Text Browser Navigation Bar: Main Site Navigation and Search | Current Page Navigation | Current Page Content
Dr. Stephen D. Biddle is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. From June 2001-July of 2006, he was a Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Before joining SSI in June 2001, he was a member of the political science faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has held research positions at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia; Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA); and the Kennedy School of Government's Office of National Security Programs. Dr. Biddle has presented testimony before congressional committees on issues relating to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, conventional net assessment, and European arms control; served as U.S. Representative to the NATO Defense Research Group study on Stable Defense; is a member of the Defense Department Senior Advisory Group on Homeland Defense; is co-director of the Columbia University Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS); and holds an appointment as Adjunct Associate Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. His book, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, was published by Princeton University Press in July 2004, and won the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Award Silver Medal for 2005. His other publications include articles in Foreign Affairs, International Security, Survival, The Journal of Politics, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis, and Military Operations Research; shorter pieces on military topics in The Wall Street Journal, Orbis, Joint Force Quarterly, and Defense News; various chapters in edited volumes; and 28 IDA, SSI, and NATO reports. His research has won Barchi, Rist, and Impact Prizes from the Military Operations Research Society, and he won the Army Superior Civilian Service Medal in 2003. Dr. Biddle holds AB (1981), MPP (1985), and Ph.D. (Public Policy, 1992) degrees, all from Harvard University.
Authored by Dr. Stephen D. Biddle, Mr. Jeffrey A. Friedman.
Critics of irregular-warfare transformation often cite the 2006 Lebanon campaign as evidence that modern nonstate actors can wage conventional warfare in state-like ways. This analysis assesses this claim via a detailed analysis of Hezbollah’s conduct of the campaign at the tactical through theater-strategic levels of war.
Authored by Dr. Stephen D. Biddle.
Three years after 9-11, some of the most important choices for American grand strategy have yet to be made. Heretofore, the costs of pursuing ambitious but ill-defined goals have been high but tolerable; the Iraqi insurgency, however, is raising the costs to the point where choices must be made. The two natural alternatives, rollback and containment, each have strengths. But they also have real drawbacks--and the choice between them rests on some basic, and inherently subjective, value judgments.
Authored by Dr. Stephen D. Biddle.
America's novel use of special forces, precision weapons, and indigenous allies has attracted widespread attention since its debut in Northern Afghanistan. Many think it caused the Taliban's sudden collapse. For them, this "Afghan Model" represents warfare's future, and should become the new template for US defense planning. Critics, however, see Afghanistan as an anomaly.