

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. ARMY RECRUITING FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AND BEYOND

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ABSTRACT

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The current Army strategic recruiting environment is undergoing significant change in nine major areas. The current recruit population (Millennial Generation), the parents of the recruit population, the increase in global terrorism and military conflict, cyberspace and the advancement of information technologies and dissemination, globalization, the segregation of America, politicization of the recruiting effort, execution of war, and sustained economic growth and prosperity are all having a significant impact on Army recruiting. A construct for an Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan that addresses these changes in the strategic environment and can ensure continued success in meeting the Army's recruiting mission is proposed in this strategy research project. Priority to the Army recruiting strategic planning effort should be given to addressing the emerging changes in the strategic environment along with increasing the effectiveness of current recruiting operations. The proposed Army Grand Strategic Recruiting Plan is a framework and construct that could help enable the Army meet the strategic challenge of achieving its recruiting mission, and maintaining a viable all-volunteer Army during the current prolonged war.

U.S. ARMY RECRUITING FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AND BEYOND

Purpose

The purpose of this strategy research project is to establish the framework for a strategic plan that will support the U.S. Army in meeting its recruiting mission during the long Global War on Terror and beyond. Due to several social, demographic and other factors (to include the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001), the strategic recruiting environment for the U.S. Army has dramatically changed. The U.S. Army must adapt to the changing strategic environment to ensure that it can continue to attract the high quality soldiers that have characterized the U.S. Army since the all-volunteer professional Army was established in the early 1970s. The framework for a strategic plan outlined in this project provides the U.S. Army a strategic planning construct for managing the way ahead to ensure that it can effectively adapt to the changing strategic environment, and achieve its recruiting mission in fiscal year 2006 and well into the future.

The All-Volunteer Force

The highly successful "...All-Volunteer Force was born on July 1, 1973," largely as a result of the "American public's dissatisfaction with the draft" during the Vietnam War. "Throughout most of the 20th century, the majority of our Armed Forces personnel were drafted, serving our Nation in both World Wars, the Korean Conflict and Vietnam."¹ But, that changed with the birth of the all-volunteer force. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in 2003 stated,

The all-volunteer force has succeeded at every challenge it has faced. The nation owes a debt of gratitude to these volunteers. Today, 30 years after the inception of the all-volunteer force, we can look back and say that the decision to rely on volunteers was the right one... This concept of an All-Volunteer Force has been a booming success. It works and it works well.²

Bernard D. Rostker stated in 2003, "...today, there is no question that that the [all-volunteer force] has succeeded in producing a superb military force, tested in two wars and the pride of our nation."³ Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense when the concept of the all-volunteer force was instituted, recently stated,

Establishing the all-volunteer force was a great accomplishment. The draft has no place in today's era of warfare, where our troops face a complex and challenging enemy. It does not lead to the kind of high-quality and highly capable force that the nation needs and the all-volunteer force has produced. The dedicated service of our men and women in uniform is the clearest evidence of the wisdom of our nation's decision, 30 years ago, to return to a volunteer force.⁴

Even though some may be calling for national service and conscription, it is unlikely that the basic concept of the all-volunteer force will change unless there is a significant shift in the global strategic environment. This is evident by "...the U.S. House of Representatives [voting] down a bill... to reinstate the draft by a resounding 402-2" in October of 2004.⁵ The all-volunteer force seems to be here to stay. In the words of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, "With a professional, all-volunteer force, the U.S. military won the Cold War, liberated Afghanistan and Iraq, and has kept the peace in Asia and Europe. And the all-volunteer force will win the global war on terror."⁶

The Current Strategic Environment

Even in "...the simplest of times, [recruiting] is a complex business with casual observers proclaiming either this factor or that is the 'true' driver of success, when in reality it is a host of factors working in concert."⁷ Stephen E. Herbits likens the recruiting system to the complex "process of refining raw petroleum." In the control room..., "[there] are many knobs, switches, dials, and mechanisms that control the process..."⁸ During the last thirty years there have been a few times when the U.S. Army has been unable to meet its recruiting mission. In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army made several individual decisions that had the collective effect of nearly preventing the all-voluntary force from succeeding. Intervention by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1974 was required to reverse those decisions by the Army leadership that was undermining the success of the all-volunteer force.⁹ During this time even the President of the United States questioned whether or not having an all-volunteer force would be viable.¹⁰ In 1979, partly as a result of limiting government pay increases as an anti-inflationary measure, the U.S. Army missed its recruiting mission by over 17,000 prompting the then Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Edward C. "Shy" Meyers to proclaim a "'Hollow' Army."¹¹ Again in the 1990s, the U.S. Army failed to meet its recruiting mission. In 1999, the U.S. Army finished the fiscal year short almost 6,300 accessions. There were several changes occurring in the strategic recruiting environment at that time, and the U.S. Army did not adequately anticipate or prepare for them. These included a national jobless rate that had fallen to 4.1%, a 29-year low, the end of the Army draw down which required the Army to replace its losses on a one for one basis, and the recruiting market in general had a lower propensity for military service than in previous years.¹²

The U.S. Army's failure to attract enough recruits is nothing new to the Nation. "As far back as 1830, President Jackson's Secretary of War John Eaton reported that the Army had been unable to fill its rather modest enlistment quotas for another year with men of any quality:"¹³ Secretary of War Eaton stated,

A country possessing 12 millions of people ought surely to be able at all times to possess itself of an army of 6,000 men obtained upon principles of fare contract; if this can not be effected then it will be better to rely on some other means of defense, rather than resort to the expedient of obtaining a discontented and besotted soldiery.¹⁴

In 2005, the United States found itself in a situation again where it was unable to meet its recruiting mission. “At the end of [Fiscal Year] 2005, the active Army fell 6,627 recruits short of its annual goal of 80,000 new accessions” and “...there are some important indicators that the recruiting shortfall will be far larger next year.”¹⁵ At the very beginning of Fiscal Year 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated, “America has about 295 million people and some 2.6 million serving in the active and reserve components of our military. We don’t need compulsion to attract and retain the people that we need to serve our country.”¹⁶ Even though the words by Secretary of War Eaton and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld are very similar, the strategic situation that the United States finds itself in today is very different. The United States is at war in Afghanistan, Iraq and across the globe in a Global War on Terror. Failure to meet the FY 2006 and beyond recruiting mission is not a national option.

The strategic recruiting environment that the U.S. Army is operating in must be fully understood before a strategic plan can be developed. The current strategic recruiting environment has clearly shifted in several key areas over the last few years. These shifts have had, and will continue to have, a major effect on U.S. Army recruiting efforts. Major shifts are occurring in:

- The current recruit population (Millennial Generation)
- The parents of the recruit population
- The increase in global terror and military conflict
- Cyberspace - advancement of information technologies and dissemination
- Globalization
- The segregation of America
- Politicization of the recruiting effort
- Execution of war
- Sustained economic growth and prosperity

The Current Recruit Population (Millennial Generation)

The majority of the recruit population is generally regarded as the 17-24 year olds in the United States.¹⁷ This current group of Americans is commonly referred to as the Millennial Generation because it was born between the years 1980 and 2000, and strategically it differs

greatly from the previous generation. Research has shown that they are sociable, optimistic, well-informed, collaborative, open-minded, influential, civic-minded, and inclusive.¹⁸ This generation greatly differs from the previous generation in that it was nurtured more by its parents, it maintains a closer relationship with family, it does not just use technology, but assumes it, it is more confident and optimistic, and it is more conservative.¹⁹ More is known about the Millennial Generation than any other generation in American history. This generation has been studied extensively, and the vast amount of information on this generation will greatly aid the Army in tailoring their recruiting efforts. This Millennial Generation of 75 million is second only in size to the baby boom generation. It will prove in many ways an ideal population to recruit soldiers from who desire to serve a greater social and national cause. As Wally Bock puts it, a good slogan for the Millennial Generation is “Be all we can be.”²⁰

The Parents of the Recruit Population

Parents of each previous American Generation have been concerned about their children’s lives, but none more than the parents of the Millennial Generation. Parents, now more than ever, have to also be recruited when their sons and daughters become soldiers. Parents now, as a general rule, are more involved with their children’s lives as they are growing up, and stay involved for much longer than in past generations. The involvement of the parents in the decisions and lives of their children is unprecedented in American history. College campuses are experiencing a much larger interest by parents in their children’s education. Many universities are coming up with parent programs such as “Letting Go” and “Parent 101,” and they are expanding the role of the parent associations to address parental concerns and issues. Workshops for college staff personnel have even been established “to share strategies for managing millennial parents to help them continue to play a guiding role without jeopardizing the development process through over-involvement.”²¹ The parents of this generation have been described by college staffs as “‘helicoptering’ in to save the day and advocating before their students have a chance to problem-solve on their own.”²²

The children of the Millennial Generation are central to their parents’ sense of purpose. These parents have not only nurtured, but have sheltered their children. “Since the 1990s, there has been a major youth safety movement. We now see kids decked out in helmets and pads to ride bikes and strapped into elaborate car seats that would survive a nuclear explosion. Baby on Board signs and Tot-finders stickers were created for this generation. The ...parents of the [Millennial Generation] tend to be over-protective.”²³ Parents more, than ever, are a key player in the strategic recruiting environment. For today’s children, the point at which they will

be able to make major decisions without significant parental influence will come much later in their lives. Parents of the Millennial Generation rely more heavily on peer parents for their information, and this demand has caused an increase in parent associations and organizations of all shapes and sizes.²⁴ Parents will be a more critical factor in recruiting than what the U.S. Army has experienced before.

The Increase in Global Terror and Military Conflict

Global terror and military conflict is the current world, and it is the only world that the Millennial Generation knows. The Millennial Generation has "...no knowledge of a peaceful world. There has always been the constant reminder of nuclear, biological, and drug-related warfare that exists all around them."²⁵ The "catalyzing ...event – the one that binds them as a generation, the catastrophic moment they all witnessed during their first, most formative years – is, of course, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001."²⁶ The realities of the current world have significantly shaped the Millennial Generation. A Harris poll of the 2001 High School graduating class found that 97% of the students said "...that 'doing work that allows me to have an impact on the world' is important."²⁷ The Millennial Generation saw the beginning of the Global War on Terror, and it will be the generation that successfully ends it. The Millennial Generation believes "...in the future and their role in it," especially when it comes to ending the global threat of terrorism and resolving international conflict.²⁸ This notion of destiny for the Millennial Generation will influence Army recruiting strategy.

Cyberspace - Advancement of Information Technologies and Dissemination

The advancement of informational technologies and information dissemination has clearly changed the strategic environment. The Millennial Generation has sometimes been referred to as the net-generation.²⁹ "For them, technology is a way of life, a part of the background... Along with reliance on technology comes an expectation of cyber-service and instant response... Information processing for this generation is simply different."³⁰ The Millennial Generation does not just see the internet as something that they connect to, but they see it as the "...way to connect to the world and each other."³¹ This generation lives in cyber-space, and it is truly a geographic location for them. Effectively recruiting in cyberspace will be a major strategic shift for the Army. The Millennial Generation is an internet-based generation that exhibits a fundamental interdependence on family, friends, teachers and others in their lives. The Millennial Generation "...has grown up getting [most of their] information on line."³² "The net is their primary source of news. Eighty percent use the net frequently as an information source." This is in great contrast to their parents who get most of their information from

television.³³ The Millennial Generation is "...used to bits and bytes, flash and color, making seemingly random connections and finding links among disparate information."³⁴ College faculty members are having trouble meeting the expectations of students who "...expect an enriched online learning environment." Students of the Millennial Generation can become impatient with "...visually dull method[s] of taking in information," and bored with traditional college lectures.³⁵ Email and instant messaging is the way that the Millennial Generation communicates, and U.S. Army Recruiting Command must understand and master cyberspace, and the online information environment, to reach the Millennial Generation.

Globalization.

Globalization will have a tremendous effect on the strategic recruiting environment. As Clair Raines puts it, "With penpals in Singapore and Senegal, Millennials grew up seeing things as global, connected, and open for business 24/7."³⁶ The Millennial Generation "...grew up ...with more daily interaction with other ethnicities and cultures than ever before."³⁷ As Thomas L. Friedman describes it, Globalization is the new international system, and it is here to stay.³⁸ The Millennial Generation has become masters of the global information networks and is influenced more by world opinion and international legitimacy than any previous American generation. Even though the American Millennial Generation can be characterized as patriotic and having an increased interest in political issues,³⁹ the Millennial Generation sees the United States in the larger context of the world.⁴⁰ On a recent Roper Survey of high school students, the students indicated that "selfishness" was the "...major cause of problems" in the [United States]."⁴¹ This notion also applies to the United States involvement in international affairs. Information technology has been the "great unifier" of the Millennial Generation "...from places as diverse as Geneva, Japan, and Jersey. More than any other factor, it has united the generation, even globally."⁴² The Millennial Generation thinks in terms of the global greater good. The United States Army must be viewed as a values-based institution that serves both the greater national and international good to be attractive to the Millennial Generation.

The Segregation of America.

Much of the literature seems to describe a homogenous Millennial Generation. This is clearly not the case. American society is somewhat segregated in four major ways: economically, culturally, ethnically, and generationally. "Sixteen percent [of the Millennial Generation is] – or are currently - growing up in poverty. Although every generation has members who grew up poor, never have the differences been so dramatic. The schism is [now also] about technology... There is a group of young people who grew up – and are growing up-

without access to a computer - at home at school, or in the community.”⁴³ A cyber-based recruiting strategy may not reach a significant portion of the Millennial Generation.

The United States is also self-segregating in several ways. Robert D. Kaplan in his book, *An Empire Wilderness: Travels into America's Future* describes a United States where people, especially those who live in the technology centered urban fringes have more in common with people they have developed and maintained relationships with through telecommunications and cyberspace than with people who are their geographic neighbors, or live in close proximity. Kaplan suggests that the very meaning of community is radically changing. Ethnic and cultural groups that are separated by geography remain connected by telecommunications and never get fully assimilated into the local communities.⁴⁴ The Russian Americans in Denver can have closer ties with, and be more influenced by, the Russian Americans living in Los Angeles than by their next door neighbors in Denver.⁴⁵ The Iraqi American population in Dearborn, Michigan has more in common, and more interaction with the Iraqi Americans in New York than with the citizens of nearby Detroit, Michigan.⁴⁶ This cyber-segregation of ethnic and cultural groups in America strongly links similar pockets together. Cyber-segregation can also be found to some degree in religious, business, social, and athletic organizations. Access into these cultural and ethnic groups defined by cyberspace, presents unique challenges for future U.S Army recruiting strategies. Local recruiters will find it difficult to truly access to these cyber-segregated groups in their limited geographic areas of responsibility.

There is also a large portion of the previous generation (commonly referred to as Generation X) who are still of recruiting age. This generation was born before 1980, and they have their own distinct cultural characteristics. One of the most significant is that they “...stay at home longer. More of these young adults live with their parents than at any time since the Great Depression.”⁴⁷ Generation X has been described as “late bloomers” by some because they start their work and family lives much later than previous generations. This is a strategic challenge for Army recruiters because they have to devise a recruiting strategy for two different generations that according to Penny Rue, exhibit a “sharp break” in characteristics.⁴⁸

Politicization of the Recruiting Effort

It can be argued that government leaders have failed at times before in the history of the United States to actively support the raising of an Army to fight our Nation's wars. There are a few indications that the strategic political environment may be heading in that direction again. It is the explicit constitutional responsibility of the Congress of the United States to “...raise and support Armies.”⁴⁹ But, some congressmen have introduced legislation to make it more difficult

for recruiters to get access to American High School Students.⁵⁰ Also, a respected U.S. Congressman recently said that “he would not join, nor would he expect others to join” [the U.S. Military].⁵¹ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said that actions like these are “...damaging to recruiting.”⁵² And, most importantly, it undermines the ability of congressmen to fulfill their constitutional responsibility. When a recent report attributed to former government and military leaders associated with the current opposition party in the United States indicated that the U.S. Government Administration “...has “broken faith with the American Soldier...,” it added additional challenges for Recruiting Command to overcome in order to fulfill its mission. It is highly unlikely that most professional government leaders would overtly not support U.S. Army recruiting efforts, but, there is some danger if Army recruiting success, or lack of success, supports a particular political agenda. Army recruiting efforts could be impacted by passive government leaders who do not actively, openly and aggressively supporting efforts to raise, maintain and support the Army during execution of the Global War on Terror.

Execution of War

The U.S. Government has embarked upon a type of war, which is not clearly understood by much of the American population. The American people have grown accustomed to the military successes associated with the post-Vietnam changes that were made in the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense in the mid-1980s to correct known organizational and institutional flaws. Military successes directly attributed to these changes included Panama, the 1st Gulf War, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.⁵³ For the first time since the Vietnam War, the U.S. Government is involved in a complex casualty producing conflict that will span multiple U.S. election cycles. This is the first time since 1973 that the all-volunteer Army has been executing sustained operations where military leaders are routinely criticized in the open press for strategic and operational decisions.⁵⁴ The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that “Victory against terrorism will not occur as a single, defining moment. It will not be marked by [a]... surrender ceremony.”⁵⁵ The Global War on Terror and the general method for winning and achieving victory must be explained to, and understood by, the American people, if sustained public support to the U.S. Army recruiting effort is to be achieved. Jack Valenti, a former advisor to President Johnson and former head of the Motion Picture Association of America recently said, “No president can win a war when public support for that war begins to decline and evaporate.”⁵⁶ It is also likely that any decline in public support for the Global War on Terror will make it more challenging to meet recruiting objectives.

Sustained Economic Growth and Prosperity

The strength of the U.S. economy has always been a major factor in the strategic recruiting environment. The United States has had nearly five years of uninterrupted growth, and the U.S. economy is "...healthy and vigorous, and growing faster than other major industrialized nations."⁵⁷ The United States jobless rate dropped to 4.7% In January 2006, a nearly five year low.⁵⁸ Many see the strong economic conditions in the United States continuing.⁵⁹ The U. S. Army Recruiting effort has historically had recruiting challenges when the Nation's jobless rate has been low. In 1999, "...the nation's jobless rate had fallen to 4.1%, a 29 year low," and partly as a result, the U.S. Army, "...finished fiscal year 1999 almost 6,300 accessions short of the Regular Army (RA) accession mission and over 10,500 accessions short of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) accession mission."⁶⁰ A strong domestic economy will continue to have a significant impact on the strategic recruiting environment over the next several years.

Strategic Planning

"Military leaders ...[use] strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation while simultaneously focusing on future challenges."⁶¹ And, in this particular case, Army leadership must use the strategic planning process to develop a strategic plan to effectively address, or effectively counter the nine major shifts in the strategic environment, and ensure that current and future recruiting missions can be met. Specific recruiting strategies need to be tailored for the current recruit population (Millennial Generation) and the various segregated markets that lie outside of the Millennial Generation norm. The recruiting organizations and techniques will likely have to be adjusted to be effective in cyberspace. The U.S. Army will need to address the unique needs and desires of the parents of Millennial Generation in order to support U.S. Army Recruiting effort and maintain national support for the Army. The Army's strategic plan must be designed to take into consideration the United States will be at war and involved with military conflict for years to come, and potential recruits see themselves as part of a larger global community and will want to serve something bigger than just the United States and themselves. There will also be strategic challenges to recruiting efforts that will result from sustained U.S. economic growth and prosperity, a new type of long-term warfare that the U.S. population is not familiar with, and possible politicization of the national recruiting effort. The recruiting strategic plan must be designed to be effective in this emerging strategic environment.

The biggest pitfall in developing a strategic plan is strategy by default, or strategy by bureaucratic inertia. Each "...organization already has some semblance of direction, just as it has products, markets, business processes, a corporate culture, an organization structure, and a reward system." Many attempts to develop a strategic plan only end up being a continuation of current operations focused on implementing the current course direction. "Short-termism is seductive, but [it can also be] potentially fatal." When "...driven to 'do something,' the operational focus [of many organizations] may force their hand on answering the 'how' without having defined the 'what.'" ⁶² "Strategic planning is [simply] the process of determining the long-term vision and goals of an enterprise and how to fulfill them." ⁶³

Strategic planning requires seven things: 1) a vision; 2) a defined goal, objective or endstate; 3) a basic strategic planning construct that serves as a framework for developing a strategic plan that can be implemented by the organization; 4) identification of supporting goals and objectives; 5) a disciplined process to monitor and manage the implementation of the strategic plan that results in the achievement of the supporting goals and objectives; 6) a process for prioritizing efforts, especially in a resource-constrained environment; 7) a process to keep the strategic planning effort current and living so that it can adapt to a changing strategic environment, and still result in achievement of the ultimate defined goal, objective or endstate; and 8) a way to quickly change and evolve all of the organizations associated with the strategic plan to be responsive to changes in the strategic environment. ⁶⁴

U.S. Army Recruiting Command already has the first two things that are required for a strategic plan, a vision and an endstate. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command vision is:

The United States Army Recruiting Command recruits Soldiers, both officers and enlisted, to meet the needs of an expeditionary Army, begins the transformation from civilian to Soldier, acts as the Army's liaison with the American people, and does all with integrity and a professionalism that clearly demonstrates the warrior ethos and Army values. We remain relevant and ready to provide the strength for our Army, today and into the future. ⁶⁵

The ultimate endstate for U.S. Army Recruiting Command is to provide "...the Army the quantity and quality of men and women required for the Army to remain a relevant and ready force" in Fiscal Year 2006 and beyond. The details of the U.S. Army recruiting mission are specified from year to year by the Department of the Army. In Fiscal Year 2006 this specifically included recruiting 80,000 Regular Army soldiers, "and building a 25% - 35% Fiscal Year 2007 [Entry] Delayed Entry Program (EDEP) pool." ⁶⁶

The Strategic Planning Construct

There are four primary requirements for a strategic planning construct. First, a strategic planning construct must be a feasible model for how the organization is going to achieve the endstate. This includes being an effective tool in communicating how the organization is going to achieve its endstate.

Second, the strategic planning construct should fit the current organization. Often the strategic planning construct captures a strategy, but implementation and execution fails because the organizational structure cannot effectively implement the strategic plan. Many times the organization needs to be changed or modified slightly to fit the strategic planning construct. The developers of the strategic planning construct should strive to minimize the organizational changes and stay within the existing organizational structure as much as possible. But, it is still very important that the existing organizational structure does not overly influence the strategic construct, or strategy by default may occur. There will be cases when a strategic area of action is identified and the existing organizational structure can not support the strategic requirements. In these cases, a new organizational structure or organizational mechanism will need to be created to address the new strategic area.

Third, the strategic planning construct ideally will be an effective planning model that can be used to create a common planning focus for all levels of the organization. For example, in U.S. Army Recruiting Command the strategic planning construct should be able to be used as a framework for the subordinate brigade, battalion, company and station plans. Even though the details of the plan will be different at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of an organization, it is useful if the general framework is generally the same to create focus and unity of effort throughout the organization.

And, fourth, the strategic planning construct should capture all that the organization is doing to achieve the defined endstate. In most strategic plans there are literally hundreds of tasks and actions being accomplished throughout the organization. The strategic planning construct must provide a framework that encompasses each action and task so that it can be an effective tool in managing implementation and execution of the strategic plan.⁶⁷

The process of developing a strategic plan for U.S. Army Recruiting Command is somewhat simplified because it operates on an annual recruiting cycle with the actual mission often changing relatively little from year to year. Also, U.S. Army Recruiting Command operations continue almost uninterrupted from year to year and month to month. The recurring cycles and continuous operational characteristics of U.S. Army Recruiting Command naturally lead strategic planners to use lines of operation as a basis for the U.S. Army Recruiting

Command Strategic Plan. Lines of operation are a logical strategic direction that an organization must follow to achieve its endstate. There can be multiple lines of operations in a strategic plan, and in most cases lines of operation are interrelated and support one another. A line of operation can be designed around a function (eg. human resource management) or around a task (eg. increase market share). The one thing that all lines of operation have in common is that they connect tasks, actions and intermediate objectives in time and purpose related to the organization's defined endstate. Also, each line of operation should have a clearly defined person or organization responsible for achieving the actions and tasks along the line of operation and ensuring that the line of operation continues to support achievement of the organization's defined endstate. Often lines of operation are grouped together by task, organization or function to further clarify and define responsibilities, or strategic relationships. For the purpose of this project, a grouping of related lines of operation will be referred to as a campaign, a grouping of related campaigns will be referred to as a strategic plan, and grouping of related strategic plans will be referred to as a grand strategic plan.⁶⁸

The Army's Grand Strategic Recruiting Plan

The Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan must be designed to achieve success in two major strategic areas (see figure 1). The Recruiting Command Strategic Plan, is the principle



FIGURE 1

domain of U.S. Army Recruiting Command. It consists of two major campaigns. The second strategic plan, Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan, is the principle domain of organizations outside of U.S. Army Recruiting Command. The Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan also consists of two major campaigns.

“The [U.S.] Army G1 is the senior Army Human Resource Manager who oversees... the accessions function.”⁶⁹ But, the current recruiting guidance, direction and missions provided by the G1, even though quite extensive, do not constitute a grand strategic plan that identifies all that needs to be done, who is going to do it, and how it is going to get done. The U.S. Army G1, U.S. Army G3, U.S. Army Accessions Command, and U.S. Army Recruiting Command (in coordination with others involved in the effort) should probably develop the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan which will serve as the umbrella plan for the subordinate strategic plans and campaigns.

The elements of the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan are discussed further in the following sections. A recommendation for who (which organization) should have the planning and integration lead is suggested for each element of the strategic plan. It is understood that U.S. Army Recruiting Command and other organizations involved with the U.S. Army recruiting effort are in the best position to ultimately select the most appropriate planning and integration lead.

The Recruiting Command Strategic Plan

U.S. Army Recruiting Command has historically developed a Fiscal Year Campaign Plan⁷⁰ and a periodic Vision and Transformation Strategy⁷¹. The proposed Recruiting Command Strategic Plan is designed to combine these two documents into a single strategic plan, potentially eliminating the need for these two separate documents. The proposed Recruiting Command Strategic Plan consists of two campaigns. The first is the Recruiting Operations Campaign. The second campaign is the Recruiting Support Campaign. Both campaigns are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Recruiting Operations Campaign

The Recruiting Operations Campaign (figure 2) provides detailed guidance and direction on how the U.S. Army Recruiting Command orchestrates resources in time and geography to achieve the recruiting mission. The Recruiting Operations Campaign consists of eight lines of operation. The Advertising and Public Affairs Directorate (G5) is ideal for developing the first three lines of operation of the Recruiting Operations Campaign. The first is a local advertising and marketing strategy to support the subordinate recruiting command organizations. The

focus of this line of operation is at the local level, but it is nested in the national advertising and marketing strategy which will be discussed later. The second is a local outreach and strategic partner strategy to utilize strategic partnerships inside and outside of the U.S. Army to support the recruiting effort. The third line of operation is a strategic communications strategy that is a "...proactive and continuous process that supports the [U.S. Army Recruiting Command Strategic Plan] by identifying and responding to strategic... opportunities with information related activities."⁷² The primary focus of the strategic communication effort is to inform those in and outside of U.S. Army Recruiting Command about Recruiting Command in order to support the U.S. Army Recruiting Command Strategic Plan. Even though this effort supports the local and national marketing efforts, its purpose is more to inform about U.S. Army Recruiting Command than market the Army to potential recruits.



FIGURE 2

The U.S. Army Recruiting Command's Recruiting Operations Directorate (G3) is ideally suited to develop recruiting plans and strategies for the next five lines of operation of the Recruiting Operations Campaign. The fourth, fifth and sixth lines of operation are plans and strategies that focus on specific markets which include the high school, college, special, untapped and unanticipated markets. The seventh line of operation is the cyber-recruiting operations strategy focused on taking advantage of information technologies to reach specific

target markets. The eighth line of operation is the implementation of recruiting and assistance programs to encourage and enable subordinate recruiting organizations to achieve their specific recruiting missions. The Recruiting Operations Directorate (G3) is the most logical choice to manage and integrate the planning and implementation of the eight lines of operation of the Recruiting Operations Campaign, since it has staff responsibility for most of the campaign.

Recruiting Support Campaign

The Recruiting Support Campaign provides the strategy for how U.S. Army Recruiting Command will have the personnel, morale, training, procedures, organization and facilities needed to effectively implement the Recruiting Operations Campaign, effectively operate in the current (and future) strategic environment; and utilize its resources in an effective and efficient manner. The eight lines of operation of the Recruiting Support Campaign are represented in figure 3. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command Chief of Staff, with support from the Resource Management Directorate (G4), is the most logical choice to manage and integrate the planning and implementation efforts associated with the Recruiting Support Campaign, since this campaign involves the majority of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command's staff. The Recruiting Support Campaign lines of operation are on-going and currently being managed by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command.⁷³




FIGURE 3

The lines of operation for this campaign collectively build organizational excellence and ensure that U.S. Army Recruiting Command can support the short-term and long-term components of the recruiting operations campaign. The Personnel Directorate (G1) develops and implements the plan to maintain morale, support personnel well-being and effectively manage the human resources to support the Recruiting Operations Campaign. The Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (G2) is responsible for developing the information and intelligence capabilities and procedures to effectively support recruiting operations. The Resource Management Directorate (G4) develops and implements the resources, logistics and facilities plan to support recruiting operations. The Information Management Directorate (G6) “plans, develops goals and directs implementation strategy for [U.S. Army Recruiting Command’s] automation and computer systems.”⁷⁴ The Training Directorate (G7) is responsible for the training and leader development line of operation. The chief of staff is responsible for the long term expansion of cyber-recruiting capability to enable U.S. Army Recruiting Command to master the geographic domain of cyberspace. The Chief of Staff would also be responsible for developing and implementing the routine plans to adjust and evolve the organization, and improve processes and procedures, and implement the Lean Six Sigma program.⁷⁵

Mobilize the Army and the Nation Strategic Plan

Since the establishment of the all-volunteer professional Army in 1973, when the policy of conscription was abandoned by the United States Government, mobilizing the Army and the Nation behind the recruiting effort has been the most critical component of meeting the recruiting mission.⁷⁶ But, this effort typically has not been well integrated, coordinated and synchronized. Only when a recruiting command shortfall occurs, does there historically seem to be an interest in mobilizing the Army and Nation behind the recruiting effort, and by that time it is usually too late to have an impact on meeting the current fiscal year mission.⁷⁷ The Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan must be emphasized now to ensure that the Army can meet its recruiting mission in Fiscal Year 2006 and beyond. The Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan should be sustained and expanded as needed to ensure that it can effectively shape the recruiting marketplace in future years.

The Mobilize the Army and the Nation Strategic Plan consists of two campaigns. The first campaign mobilizes the Army to support the recruiting effort and is orchestrated by the organizations in, or closely associated with, the U.S. Army. The second campaign mobilizes the nation to support the recruiting effort and is orchestrated by a number of organizations. Neither

of the campaigns of this strategic plan is totally controlled by U.S. Army Recruiting Command, but U.S. Army Recruiting Command must be able to influence this critical part of the strategic effort, and ensure that these campaigns are integrated and synchronized to achieve the maximum effect. It is this strategic plan that creates the strategic environment that enables U.S. Army Recruiting Command to be successful.

Currently there is not a very good way to measure the effectiveness of the Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan, but a significant amount of national resources, and the vast majority of the marketing and advertising budget is allocated to this effort.⁷⁸ “Walk Ins” and “Call Ins” (those interested Americans who make contact with a recruiter first)⁷⁹ are a good indication of how effective the Mobilize the Army and Nation Campaign is. A quick review of recent historical recruiting data reveals that an effective Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan is responsible for at least one out of five recruits.⁸⁰ And, it is likely that it may have a significant influence on up to 50% of the recruits during wartime. “General Maxwell Thurman, who is widely recognized ...as the architect of the Army's first all-volunteer force recruiting strategy...,”⁸¹ said “Today's [peacetime] military may be called an all-volunteer force, but it is, in reality, an all-recruited force.”⁸² In wartime, the situation changes and the Army is both a recruited Army and a volunteer Army, and the Mobilize the Army and the Nation Strategic Plan is needed to build the sense of national service and duty that produces the required wartime volunteers. These volunteers may wait to be approached by a recruiter first, but they are already very receptive due to an effective effort to mobilize the nation to volunteer and serve during wartime. The Mobilize the Army and Nation Campaign is absolutely critical in building propensity to enlist during wartime.⁸³

Mobilize the Army

The Mobilize the Army Campaign consists of seven lines of operation (figure 4). The Mobilize the Army Campaign is a loose family of plans that are developed and implemented by a wide collection of organizations within, or associated with, the U.S. Army. The most logical organization to lead this effort would be a Recruiting Intra-Army Coordination Group (RIACG). The Recruiting Inter-Agency Coordination Group would function similar to a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The Recruiting Intra-Agency Coordination Group is a “multi-functional advisory organizational element on the [Recruiting Command] staff that facilitates planning, coordination and information sharing across the [internal Army recruiting] community. The primary role of the [Recruiting Intra-Army Coordination Group] is to enhance interchange among civilian and military organizations spanning the entire range of [Army recruiting

activities].”⁸⁴ The current Competitive Advantage Working Group that already exists in the Army recruiting community could be expanded to perform the RIACG role.⁸⁵ Currently an executive agent for developing a Mobilize the Army Campaign has not been designated, and as a result, efforts along these lines of operation are not well coordinated or synchronized, and significant gaps in required efforts exist.

The first line of operation in the Mobilizing the Army Campaign is Army Communications. The Draft Army Communications Plan 2006 developed by the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCA) is currently the core of this line of operation and it should be finalized and fully implemented. The three proposed desired effects of the Army Communications Plan (“to attract and retain quality soldiers, to maintain public support, and to resource the Army”) must be realized as soon as possible in FY 2006 to have the required effect on the current strategic recruiting environment. This communications effort involves the entire U.S. Army.⁸⁶




FIGURE 4

The National Marketing and Advertising Line of Operation is orchestrated by the Army Brand Group⁸⁷ and Army Accessions Command (ACC) to primarily support the mission of U.S. Army Recruiting Command. The effectiveness of all elements of the National Marketing and Advertising line of operation will need to be maximized to enable the U.S. Army to meet its

recruiting mission during the Global War on Terror. Measures of effectiveness should be developed and refined to focus these efforts to not only increase brand recognition of the Army in the broader American public, but to specifically target (and sell service in the Army) to current and future recruit populations and their influencers.⁸⁸

The Total Army Involvement in Recruiting program, the Army's Call to Duty effort, and related programs are the foundation of the third line of operation.⁸⁹ The U.S. Army involvement in the recruiting effort must continue to be expanded to capitalize on the greatest recruiting asset in the U.S. Army Inventory, the current U.S. Army soldier. The current effort of U.S. Army Accessions Command, (which includes a referral bonus) to harness soldiers from the Millennial Generation to recruit (especially in cyber-space) their friends, family and others who would make superb soldiers is crucial to meeting the recruiting mission in today's strategic environment. This notion of using existing soldiers to recruit others is a major strategic shift for the Army. But this is a common practice in many professions (including the Army National Guard), and the U.S. Army must adopt it and make it part of each soldier's professional responsibility.⁹⁰

Congress should aggressively begin supporting the U.S. Army recruiting effort early in Fiscal Year 2006 to enable U.S. Army Recruiting Command to meet its short-mission. A detailed Congressional Recruiting Support Plan should be developed in coordination with Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison (OCLL) that: recognizes the critical service to the nation that soldiers are currently providing; publicly recognize those who chose to enlist in the U.S. Army for their public service; reassure families (including parents) of current soldiers that supporting them and their soldiers remains a top priority; and encourage Americans to serve their country by enlisting now in the U.S. Army during this time of war.

The United States Army must continue to aggressively address the concerns of the families of soldiers. The Army Family Support Line of Operation logically would be led and developed by the U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center (USACFSC). It has often been said that the Army recruits soldiers, but retains families. The strategic recruiting environment is shifting, and now the Army is beginning to find itself in a position where parents are the biggest recruiting influence on potential soldiers, and parents of soldiers are the biggest influence on parents of potential soldiers.⁹¹ Due to strategic shifts in the recruiting environment, the U.S. Army must not only sell an enlistment in the Army to parents of prospective recruits, but must also fully embrace the notion that parents of current soldiers are part of the larger Army recruiting effort. Parents of potential soldiers would prefer to learn about the Army from current parents of soldiers, rather than from recruiters or from veterans who served decades ago.⁹² In a

recent phone conversation with a Military OneSource counselor, she indicated that Army parents often feel like the “forgotten family member.”⁹³ This must change if the U.S. Army is to be successful in today’s strategic recruiting environment. Parents of the Millennial Generation are accustomed to being members of parent associations and support groups. This is evident by the large number of soldier parent groups that have sprung up around the nation since the Global War on Terror began.⁹⁴ Parents of soldiers will sell the Army to other parents more effectively than Army recruiters, or military leaders who are participating in the U.S. Army’s highly successful Outreach program.⁹⁵ The Army Family Action Plan,⁹⁶ Army Family Team Building⁹⁷ and related programs should be expanded to specifically include the emerging needs of parents, and the Army must encourage the establishment of soldier parent groups, much like the state and regional parent associations that exist for service academy cadets.

The Army Associations and Veteran Organizations Line of Operation is being coordinated and led by the Recruiting Command’s Advertising and Public Affairs Directorate (G5). Army associations (including associations partnered with the Army) and veteran organizations should be encouraged to expand their missions, mandates, programs and/or services to include support to establishing local, regional and state soldier parent groups and associations. This will help provide the parents of the Millennial Generation with the type of associations and support groups that they are accustomed to. Army associations and veterans organizations should also be encouraged to sponsor the public presentation of national service awards to high school and college age students who choose to serve their nation in the U. S. Army in an effort to reinforce to the American public the importance of serving this nation.

The Army Defense Contractor Support Line of Operation could be coordinated and led by the Recruiting Command’s Advertising and Public Affairs Directorate (G5). Army defense contractors should be leveraged to support the recruiting effort. Defense contractor advertisements, just like during World War II (the last global war), could be effective in supporting Army recruiting. Recruiting messages to both prospective soldiers and parents of soldiers should be included in their routine advertisements. The messages should be selected by U.S. Army Recruiting Command and they should be made available to Army defense contractors. Army associations and Army leaders should highly encourage integration of these recruiting themes in contractor marketing and advertising campaigns when possible. Army defense contractors should be encouraged to support the establishment of local, regional and state soldier parent groups and associations. And, Army defense contractors should also be encouraged to sponsor the public presenting of national service awards to local high school and college age students who choose to serve their nation in the U. S. Army.

Mobilize the Nation Campaign

The Mobilize the Nation Campaign is the least developed of all elements of the Army Recruiting Campaigns (figure 5). There is currently no single organization with the resources and designated authority to coordinate these interagency efforts. During every long-duration American war, national, state and local government leaders, the national media, national entertainment and sports industries, educational institutions, national businesses, and national volunteer and service organizations were mobilized to support the recruiting effort. A National Interagency Coordination Group (NIACG), similar to the Recruiting Intra-Army Coordination Group, should be formed to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of national organizations and institutions outside the Department of Defense that impact recruiting. A Department of the Army organization should be designated as the U.S. Army lead on this effort. U.S Army Accessions Command⁹⁸ and the U.S. Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs⁹⁹ are pursuing actions and efforts related to this campaign, but currently there is no over-arching and integrated plan to mobilize the nation behind the recruiting effort.¹⁰⁰ Also, the capability to determine the recruiting effectiveness of these lines of operation should be expanded, and in some cases created, to enable the refinement and focus of current efforts to make them more effective.



FIGURE 5

The Way Ahead

Following the development of a strategic construct, the way ahead is based on increasing the effectiveness of recruiting operations (inside and outside of U.S. Army Recruiting Command), and mobilizing the Army and the nation to more effectively shape the recruiting markets in today's strategic environment. Over the next several years, especially as the United States is engaged in the Global War on Terror, the effectiveness of all aspects of the Army Recruiting Grand Strategy must be maximized.

There are several steps that need to be taken to further develop and implement the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan based on the strategic planning construct outlined. Individuals or organizations must be designated as the planning and coordination lead for each component of the plan. The individuals or organizations designated as the lead should identify the key supporting goals and objectives for both the short-term (fiscal year 2006), and the long-term (out to fiscal year 2011). These supporting goals and objectives should be identified and developed, along with the strategies to reach them, for every line of operation, and major component of the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan. These goals, objectives and strategies should then be incorporated into plans for each line of operation. Each plan will be unique and designed based on the characteristics of each line of operation. These inter-related and mutually supporting plans will make up the family of plans that are the foundation of the United States Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan.

A disciplined process must be instituted to monitor and manage the implementation of the plans for each line of operation. This will help force achievement of the supporting goals and objectives, and ensure that the plans support, but do not duplicate other efforts. The management of the implementation will ensure that all strategic requirements are addressed, preventing a strategy by default from emerging. The implementation process cannot take a one-size-fits-all approach, and each implementation process should be designed specifically for each line of operation. The implementation process will, of course, include periodic reviews and adjustments to the plan as appropriate. This process should also help prioritize efforts and keep the strategic planning process alive so that it remains current. The management of the implementation process should focus on a long enough planning horizon to ensure that the organizations associated with the U.S. Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan can quickly evolve to be responsive to changes in the strategic environment.

Each line of operation should have two components. The first is a rolling short term plan that remains current and is focused 12 months out regardless of fiscal year. The second is a long-term plan that is focused from one to five years in the future. This approach will keep the

Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan alive and prevent it from becoming stagnant, irrelevant or obsolete.

Finally, organizations need to be adjusted, or planning and implementation groups formed to effectively plan and implement the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan. An overarching integrator for the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan should be identified and be given executive agent responsibility for developing and implementing the plan. A review should be conducted to determine how to best consolidate planning and implementation efforts under one organization where possible, and form coordination and implementation groups where required. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command could utilize its Office of Internal Audit to assist in this effort.

Recommendations

The development and implementation of an Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan is a living and an evolutionary process. There are a vast number of required tasks and actions associated with Army recruiting. Given the limited resources in today's recruiting environment several efforts need to be given priority to ensure that the U.S. Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan will enable the Army to obtain the quantity and quality of men and women required for Fiscal Year 2006 and beyond. First, Army family support needs to be expanded in regards to meeting the specific needs of parents. The American public connects with the Army through parents of soldiers and through other soldier family members. And, parents of current soldiers are often the biggest influence on potential soldiers, and other parents whose children are interested in joining the Army.

Second, Army recruiting operations should master the geographic location of cyberspace. Mastering cyberspace is more than "cyberizing" existing Recruiting Command operations, techniques and procedures. Mastering cyberspace is actually designing and engineering Recruiting Command organizations, operations and procedures around the unique characteristics of cyberspace to enable U.S. Army Recruiting Command to be a national leader in cyber-recruiting. Soldiers of the future will be found in cyberspace, and the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan must propel the Army to increase its cyber-recruiting capability.

Third, a Recruiting Intra-Army Coordination Group (RIACG), or equivalent capability, that can facilitate planning, coordination and information sharing across the internal Army recruiting community must be formed. Interchange among civilian and military organizations spanning the range of Army recruiting activities will need to be enhanced if the U.S. Army is to meet its recruiting mission during the Global War on Terror. Efforts along the lines of operation in the

proposed Mobilize the Army Campaign are currently not well coordinated or synchronized, and significant gaps in required effort exist

Fourth, the Mobilize the Nation Campaign should be further developed to maximize the positive effect that National support has on Army recruiting efforts. A formal coordination group should be established to coordinate and synchronize these efforts. Measures of effectiveness need to be refined to help manage and focus these national efforts. The Mobilize the Nation Campaign will be critical in getting the American public to: 1) support with service and sacrifice the current war which will be characterized by prolonged military conflict and global terrorism, and honor those who have served and sacrificed the most; 2) understand that America not only fights for itself, but fights for the greater international good; 3) realize that the Global War on Terror must be a sustained national endeavor and must not be politicized; and 4) understand that even though the type of war that we are fighting is different from conflicts of the recent past, we have a determined long term national and international plan that will ensure our success.

Fifth, U.S. Army Recruiting Command should continue to expand the role of the Command Planning Group so that it can effectively coordinate and integrate the plans and activities of the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan and ensure unity of effort. The Command Planning Group must maintain a holistic and strategic view of the strategic recruiting environment and be in a position to guide and influence the Army recruiting efforts. The current strategic plan that emerged from the January 2006 U.S. Army Recruiting Command strategic planning conference has been a significant evolutionary step in the right direction.¹⁰¹ Over time, this effort should be expanded in both planning horizon and strategic breadth.

Sixth, Effectiveness of all recruiting activities should be increased to enable the U.S. Army to meet its mission, particularly in the short-term. The ratio of effort and resources spent per recruit must be maximized to ensure that the greatest effect is being achieved. The strategic recruiting environment, even without the impact of the current Global War on Terror, makes the Army recruiting mission a challenge. The economic growth and prosperity currently being experienced by the United States will also have a negative effect on Army recruiting if historical precedents hold true. Also, the U.S. Army must figure out ways to reach the emerging dispersed and segregated markets that often cross recruiting command unit boundaries.

And seventh, the U.S. Army must capitalize on the current soldiers of the Millennial Generation to recruit their peers into the service of the United States Army. Since the establishment of the all-volunteer Army, the current serving force has not been fully mobilized to assist in the recruiting effort. The Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan must institutionalize this effort as part of the professional Army culture.

Conclusion

The current strategic recruiting environment is undergoing significant change in nine major areas. The current recruit population (Millennial Generation), the parents of the recruit population, the increase in global terrorism and military conflict, cyberspace and the advancement of information technologies and dissemination, globalization, the segregation of America, politicization of the recruiting effort, execution of war, and sustained economic growth and prosperity are all having a significant impact on Army recruiting. An Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan that can address these changes in the strategic environment and ensure continued success in meeting the Army's recruiting mission is needed.

The Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan construct proposed is structured into two subordinate strategic plans, a Recruiting Command Strategic Plan and a Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan. The Recruiting Command Strategic Plan, as the title indicates, is focused on recruiting efforts under the direct control and direction of U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and consists of a Recruiting Operations Campaign and a Recruiting Support Campaign. The Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan is focused on necessary recruiting efforts that are outside of the direct control of U.S. Army Recruiting Command. The Mobilize the Army and Nation Strategic Plan consists of a Mobilize the Army Campaign and a Mobilize the Nation Campaign. Each of the four campaigns have several proposed lines of operation designed around a function, task and/or an organization. This planning construct is not the only way that the recruiting efforts and activities can be organized, but it is one that can be used to help shape the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Planning effort.

There are several steps that need to be taken to further develop and implement the United States Army's Grand Strategic Recruiting Plan based on the strategic planning construct outlined in this paper. Key supporting goals and objectives for both the short term (fiscal year 2006), and the long term (out to fiscal year 2011 and beyond) should be identified for each line of operation. Also, an implementation plan should be developed and executed for each line of operation that make up the inter-related and mutually supporting family of plans that are the foundation of the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan. Finally, organizations need to be adjusted, and coordination groups need to be formed to plan and implement the Army Recruiting Grand Strategic Plan.

Priority for the strategic planning effort should be given to addressing the emerging changes to the strategic environment along with increasing the effectiveness of current recruiting operations. The Recruiting Command Strategic Plan alone cannot achieve the Army's recruiting mission. The Mobilize the Army and the Nation Strategic Plan is equally responsible

for ensuring that the Army can meet its recruiting objectives. In the words of the Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter J. Schoomaker, "This is the first time in our history in which the Nation has tested the All-Volunteer force during a prolonged war. ...[Keeping the Army] appropriately manned may well be the greatest strategic challenge that we face."¹⁰² The proposed Army Grand Strategic Recruiting Plan is a framework and construct that may help enable the U.S. Army meet this strategic challenge.

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