with its generation of transit fees and the creation of thousands of jobs, but security concerns delayed planning and construction.⁹⁷ However, in April 2008 the oil ministers of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India signed an agreement "to commence construction work on the trans-Afghanistan pipeline in 2010."⁹⁸ In the final analysis, the Bush administration agreed that the consolidation of political institutions and continued comprehensive economic development could not occur until citizens were secure, so it considered the military efforts critical.⁹⁹

Military Efforts.

President Bush's main military objective in Afghanistan was to provide security so that political and economic development could proceed.¹⁰⁰ Over time, this objective required military forces to do much more than just engage in combat. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued strategic guidance to Central Command (CENTCOM) shortly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and the CENTCOM staff produced an operational plan, that the President approved before the initiation of military action. The initial actions in Afghanistan, which began on October 7, 2001, were combat operations and humanitarian assistance. Afghan forces led the fight against the Taliban regime and were supported by several thousand U.S. and allied forces (primarily special forces), as well as U.S. airstrikes. The mission was called Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and

the objective was to eliminate al Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime. The international coalition had formed quickly. General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, informed the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 20, 2001, that “America’s NATO partners, as well as Australia, were already lining up to contribute forces and logistical support.”¹⁰¹ American forces were joined by Australian, British, Canadian, Danish, French, German, Norwegian, and New Zealand special forces; British, Canadian, German, and Australian infantry forces; and French, Dutch, Japanese, and Canadian air forces.¹⁰² The initial operation “was short and decisive,” and the coalition overthrew the regime more quickly than expected. Major combat operations were over within 2 months, after which CENTCOM and the coalition adjusted their strategy.¹⁰³ OEF operations continued, primarily in the south and south-east of the country where the Taliban and al Qaeda forces had retreated, but they were more focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Additionally, commanders recognized that they needed to engage in stabilization and reconstruction activities to consolidate the security gains.¹⁰⁴

The ISAF mission, which concentrated on stabilization and reconstruction, therefore complemented the OEF mission. All of the members of the NSC supported the concept of a broad coalition in Afghanistan and the President approved the U.S. policy supporting a multinational ISAF force to secure Kabul and its environs.¹⁰⁵ In December 2001, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 established the UN mandate for ISAF. Its mission was primarily to engage in postwar security and stabilization operations, although it also became increasingly involved in counterinsurgency operations. It also was to assist the government in extending its authority across the country to create a stable environment in which good governance, reconstruction, and development could occur. By 2008, 40 countries were contributing some 45,000 troops to the mission, including all 26 NATO members. ISAF conducted operations jointly with the Afghan National Army (ANA), and ISAF commanders coordinated closely with the Afghan government, other international organizations, and the U.S. OEF commander. ISAF forces were originally located only in Kabul, but they were progressively extended across the country in a phased process that was completed in 2006.¹⁰⁶ The UK commanded ISAF forces from December 2001-June 2002, Turkey took over from June-December 2002, Germany and the Netherlands jointly led ISAF forces from December 2002-August 2003, and NATO assumed permanent leadership in August 2003.

The multinational character of ISAF led to complex operational problems. Each contributing nation set its own legal and political restrictions, or national caveats, on what their military forces could do operationally, and there were differing perceptions of what the operational missions were. For example, some states defined coalition operations as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, others defined operations as stabilization and reconstruction.¹⁰⁷ Some countries, such as Germany, Italy, Spain and Turkey, were highly risk averse and would not let their troops engage in combat operations or operate in dangerous areas. There were also occasions when commanders engaged in combat operations against entrenched Taliban forces asked their allies for assistance and were refused based on strict national caveats. However, even with these problems, “Coalition forces have won every major battle with the Taliban and the other insurgents, which lack the firepower to stand against the superior military strength of U.S., NATO

and Afghan forces.”¹⁰⁸ The administration constantly pressed its allies to remove caveats on troops supporting ISAF, both directly by the President¹⁰⁹ and through the chairman of the military committee at NATO and at North Atlantic Council meetings. It had some limited success. For example, between April and September 2008, several NATO nations removed their caveats.¹¹⁰

Both OEF and ISAF tried to balance a fine line when it came to troop levels. On the one hand, coalition nations tried to maintain a light footprint so they did not lose the support of the Afghan population or were perceived as an occupation force.¹¹¹ On February 12, 2003, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman stated, “We do not want to overstay our welcome, or become the targets of various resentments, or foster a relationship of dependency that retards Afghan progress instead of promoting it.”¹¹² On the other hand, trying to keep non-Afghan troop levels to the minimum necessarily meant the forces were thinly dispersed across the country, making security gains difficult to maintain. In an effort to consolidate security gains and train Afghan security forces as quickly as possible, commanders constantly assessed coalition force levels and then asked their national governments for more forces when they felt they were needed. The Bush administration never denied requests for additional U.S. forces, although allied nations were often reluctant to increase force levels.¹¹³ As a result, the force levels progressively increased over time, and by 2008 there were 18,000 U.S. forces in OEF and 13,000 in ISAF. There were also almost 30,000 international forces in the country. Additionally, in October 2008, the administration decided to give the ISAF commander, General David McKiernan, operational control of OEF forces in order to facilitate the coordination of ISAF and OEF forces and establish unity of command.¹¹⁴ President Bush also approved General McKiernan’s request in the fall of 2008 to increase force levels by some 20,000 troops. This increase would give him the capacity to fully implement the new counterinsurgency strategy of “Clear, Hold, and Build,” to quell the insurgency, and to secure the south and southeast regions of Afghanistan.¹¹⁵ The President called it a “quiet surge.”¹¹⁶

For the United States to achieve its goal of ensuring security for the population over the long term, it had to engage in capacity building. That is, it had to train the Afghan military and police so those forces could become the primary providers of security. In 2002, President Bush approved the NSC’s recommendation that the United States become the lead nation for the training, mentorship, and development of the ANA.¹¹⁷ The ANA barely existed in 2004, but by 2008 it was over 50,000 men strong.¹¹⁸ Planners on the CENTCOM staff developed the overall “train and equip” plan, and the ultimate goal was to establish an 80,000-man ANA by 2010.¹¹⁹ Due to the increase in insurgent violence in 2007 and 2008, the United States and the coalition, in coordination with the Afghan government, agreed to accelerate training and build an Afghan army of 134,000 by 2013.¹²⁰ Both U.S. and NATO nations financed the construction of military training infrastructure and donated equipment and other support, such as uniforms. By 2008, the ANA was capable of leading and sustaining independent combat operations in some areas of the country.¹²¹

Germany was initially the lead nation for the training and development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) but its efforts were slow, poorly organized, and limited to traditional law enforcement training. In 2007, the EU agreed to assume the lead for

training, but its efforts were also limited and disappointing. Over time both coalition commanders and the Karzai government recognized that the Afghan police needed to do more than engage in traditional law enforcement activities. Given the violent tactics and targeting of civilians by the insurgents, they needed to assist the ANA in counterinsurgency, but neither the German nor the EU mandate permitted paramilitary or counterinsurgency training, so the U.S. administration approved the proposal for America to take over as lead nation and conduct the vast majority of the training in 2008. However, the EU still conducted traditional law enforcement training, especially in the north of the country.

U.S. funding for the program of \$5.9 billion between 2005 and 2008 dwarfed all other donors, but as Major General Robert Cone, head of the U.S. training mission, noted in October 2008, there was still a long way to go before there would be sufficient trained and competent police forces available to ensure security in local communities.¹²² By the end of 2008, the coalition had trained 75,000 Afghan police.¹²³

The U.S.-led OEF coalition developed the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2002 because the long timeline for the development of the ANA and the ANP meant coalition forces had a security gap problem. Since both OEF and ISAF forces were thinly dispersed initially, they could not provide essential security to remote parts of the country. The mission of the PRTs was to extend the influence of the Afghan government into the provinces and to provide security for reconstruction and economic development at the local level; thus PRTs blended security, governance, and development. Both military service members and civilians, from various agencies such as USAID, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, and their allied counterparts, manned the PRTs. Their size and missions varied, depending on the needs of the local community. Their activities ranged from building roads, schools and health clinics, to digging wells, providing micro-grants for small businesses, training and advising public administrators, and helping farmers grow legal crops.¹²⁴ In 2006, all PRTs came under the command of ISAF, and by 2008 there were 26 PRTs operating across Afghanistan; 12 of them led by the United States and 14 by NATO allies and coalition partners.¹²⁵

The Afghan government welcomed the PRTs, and shortly after the first few started operating, Secretary Rumsfeld called them “a good thing for the people of this country and we’re encouraged to continue and expand [them].”¹²⁶ The U.S. embassy considered the PRTs so integral to the long-term success of the counterinsurgency campaign, it proposed that the U.S. Government establish four new PRTs and increase the civilian presence in them by 200 personnel in November 2008.¹²⁷ However, the 2009 Defense Department report on Afghanistan noted that “greater emphasis must be placed on integration and harmonization of PRT core functions and objectives” to ensure the U.S. Government could evaluate their performance.¹²⁸

The U.S. administration and coalition partners also supported the programs encompassed by the UN’s Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), which were largely successful and ran between 2003 and 2008. (Note: the U.S. Military Office for Security Cooperation in the U.S. embassy had responsibility for managing coalition support for the programs). The ANBP program had four components: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); Heavy Weapons Cantonment; Anti-Personnel Mines and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD); and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG).

Japan was the lead donor nation for the DDR program, and by June 2006 the program was completed: over 93,000 soldiers were demobilized from the Afghan Military Forces (AMF). This organization was different from the ANA and some of the decommissioned AMF soldiers subsequently joined the ANA. More than 63,000 soldiers were disarmed. About 110,000 light, medium, and heavy weapons were collected and over half of them destroyed. In addition, over 53,000 ex-combatants had completed reintegration training with 90 percent finding other employment.¹²⁹

The objective of the Heavy Weapons Cantonment program was to bring central government control over the weapons that had flooded the country during the previous 2 decades, and to break the influence of the regional warlords. By 2005, ANBP and coalition forces had deactivated and consolidated over 12,000 heavy weapons such as anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, artillery guns, main battle tanks, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars into 14 controlled cantonment sites.¹³⁰

The APMASD program began in 2005. Experts estimated some 100,000 tons of various types of mines and munitions were littered in unguarded locations across the country, posing a significant security threat to the new government. Under the program, over 20 metric tons of the most dangerous munitions were transported to secure storage locations or destroyed. Before its mandate expired in 2008, the program also brought Afghanistan into compliance with the Ottawa treaty requirements which ban anti-personnel landmines.¹³¹

The DIAG was the final pillar of the UN program and was focused on the illegal armed militias which existed outside of the AMF. During the course of the program, which began in 2005 and ended in March 2008, over 1,000 individuals belonging to various illegal armed and criminal groups were arrested and forcefully disarmed, with more than 42,000 weapons confiscated and 14,000 destroyed. However, as of the end of 2008, there were still a number of illegal armed groups operating in the country, and the government was working on a program to deal with the problem which included various incentives such as employment opportunities and local development projects.¹³²

While the overall U.S. objective of providing security remained constant, the military strategy evolved over time and eventually included five key areas:

1. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations conducted primarily by OEF forces;
2. stability and reconstruction operations conducted primarily by ISAF;
3. the expansion of PRTs;
4. training and equipping the Afghan army and police forces; and,
5. supporting the UN's Afghan New Beginnings Program.¹³³

All of these programs were codified in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact and aligned closely with the goals and priorities of the ANDS. U.S. officials and military commanders repeatedly emphasized that as the capabilities of Afghan security forces, military and police, improved and they were able to lead and sustain operations independently and thus provide security to local populations, the roles of OEF and ISAF would continue to shift and become more focused on training and mentorship, rather than direct action combat operations.¹³⁴

Conclusion.

The Bush administration repeatedly emphasized over the years that security, economic development, stable governance, the rule of law, and human rights were all interconnected, and continued progress in all areas was necessary to ensure Afghanistan did not again become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist movements. General Myers put it well in his book, “Political, military, and economic progress . . . You can’t ask for just one of those three items to move independently of the others – they have to be linked to advance simultaneously because they are synergistic and build upon and reinforce one another.”¹³⁵ Overall, President Bush’s leadership was an important element in the progress that was made. He knew Afghanistan represented a long-term challenge and that a consistent U.S. commitment would be needed to encourage the Afghan people to continue to work on the monumental challenges they faced and to encourage allied nations and international agencies to stay engaged.¹³⁶ His overall objective never changed, and he aggressively pushed federal agencies to do more, and to do it better and faster. USAID administrator Andrew Natsios commented on the President’s insistence that rebuilding and reconstruction efforts be accelerated as much as possible. He said, “This is actually much more rapid than it normally is. But people are impatient. They want work done immediately.”¹³⁷

The administration was slow at times to recognize that some strategies needed to be changed, for example, both commanders and policymakers were slow to recognize and respond to the threat posed by the change in the insurgent’s tactics after 2006 and the destabilizing nature of the sanctuaries in Pakistan. However, by 2008, U.S. commanders began implementing a new counterinsurgency strategy, and force levels were subsequently significantly increased. Other examples of changes included the revised poppy eradication strategy and the taking over of the training of the ANP. Challenges remained, such as the need to increase allied training and mentoring personnel so that Major General Cone had the resources he needed to meet the new target of a 134,000-man ANA by 2013. Corruption was another acute problem that had to be more effectively addressed, for it undermined the faith of Afghan citizens in their government and inhibited the consolidation of democratic political institutions and stable governance.¹³⁸

Coordination among military coalition partners, U.S. agencies, and the international community to execute the various political, economic, and military efforts was never perfect, but various efforts were made over the years to improve it, some more successful than others. For example, as U.S. military operations evolved, incorporating security and stabilization missions with counterinsurgency missions, and as force levels increased, U.S. commanders reorganized or established new military command headquarters. In October 2003, CENTCOM established Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) which incorporated all U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The new commander and his personal staff moved from Bagram to Kabul so they were co-located with the U.S. ambassador in the embassy. The intent was to improve political-military cooperation and coordination.¹³⁹ This change resulted in “greater integration in implementing interagency policy and increased success in carrying out U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan.” The military team gave the ambassador a planning capability he did not previously have with state department assets. It enabled consensus-building among

embassy personnel, especially among defense, state, intelligence, and USAID, and was a mechanism for the collection and collation of information about “nearly all U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, be they military, USAID, or nongovernmental” which gave the ambassador an overall view of the ongoing programs and their shortcomings. This allowed him to adjust the military, political, and economic efforts and improved his ability to coordinate with international partners or seek support from the U.S. interagency.¹⁴⁰ Unfortunately, this unprecedented level of civil-military cooperation could not be replicated by the interagency in Washington, DC, due to the large size of the federal bureaucracy and because functional and regional areas of responsibility did not correspond with each other across federal agencies.

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General John Craddock commented on international coordination in October 2008, “The overarching strategy of the international community is correct, but we must find a way to enhance our comprehensive approach toward success. We need a [more] cohesive and coherent effort with cooperation and coordination building on common strengths and off-setting persistent shortfalls.”¹⁴¹ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates referred to new American efforts to improve coordination in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in early 2009. He said, “Various initiatives are under way that will better integrate and coordinate U.S. military efforts with civilian agencies as well as engage the expertise of the private sector, including nongovernmental organizations and academia.”¹⁴² Additionally, UN Security Council Resolution 1806, passed in March 2008, announced the intention of the UN to be more deeply engaged in Afghanistan and to strengthen its civil-military cooperation, especially with ISAF. The resolution expanded the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) throughout the country and gave it the lead role in coordinating the overall international civilian assistance effort.¹⁴³

The efforts of the United States and the international community were unprecedented in Afghanistan. By 2008, more than 40 countries and hundreds of governmental organizations and NGOs were engaged in the political, economic, and military efforts.

The high degree of the enduring international commitment was surprising when one considers that Afghanistan was just one front in the War on Terrorism. The President stated on October 7, 2001, that “Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader,”¹⁴⁴ and subsequent U.S. and international actions have borne this out. Since 2001, national governments have cooperated to stop the flow of funds connected to terrorist financing, law enforcement agencies coordinated their activities to track and arrest Islamic extremists from al Qaeda and its affiliated groups, and allied governments engaged in an unprecedented degree of intelligence sharing.¹⁴⁵ This international cooperation resulted in the disruption of a number of major terrorist attacks in Europe.¹⁴⁶ Programs such as the Proliferation Security Initiative successfully interdicted the provision of WMD-related military weapons, equipment, and delivery systems to jihadist groups and state-sponsors of terrorism, and helped disrupt the A. Q. Khan nuclear weapons network, leading to the “flip” of Libya which formally gave up its support to terrorism and the dismantling of its WMD program in 2003.¹⁴⁷ Military operations have been extensive and included support to the Philippine armed forces to combat the al Qaeda-affiliated group, Abu Sayyaf, to strengthening the capabilities of African nations to fight jihadist groups in the Pan-Sahel Initiative, to operations in the Horn of Africa to prevent

the emergence of another Taliban-like terrorist state in Somalia, to maritime operations worldwide which included ship boarding of suspect vessels, as well as the defeat of al Qaeda and other insurgents and the building of democratic political institutions in Iraq. Despite these wide-ranging efforts, the administration never lost sight of Afghanistan. Reconstruction funding and military troop levels never dropped off. (See Appendix II.)

Many of the countries and organizations engaged in Afghanistan established their own goals, metrics, and timelines to measure progress. The parallel efforts were not integrated and made policy execution difficult. In the United States, the Departments of Defense and State and their subordinate organizations translated the broad U.S. objectives into specific goals, metrics, and proposed timelines, but they were not integrated at the interagency level or with international efforts. Other examples included the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, a sub-element of the U.S. OEF command. In coordination with coalition partners, U.S. Government agencies, the UNAMA mission, and the Afghan government, it established civil-military goals, metrics, and measures of effectiveness to monitor progress in the areas of security, reconstruction, and governance.¹⁴⁸ General Craddock announced the establishment of a standardized system of 63 metrics in order for ISAF to track progress in December 2007,¹⁴⁹ and the UN's ANBP program had its own goals, metrics, and timelines. Before the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, there was no institutional mechanism at the international level to coordinate the various systems established by different countries and organizations to track and measure progress. Moreover, never in U.S. history had there been such an emphasis on measuring and tracking post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations.

Due to concerns about the reconstruction effort and whether U.S. assistance programs were effective and U.S. funds spent wisely, Congress created the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in January 2008. President Bush appointed Major General (Retired) Arnold Fields as the director of the organization in June 2008. He reported to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and was required to submit formal reports to Congress quarterly. SIGAR's mission was to "provide for the independent and objective conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan."¹⁵⁰ The first SIGAR report in October 2008 summarized the actions Major General Fields had taken to establish the organization. The second report in January 2009 gave a summary of the annual accountability and oversight reports that various federal agencies had published since 2002 and outlined the areas SIGAR would focus on over the next 18 months: review the internal controls and accountability procedures of U.S. federal agencies and Afghan ministries; review PRT effectiveness; review reconstruction strategies; and review crucial sectors like power generation to see if progress measured up to expectations. The report also made a preliminary assessment that reconstruction efforts were fragmented, and that existing strategies lacked coherence. It also recommended that ANDS should serve as the master strategy for the development and integration of individual national reconstruction strategies.¹⁵¹ Major General Fields noted in his testimony to Congress in March 2009 that his team had been welcomed by both Ambassador Wood and General McKiernan, but he also highlighted that his organization had a \$7.2 million shortfall for the remainder of fiscal year 2009, which would restrict his ability to hire essential staff

and build program offices in Afghanistan.¹⁵² If SIGAR could be properly funded and staffed, its investigation and oversight capabilities would represent a major step forward in not only U.S. economic reconstruction strategy development, integration, and execution, but also international coordination.

Besides the growing American and international recognition of the need for a systematic way to coordinate, integrate, measure, and track progress, a major effort was undertaken by the NSC and the new commander of CENTCOM, General Petraeus, in the fall and winter of 2008 to review the status of Afghanistan and the region, to conduct long-range planning, and to prepare a report recommending policy options to the new administration.¹⁵³ Among other things, the review emphasized the need for new thinking to address Afghanistan's challenges. For example, U.S. military planners in Kabul proposed a "bottom up" approach to capacity and institution building. That is, rather than continuing to focus primarily on supporting national-level political institutions, they recommended that the coalition and international community should focus more attention on supporting local and regional institutions.¹⁵⁴

The rise in insurgent violence was also a prime concern.¹⁵⁵ Secretary Gates noted in January 2009 that violence had increased in some areas of the country after 2006 because jihadists had fled to the region from Iraq where al Qaeda and its affiliates had suffered a resounding defeat. Also, the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan had become a sanctuary for the fleeing jihadists, al Qaeda, and the remnants of the Taliban.¹⁵⁶ More importantly, insurgents were relying more on asymmetric tactics, such as suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices, which they used against civilian targets, rather than coalition or Afghan conventional forces, to terrorize the population. General McKiernan noted in February 2009 that the increase in violence was also associated with coalition efforts to implement the "Clear, Hold, and Build" strategy in areas of the country where coalition forces had not previously been engaged. He said the "international force presence and Afghan security force presence is larger this year than it was a year ago, so we're operating in areas where we weren't before. That's going to bring with it, at least for a period of time, an increased level of violence" because the insurgents do not want to see economic and political progress advance in the south and southeast of the country.¹⁵⁷ General Myers echoed General McKiernan's assessment that insurgents were fighting to derail political and economic progress, but he also expressed confidence in the coalition forces when he said, "The American and NATO-ISAF forces have so far coped with it, while continuing to protect and foster reconstruction and humanitarian assistance."¹⁵⁸

The associated insecurity stymied and slowed some important development projects, but the violence did not stop significant economic development or seriously threaten the established democratic political institutions. Long-term success in Afghanistan required dealing with the increase in violence which was supported by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and thus NATO and the United States needed to continue to work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments, through the Tripartite Commission, which was established in 2003, and build a joint, regional strategy to address the problems in the tribal areas. This was a particular area of importance for CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, who outlined the need for increased U.S. and allied combat and support forces, as well as adjustments in military activities for better security of the Afghan population at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009.¹⁵⁹

There were many reports published over the years by various think tanks and other independent experts criticizing the failures in Afghanistan. However, most of the reports focused on specific issue areas and did not note the broad progress that had been made across the political, economic, and military spectrums, much less the high degree of international commitment and staying power of the participants. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman stated in 2004 that “We are realistic about the difficulties and about how far we have to go. But it is not ‘realistic’ to fail to recognize how far we have come.”¹⁶⁰ This statement was still relevant at the end of 2008. Both Afghan citizens and outside experts suffered from unrealistic expectations: surveys conducted in Afghanistan in 2008 indicated frustration on the part of many that positive change was not happening faster.¹⁶¹ However, the vast majority of Afghanistan was peaceful and progressing. A report published by NATO in 2008 noted that three-fifths of Afghanistan was considered stable. In fact, the regions in the north, the west, and around Kabul had been relatively peaceful for almost 2 years. The report also stated that some 70 percent of the recent insurgent violence had occurred in only 10 percent of the country, the South and the Southeast, where less than 6 percent of the population lived.¹⁶² Despite the increase in violence, the insurgents had not regained any of the territory they lost in 2001. They were pushed back to the Afghan-Pakistan border region in 2001, the South and Southeast regions of Afghanistan, and remained there. This is why, in his press conference on February 18, 2009, General McKiernan stated that additional U.S. forces flowing into Afghanistan would be deployed in the southern part of the country along the Afghan-Pakistan border.¹⁶³

The contribution this paper makes to historiography is a review of the broad dimensions of the Bush administration policy and strategy with regard to Afghanistan and the fact that it was multilateral and multinational, encompassing extensive political, economic, and military efforts during the entire period of the administration. It also provides broad documentation of the concrete progress made in the country between 2001 and 2008. In a short period of time, Afghanistan, with U.S. and international assistance, created the foundations for a representative democracy and market-based economy and identified clear future goals in various international agreements. The historiographic information currently available gives little sense of the internal debates within the Bush administration over the course of the entire 7 1/2 year period and provides no insight into the issues policymakers struggled with regarding priorities and resource requirements, or how they assessed program performance. Future declassification of administration documents, scholarly research, and the publication of memoirs by administration officials—especially key players like the ambassadors, cabinet officials, and members of the NSC staff—are needed to fill in this picture.

Unfortunately, media reporting has made filling in an accurate historiographic picture more difficult, for it did not provide a balanced picture. It overwhelmingly focused on the bad news and on military operations. Reports on positive developments were few and far between. There was little reporting on the significant progress made in economic development and reconstruction. There was very little reporting on the unprecedented and successful elections in 2004 and 2005 or the extremely high voter turn-out. There was little reporting on the preparations for the 2009 and 2010 elections, and there was no reporting on Afghan opinions surveys in 2008 which demonstrated that 67 percent of

Afghans thought their national government was doing a good job, 78 percent agreed democracy was the best form of government, 89 percent had confidence in the ANA, and 66 percent thought democracy and Islam were compatible.¹⁶⁴ Even worse, U.S. media reporting was often distorted or factually incorrect. *Time* magazine called Afghanistan a quagmire in late October 2001 after only 4 weeks of military operations. This characterization spread throughout the media and was repeated by such news organizations as the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*. Within 2 weeks of the declaration of quagmire, the Taliban had crumbled and allied forces had secured every major city in Afghanistan, including Kabul. The media consistently characterized U.S. policy as unilateral which could not be further from the truth, and it rarely corrected the erroneous reports. As Douglas Feith noted, "Harsh judgments were quickly exposed as errors. But the later successes on the ground failed to produce a more open-minded or civil style of journalism—let alone any corrections for the record."¹⁶⁵ General Myers echoed his frustration when he said, "Correcting inaccurate media coverage remained as difficult as it was necessary. . . . Sometime press stories were no more substantial than rumors."¹⁶⁶

In conclusion, progress notwithstanding, the country still had a long way to go by the end of the Bush administration. The change in administrations in 2009 presented an opportunity for major assessments and reevaluations of strategy, but given the early policy statements of the Obama administration, it appeared the overall U.S. objective would largely remain the same: disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its allies and keep Afghanistan from reverting back to a sanctuary for international terrorists.¹⁶⁷ The new administration also mirrored the political-economic-military strategy of the Bush administration. At the annual International Conference on Afghanistan in the Netherlands in March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "Our strategy . . . must integrate military and civilian activities." She added, "Security is the essential first step. . . . We must also help Afghans strengthen their economy and institutions." She highlighted the priority development areas as roads, public institutions, schools, hospitals, irrigation, and agriculture. She also reiterated the United States would continue to work with the UN and international community.¹⁶⁸ President Obama matched words with action by significantly increasing the size of U.S. assistance programs for Afghanistan.¹⁶⁹

One could argue there was a basis for optimism about Afghanistan over the long term as administrations transitioned from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, due to the massive international and Afghan efforts after 2001 and as General McKiernan stated in November 2008, "It's not about NATO or the international community; it's about the region and the people of Afghanistan. . . . I go back to a fundamental belief that the people of Afghanistan will win because they reject the Taliban and they reject . . . the radical insurgent groups that want to either replace the government in Afghanistan or make it so weak it serves their own purposes."¹⁷⁰ Senior leaders expressed confidence in the prospects for Afghanistan in early 2009. Secretary Gates stated, "While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can attain . . . our strategic objectives."¹⁷¹ General McKiernan said, "The insurgency is not going to win in Afghanistan."¹⁷² General Myers added, "The struggle will be long and hard, but the alternative is not acceptable."¹⁷³ It will take a number of years, but with continued international engagement and support, Afghanistan can reach the tipping point where it has enough internal capacity and capability to govern itself and secure itself, and the international community can

then step into the background. This would mean the definitive achievement of the main U.S. objective in Afghanistan: ensuring it never again becomes a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups.

ENDNOTES

1. The strategy was explicitly stated in the 2002 U.S. *National Security Strategy*: "As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists." George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: The White House, September 17, 2002, p. 7.

2. Bin Laden officially declared war on the United States and the rest of the civilized world several times, including in his August 23, 1996, "Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" and in his February 23, 1998, "Declaration of Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jews." Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, New York: Broadway Books, 2007, pp. 5-15, 216.

3. Presidential Proclamation Declaring National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims of the Terrorist Attacks, September 13, 2001, National Review, ed., "*We Will Prevail*:" President George W. Bush on War, Terrorism, and Freedom, New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc, 2003, p. 4.

4. Presidential Radio Address to the Nation, September 15, 2001, National Review, ed., "*We Will Prevail*," p. 8.

5. Richard B. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security*, New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 163.

6. Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008, pp. 50-71, 135-137, 507.

7. Radical Muslim clerics have issued numerous *fatwas* that sanction suicide bombing; the mutilation of dead bodies; the killing of noncombatant women, children, and the elderly; and the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction. Shmuel Bar, "Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas," *Research Monographs On the Muslim World*, No. 1, Paper 1, Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, August 2006, pp. 1, 10-15. General Myers also commented on the threat posed by jihadist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in his book: "There should be no doubt that if al-Qaida and their associates obtain fissile material, they will use it to produce real tragedies here in the United States or somewhere else in the world. The impact, of course, no matter where the event occurred, would be felt globally. There is a lot at stake, and we can't simply wish this threat away." Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, p. 280.

8. Feith, *War and Decision*, pp. 50-71, 135-137, 507.

9. Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress, September 23, 2001. National Review, ed., "*We Will Prevail*," pp. 13-17.

10. Presidential Address to the Nation, October 7, 2001, National Review, ed., "*We Will Prevail*," p. 33.

11. The United States contributed \$320 million in humanitarian assistance and worked with United Nations (UN) agencies such as the World Food Program and private volunteer organizations to ensure the food and medicine reached the Afghan people. "President Directs Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan," Remarks by the President to State Department Employees, October 4, 2001, Washington, DC: The White House, available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011004.html.

12. Presidential Speech to the Warsaw Conference, November 6, 2001, National Review, ed., *"We Will Prevail,"* p. 59.
13. George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, pp. 194-197, 205-207.
14. Presidential Speech at the Signing Ceremony for the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, December 12, 2001, National Review, ed., *"We Will Prevail,"* p. 97.
15. "U.S. Commitment to Afghanistan," Washington, DC: The White House, May 2005, available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/Afghanistan/us-commitment.html#democracy. See also gov/infocus/Afghanistan/us-commitment.html#democracy.
16. Presidential Speech to Military Personnel at Fort Campbell, KY, November 21, 2001, National Review, ed. *"We Will Prevail,"* p. 75.
17. President George W. Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan," Remarks by the President on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Washington, DC: The White House, the East Room, March 19, 2004, available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040319-3.html.
18. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 205.
19. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, p. 165.
20. Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002, pp. 1-8, 255, 257, 270, 277, 278.
21. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, "Afghanistan Country Page," last updated January 13, 2011, available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>.
22. Tanner, *Afghanistan*, pp. 243-270, 271, 277, 278.
23. Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL30588, August 27, 2003, p. 28.
24. Tanner, *Afghanistan*, pp. 277, 278.
25. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, p. 29.
26. Tanner, *Afghanistan*, p. 284.
27. According to President Bush, "I wanted to make sure the team had thought through the post war strategy. I felt strongly that the Afghan people should be able to select their new leader. They had suffered too much—and the American people were risking too much—to let the country slide back into tyranny. I asked Colin to work on a plan for a transition to democracy." Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 197.
28. The U.S. ambassadors have been Robert Finn, 2002-03; Zalmay Khalilzad, 2003-05; Ronald Neumann, 2005-07; William Wood, 2007-09; and Karl Eikenberry, 2009-present).
29. John D. Montgomery and Dennis A. Rondinelli, eds., *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p. 16.
30. *Ibid*, pp. 16-22.

31. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 207.
32. "Joint Statement on Afghanistan: Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Afghanistan," Washington, DC: The White House, November 13, 2001, available from <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-9.html>.
33. Douglas J. Feith, "Civil Liberties, Civil Society and Civility," Remarks at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 3, 2005.
34. "Joint Statement on Afghanistan: Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Afghanistan."
35. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, p. 11.
36. Adam Bennett, ed., *Reconstructing Afghanistan*, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Publication Services, 2005, p. 1. The Bonn Agreement laid out the following political transition process: establish the Interim Administration, convene an emergency *loya jirga* to establish the Transitional Authority, write a new constitution, convene a *loya jirga* to approve the new constitution, hold parliamentary and presidential elections. The Agreement also requested a UN force to ensure security and assist with establishing and training the new Afghan security and armed forces. It requested the UN to advise on the political transition process, and it requested the UN and international community to assist with recovery, reconstruction, and elections. *Afghan Bonn Agreement*, available from www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm.
37. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL30588, November 1, 2007, pp. 7-8.
38. "Fact Sheet: Election in Afghanistan," Washington, DC, The White House, October 7, 2004, available from merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/Afghanistan/WH/20041007-13.pdf.
39. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, p. 13.
40. "Fact Sheet: Election in Afghanistan," The White House, October 7, 2004.
41. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, p. 9.
42. "U.S. Commitment to Afghanistan," The White House.
43. *Ibid*; "Fact Sheet: Increasing Support to Help the People of Afghanistan Succeed," Washington, DC, The White House, February 15, 2007, available from merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/Afghanistan/WH/20070215.pdf.
44. The subsequent Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) reaffirmed the principles about the role of the central government articulated in the National Development Framework (NDF). Peter Marsden, "Afghanistan: Economy," *EuropaWorld Online*, London, UK: Routledge, 2010, pp. 6, 11.
45. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 209. Interestingly, the policy, strategy, and actions taken by the Bush administration were a concrete manifestation of the five arenas required for democracy to be consolidated as articulated by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. Linz and Stepan argue stable democracy is more than periodic elections, it requires a robust civil society, social movements, civic associations, and freedom of individual self-expression; a political society, political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and legislatures; the rule of law, hierarchy of laws, judicial system, and legal culture; a competent state bureaucracy, including security forces; and an economic society, state regulations, and public institutions like education, health, and transportation systems. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 7-15.

46. Peter W. Rodman, "United States Policy in Afghanistan," Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, April 29, 2004, p. 3, available from armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-04-29rodman.html.

47. Karzai moved quickly; there are 33 provinces in Afghanistan, and in 2004 he removed 16 provincial governors from office, as well as 17 provincial police chiefs. Rodman, "United States Policy in Afghanistan," p. 3.

48. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, pp. 10-12.

49. "EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration: Commitment to a new EU-Afghan Partnership," Strasbourg, Germany: Council of the European Union, November 16, 2005, p. 2.

50. Beth DeGrasse and Emily Hsu, *USIPeace Briefing: Afghans, International Community Chart a Joint Path Forward*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2006.

51. *The Afghanistan Compact*, The London Conference on Afghanistan, January 31-February 1, 2006, pp. 2, 3, 5, 16.

52. For years, the ambassadors held weekly meetings, via secure video teleconferencing, with the National Security Council (NSC) principals. The ambassador reported on what the United States was doing in the country and what the UN and the coalition were doing. He made recommendations on what the United States should do to support the UN and the Afghan government, and he answered the questions of the NSC. He was accompanied by the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan as well as other military and civilian staff members.

53. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, p. 13.

54. "NSPD-44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," Washington, DC: The White House, December 7, 2005, available from fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.htm.

55. Grant Kippen, *Elections in 2009 and 2010: Technical and Contextual Challenges to Building Democracy in Afghanistan*, Kabul, Afghanistan: Research and Evaluation Unit, November 2008, pp. 1, 2, 9, 12-14.

56. Feith, *War and Decision*, p. 153; Rodman, "United States Policy in Afghanistan," p. 3; Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*, pp. 10-12.

57. Andrew S. Natsios, "Reconstruction and Rebuilding in Afghanistan," On-the-Record Briefing, Washington, DC, Department of State, December 23, 2002, p. 7.

58. Bush, *Decision Points*, pp. 207, 209-121.

59. The White House, "U.S. Commitment to Afghanistan."

60. John B. Taylor, *Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007, pp. xi, xii, 1, 6-9, 12, 14.

61. Taylor, *Global Financial Warriors*, pp. 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38, 46.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 44, 46, 51, 52, 58, 61, 62.

63. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, p. 19.

64. Marsden, "Afghanistan: Economy," p. 36.
65. Robert Gates, "Defense Secretary on Successful NATO Mission in Afghanistan," Media Roundtable with Secretary Gates from Noordwijk, Netherlands, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 24, 2007, available from www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=75DD7DBE-2495-46D2-88B1-0049EBB28F17.
66. Natsios, "Reconstruction and Rebuilding in Afghanistan," pp. 1-4.
67. *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2009, p. 62.
68. "Asia and the Near East," Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, June 29, 2007, available from www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/afghanistan/eg.html.
69. "USAID Assistance to Afghanistan 2002-2008," Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, March 27, 2008, available from www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2008/fs080327.html.
70. Taylor, *Global Financial Warriors*, p. 38.
71. "USAID Assistance to Afghanistan 2002-2008."
72. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, p. 3; USAID Factsheet, "USAID Assistance to Afghanistan 2002-2008."
73. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkmenistan , Afghanistan Agree on Extensive Cooperation," Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, July 6, 2007, available from www.mfa.gov.af/rren-turk-afg-agree.asp.
74. The World Bank, "Afghanistan Country Overview 2010," August 2010, available from www.worldbank.org.af.
75. Marsden, "Afghanistan: Economy," p. 34.
76. The World Bank, "Afghan Ownership and Improved Local Level Accountability Key to Effective Service Delivery in Afghanistan, says new World Bank Country Strategy," June 4, 2009, available from www.worldbank.org.af.
77. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, Washington, DC, January 30, 2009, p. 37.
78. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, pp. 3, 43, 46, 47-55.
79. "Fact Sheet: Increasing Support to Help the People of Afghanistan Succeed," Washington, DC, The White House, February 15, 2007.
80. Note: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was specifically directed by the President and First Lady to put a heavy focus on education and school reconstruction, so they invested heavily in this area. Natsios, "Reconstruction and Rebuilding Efforts in Afghanistan," p. 3.
81. "U.S. Commitment to Afghanistan," Washington, DC, The White House; USAID Factsheet, "USAID Assistance to Afghanistan 2002-2008."
82. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, pp. 45, 46.

83. U.S. Department of Treasury, "United States and Other Paris Club Creditors Provide Further Debt Relief to Afghanistan," Press release, July 18, 2007, available from www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp495.htm.

84. The World Bank, "Afghanistan Country Overview 2010."

85. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. United Nations Development Program, "Afghanistan: Millennium Development Goals: Progress at a glance," New York: United Nations, 2005, available from www.undp.org.af/MDGs/index/htm.

86. The World Bank, "Afghanistan Country Overview 2008," May 2008, available from www.worldbank.org.af.

87. *The Afghanistan Compact*, pp. 4, 9-12.

88. Beth Ellen Cole, *USIPeace Briefing: Afghanistan's Economy: On the Right Road, but Still a Long Way to Go*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, November 2007, available from www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/1108_afghanistan_economy.html.

89. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 220.

90. Christopher M. Blanchard, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32686, December 6, 2007, pp. i, 1, 2, 9, 13, 14, 22-24, 27, 34, 44, 47.

91. *Ibid.* Before March 2007, Thomas Schweich had been the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, so he was prepared for the new job.

92. General John Craddock, "NATO Operations – Internal and External Challenges," SACEUR's Address to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Matters, October 20, 2008, available from www.nato.int/shape/opinions/2008/s081020a.htm.

93. Natsios, "Reconstruction and Rebuilding Efforts in Afghanistan," p. 1.

94. Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, p. 19.

95. Marsden, "Afghanistan: Economy," p. 33.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

97. *Afghanistan Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal*, Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, February 2006.

98. Marsden, "Afghanistan: Economy," p. 35.

99. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 207.

100. *Ibid.*

101. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, pp. 2, 168-173, 176, 195.

102. British, French, and New Zealand special forces were the first to arrive in Afghanistan in October 2001; the other special forces arrived in December 2001; other coalition forces, such as combat forces and

air forces, started arriving in November 2001. Eric Micheletti, *Special Forces: War on Terrorism in Afghanistan*, Paris, France: Histoire & Collections, 2003, pp. 6, 115, 118, 128, 142, 150, 157, 158.

103. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, p. 2.

104. *Ibid.*, pp. 197, 208, 269-270; Feith, *War and Decision*, pp. 140, 153, 156-157.

105. Feith, *War and Decision*, pp. 90, 134.

106. NATO, *Briefing: Helping secure Afghanistan's future*, Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 2008, pp. 1-4, 12.

107. Timo Noetzel and Sibylle Scheipers, "Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden Sharing or Disunity?" Chatham House Briefing Paper, London, UK: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, October 2007, pp. 2, 4-6.

108. James Phillips and Lisa Curtis, "The War in Afghanistan: More Help Needed," *Backgrounder*, No. 2124, April 17, 2008, pp. 2, 6.

109. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 212.

110. Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 30.

111. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 207.

112. Peter W. Rodman, "Post-Conflict Afghanistan," Testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, February 12, 2003, p. 3, available from foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/RodmanTestimony030212.pdf.

113. In hindsight, President Bush acknowledged the problems posed by the emphasis on a light footprint: "This strategy worked well at first. But in retrospect, our rapid success with low troop levels created false comfort, and our desire to maintain a light military footprint left us short of the resources we needed. It would take several years for these shortcomings to become clear." Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 207.

114. Transcript: General David McKiernan speaks at Council's Commanders Series, November 18, 2008, available from www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-d-mckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcripts.

115. "President Bush Meets with General David McKiernan, Commander for NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan," Washington, DC: The White House, October 1, 2008, available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081001-7.html; Ann Scott Tyson, "Gates Backs Buildup of U.S. Troops in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, November 22, 2008, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/21/AR2008112103504.html.

116. David Mckeeby, "Bush Makes Surprise Farewell Visits to Iraq, Afghanistan," Embassy of the United States, Belgium, December 15, 2008, available from www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=B2D786BF-D8F0-443D-84F0-4F6F196C3673.

117. Rodman, "Post-Conflict Afghanistan," p. 5.

118. Victoria Nuland, "Ambassador Nuland on NATO Emerging in Afghanistan," Embassy of the United States, Belgium, February 1, 2008, available from www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=FA944BB7-EBE7-44D8-9AB6-D0F6630271CE.

119. NATO Press Release, "ISAF's Strategic Vision: Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance (ISAF) in Afghanistan," April 3, 2008, available from www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-052e.html.

120. Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 8.

121. Nuland, "Ambassador Nuland on NATO Emerging in Afghanistan."

122. International Crisis Group, "Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy," *Asia Briefing*, No. 85, December 18, 2008, pp. 1, 9, 10.

123. Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 9.

124. The White House, "Fact Sheet: Helping Afghanistan Achieve Sustainable Progress," March 13, 2008, available from merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20080313-4pdf.

125. *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq*, GAO-08-905RSU, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 26, 2008, p. 3.

126. Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Media Availability with Afghan President Karzai," U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, September 7, 2003, available from www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3142.

127. *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 30, 2009, p. 10.

128. Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 74.

129. United Nations Development Program, *Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP)*, available from www.undpanbp.org.

130. *Ibid.*

131. *Ibid.*

132. *Ibid.*

133. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are not completely distinct and separate missions. As force levels increased and missions evolved, they began to overlap. For example: the U.S. 101st Airborne Division is an ISAF force and its mission is counterinsurgency; in order for OEF forces to consolidate success from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, they also have to engage in stability and reconstruction actions; and the PRTs undoubtedly engage in stability and reconstruction operations every day.

134. "President Welcomes Afghan President Karzai to the White House," Washington, DC: The White House, May 23, 2005, available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050523.html; Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, "U.S. Policy in Afghanistan," Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 14, 2008, available from 2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/2008/103437.htm; Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, "Afghanistan: A Plan to Turn the Tide," Remarks Before the Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, January 31, 2008, available from 2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/2008/103507.htm; Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, "U.S. Committed to Afghanistan," Remarks to the Press, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 8, 2008, available from www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/2008/111669.htm; Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., "Afghan Army Becoming More Effective Force, U.S. General

Says," *America.gov*, November 25, 2008, available from www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/November/20081125153919dmslahrellek8.581179e-02.html.

135. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, p. 306.

136. Bush, *Decision Points*, pp. 206, 208, 211, 212, 220.

137. Natsios, "Reconstruction and Rebuilding in Afghanistan," p. 5.

138. The Afghan government recognized the corrosive impact of corruption. In 2007, the head of the Afghan Ministry of Finance asked the World Bank to analyze the causes of corruption and develop recommendations for how the Afghan government could fight it at the annual World Bank/IMF Board of Governors' meeting. In the 2009 annual meeting, the Afghan representative from the Ministry of Finance reported on the ongoing anti-corruption efforts. Anwar Ul-Haq Ahady, Minister of Finance, "Speech for the Plenary Session of the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund," Washington, DC, October 22, 2007, p. 2; Omar Zakhilwal, "Statement by the Hon. Omar Zakhilwal, Governor of the Bank for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at the Joint Annual Discussions," Istanbul, Turkey, October 6-7, 2009, p. 2.

139. Before the creation of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), military commanders and their headquarters were located in Bagram, Afghanistan.

140. Tucker B. Mansager, "Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 40, 1st Quarter, 2006, pp. 80, 82, 83.

141. Craddock, "NATO Operations—Internal and External Challenges."

142. Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2009. Additionally, on February 21, 2009, the author spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Bill DeMarco, who was the Joint Staff J5 representative responsible for coordinating U.S. interagency cooperation for stabilization operations. For the previous 6 months, Lieutenant Colonel DeMarco had been working closely with counterparts on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, in the State Department, USAID, the Treasury Department, and the Combatant Commands to improve U.S. security and stabilization efforts.

143. Phillips and Curtis, "The War in Afghanistan: More Help Needed," p. 7.

144. Presidential Address to the Nation, October 7, 2001; *National Review*, ed., "We Will Prevail," p. 34.

145. Information is personal knowledge based on author's work at U.S. European Command where she assisted in the coordination of U.S. military, intelligence, financial, and law enforcement actions with allied nations in Europe.

146. Foiled terrorist plots included: February 2002 — plot to bomb U.S. embassy in Rome; December 2002 — plot to bomb Russian embassy in Paris; March 2004 — bombing plot in UK in which police seized half a ton of ammonium nitrate; November 2004 — plot in Spain to bomb Spain's High Court, Madrid soccer stadium, and other public landmarks; September/October 2005 — bombing plot in France against Paris Metro, Orly airport, and the HQs of France's internal security service; October 2005 — plot in Netherlands to bomb Schipol airport, Dutch Parliament, Borssele nuclear reactor, Dutch Defense Ministry, and secret service; August 2006 — plot to bomb 10 aircraft traveling between the UK and the United States; September 2007 — plot in Germany to bomb Frankfurt airport and a U.S. airbase. Sources for this information are a variety of government sources, to include the annual U.S. State Department, "Country Reports on Terrorism."

147. John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad*, New York: Threshold Editions, 2007, pp. 119, 125-127.

148. Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, *Metrics to Monitor Governance and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Development of Measures of Effectiveness for Civil-Military Operations and a Standardized Tool to Monitor Governance Quality*, Kabul, Afghanistan: United States Combined Forces Command, March 12, 2004, pp. 1-10.

149. Carl Robichaud, "Assessing Afghanistan: NATO's 63 new metrics," *Afghanistan Watch*, December 5, 2007, available from www.afghanistanwatch.org/2007/12/assessing-afgha.html.

150. SIGAR Homepage, "SIGAR: Independent and Objective Oversight," available from www.sigar.mil.

151. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, pp. i, 1-3, 9.

152. Arnold Fields, "Effective Counterinsurgency: How the Use and Misuse of Reconstruction Funding Affects the War Effort in Iraq and Afghanistan," Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 25, 2009, p. 8.

153. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 218.

154. Based on author conversation with Colonel Jim Helis on January 9, 2009. Colonel Helis was the Director of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. He was deployed to Afghanistan in June-December 2008 to the ISAF CJ5 as Chief of Plans to assist in long-range planning.

155. Note: the increase in violence has to be taken into context. Afghanistan was largely peaceful 2002-04, and the recent increase is nowhere near the level of violence seen in Iraq. American combat fatalities are a good example for U.S. forces have engaged in the most intense fighting: in 2002 and 2003, there were less than 20 combat-related fatalities each year; in 2004, there were 25; in 2005 and 2006, there were approximately 65 fatalities each year; in 2007, there were 80; and in 2008, there were 130 combat fatalities. Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 32. As a point of comparison, on average, there are approximately 200 training accidents that result in fatalities in the U.S. Army every year; these are not related to military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.

156. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee," DoD Speech Transcript, January 27, 2009, p. 1, available from www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337.

157. General David McKiernan, "DoD News Briefing with Gen. McKiernan from the Pentagon," DoD News Transcript, February 18, 2009, p. 6, available from www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4354.

158. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, p. 270.

159. General David H. Petraeus, "The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan," Commander's Remarks at the 45th Munich Security Conference, February 8, 2009.

160. Rodman, "Post-Conflict Afghanistan," p. 10.

161. Kippen, *Elections in 2009 and 2010*, p. 6.

162. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Briefing: Helping secure Afghanistan's future*, p. 4.

163. McKiernan, "DoD News Briefing with Gen. McKiernan from the Pentagon," pp. 1, 7.
164. Ruth Rennie, ed., *State Building, Security and Social Change in Afghanistan: Reflections on a Survey of the Afghan People*, Kabul, Afghanistan: The Asia Foundation, 2008, pp. 23, 72, 173, 177.
165. Feith, *War and Decision*, p. 126.
166. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, p. 189.
167. President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," Presidential Speech Transcript, West Point, NY, December 1, 2009, available from [/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan).
168. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks at the International Conference on Afghanistan," U.S. Department of State Speech Transcript, March 31, 2009, available from www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/03/121037.htm.
169. Marsden, "Afghanistan: Economy," p. 18.
170. Transcript: General David McKiernan speaks at Council's Commanders Series.
171. Gates, "Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee," p. 1.
172. McKiernan, "DoD News Briefing with Gen. McKiernan from the Pentagon," p. 9.
173. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, p. 270.

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY

July 1973	Zahir Shah overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, who established a dictatorship.
April 1978	Communists overthrow Daoud.
December 27, 1979	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan to support the Communist government.
April 14, 1988	Gorbachev agrees to United Nations (UN)-brokered accord and begins withdrawal.
January 1989	United States closes its embassy in Kabul.
February 15, 1989	Soviet withdrawal of troops complete.
April 1992	Establishment of <i>mujahedin</i> government.
1992-96	Civil war among <i>mujahedin</i> factions.
1993-94	Taliban formed.
November 1994	Taliban begins offensive to control Afghanistan by seizing Kandahar.
February 1995	Taliban begins siege of Kabul, an 18-month stalemate in which most of Kabul is destroyed.
May 1996	Osama Bin Laden moves the al Qaeda organization to Afghanistan.
September 27, 1996	Taliban takes control of Kabul and forms Taliban government.
September 11, 2001	Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the United States.
September 24, 2001	U.S. presidential executive order freezes terrorist assets and financing activities.

October 7, 2001	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) begins; military campaign against Taliban government and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
November 14, 2001	UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1378, calling for a central UN role in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
November 21, 2001	United States hosts initial international donor's meeting in Washington, DC.
December 2001	Taliban government collapses.
December 5, 2001	Major Afghan factions meet under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany, and sign an agreement to form a 30-member interim government to run Afghanistan until the meeting of a traditional national assembly (<i>loya jirga</i>); Hamid Karzai selected as chairman of the interim administration. The Bonn Agreement also provided for an international peacekeeping force to maintain security.
December 20, 2001	UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1386, authorizing an international peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The United Kingdom (UK) assumes lead nation for ISAF (December 2001-June 2002).
January 2002	Afghan government banned opium poppy cultivation and developed a national counternarcotics strategy.
January 20-21, 2002	Donor conference in Tokyo; United States pledges \$296 million for reconstruction aid. Total pledges for reconstruction amounted to \$2 billion for 2002 and \$4.5 billion over the next 5 years.
March 23, 2002	Schools reopened; girls returned to school for the first time since the Taliban came to power.
March 2002	In Kabul, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Robert Finn was sworn in.
May 2002	The World Bank reopens its office in Afghanistan after a 20-year absence.

June-December 2002	Turkey assumes lead of ISAF.
July 9, 2002	Inaugural meeting between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Pakistan on the construction of a gas pipeline.
June 11-19, 2002	<i>Loya jirga</i> meets and selects a transitional government to run Afghanistan for 2 years; it also approves Hamid Karzai to continue as leader.
October 2002	35-member constitutional commission appointed to draft a new constitution.
December 2002	United States announces plan to form Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), composed of U.S. forces, representatives of U.S. aid, and other agencies and allied personnel. Concept is for the PRT to provide security for aid workers to help with reconstruction. By the end of 2008, a total of 26 PRTs (12 led by the United States and 14 led by various NATO nations) were spread across the country.
December 2002- August 2003	Germany and Netherlands assume joint lead of ISAF.
March 17, 2003	Donor conference in Brussels; United States pledges \$820 million for Afghan programs.
July 2003	Karzai creates a joint Afghan-UN committee with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to organize elections.
July 2003	Karzai announces defense ministry reforms that allow Japan as lead nation and UNAMA to begin a program to demobilize up to 100,000 private militiamen and reintegrate them into Afghan society.
August 11, 2003	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumes permanent lead of ISAF, putting to rest the difficulty of identifying a new lead nation every 6 months.
November 2003	New Afghan constitution unveiled and distributed throughout the country.
December 2003	Protocol agreement for a gas pipeline project signed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan.

January 2004	Constitutional <i>loya jirga</i> approves and adopts the new constitution.
March 2004	Afghan government endorses the UN Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals.
September 2004	United States and Afghanistan sign a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement.
October 9, 2004	Presidential elections held (80 percent turnout). Hamid Karzai declared the winner on November 3, 2004.
December 13, 2004	Member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO) vote to start membership talks with Afghanistan.
May 8, 2005	Karzai holds consultative <i>loya jirga</i> on whether to host permanent U.S. bases; the 1,000 delegates support an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security.
September 18, 2005	Parliamentary and provincial council elections held.
December 18, 2005	Parliament convenes for the first time.
February 1, 2006	London Compact adopted at a London conference on Afghanistan; Compact outlines Afghanistan's 5-year development strategy.
March 2006	Energy experts announce the existence of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in Afghanistan. If these amounts are proven, the country could be relatively self-sufficient in energy.
March 2008	UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1806 expands the UNAMA mandate and gives it a lead role in coordinating the international civilian assistance effort.
April 2008	President Karzai approves the Afghanistan National Development Strategy developed jointly with the UN.
October 2008	Voter registration for the 2009 and 2010 elections begins.
October 2008	NATO approves proposal for ISAF to conduct drug interdiction operations and General McKiernan dual-hatted as OEF and ISAF commander.

APPENDIX II

RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING AND MILITARY FORCE LEVELS

	U.S. Funds Appropriated for Reconstruction	U.S. Force Levels in Afghanistan	International Force Levels in Afghanistan
FY 2001	\$192.53 million	Less than 4,000	Several thousand
FY 2002	\$1,070.35 million	9,000	5,000
FY 2003	\$986.09 million	10,000	5,000
FY 2004	\$2,578.00 million	17,000	8,000
FY 2005	\$4,896.02 million	19,000	10,500
FY 2006	\$3,527.16 million	21,000 (10,600 in OEF) (10,400 in ISAF)	18,000
FY 2007	\$10,030.62 million	27,000 (12,000 in OEF) (15,000 in ISAF)	26,000
FY 2008	\$5,993.02 million	31,000 (18,000 in OEF) (13,000 in ISAF)	29,800
FY 2009	\$9,881 million	62,000 (36,000 in OEF) (26,000 in ISAF)	35,000
FY 2010	\$11,595 million	100,000	40,000

Sources: Information on Reconstruction funds: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2009, p. 37; Information on U.S. and international military force levels: various government and open source documents, including Afghanistan Index, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, November 11, 2010, p. 4.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Major General Gregg F. Martin
Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.**

**Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II**

**Author
Colonel Deborah Hanagan**

**Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce**

**Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

**Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil**



FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil

ISBN 1-58487-503-8



9 781584 875031

90000>

