

## Implications & Recommendations

The USAWC Study Group considered the impact of the RAF concept within fiscal constraints, the changing future environment, the joint operating environment, and new strategic guidance as the Army transitions toward steady-state and shaping operations. While the Army has been doing steady-state and shaping operations for decades, adoption of the RAF concept will stimulate new concerns, opportunities, and challenges, many of which are addressed herein. Analysis was organized across ten areas: the six Army warfighting functions (WfFs), special operations forces (SOF), the army force generation (ARFORGEN) process, joint task force headquarters, and legal authorities. Implications and recommendations for each are included in this section and organized in accord with the more in-depth reports that comprise the remainder of the compendium.

### Mission Command

#### Implications

1. The RAF concept requires leaders to embrace the mission command philosophy.
2. Additional materiel solutions to facilitate remote communications at all deployed levels will be required.
3. The distributed nature of RAF missions will necessitate additional mission command systems below battalion level in order to enable dispersed forces to create shared understanding before, during, and after missions.
4. The RAF concept will require “digitally enabled” Army forces below the battalion level.
5. The Army must accommodate enhanced requirements for testing and evaluating the communication systems necessary to support the RAF concept.
6. All Army corps and division headquarters lack a joint presence in cyber space and joint internet protocol addresses (IPs) necessary to enable joint mission command systems required for a JTF Headquarters.

#### Recommendations

1. Conduct further analysis of the RAF concept to provide a JTF capable headquarters based on the growing complexity of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment combined with the mandated 25 percent reduction in staff manpower.
2. All forces should continue to be assigned, allocated, or apportioned to the combatant commands. The service retained combatant command aligned (SRCA) relationship should be discontinued to the maximum extent possible. To fully gain the benefits of building relationships and understanding within a combatant command, more forces should be assigned to combatant commands.

3. At a minimum, each ASCC should have an assigned division headquarters. ASCCs with assigned division headquarters bring stability from the strategic level through the operational level to the tactical level for each theater. The division headquarters can then act as a stabilizing influence that will reduce turmoil and confusion as brigades rotate in and out of their available phases. Additionally, with a 25 percent staff reduction in both ASCC and division headquarters, efficiencies created by long term relationships are vital.
4. Establish a deliberate exercise program between the ASCC, the assigned division headquarters, and the allocated RAF brigades using scenarios from the specific theater. A well-executed exercise program builds cohesive teams, develops trust and relationships, and creates shared understanding. The combat training centers utilize the Leader Training Program (LTP) to achieve this result, which could also work for RAF units. Additionally, exercises enable each unit to test its communications systems prior to execution, reinforce reporting requirements, and develop battle rhythms that ensure better command and control.
5. ASCCs must develop training programs that ensure RAF units can execute the required network administration for joint communications when called upon to be JTF HQs. A program focusing on joint network certifications, policies, and procedures will greatly enhance a unit's ability to execute a JTF mission.
6. Each ASCC should create a theater specific mission essential equipment list (MEEL) along with requests for any unfulfilled requirements. These specific requirements and capability gaps should drive the combatant command's Integrated Priority List (IPL) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) submissions. Validated requirements would enable the acquisition system to develop appropriate solutions.
7. As solutions for RAF capability gaps are developed, they should be fielded to each combatant command's assigned division headquarters. The division can then train and employ the solutions as necessary to ensure each RAF brigade has an appropriate toolkit to handle the scale and scope of security cooperation activities. As BCTs rotate in and out of each combatant command, the permanently assigned division headquarters can maintain the required expertise to install, operate, and maintain systems.
8. Expand the scope of the network integration exercise (NIE) to include steady-state activities and all six phases of operations. With the potential for leveraging commercial solutions, the NIE should be modified to incorporate RAF communications requirements. Executed semianually, NIE provides a unique opportunity to rapidly inject commercial off-the-shelf solutions into the Defense Acquisition System.
9. A JTF headquarters' mission command system should occupy IP space at the DoD/Joint level to enable subordinate service networks to establish trusted network connections (e.g., Army HQs utilizing Army IP addresses will have difficulty connecting to a Navy HQs utilizing Navy IP addresses due to challenges associated with network trust).

## **Movement and Maneuver**

### **Implications**

1. The RAF concept increases demand for reconnaissance forces while amplifying the requirement for an enhanced approach to reconnaissance.
2. The RAF concept highlights existing capability and identifies the capacity gaps inherent in organic BCT reconnaissance forces.
3. The RAF concept enhances the need to expand the movement and maneuver warfighting function's strategic role in deterring conflict and shaping the operational environment.

4. The RAF concept increases the requirement for strategic movement and force projection agility.

## Recommendations

1. The Army Chief of Staff should clarify the definition of RAF for shared understanding and normalization.
2. The Army should codify in doctrine the expanded role of movement and maneuver in preventing conflict and shaping the operational environment.
3. The Army should modify training manuals to capture the conditions in which movement and maneuver tasks are performed in support of the RAF concept.
4. The Army should designate reconnaissance as a warfighting function. Doing so will emphasize its critical importance and compel increased attention to the planning and execution of reconnaissance across the range of military operations.
5. The Army should increase a BCT's capability to conduct reconnaissance by standardizing reconnaissance squadrons and platoon formations in all BCTs in support of the range of military operations.
6. To prevent the possibility of creating a hollow force, the Army should adopt a new approach to the ARFORGEN process; one that creates a higher base level of readiness across the Army through improved manning, equipping and training strategies.<sup>1</sup>
7. In order to meet rapid deployment requirements, DoD should plan for and improve the capacity of domestic and foreign installations which provide optimal locations for strategic movement by air or sea.

## Intelligence

### Implications

1. The RAF concept requires a versatile mix of intelligence capabilities and expertise across the total force (AC, ARNG, USAR, and DA Civilians). The intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) must execute numerous RAF tasks, including: providing support to a JTF-capable HQ, providing forward stationed forces and capabilities, executing reach-back support from outside the AOR, conducting language proficiency, and providing regional expertise and cultural knowledge (LREC) training across the total force.<sup>2</sup> The intelligence training and certifications needed to execute these tasks necessitates synchronized allocation of IWfF resources across the total force.
2. The RAF concept builds upon the material and personnel solutions used to prepare intelligence personnel and units for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, many of these practices are cost prohibitive given the current fiscally constrained environment. Capability gaps will be created.
3. The cumulative effects of costly IWfF training solutions, force modernization efforts, accelerated force drawdown and anticipated reductions in headquarters will significantly curtail the ability to execute RAF tasks.

### Recommendations

1. Establishing an effective JTF Intelligence Directorate requires significant re-structuring and augmentation to corps or division intelligence staffs in a JTF HQ. Creating joint manning document (JMD) templates using corps and division MTO&Es against the different JTF mission parameters would enhance the transition to a JTF HQ. These templates could also identify to the CCDR the enabler support required to facilitate command and control between the CCDR and the JTF HQ.

2. Foreign disclosure officer (FDO) requirements, coalition and joint network integration, or simply organizing the IWfF staff effort for a JTF headquarters requirements quickly overwhelm the intelligence staffs in corps and division HQs. The Army and the IWfF should invest in the capabilities inherent within the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The intelligence support functional teams concept within the Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) within the JECC would help coordinate, manage, and synchronize intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination within the IWfF of the JTF.<sup>3</sup>
3. A comprehensive IWfF troop-to-task assessment for the personnel, equipment, and facilities is needed for reach-back or split-based operations in both corps and divisions. The requirements may drive certain intelligence capabilities to reside in the reach-back location with none of the discipline moving forward. The IWfF can only provide the appropriate level of confidence to the forward command if resourced and organized appropriately at both locations.
4. A comprehensive review of the IWfF Title 10 functions and responsibilities must occur to clearly define responsibilities and resources required to execute the RAF specified and implied tasks. While the MSE is a FORSCOM initiative, it does not cover the total force IWfF requirements. Failure to address this issue early in the RAF operational concept will lead to friction and gaps in the IWfF's ability to support RAF across the DOTMLPF.
5. DA G2, INSCOM, FORSCOM and TRADOC must create a working group to assess the ability of RAF units to perform Foundry training and IROC across the total force. While certain installations have improved IT infrastructure and capabilities within existing SCIFs, only a finite amount of space is available. INSCOM can provide valuable insights as the subject matter expert with its extensive experience in building SCIFs for both CONUS and OCONUS locations.
6. Consolidate the culture and language training for both Army linguists and general purpose forces (GPF) under one proponent. Doing so allows for a more prudent use of resources to train regionally aligned GPF and assigned Army linguists. The Army Civil Affairs (CA) branch could assume this mission and provide divisions and their assigned BCTs with culture and language training oversight. The increased emphasis the RAF concept places on culture and language should force the Army to align the CA companies, currently consolidated at the 85<sup>th</sup> CA Brigade, under the BCT and division structure. These CA Soldiers can provide valuable training to both GPF and the 35P Army cryptologic linguists authorized in each Army BCT.
7. Recommend the DA G2 staff provide analysis and subject matter experts to the DA G8 for facility and infrastructure enhancements to fully implement reach-back, Foundry training, IROC, and IWfF support to a JTF HQs. The DA G2 staff must capture the baseline of equipment and facilities needed to implement the RAF concept. Only by incorporating this information can the DA G8 accurately determine the costs associated with RAF implementation.
8. Staff DA PAM 600-3 and DA PAM 611-21 across the active component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves to determine the knowledge, skills and attributes (KSAs) needed for a regionally-aligned and globally-engaged Army. The IWfF should consider KSAs that include regional and cultural understanding, critical thinking skills, strategic agility, building strategic networks, and balancing assignments between tactical and operational level intelligence formations. Adjust officer and NCO career progression charts to incorporate longer time in grade and longer unit dwell times for a smaller and more stable force.
9. The Army Staff should complete a Total Army Analysis (TAA) that captures the grade plate reductions, FY15 draw down of forces, and the 25 percent reduction in two-star level and above headquarters initiatives

to identify the loss of capabilities associated with these changes. Due to the near simultaneity of the events, second and third order effects these reductions will have upon the RAF concept have yet to be determined.

10. Create consolidated BCT SCIFs on installations which allow BCT IWfF staffs to use their assigned tactical joint worldwide intelligence community system (JWICS) capable systems and distributed common ground system- Army (DCGS-A) in a garrison environment. This basic facility would have the same perimeter and interior security required for a SCIF. Each BCT would have space to conduct all source intelligence analysis within a JWICS enabled environment. Using assigned tactical JWICS and DCGS-A systems does not require the robust IT infrastructure that the larger SCIFs contain. BCT intelligence staffs would simply require an area that allows for securing the tactical vehicle systems within the sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) accredited security perimeter, attach the system to the prime power and run network cables inside the building to the tactical DCGS-A systems. When required to deploy, these BCT IWfF staffs simply unplug the tactical systems and depart.

## Fires

### Implications

1. The RAF concept will increase demand for deployable fires training systems and simulators.
2. The RAF concept will increase demand for capabilities to support inform and influence activities (IIA).
3. The RAF concept creates increased demand for ‘non-traditional’ military education if force personnel are to be proficient and regionally aligned.
4. The RAF concept must be incorporated into professional military education (PME) at the earliest appropriate time to ensure leaders are regionally aware, culturally sensitive, and better prepared to operate in a decentralized environment.

### Recommendations

1. Adapt existing and create new fires training simulators and systems that are easily-deployable by small teams and by military and commercial air. These systems must be ruggedized and operable in environments with unreliable commercial power supplies (e.g., simulators that support training in fire support, fire direction, cannon operations, air defense, and numerous computer-assisted IIA modules).
2. Create an inform and influence activity (IIA) battalion aligned with each geographic combatant command to better leverage strategic messaging. The IIA functions would gain increased effectiveness if the Soldiers were more regionally aware and able to capitalize on that awareness.
3. The Army should increase non-traditional training and education available for leaders. Broadening opportunities (e.g., internships, interagency training, formal civilian education, and working with NGOs) provide a diversity of experiences and perspectives that serve the Army well in the long run. AR 600-3, *The Personnel Development System*, should be updated to reflect these new career opportunities.
4. The Army should consider a 4-year rotation cycle between ARFORGEN and RAF support missions. An extended rotation cycle would reduce personnel turbulence, mitigate drops in readiness, and save money. Additionally, the Army should develop training packages for RAF units that better deliver training in decentralized and austere environments.

5. Assign a foreign area officer (FAO) to the division and corps staffs. The FAO has unique training, skills, and experiences that would better enable the division and corps commander to navigate the interagency environment as well as provide a unique cultural perspective to the planning staff.
6. Revise and update current professional military education (PME) to reflect the emerging RAF doctrine and requirements. The RAF concept calls for agile and adaptive leaders who can operate in austere environments with minimal oversight. The PME process must develop and foster these skills as well as provide a framework for cultural understanding among Army leaders.

## **Sustainment**

### **Implications**

1. The RAF concept increases requirements for enhanced sustainment, coordination, and synchronization efforts between the Army service component commands (ASCC), RAF units, and sustainment enablers.
2. Deployed RAF units may have to be capable of independent self-support. RAF units will likely deploy in small decentralized teams without the support of an established logistics support area (LSA) and may have to independently support themselves.
3. ASCCs must continue to include RAF units in their sustainment plans.

### **Recommendations**

1. Consider combining EUCOM and AFRICOM in the Unified Command Plan to improve efficiency. This change would consolidate all sustainment forces (21st TSC & 16th Sustainment BDE) under one CCDR for planning and execution purposes.
2. Regionally align each active duty sustainment brigade with a division and CCMD. This would combine the sustainment assets and division C2 together as they support each region. This would also ensure expeditionary timeliness and give the supported CCDR coordinated sustainment in his campaign plan.
3. Build an equipment activity set (EAS) for AFRICOM and PACOM, similar to the package recently completed to support EUCOM. These sets ensure RAF is expeditionary in response time and allows the CCDRs enhanced employment flexibility. The density list should include a combined arms battalion, brigade C2 element, and enablers.

## **Protection**

### **Implications**

1. The RAF concept will increase demand for protection warfighting function (PWfF) tasks during steady state and shaping operations.
2. Anticipated theater and joint level headquarters staff reductions will hamper the ability to meet the protection requirements generated by RAF implementation.
3. The RAF concept will increase the demand for TSC activities, including many military police (MP) tasks.
4. Theater security cooperation and state partnership programs need to be integrated into protection doctrine.

5. Small units deployed to remote areas should have SOF-like communications packages to enhance protection.

### Recommendations

1. The Joint Staff or a selected proponent must review Joint Publication 3-10 *Joint Security Operations* which focuses on combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and decisive action, but does not address TSC activities within the joint security area. DoD must develop a joint publication to address steady-state operations or security cooperation as future operations will increasingly emphasize those activities.
2. AFRICOM is an example of an austere environment, and the RAF BCT MTOEs do not provide robust secure communications to support numerous small teams that deploy separately while operating within large AORs. RAF units should have access to expeditionary-type communications capabilities. RAF missions should be augmented with portable satellite communications to provide reliable communications either organically to regionally aligned BCTs or resourced to the small teams by the ASCC HQs.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, the Army should consider acquiring off-the-shelf commercial technologies to enhance accountability, reporting, and communications with country teams or higher HQs.
3. Align reserve component maneuver enhancement brigades (MEBs) to CCMDs or Army divisions. MEBs can augment ASCC and JTF HQs with MP, Engineer, Aviation, and Air Defense staff enablers for 6-month rotations.
4. The Army should reconsider elimination of MPs from the BCTs. MPs are a vital protection WfF asset and enabler for BCTs throughout all phases of operations, as well as during steady state and shaping operations.
5. Enhanced emphasis is required on PWfF tasks if we are to ensure commanders have the means to preserve combat power.

## SOF Integration

### Implications

1. The RAF concept increases requirements for theater coordination and synchronization between special operations forces and conventional forces.
2. The RAF concept creates opportunities for integration between conventional and special operations force personnel at both the operational and staff levels.
3. Increased participation in TSC activities by conventional forces will provide special operations forces with reduced requirements for non-SOF unique missions.

### Recommendations

1. Increase Army and SOF interoperability and interdependence.
2. Assign the majority of SOF capabilities, to include Army SOF units and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) capabilities, to the geographic combatant commands (GCCs). Reorganization will require enhancing the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).

3. Assign active component forces to a CCDR. Most service-retained forces should be in the generating force. Capitalize on demand and requirements from CCDRs to drive force structure across the Total Army. Detailed analysis can provide force solutions by CCMD to include type of capabilities, components, and density.
4. Prioritize readiness and resources to the CCDRs' objectives. Deployable C1 units must be maintained as the response option to meet the requirements of major contingencies and OPLANs. RAF elements should specifically train to their directed RAF mission and readiness level (SOF L/E-1): Increase the interoperability between SOF and CF. Incorporate TSOC/ASCC staffs and functions, increase training, deploy joint teams for TSC efforts, and merge the PME of SOF and CF personnel to include a "SOF Familiarity Certification" for CF.

## **ARFORGEN**

### **Implications**

1. An unforeseen crisis could interrupt implementation and place the RAF concept in jeopardy.
2. The creation of service retained, combatant command aligned (SRCA) distribution provides a useful tool for managing readiness while simultaneously preparing units to meet CCDR requirements.
3. The Army force generation (ARFORGEN) process requires adjustment to support an Army-wide readiness management philosophy that prepares RAF units to support CCDRs and maintains a higher base level of readiness across the force.
4. A regionally aligned policy allows Army units to be globally engaged while remaining CONUS based.
5. ARFORGEN and RAF policy synchronization allows the Army to support current and future global mission requirements while being concentrated in the Continental United States.
6. A Regionally Aligned Force policy facilitates global engagement.

### **Recommendations**

1. The Army should adjust RAF and ARFORGEN training, manning, and equipping policies to meet future combatant command requirements with available resources.
2. Identify and habitually align brigade combat teams with the 6 geographic combatant commands and determine the how best to align division headquarters or enabling units.
3. Service retained, combatant command aligned forces should be retained to support the CCDRs.
4. The Army should retain ARFORGEN and exploit extant flexibility to manage units and resources.
5. The Army must use ARFORGEN to set the operating force in a predictable cycle to generate balanced support for the combatant commands.
6. The Army should return to the original regional alignment vision with the BCT as the central core capability. In less than 2 years, the "Regionally-Aligned Brigade" concept became the "Regionally-Aligned Forces" policy.<sup>5</sup> The Army must clearly define what the Regionally Aligned Force policy is and is not in order to establish a common understanding and terms of reference for the defense community.

7. The Army must accelerate institutionalizing regionally-aligned force policy. By refining and focusing on a core capability, producing 12 habitually aligned brigade combat teams for example, the Army could expedite implementation.<sup>6</sup> Policy modifications, to include growth, can be adjusted in the future in response to combatant commander feedback and mission demand.
8. The Army should retain ARFORGEN in order to manage readiness. ARFORGEN allows the Army to synchronize manning, equipping and training polices. The Army must be careful not to create so many unit force pools cycling through ARFORGEN that a conflict erupts in resource prioritization. ARFORGEN revisions allow the Army to avoid the pre-2001 “tiered readiness” institutional stigma.<sup>7</sup> One way to overcome tiered readiness is to separate and manage units by mission.
9. Commanders’ comments are an important component of unit status reporting. However, the Army should temporarily suspend a command’s ability to subjectively upgrade a unit’s overall readiness assessment. As the Army draws down, quantitative data should define unit readiness. Commands must resist pressure to routinely assert that a unit can accomplish mission tasks it is not trained/resourced to conduct, especially as budgets and resources reduce.
10. The Army should work with combatant commands to expand regional engagements to include regional allies while conducting regionally-aligned missions in order to establish long term multi-lateral partnerships. Strategic guidance specifies that the United States will partner to solve international problems; however, just as the United States is reducing defense budgets, so too are allies.<sup>8</sup>
11. The Army should commit to habitually aligning brigade combat teams to geographic combatant commands and extend the alignment to multiple ARFORGEN cycles. Habitually-aligned units remain available to support contingency operations if required. Repetitive missions in support of combatant commands allow Army units to establish relationships with host nation militaries.
12. The Army should retain units not assigned to combatant commands in order to centralize training and resources and to generate tailored forces to support combatant command mission requirements. Retaining units not assigned to combatant commands allows flexibility to generate a tailored force in support of combatant commands. Combatant commands can request force packages if mission required.
13. The Army should create “Cultural Centers of Excellence” at Fort Polk and Fort Irwin to support centralized regionally-aligned programs of instruction. Failure to habitually align units with combatant commands results in units and installations competing for customized training resources during each ARFORGEN cycle. FORSCOM should centralize training and readiness management for unassigned, service-retained units.
14. The Army should overhaul mid-grade and senior personnel assignment policies to encourage commitment to the regionally aligned force policy. It should also adapt manning policies to maximize assignments in regionally-aligned units in order to support the long term viability of the policy and achieve a return on investment. As the size of the Army falls, and 12 to 14 percent of Army manpower turns over annually, the fastest way to develop Soldiers culturally is by repetitive assignments to regionally aligned units.<sup>9</sup>
15. The Army should modify enlisted, officer, and command tours, and extend brigades to multiple ARFORGEN alignment cycles with the same combatant command. This allows the Army to realize returns on investments made on culture and language training. The synchronization of ARFORGEN and regionally-aligned force policy allows the Army to overhaul its personnel policy.

## **JTF Capable HQs**

### **Implications**

1. The RAF concept will require the Army to regionally align a JTF-capable division or corps headquarters to each CCDR; the service retained, CCDR- aligned designation provides the flexibility to react to emerging crises.
2. The RAF concept will provide dedicated and predictable units to a CCDR that may be leveraged to mitigate the 25 percent reduction in two star headquarters staff.
3. Conducting RAF associated missions will require the assistance and support of habitually aligned division headquarters.
4. Aligning division and corps headquarters capable of serving as a JTF HQs creates a requirement to manage readiness for each organization.

### **Recommendations**

1. Joint and Army Staffs should: 1) adjust the current force generation systems; 2) establish longer-term alignment of headquarters; 3) change human capital policies for regional expertise; and, 4) enhance corps and division headquarters to function as core JTF elements.
2. Division and corps headquarters should remain service retained combatant commander aligned, except for forces in PACOM. Little depth exists in operational headquarters, even post-drawdown. ARFORGEN's phases only work if there are enough units to have one in reset, one in training, and one deployed. Lack of depth requires central control of the division and corps headquarters for readiness, availability, and resources. This prevents gaps in strategic flexibility to react or surge capability for crisis or operations.
3. The Army should consistently align division HQs to the GCCs. These division HQs can then assist subordinate units with RAF- specific requirements such as country clearances, regional logistical challenges, and interagency coordination.
4. Enable corps and division headquarters for success as the core elements in JTF operations. The DoD should establish policies to mitigate challenges division and corps headquarters face in becoming JTFs, especially in the tactical command post (TAC). The TAC is the core from which to build many JTFs and is currently fenced from the 25 percent reductions for two star headquarters. Those and other critical staff positions should be coded to require Joint Professional Military Education II certification, should be stabilized for more than two years, and should be incentivized to draw and reward talent. Habitual stabilization will create efficiencies in training, standardization in operations, and depth in relationships.
5. Develop manning policies that incentivize and manage regional alignment of human capital to maximize return on investment. At the company level, officers should develop functional expertise; at the field grade level and higher, officers should develop operational, strategic, and regional expertise. There would be talent management advantages in assigning an identifier at the field grade level for officers and E8 for enlisted to indicate regional experience. This identifier, like other skills, could function as descriptive criteria when making future assignments. It could be either an Army skill identifier or a secondary military occupational specialty code (similar to the foreign area officer letter designation after the '48' for their regional focus). The assignment process should also consider regional experience in command and key

billet slating guidance, fellowship applications, and broadening assignments. Talent and experience management enhances future assignments and generates enhanced regional expertise.

6. Ensure or develop the capability of home-station joint operations centers (JOCs) for divisions and corps. Such home station posts need to build two JTF-capable headquarters JOCs for joint connectivity with theater, one to track ongoing operations, and a second to train JTFs prior to employment. Recapitalize JOC hardware resources available from the Army drawdown and redeployment of equipment from theater. These facilities provide reach-back capacity for the division HQ, subordinate unit teams, or other JTFs when deployed.

## **Authorities**

### **Implications**

1. The RAF concept designation comes with no new authorities or funding during a period of increasing budget constraints.
2. As the RAF concept is expanded throughout the total force, the diversity of missions, including security cooperation and security force assistance, may require a more tailored and durable set of authorities than currently exists.
3. If the Army does not secure funds to train, equip, and employ aligned forces for exercises and operations, concept implementation will be at risk.
4. RAF units require mission specific limits for employment in theater.
5. Despite rapid changes in the theater, deployed RAF units are not immediately capable of performing all missions across the range of military operations.

### **Recommendations**

1. The Judge Advocate General's School should add a discussion of authorities and funding for RAF missions to training programs oriented on BCT and other command judge advocates.
2. Prioritize readiness and resources to the CCDRs' objectives. Deployable C1 units must be maintained as the response option to meet the requirements of major contingencies and OPLANs. RAF elements should specifically train to their directed RAF mission and readiness level.
3. The RAF concept requires a comprehensive review of authorities to maximize the concept's effectiveness and increase employment options. No authorities are required for RAF units to take advantage of low-cost methods of integrating culture, language and regional skills training into their objectives/plans.

## **Summary**

None of the challenges identified by the study group are insurmountable. Many reflect Army wide issues that would benefit from an integrated DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities) solution. Furthermore, none exist in isolation. Solutions in one area may present challenges to another area and scarce resources may be required to mitigate risk. Building upon the best practices of 12 years of sustained operations, the RAF concept creates numerous opportunities and challenges for the Army to shape the force while supporting the needs of the geographic combatant commands.

Consequentially, implementation presents a genuine opportunity to consider the increasingly important role that shaping operations will play in meeting regional objectives and advancing U.S. security interests in accord with a philosophy of “prevent, shape, and win.”

### Notes

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<sup>1</sup>John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2013, Fiscal year 2013,” Posture Statement presented to the 113<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, *Intelligence*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 31, 2012, p. 2-6.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>4</sup>Gus Benton, “2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report,” memorandum for record, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 31, 2013.

<sup>5</sup>Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress* Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2013, p. 3; LTG James L. Huggins, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, HQDA G3/5/7, “FRAGO 1 to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD,” Washington, DC, HQDA, October 17, 2013, p. O-3.

<sup>6</sup>Author calculations. If the Army aligned two brigade combat teams per geographic combatant command, then one BCT would be available to conduct missions, while the other BCT trained for the following year’s mission. This would require 12 BCTs to support regionally alignment. Future modifications can add enablers, divisions, or corps as required by demand.

<sup>7</sup>General Robert Cone, “TRADOC Commander: No plans to return to ‘tiered readiness’ in building future Army,” available from [www.ausa.org/meetings/2012/annualmeeting/pages/chapterpresidentsdinner.aspx](http://www.ausa.org/meetings/2012/annualmeeting/pages/chapterpresidentsdinner.aspx), accessed on February 1, 2014.

<sup>8</sup>Richard Norton-Taylor, “Armed forces budget to be cut by 500M British pounds,” available from [www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/20/armed-forces-budget-cut-500m](http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/20/armed-forces-budget-cut-500m), accessed on February 9, 2014; Malcolm Chalmers, “The Squeeze Continues-UK Defence Spending and the 2013 Budget,” available from [www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C51506B24A254C](http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C51506B24A254C), accessed on February 9, 2014.

<sup>9</sup>Author calculations determined that approximately 12 to 14 percent of Army manpower turns over annually after reviewing manpower data in the Fiscal Year 2014 Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report; U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report, Fiscal Year 2014* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 2013, pp. 7, 20, 44.