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Research Professor of National Security Studies (JIIM)
Area(s) of Expertise: Post-hostilities operations, counter-insurgency, training indigenous security forces, information operations, Army force structure, Regions: Korea, Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq
Email Professor John R. Martin
Professor John R. Martin joined the Strategic Studies Institute in mid-2009 and is the Institute's specialist in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational issues. Professor Martin previously served at SSI from 2000 to 2004, serving as the Chairman of the Art of War Department and concurrently as the Institute's Deputy Director. Professor Martin was also a Visiting Professor at SSI in 2006 and 2007.
Professor Martin served in the U.S. Army for over thirty-one years, retiring as a Colonel. He served extensively in the Republic of Korea, primarily in tactical Aviation, but also with the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and as commander of a liaison team with the Republic of Korea Army. He also possesses considerable experience in Washington, DC, where he worked on Army force structure, manning the force, the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program and providing language training. While in the Army, Professor Martin was deployed operationally to Guam (1975: Operation New Life), Kosovo (1999: Task Force Falcon), Bosnia (1999-2000: SFOR), Afghanistan (2002: CJTF-180) and Iraq (2003: 0RHA/CPA; 2005: MNSTC-I, 2007: MNF-I).
Professor Martin was the Executive Editor of Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. This major government report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction was published in early 2009 and analyzed the reconstruction of Iraq since 2003.
Professor Martin graduated with highest distinction from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, in 1988. He is a 1996 graduate of the National War College and holds Master's Degrees in National Security Affairs from both institutions. Professor Martin also holds a Master's Degree in Aeronautical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, MD. He is a 1974 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY.
*The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI.
Authored by Dr. Steven Metz. Edited by Professor John R. Martin.
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to initiate its latest monograph series, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions. SSI started this project in an effort to give leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces some important insights into how military advice was provided to the Nation’s civilian leadership during the many years—including the months before the invasion—of the war in Iraq. Dr. Metz starts this series with an impressive review of the decision to remove Saddam Hussein by force. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that this and the succeeding monographs will generate debate on just how the United States made decisions—some of them disastrous—about Iraq. The resulting better understanding of the decisions should lead to strengthening of the processes—where appropriate—so that the military and civilian leadership forge better decisions in the future.
Authored by Professor John R. Martin.
One of the basics of strategy is understanding the foe and the type of war in which a nation is involved. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does not fit easily into the mold of war, but that is because of too much comparison with conventional wars; the Cold War may provide a better model. This report chronicles the panels and resulting papers from the Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, in April 2006.
Edited by Professor John R. Martin.
Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens.