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Authored by Dr. Steven Metz.
In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible—perhaps probable—strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its “responsible withdrawal” from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged—with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision—could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timely and shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.
2010 SSI Annual Strategy Conference Report "Defining War for the 21st Century"
Decisionmaking in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force
COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy
Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceputalizing Threat and Response
Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower