

RAF and Protection Warfighting Function

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Through regional alignment, the Army will maintain its warfighting skills and complement these skills with language, regional expertise and cultural training.

—General Raymond Odierno¹

As the United States concludes the second of two major conflicts within a twelve year period, military leaders are reflecting on lessons learned, looking inward, analyzing recent innovations, and reviewing strategy in order to enhance and codify the nation's war-fighting capabilities. They are preparing for future conflicts in a rapidly changing global environment by scrutinizing equipment, doctrine, force structure, personnel, and related military systems.

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Raymond Odierno, recently implemented the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept execution order (December 2012), which lays out the Army's strategy to support the joint force in the future operational environment. This concept provides combatant commanders (CCDRs) with tailored, responsive and consistently available Army forces, including joint task force (JTF) headquarters to respond to emerging global challenges.² Regionally Aligned Forces provide the CCDR with land forces for a variety of missions as set forth in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) in accord with the National Security Strategy (NSS).

RAF is a fresh concept for providing resources for the CCDR. The question is, however: do RAFs provide CCDRs with the best means for executing strategy in the 21st century? Continued analysis, after-action reports, and further research are warranted. This report examines one of six warfighting functions (WfFs)—Protection—to determine if RAF provides appropriate capability. Challenges and risks associated with Protection are identified using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) problem-solving construct. This essay describes the post-9/11 environment, shows how forces will be regionally aligned, and elaborates on the WfF of Protection. The Army Service Component Command (ASCC), corps, division, and brigade levels are analyzed to identify potential capability gaps in Protection. Finally, the DOTMLPF analysis is applied to optimize the operational assets necessary to assure the protection requirements needed by CCDRs.

Background

The 21st century strategic environment poses an array of complicated challenges. Challenges include smaller conflicts, rather than large-state wars, engagements with smaller nation states with high-tech militaries, encounters with non-state actors, and possibly interventions into internal conflicts. Global challenges include boundary disputes, social and ethnic inequality, economic competition and instability, cyber warfare, world health issues, water disputes, and the impact of climate change on an increasingly multi-polar world. Twenty-first century war will exist when any state or a group, including non-state actors, employs lethal force against an opposing entity to achieve an objective.³ As General Rupert Smith asserts, however, the days of "war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs no longer exists." But conflict, confrontation, and

combat will continue.⁴ The Department of Defense Joint Publication 1 acknowledges that the strategic security environment will increasingly be “characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict.”⁵

This new global environment is fraught with challenges. It presents national security threats from state and non-state actors; international alliances is replete with changing national societies and cultures, federal budget constraints, and a socially-networked public. Further complications derive from a bi-partisan U.S. federal government with no common domestic or global strategic vision and, moreover, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that often complicate global issues. “Despite NGOs good intentions. For all their strengths, NGOs are special interests. The best of them . . . often suffer from tunnel vision, judging every public act by how it affects their particular interest.”⁶ Within a CCDR’s AOR, NGOs are not aligned with national visions of stability and prosperity. NGO’s efforts sometimes inhibit progress and sometimes deliver overlapping and redundant programs. Additionally, as the United States is more than ever closely tied and rapidly interconnected to all world actors and events, every issue is complicated. Globalization and the information revolution are major catalysts for rapid change.⁷ T. Owen Jacobs sees the environment as filled with “volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity” a strategic environment succinctly characterized by the acronym VUCA.⁸

The President’s National Security Strategy states that “we will continue to rebalance our military capabilities . . . to address the full range of military operations.”⁹ The strategy also adjusts the nation’s long-term priorities by focusing attention and resources on a wider set of countries and challenges (including both the Asian Pacific and the Middle East).¹⁰

To execute this strategy in an increasingly complex world, the U.S. Armed Forces are seeking innovative concepts. The CJCS published the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations which proposed a “globally integrated operations” approach.¹¹ The Navy and Air Force are considering the Air-Sea Battle Concept to address anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) issues. This document is globally focused, but prioritized towards the Asia Pacific and Middle East. The CSA supports the CJCS’s vision for the Army through 2020 and beyond with a posture statement of “Prevent, Shape and Win.” To realize the intent of a Prevent, Shape and Win approach, the Army must become regionally aligned, i.e., flexibly tailored for particular missions.¹² The CSA’s RAF concept seeks to achieve the President’s strategic ends through the ways and means provided by the joint force and the several services. The G3/5/7 defines RAF as:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. This includes Army total force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.¹³

Adopting the RAF concept entails significant concerns and challenges as doing so is a shift from the steady state and shaping operations practiced for decades.

Protection

Just how viable is the RAF's concept for providing the WfF of Protection in a JIIM environment? Does it assure the preservation and survivability of the RAF throughout the CCDR's operational environment? Overall, six WfFs are designed to assist commanders. "Commanders use the warfighting functions [WfFs] to help them exercise command and to help them and their staffs exercise control" throughout planning, preparing, executing and assessing operations.¹⁴ By definition, a WfF consists of "a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and establish training objectives."¹⁵ All WfFs must synchronize scalable capabilities to provide lethal and non-lethal effects.¹⁶ The Protection WfF is defined as:

The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States and its multinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The Protection warfighting function [WfF] enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power.¹⁷

Protection is a continuing activity carried out through 13 sub-tasks: employ safety techniques; implement operations security; provide intelligence; physical security; anti-terrorism measures; law and order; survivability; health protection; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations; explosive ordinance disposal; air and missile defense; personnel recovery; and operational area security. Successful execution of these sub-tasks assures comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring protection (see Figure 2).¹⁸




Figure 2. Comprehensive, Integrated, Layered, Redundant, Enduring¹⁹

The Army's WfFs nest closely with the joint functions. Just as the Army WfFs reinforce and complement one another, so do the joint functions. Joint Pub 3-0 defines the joint functions as a consolidation

of “related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate synchronize and direct joint operations.”²⁰ The joint function of Protection focuses on four primary areas: active defense measures, passive defense measures, use of technology to reduce fratricide, and emergency management and response to reduce personnel and equipment loss.²¹ The joint function of Protection consists of twelve sub-tasks. Integration and synchronization of these tasks and systems can maximize operation effectiveness (see Figure 3).

- **Provide Air and Missile Defense**
- **Protect U.S. Civilians**
- **Provide Physical Security for Forces and Means**
- **Conduct Defensive Countermeasures**
- **Provide CBRN Defense**
- **Conduct OPSEC**
- **Secure/Protect Forces, Bases, Joint Security Areas and LOCs**
- **Conduct Personnel Recovery**
- **WMD Consequence Management**
- **Establish Anti-Terrorism Programs**
- **Establish Measures to Prevent Fratricide**
- **Provide Emergency Management Response Capabilities and Services**

Figure 3. Joint Function Protection Tasks²²

Other WfFs, such as C2, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Sustainment, Intelligence are relatively straight forward. Joint and Army doctrine codified these decades ago and together they form the basis for all military operations. Protection, however, is not as clear because it spans the other five WfFs.²³ Both the Army’s and joint force’s protection measures require coordination with the other WfFs. Providing health protection, for example, requires coordination with sustainment assets. Conducting personnel recovery operations requires coordination with movement and maneuver as well as mission command.

Emphasis of Protection

The CCDR is ultimately responsible for executing the Protection WfF responsibilities and military joint security operations in his AOR—including for all assets assigned or attached. This responsibility is established in joint publications, and the President’s Unified Command Plan. When planning and executing operations or developing campaign plans, both joint and Army publications codify joint and Army responsibility to reinforce and complement one another. Army and joint foundational doctrine is designed to prevent worst case scenarios. It applies to joint operations that are conducting combined arms maneuver (CAM) or wide area security (WAS)—operation plan phases zero through five. Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Security Operations, addresses security and protection tasks for bases, base nodes, ports, and airfields. It also focuses on joint security areas designated to facilitate protection of bases.

Staffs planned and integrated all aspects of the WfFs during operations in OIF and OEF. In these operations, units incorporated robust staffs and abundant assets. If a command identified a need for a certain capability, whether it was to enhance protection with physical security barriers, the command submitted an operational needs statement (ONS) to secure the asset. Overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds were available to resource almost any capability gaps.

As U.S. forces decrease in size and capacity, and as operations focus on steady state theater security cooperation (TSC) activities and contingency planning with reduced OCO and decreasing budgets, how can

HQs and Staffs stay focused on incorporating and synchronizing the Protection WfF tasks in order to preserve the force? Presumably, U.S. military forces will operate in and outside joint security areas; they will be required to do more with less. In this environment, opportunistic adversaries may seek to exploit gaps among our allies and partners while U.S. leaders focus on narrowing U.S. footprints abroad. The U.S. military will become smaller yet remain shaped and prepared for expeditionary operations.

To execute the RAF concept, U.S. landpower forces will use smaller, more dispersed unit footprints as they conduct TSC activities. Therefore, the Protection WfF requires greater emphasis to preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power if needed. Consider the AFRICOM example: Several actors within the AFRICOM AOR pose on-going threats to U.S. interests. The AFRICOM Commander, General David Rodriguez, claims that the “highest number of high-threats [are] to our embassies is in Africa.”²⁴ He believes that African adversaries are learning from experiences in Afghanistan how best to attack U.S. facilities.²⁵ As staffs focus on coordinating and planning steady state operations to prevent and shape the environment through TSC activities, threats persist—requiring a variety of Protection WfF considerations. AFRICOM is responsible for protecting U.S. personnel and facilities across the region, whether in CJTF-HOA joint security area of operations, or the ASCC AOR not under CJTF-HOA. During steady-state and shaping operations, Protection WfF planning and tasks necessarily increase. Additionally, small unit teams across austere and large AOs require innovative means to ensure they are appropriately protected. Once an OPLAN is executed and operational phases transition from phase 1 to 4, military efforts increase, and the emphasis on Protection WfF planning and tasks decreases as established HQs integrate Protection WfF tasks. Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the Protection WfF, steady state operations and OPLAN phases.




Figure 4. Emphasis on Protection Tasks and Planning²⁶

RAF Missions

Doing more with less is the new normal. As the armed services compete for resources in a fiscally constrained environment, the Army must find increasingly efficient ways to employ the force effectively. RAF provides CCDRs with the landpower resources needed to meet emerging regional demands. The CCDRs are

required by the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) to prepare and review theatre campaign plans (TCP).²⁷ The TCP is the CCDR's vehicle for operationalizing the theater strategy. The TCP provides a framework within which CCDRs conduct TSC activities with regional partners through cooperative security and development activities and doing so informs the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP). "U.S. forces engage in security cooperation for many reasons, not just as a preventive measure, but also more frequently to help other countries' military forces become more professional, proficient, interoperable, and reliable in burden sharing."²⁸

TSC activities through the TCP or OPLANs provide the CCDR the steady-state or phase 0 shaping operations to prevent emerging crises and help ensure strategic and operational end states.²⁹ CCDR's TCPs generate mission demands. For example, AFRICOM and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conduct hundreds of TSC activities throughout their AORs to meet TCP objectives. In order to prevent and shape the AOR, CCDR missions include TSC, crisis response, and operational support. According to JP 5-0, TSC activities consist of "military engagement, multinational combined exercises, personnel exchanges, and similar security cooperation activities in order to facilitate" partnerships.³⁰ Currently, for example, the 2d Armored brigade combat team, 1st Infantry division (2/1 ABCT) is providing a security force, response force, and is conducting numerous TSC activities in the AFRICOM AOR—no less than 108 activities during its first six months. As RAF elements deploy to conduct TSC, they can provide standard security and response force packages, providing the CCDR with emergent crisis options.

RAF will also enable CCDRs to broaden the mission to include tasks other than pure TSC. The CSA approves of flexibility, but flexibility carries added risk such as undertaking operational tasks and emerging missions that are not in the brigade's scope. Expanded missions, if any, will still require a request for forces (RFF) for SECDEF approval.³¹ The completed TCP links CCDRs ends and ways to the various forms of national strategic guidance to "prevent, shape, security and peace." In short, the CCDR can conduct security cooperation activities while employing a RAF brigade to help shape the environment and prevent unstable situations from escalating into measured conflict.

Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations help the commander shape the security environment.³² The CJTF-HOA, for example, leverages its strategic position as a regional power projection location. CJTF-HOA coordinates with African partner nations, other coalition partners, and interagency/intergovernmental entities to achieve coordinated efforts to deter and defeat transnational threats, to protect U.S. security interests, to prevent future conflicts, and to support humanitarian and disaster relief.³³

The United States Government (USG) agency with primary responsibility for foreign nations is the Department of State (DoS).³⁴ The CCDRs provide all military resources conducting TSC to support DoS efforts in country. CCDRs conduct many and varied missions: building partner capacity and capability through mil-to-mil exercises; military engagements; security force assistance; foreign military sales; and building diplomatic relations. CCDRs must work closely with the DoS to coordinate and conduct security cooperation activities. Land forces provide the means to shape the CCDR's environment to achieve the TCP objectives. Some security cooperation activities require smaller teams across numerous countries within a large AOR. Therefore, typical RAF missions include military education, security assistance, civil affairs support, rotational military exercises and engagements, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. General Carter Ham (a former AFRICOM commander) stated that since March 2013, 2/1 ABCT supported U.S. AFRICOM in developing enduring relationships and cooperation with partner nations' land forces. RAF engagements will likely range from small travelling contact teams to support for major exercises.³⁵ As the United States draws down from two major conflicts and the Army shifts to the RAF concept, RAF brigades deployed in support of TSC activities will be smaller and more dispersed while conducting a greater variety of missions.

With smaller unit footprints across large CCDR's AORs, the biggest challenge will be to ensure that RAFs deployed for TSC activities have an overarching umbrella of protection, especially when supporting weak nation states. As Nathan Freier argues:

Future ground forces will be vulnerable to numerous hazards in almost all operational conditions. . . . [These military] forces, hardware, and secure communications and networked information sharing will all be vulnerable to lethal and non-lethal threats. . . . Even operations in the most benign environments conducted in pursuit of purely humanitarian purposes will occur under conditions of persistent threat from a variety of challenges . . .³⁶

The CCDR and his ASCC or a joint task force are responsible to plan and coordinate the Protection WfF to ensure that the Soldiers, citizens, and partnered nations are adequately protected. Theater level HQs, like ASCCs, have the capability to coordinate the overarching Protection WfF tasks, such as air missile defense and CBRN defense operations. For remote small teams dispersed throughout a large AOR, however, ASCC level HQs and JTFs must ensure that Protection WfF tasks are incorporated into the plans and orders.

ASCC and brigade HQs should not assume Protection WfF measures are redundant. To provide adequate protection, CCDRs and DoS should coordinate plans and integrate protective measures. Responsibility for ensuring seamless transitions for protection when changing HQs must be shared between these HQs. Monitoring systems and tools within the levels of command should be established to ensure working protection systems are in place. The ASCC HQs provides the military resources to achieve TSC activities; the DoS bears the responsibility for ensuring its internal systems account for these teams. Coordination and integration of capabilities throughout the joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment bind these organizations together so as to achieve maximum situational awareness and synchronization.

HQs Capabilities

Both joint and Army doctrine codify ways to coordinate and integrate Protection tasks. The primary difference between joint and Army doctrine is the designation of the providers of protection assets and designation of responsible protection personnel. The ASCC HQs coordinate and provide the resources for requesting subordinate HQs, such as theater air and missile defense assets in a joint operational area for a JTF. Also, Army and joint doctrine differ regarding the organizational level at which Protection tasks are coordinated and integrated. ASCC HQs, Army corps HQs and division HQs have organic Protection cells in their HQs. Army BCTs do not have Protection cells. If a JTF is stood up in a CCDR's AOR, its Protection cell is typically an afterthought during Phase 0. Instead, these HQs stand up ad hoc cells and assign personnel to coordinate functions as an additional duty. Moreover, the BCT HQs normally do not deploy during RAF missions; rather, they remain at home station planning and coordinating subordinate units for these missions. For theater steady state operations, the ASCCs are responsible for the Protection WfF. During Phase 0 in an operation or contingency plan, JTF HQs are responsible for protection of the RAF troops on the ground. Also, ASCCs and JTFs must coordinate through the DoS country teams to coordinate Protection WfF tasks. A significant challenge identified by 2/1 ABCT was the lack of interoperability of hardware, communications, and networks between the ASCCs and JTFs and small teams on the ground. For example, 2/1 ABCT small unit teams do not have satellite phones or computer reach back on secret computer servers (SIPR access).³⁷ TSC activities properly planned and resourced, with coordination across all HQ's functional cells, staffs, and the DoS country teams could identify these shortfalls and provide protection resources.

BCT Level

BCTs are the RAF's primary unit. The BCT HQs can integrate and coordinate Protection WfF tasks among staff members. But, they will be challenged as they carry out all other assigned tasks. They can quickly be over tasked as they plan and execute home station training while concurrently deploying multiple subordinate units. For example, the 2/1 ABCT commander organized subordinate units and staff to plan, prepare, and execute missions directed by the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) while also maintaining the capability to deploy a contingency expeditionary force (CEF).³⁸

When BCTs deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the theaters were well established and after two or three years mature. HQs were available at levels from brigade to theater, augmented with service and joint staffs to plan, integrate, and execute the numerous Protection WfF tasks. Those HQs had functional systems in place that incorporated the Protection WfF into the daily operations and plans. For example, in OIF the Central Command (CENTCOM) Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) designated the commander, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), as the joint security coordinator for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As unit commander, Major General Harold Bromberg conducted and synchronized several protection activities, to include leading vulnerability assessments and force protection boards. Consequently, during OIF a single commander standardized, integrated, and coordinated force protection standards which were comprehensive and promoted clarity.³⁹ Additionally, ASCC and corps level HQs overlapped their explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) assets within the BCTs' AOs to coordinate and mutually support these enablers.

RAF units conducting theater security cooperation activities, crisis response, and mil-to-mil exercises tend to operate in immature and austere theaters. So the OIF enablers and organizations may not be available for RAF operations. Accordingly, ASCCs or newly established JTFs will be challenged to implement steady state or phase 0 operations. As the RAF concept matures, these challenges will be mitigated as BCTs acquire institutional knowledge of the region, build on established relationships, and incorporate interagency interoperability with the ASCC or a JTF HQs.

DOTMLPF analysis

Doctrine provides the guidance around which military organizations organize, plan, train, and fight. Doctrine drives the organization's training, material acquisition, and leadership development. Doctrinal analysis reveals the way the military conducts operations and may reveal better ways to close capability gaps.⁴⁰ An existing joint and service doctrinal basis addresses the application of Army and joint Protection functions and attendant staff organizations. Emphasis on the Protection WfF has matured since 2001. The June 2001 FM 3-0 *Operations* did not cite Protection as a Battlefield Operating System (BOS)—which identifies the physical means needed to accomplish missions. FM 3-0, however, lists Protection as an element of combat power.⁴¹

The Army recently issued Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-37 *Protection*. The ADP identifies the fundamentals and the ADRP provides elaboration of the fundamentals. Army doctrine now identifies Protection as an important WfF that must be incorporated into plans, training and execution to preserve the force and maximize operations effectiveness.⁴² ADRP 3-37 nests with ADRP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations* which describes Protection as continuing activity and a WfF, and clearly aligns this function with the joint definition of the same.

Army doctrine defines Protection and its enablers; it lists the protective tasks, which ensure systems are synchronized and integrated throughout the operations process. This new Army doctrine provides overarching guidance and a conceptual framework for explaining how the Army conducts Protection to support

commanders while conducting unified land operations. The doctrinal principles depict the Protection WfF as a layered, comprehensive, redundant, integrated and enduring activity that must be carefully planned and adequately resourced.⁴³ Consequently, the ADRP 3-37 provides a list of fourteen supporting Protection tasks incorporated throughout plans and orders. With regard to health protection, for example, the ADRP 3-37 provides specific directions and a checklist of sub-tasks to ensure appropriate health protection measures are established “to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers.”⁴⁴ Army doctrine also specifies the organization, duties, and responsibilities of Protection cells; it explains how to integrate the Protection WfF into the operations process by conforming to Protection WfF principles.

Joint Publication 3-0 *Joint Operations* and 3-10 *Joint Security Operations* provide doctrine overviews of overarching protection frameworks for the joint staff and HQs, including guidance of incorporating protection into the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Both joint and Army publications are complementary. For example, both doctrines identify supporting Protection WfF tasks that align with each other; however, ADP 3-37 identifies two additional supporting tasks: provide intelligence support and provide internment and resettlement.⁴⁵

Generally speaking, Army doctrine has a more holistic view of the Protection WfF than does joint doctrine. Additionally, Army doctrine provides a field manual for theater security cooperation. FM 3-22 explains operations in steady state and shaping environments. Joint doctrine does not specifically provide a commensurate manual to explain steady state operations. Current joint doctrine is primarily focused on preventing worst case scenarios: phased operations and contingency plans.

What is needed is a joint publication that addresses steady state operations or security cooperation. Joint Publication 3-10 *Joint Security Operations* provides a baseline for the joint environment; it specifies responsibilities, levels of threats, and techniques and procedures for managing joint security areas. The document, however, is CAM, WAS, and decisive action centric. Although this joint publication does allow joint force commanders (JFC) to establish the operational framework while providing for flexibility, it does not address TSC activities within the joint security area.⁴⁶ Joint doctrine should provide specific guidance on the full range of military operations, to include steady state operations consisting of TSC activities as well as humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

Additionally, useful doctrine should also incorporate some of the State Partnership Program (SPP) National Guard Brigades’ techniques and procedures as models. For twenty years, the 48th IBC T Georgia National Guard (NG), for example, has partnered with the country of Georgia. It has developed functional systems and working procedures for the United States Army Europe (USAREUR), the DoS Georgia Country Team, and the National Guard Bureau. Brigade liaison officers are attached to USAREUR and rotated every two years. Planners are embedded with the country team, coordinate upcoming military activities, and address force protection concerns for small teams that deploy to Georgia.⁴⁷ Improving joint doctrine will help to both acknowledge and address the challenges and capability gaps that exist in steady state activities like these.

Organizational analysis examines how the force is structured to fight at all levels: theater, corps, divisions, brigades, and others. The goal is optimal structure that will maximize unit effectiveness.⁴⁸ Three concerns exist, however. First, are corps, divisions, and BCTs HQs properly staffed to ensure that Protection WfF capabilities are integrated into the operations? Currently, corps and division HQs are designed to operate, when augmented, as single JTF HQs. They currently have authorized personnel to manage the tasks typically conducted during the past twelve years of conflict. With the new round of force structure recommendations, corps, divisions, and BCT HQs are scheduled to reduce staffs and change structure. A recommendation from the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) for organizing the Protection cell resulted in eliminating and transferring positions to the RC. A 25 percent HQs personnel reduction, currently pre-decisional,

eliminates the Protection cell and reduces the HQs staff capacity. The responsibility for the Protection WfF is now assigned to the Movement and Maneuver cell. With reduced Protection WfF expertise, HQs staff will depend on the Movement and Maneuver Cell to fully integrate and support commanders' Protection WfF requirements. This cell must support tasks to enable sustainment (i.e., general engineering and counter-IED operations) and to preserve the force (i.e., survivability, base camps, and urban search and rescue).⁴⁹ If this remains the case, then the HQ's staffs sections will not be optimally organized to execute the appropriate Protection WfF tasks. Reductions in key enablers, staff cells, and expertise reduces organizational unity of effort which, in turn, undermines the full range of military operations.

JTF HQs are usually built from a corps and division HQs organization. In standing JTF headquarters, the joint security cells are typically ad hoc, mission-set dependent, and heavily augmented for major combat operations. However, they are not usually manned for steady state or phase zero operations. The number of tasks, requirements, and oversight do not change with the type of mission—whether it is security cooperation activities or decisive action. Protection cells, joint security cells, even protection working groups continuously monitor and evaluate the ongoing functions. Requirements to incorporate the Protection WfF for RAF and SPP units across the CCDR's AOR remain. Any reorganization of the Protection cells that mandates reduction in the HQs staff weakens the commander's flexibility and capability to protect the force.

A second concern is that BCTs lose their military police (MP) platoons in 2014, leaving the BCTs with no MP enablers. This loss reduces the BCTs' capability to conduct supporting Protection WfF tasks, specifically enforcement and internment. While this loss can be mitigated with the additional BCT maneuver battalion, reliance on maneuver battalions for law enforcement will detract from their capability to conduct core maneuver tasks.

The third concern is that the proponent for EOD is organized to support the Sustainment WfF. EOD should be aligned under the Protection WfF proponent in the MSCoE. Most EOD core tasks support Protection WfF tasks; for example, providing explosive ordnance disposal support is a Protection WfF supporting task. Aligning the EOD proponent under the MSCoE ensures unity of effort and provides a direct line of communications, eliminating the need for complex coordination among multiple centers.

The elimination of HQs Protection cells in corps and divisions, the loss of IBCT's MPs, and misaligned proponents pose considerable risk. Such losses will weaken IBCTs' capacity while complicating staff functions to integrate Protection into operations. Furthermore, division HQs have no brigade level organizations to draw upon to compensate for these losses. CBRN, MP, and engineer (EN) functional brigades are not associated or aligned with the divisions, unlike the sustainment and fires brigades.

During downsizing, the Army must make the right bill-payer choices for future Army capabilities. Cutting MP, Air Defense, CBRN, Engineers, and Aviation personnel in headquarter staffs, thus eliminating Protection cells—all Protection enablers—will lead to gaps in planning and integrating the Protection WfF and systems necessary to preserve combat power on the ground.

The Army should align Reserve Component maneuver enhancement brigades (MEBs) with CCDRs or Army divisions. MEBs can augment ASCC and JTFs HQs with those MP, Engineer, Aviation, and Air Defense (ADA) staff enablers for six-month rotations. MEB augmentees enhance these HQs to provide the proper emphasis on the Protection WfF and compensate for reduced staff positions. MEBs could be aligned to a division and provide this resource in the absence of the 25 percent reduction. The MEB is indispensable to the current force; it provides focused protection and assures mobility for the supported commander. Normally MEBs operate in support of divisions, but MEBs can support corps and higher level commands. The Reserve Component must plan carefully to provide the MEBs with appropriate timelines and predictability to train, fund, and deploy.

The Army should deploy small corps and division Protection cells to the ASCC or JTF HQs for six month rotations to augment these staffs. This augmentation cell would come from the corps/division HQs aligned with the CCDR, and it would include MP, ADA, Aviation, and CBRN personnel. Even the RAF BCT could augment some of its HQs personnel to support its organic deployed units. This provides a couple of advantages. First, it is cost effective since augmenting the Protection WfF assets to assist the ASCC or JTF HQs is more economical than providing additional HQs. Second, these augmentees are trained protection cell personnel from the organic RAF home station, so ad-hoc cells are not needed. These augmentees have a relationship and established ties with the RAF elements down range. This linkage facilitates home station reach back for any coordination. Additionally, they can serve as a liaison team for both the forward HQs and home station BCT.

Finally, the Army and MP proponent should conduct further analysis on the elimination of MPs from the BCTs. The MSCoE Protection proponent declares MP support to the BCTs will be provided from the echelon above Brigades (EAB) force pool. Also, a revised doctrinal rule of allocation (ROA) provides an MP company to support each committed BCT in phases I-III, and one MP company plus one MP platoon in phase IV.⁵⁰ Under this concept, there are not enough AC MP units to support this proposal, and the MP proponent is looking for a RC solution.⁵¹ This is a vital Protection WfF asset and enabler for BCTs throughout all operational phases including steady state and shaping operations; an asset that needs to be preserved.

Training analysis is concerned with how to prepare forces to operate from the individual level through advanced collective levels, including during joint exercises, while seeking techniques to offset capability gaps.⁵² Units struggle to properly and appropriately train their Soldiers who deploy to the regionally aligned areas. Detailed country clearance and deployment checklists and training requirements are required for small units and individual Soldiers. There is a large onus on the BCT HQs to ensure Soldiers are thoroughly and diligently prepared for deployments. Sufficient time must be allocated to complete force protection checklists.

Lessons learned from 2/1 ABCT should be leveraged. RAF units, for example, should leverage country teams for expertise to gain a situational understanding of country security. RAF units should coordinate early and often with country teams to determine alert procedures of deployed RAF teams when significant changes in the security environment are noted.⁵³ Last, the MSCoE should consider increasing Protection WfF educational opportunities that focus on Protection WfF tasks for RAF personnel. For example, MP courses may introduce students to a country's legal system. Likewise, survival training schools offered by the Special Forces Warfare Center and School can sharpen a Soldiers' survivability skills.

Material analysis examines the systems and equipment needed by the force to optimize operational effectiveness. Through recommended acquisitions, it also seeks to eliminate capability gaps. Likewise, inadequate or antiquated systems should be replaced.⁵⁴ The 2/1 ABCT after action-report indicated that small unit teams had limited communication capability and were unable to communicate with higher echelons. Additionally, the African theater lacks communications infrastructure in many areas where the brigade personnel and teams were dispatched. Most RAF teams were dependent on civilian cell phones and hotel internet. Force protection considerations, cyber threats, and large physical security factors strongly justify the Army's investment in appropriate communications capability.⁵⁵

AFRICOM is an austere environment, and the RAF BCT MTOEs do not support robust secure communications to sustain numerous small teams that deploy separately while operating within a large AOR. These units should have access to SOF type communications equipment. RAF missions should be augmented with portable satellite communications to provide reliable communications either organic to regionally aligned BCTs or resourced to the small teams by the ASCC HQs.⁵⁶ Additionally, some off the shelf commercial

technology might serve well to enhance accountability, reporting, and communications with country teams or higher HQs.

Leadership and education analysis examines overall professional development across the entire rank structure and seeks new solutions to eliminate capability gaps.⁵⁷ The leadership and education of personnel is adequate to implement the RAF concept and assure the Protection WfF. A large part of educating leaders and Soldiers involves learning the culture, regional expertise and language (CREL) to understand the RAF environment and area of operations. A great example is 2/1 ABCT's Dagger University. To further prepare for specific, assigned RAF missions, 2/1 ABCT created a brigade-level training program to fulfill a myriad of Army, FORSCOM, and USARAF deployment and training requirements. The Dagger University program is offered monthly to prepare for upcoming training missions and incorporates all pre-deployment tasks.⁵⁸ Dagger University enables Soldiers/students to understand the threat. The BCT can tailor the university to any regionally aligned AO. It enhances the Protection WfF for the individual Soldier and small deploying units. Students receive specialized information about insurgencies in briefings tailored to the region. Additionally, information, briefings, and updates from ASCC HQs, JTF HQs and the regional security officer (RSO) modified the force protection measures to address differing conditions. 2/1 ABCT contacted the Department of State RSO to determine additional threat and force protection measures.⁵⁹ RAF BCTs should establish their own educational protocol, possibly modeled after Dagger University.

Personnel analysis considers the availability of qualified people for the complete range of military operations.⁶⁰ Proposals for personnel reductions are currently being staffed and recommended in corps, divisions and BCT HQs. Impending reductions will impact the HQs staff cells and enablers. Corps HQs' loss of 21 positions, division HQs' loss of 14 positions, and BCT HQs' loss of the MP platoon all add up to less capability to integrate the Protection WfF tasks and systems into future operations. The proposed reductions would eliminate 40 percent in maneuver support and protection positions in the division HQs. Such a reduction far exceeds the aggregate 25 percent goal across all HQs. The single most important component of Army organizations is personnel. Proposed reductions include creating a dual-hatted Provost Marshall additionally serving as the Protection cell chief in both corps and division HQs and eliminating or consolidating some engineering positions. In order to protect the force, the Army must find the right balance of personnel and capability while accommodating mandated downsizing.

Reducing protection enablers could pose risk to many future steady state operations as the Army transitions to the RAF concept. Organizations outside RAF units may be called upon to support RAF missions. Tasking and matching Protection WfF enablers from the RC and other functional brigades to build ad hoc teams at the brigade-and-below level does not assure unity of effort.

The Reserve Component MEBs should be aligned with regionally aligned divisions. MEB HQs have sufficient staff assets and equipment to provide and integrate the Protection WfF. Aligned MEBs can augment ASCCs or JTF HQs with a robust joint security cell. This cell could be tailored and packaged to meet the needs of the augmented HQs. The MEB staff could rotate every six months and provide augmentees to the JTF HQs. Or, alternatively, it could provide augmentation to the aligned region's ASCC HQs. Additionally, it could regionally align permanently with that CCDRs AOR, thereby providing continuity for the MEB.

Facilities analysis is concerned with installations, military property, and related industrial facilities critical to force readiness and seeks to determine how facilities can be better utilized.⁶¹ Current facilities are adequate to assure the viability of the RAF concept within the Protection WfF. However, while outside the remit of this study, host nation facilities do affect the protection of U.S. forces and should continue to be carefully considered during RAF planning and execution.

Conclusion

The RAF concept is viable from a Protection perspective. Many relevant systems are in place and these systems will continue to improve, so that ASCC CDRs and JFCs will be able to conduct Protection. ASCC HQs have some overarching regional assets to ensure Protection (such as Air Missile Defense and Cyber Cells).

Integrating and focusing TSC activities and SPPs successes into the foundational doctrine remains a concern, however. This can be done through analyzing 2/1 ABCT after-action reviews that address Protection. Small units should have SOF-type communications packages. Additionally, BCTs should build appropriate education platforms and leverage Army training opportunities that address Protection skills. MEBs should align with CCDRs and divisions to provide opportunities to deploy division and BCT staff Protection enablers to enhance ASCC and JTF HQs. This initiative will assure effective Protection for the landpower forces. If the preponderance of future missions are executed in steady state and shaping operations, they will mostly participate in theater security cooperation activities aligned with the CCDRs theater campaign plan. Therefore, RAF units must emphasize thorough planning, synchronization, and integration of the Protection WfF. The more HQ staffs are resourced, the better they can focus on Protection at all levels for any type of operation. And, importantly, they are better prepared to leverage resources in a timely manner to ensure safety and security within the AOR. Carefully developed, integrated, synchronized Protection WfF plans for joint operations within the JIIM environment will help mitigate emerging crises while preserving combat power.

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