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U.S. Army War College >> Strategic Studies Institute >> Publications >> Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present, and Future
U.S. Army War College >> Strategic Studies Institute >> Publications >> Details
Authored by Dr. Andrew Mumford.
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.

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