

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE SCROLL AND THE SWORD:
SYNERGIZING CIVIL-MILITARY POWER**

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ABSTRACT

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The emerging strategic environment has so far provided some clear lessons. Foremost is that a successful long-term national security strategy must bring together military and non-military elements of power early and often. Greater use of civil and “soft” power is both more desirable and decisive in winning the peace and the “war of ideas”. Failure to realize this opportunity, at many decision-making levels, can not only cost many lives – it can also cost immense amounts of credibility and treasure, threatening to undermine long-term U.S. grand strategy. Increasingly, national security and military strategic thinkers are coming to a new appreciation of the need to leverage softer, civil elements of national power, represented in the interagency process and the private sector. However, a unifying concept of national strategic principles for synergizing civil-military power has yet to find full articulation. These principles may be found, among other places, in the evolving concepts of civil-military operations (CMO) as a way and capabilities like Civil Affairs (CA) as a means. At all levels and across the operational spectrum, evolving CMO and CA are at the forefront of stability, transition to peace, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. Meanwhile, demand for Army CA, itself in a state of dynamic change, has exhausted supply. Indeed, as the strategic and operational value of CMO and CA becomes more apparent, Joint and Army doctrines struggle to address asymmetric and ideological challenges and place CMO and CA in appropriate context. This study looks to identify that strategic context, a conceptual hierarchy, and principles for synergizing civil and military elements of power.

THE SCROLL AND THE SWORD: SYNERGIZING CIVIL-MILITARY POWER

War and peace are part of the same policy continuum. All dimensions and elements of power count – at times some more than others, but in the end result, all. Long ago, Clausewitz described war as “...merely the continuation of policy by other means” (war not being the only way) and Liddell-Hart posited a century later that the “...object of war is to attain a better peace” (going beyond war-fighting).¹ The War on Terrorism (now the “Long War”), however, provides an opportunity for broader and more substantive understanding of this insight. Applied national security strategy must now be at an unusual level of comprehensiveness, integration, and balance, from formulation through execution. Failure to realize this, at many decision-making levels, can cost many lives. It can also cost immense amounts of credibility and treasure, threatening to undermine U.S. grand strategy. More and more, national security and strategic thinkers are appreciating the need to leverage non-military elements of national power, represented in the interagency process and in the private sector. However, a unifying national concept, based on strategic principles for synergizing civil and military elements of power, has yet to find full articulation and translation into ways and means, encumbering America’s ability to apply the full weight of civil and soft power to deal with strategic and ideological challenges asymmetric to hard power. This calls for a consciousness that transcends Sun Tzu’s dictum that “...to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”.²

Synergizing Civil and Military Power

America’s need to learn to better synergize civil and military elements of power is evident in three areas – the emerging strategic environment, the prevailing American strategic culture, and recent interagency and military initiatives to close civil-military gaps.

First, the emerging strategic environment calls for a more holistic, far-reaching and balanced grand strategy. National security issues since the end of the Cold War and especially the 9/11 have been increasingly non-military. Challenges such as ethnic and religious conflict, terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental instability, infectious diseases, and sharpening competition for dwindling natural resources are transforming hitherto orthodox notions of national security. Although nation-states retain the advantage of being able to coordinate and apply the full range of power elements, growing seams especially between nation-states present increasing vulnerabilities.

Within these seams, however, are not only the greatest threats to national security in the 21st century, but also the greatest opportunities, among them international governmental and

non-governmental and private sector organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability since the early 1990s. The United Nations and its agencies alone are far more capable at peace operations than in the early 1990s. A watershed development is the recently created U.S.-inspired and supported Peace-Building Commission (PBC) as part of emerging UN reform. According to U.S. Ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton:

Our common imperative is to create a cost-effective, efficient advisory institution, capable of ensuring the successful transition from peacekeeping operations into peace building, providing important advice but not duplicating work. The PBC can most effectively help prevent nations from sliding back into conflict by ensuring that the Security Council is aware of all the elements that are essential to achieving sustainable peace in a given nation, from immediate humanitarian assistance to transitional security to national efforts at institution building.³

The growth of civil power alone stipulates more deliberate and skillful coordination of military and non-military power in more complex, multinational settings and in ways not yet entirely familiar to security policy elites. Further, stability and counterinsurgency operations have (re)emerged, involving a "...confluence of military and non-military operations... This requires an organization vested with the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military elements".⁴ And "...because insurgency is a holistic threat, counterinsurgency must be integrated and holistic".⁵ Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, however, transnational threats such as al-Qaeda are now understood as a "global insurgency" rather than simply as an international terrorist network.⁶ At the same time, due to a flattening, non-linear world, decision cycles have shrunk while interdependent second- and third-order effects gain new importance, pressuring leadership to anticipate change and shape events rather than be shaped by them. The margins of error are becoming too narrow, the consequences and stakes too high, and the opportunities too great to keep doing the business of national security as usual.

Second, traditional American bias towards (coercive) "hard" power in general – and its unilateral, pre-emptive use of late – has been not without issue and cost. Beyond missed opportunities for effective application of all elements of national power (especially informational), it presents often counterproductive costs and risks. International and domestic support for U.S. policies related to the War on Terrorism has been problematic, while America's international standing and moral authority has been tenuous, encumbering newly energized diplomatic and information strategies. In addition, the U.S. continues to shoulder immense political and financial costs, which it cannot afford indefinitely. War on Terrorism interventions have cost around \$100-billion annually in mostly supplemental instruments for over five years, on top of programmed Defense outlays. In other words, America's more pre-emptive, hard-power approach since 9/11 has already cost nearly a half-trillion dollars (not including hundreds of

billions spent so far on homeland defense or an even the larger direct and indirect costs directly resulting from 9/11.) Given mounting fiscal pressures and competing domestic constraints, there are signs this largesse cannot go on much longer.

The preference for hard power is heavily reflected fiscally, most obviously between the budgets of the Defense and State Departments (the former budget about 30 times the latter). Even though the foreign aid budget has expanded substantially, it is still only around \$18.5-billion.⁷ Developmental funds under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are about the same, while the Office of Transition Initiatives, which assists the critical transition between relief and reconstruction efforts, operates on about \$5-million.⁸ Unsurprisingly, soft power is diminutive in DoD – an organizational culture steeped in traditional American fascination with technology.⁹ Under DoD's \$7.6-billion FY05 Security Assistance Program, for example, less than \$90-million was devoted to International Military Education and Training (IMET), a key component of theater security cooperation (TSC) strategies that generates large soft-power dividends due to relationships built among military leaders.¹⁰

Soft power (which draws actors to desired actions collaboratively) is complementary to hard power. If appropriately accessed through the interagency process and from the private sector, where it largely finds itself, it can mitigate much of the costs and risks of war and help create opportunity for a more profitable peace. Hard power is mostly resource-intensive, zero-sum, and responsive. Soft power is an economical, renewable, and synergistic inflection of national power. It creates a more peaceful, stable and profitable international environment, has further-reaching effects, is less costly and risk-intensive, and increases feasible, acceptable, and sustainable strategic options.¹¹ It can also be preventative:

Strengthening weak states against failure is far easier than reviving them after they have definitively failed or collapsed... Strengthening states prone to failure before they fail is prudent policy and contributes significantly to world order and to minimize combat casualties.... [T]his is far less expensive than reconstructing states after failure. Strengthening weak states also has the potential to eliminate the authority and power vacuums within which terror thrives.¹²

Third, policy and program developments at interagency and joint levels reflect recognition of the need to more adroitly synchronize civil and military power. National security strategies are entailing a more holistic, balanced strategy involving greater use of civil and soft power. Of the eight "aims" of the *National Security Strategy*, four are soft-power intensive, three are a combination of soft and hard power, and one is primarily hard-power.¹³ Of 27 recommendations of Congress's *9/11 Commission Report*, one advocates the use of military force in direct action against terrorist organizations.¹⁴ More is being done to leverage the private sector. The

Millennium Challenge Corporation is exemplar of more savvy support to economic and business development,¹⁵ along with the self-funding Overseas Private Investment Corporation.¹⁶

There is also growing attention to improving the interagency process. Significant to this are the Center for Strategic and International Studies' *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* studies, which recommend the realization of an interagency concept of "unity of effort":

Complex U.S. contingency operations over the past decade, from Somalia to Iraq, have demonstrated the necessity for a unity of effort not only from the armed forces but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition. In most cases, however, such unity of effort has proved elusive, sometimes with disastrous results. The U.S. national security apparatus requires significant new investments in this area. Otherwise, the United States' ability to conduct successful political-military contingency operations will continue to be fundamentally impaired.¹⁷

Other than Homeland Security, State and Defense are most involved in the interagency national security process. Under the "transformational diplomacy" concept promulgated in January 2006, the State Department is empowering interagency cooperation:

Vital to this vision is continued collaboration between civilians and the military. Diplomats must be able to work effectively at the critical intersections of diplomatic affairs, economic reconstruction, and military operations.¹⁸

A month earlier, the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, the long-awaited replacement of the Clinton Administration's PDD-56. It designates DoS, as the lead agency for interagency coordination and planning, to develop strategies and plans for reconstruction and stabilization as well as a civilian response capability through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This is the first wholly interagency document of its kind.¹⁹ Given its small budget and limited personnel, it will take S/CRS some time to organize, be fully staffed and resourced, and gain institutional traction and muscle.

DoD, in contrast, is further along, starting with the Secretary of Defense's observation, shortly after 9/11, that "...wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power..."²⁰ The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has similarly instructed:

We must harness the elements of national power to win the War on Terrorism... Through closer coordination within the Department of Defense and interagency we maximize the impact of our military power and build trust, synergy, and momentum. We will focus on a collaborative approach... building and enhancing interagency relationships. Look for ways that the military instrument – and the way it is applied – can complement and strengthen the actions of other elements of national power.²¹

The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, in turn, recognizes the need for a formal strategic concept to synergize military and non-military power:

The QDR recommends the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives.²²

DoD interagency coordination mechanisms are also more robust. Among them is DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations". Released a month before NSPD-44, it notes that "integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations".²³ In addition:

Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations..., U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations..., and private sector individuals and for-profit companies.²⁴

DoDD 3000.05 supports DoD's "unified action" concept, which is "the synergistic application of all instruments of national power and multinational power and includes the action of non-military organizations as well as the military forces".²⁵ TSC, which features non-combat programs to build relationships and mitigate the need to resort to combat operations, is embedded in the *Joint Operation Planning* doctrine.²⁶ (However, there is no joint, interagency doctrine dedicated to TSC.) Then there is the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), which expands the planning and conduct of operations from a predominantly force-oriented, military-on-military approach to one that facilitates the application of all elements of power.²⁷

The Army, which bears the brunt of missions in Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) of the joint planning process, also realizes that:

Both national and international security require integrating many nonmilitary disciplines, including such areas as economic and political health. To a greater degree than ever, diplomatic, informational, and economic factors now affect national security. At the strategic level, an adversary's power is no longer reckoned in terms of its military capabilities. It is now assessed more comprehensively, in terms of its interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems.²⁸

Army operational doctrine (FM 3-0) describes the integrated operational environment as factors of "mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations" (METT-TC). The "C" in METT-TC (added in 2001) consists of "civil considerations" that:

...relate to civilian populations, culture, organizations, and leaders... in all operations directly or indirectly affecting civilian populations. At the operational level, civil considerations include the interaction between military operations and

the other instruments of national power. Civil considerations at the tactical level generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the current operation; however, they also consider larger, long term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues.²⁹

(Interestingly, while Army operational doctrine identifies seven “battle operating systems” with respect to METT-TC, none of them engages the “C” factor.)

For some time, therefore, the defense and military community will be, by default more than desire, the driver for interagency cooperation and coordination, in Washington and the field, and for the development of non-DoD managerial capabilities, recognized by a growing number in the Defense establishment. Among these efforts is DoD’s support of the S/CRS, with a transfer of about \$200-million and loan of staff to energize that effort. As a September 2005 Defense Science Board study on stability operations posited:

We have great respect for the military services’ approach to management... We believe this management discipline, now focused on combat operations, must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DoD, but across the government... In addition to strengthening capabilities within the Department of Defense, we urge the secretary to use his considerable influence to propel needed changes that span the government’s agencies and departments... other than Defense.³⁰

DoD’s enabling role in revitalizing the civil-military interagency process – helping to build capacity for transition of non-DoD missions, in DoD’s vested interest – is a longtime principle of civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs (CA). The integration, synchronization, or coordination of civil and military elements of power to fulfill national or international security objectives in unified action and EBO are, in essence, CMO and CA, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, regardless of the type of intervention, operation, or phases thereof.

Civil-Military Operations – What They Really Are

CMO have been applied, albeit not always in their currently recognizable form, by the U.S. Army for almost its entire history, starting with the first use of “military government” during the Mexican War, through Reconstruction after the Civil War, the Philippine Insurrection and other small wars in the 19th and 20th centuries, the deployment of provisional Civil Affairs/Military Government units to occupied portions of the Rhineland after World War I, and of course the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II. Since the 1950s, through the “hearts and minds” campaigns in Vietnam and particularly during the peace operations of the 1990s, CMO have doctrinally matured, the latest joint definition being:

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.³¹

Although the Cold War focus of CMO was on “minimizing civilian interference in military operations”, especially since Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, commanders are better understanding the value of CMO to visualize and shape the civilian component of the integrated operational environment (the “C” in METT-TC). Joint and Army doctrine already acknowledge that CMO permeate all military operations at all levels across the full spectrum of conflict. CMO are now at the forefront of stability, reconstruction, peace, and counterinsurgency operations. In counterinsurgencies, they are one of three critical direct action operations.³²

Ironically (or perhaps paradoxically), the U.S. Army has no CMO doctrine. There is a Joint Publication on CMO, as well as a USMC doctrine.³³ Throughout past and current versions of the Army civil affairs operations (CAO) doctrine, CMO and CA have been intertwined but not always clearly delineated, especially when translated into other doctrine. This doctrinal shortcoming has contributed to a widespread misunderstanding and confusion between CMO and CA, inadequate integration of CMO, and inappropriate employment of CA. Put simply, CMO are a concept or way, while CA is a means or capability.

Civil Affairs – A Strategic Enabler

CA is one among the military’s capabilities to facilitate CMO – no longer just in the Army. There are now three U.S. Marine civil affairs groups (CAGs, tactical CA formations slightly larger than the Army CA battalions); furthermore, the USMC has tasked its artillery battalions with CMO as a secondary mission. The Navy (in addition to setting up a corps of foreign area officers, or FAOs, to go out with the fleets) is creating two Reserve civil affairs battalions from its Reserve mobile construction (Seabee) battalions.³⁴ The Air Force has created some CMO capability to support its expeditionary concept, while both Air Force and Navy Reserve personnel are receiving CA/CMO training at Ft. Bragg, albeit to help the Army fill its depleted ranks of CA personnel to support continued deployments.³⁵

CA is the premier military specialty to facilitate CMO, and while capabilities are growing among other services, the bulk of CA still comes from the Army – land power remaining most suited to integrate all elements of national power, especially in post-conflict situations. Only the

Army has strategic, operational, and tactical CA capability, with its CA commands and brigades as well as its battalions. Army CA has been doing this for generations, though its mission has evolved considerably since the Cold War.

Army CA, with historical roots in post-war Germany and Japan, are the designated Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) units intended to support CMO across the full spectrum of conflict. During combat, CA more than helps minimize civilian interference. It helps hasten an end to hostilities and reduce civilian casualties and damage. The military's prime instrument to coordinate with local, U.S., and international civilians, CA facilitates humanitarian relief, civil order, and the resumption of public services and normal daily life as fighting subsides. As emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction, CA brokers the growth of governance and helps turn responsibilities over to civilian relief and reconstruction agencies and, ultimately, local public administrators, enabling fulfillment of the political-military end state. While CA generalists at the tactical and operational levels are in direct support of forces, CA functional specialists, especially in commands and brigades, are increasingly in general support of interagency stability and reconstruction operations, largely at operational and strategic levels. The evolution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan and Ministry Support Teams in Iraq illustrate much of this evolution in CA employment concepts.

CA is thus a strategic enabler. Its potential as such is gaining visibility. Robert Kaplan notes that the U.S. Pacific Command, within the context of its TSC concept, conducts "civil affairs projects" to help secure basing rights and, conversely, deny them to potential adversaries such as China.³⁶ More specifically, in a piece on how the U.S. should pursue its global security interests, Kaplan lists as the first of 10 "rules" the need for more CA personnel.³⁷ In addition, most actionable intelligence nowadays is of the "human intelligence" variety, which originates from open sources and comes through information and cultural/situational awareness obtained from personal contacts and relationships through diplomacy, commercial activities, and CMO (and psychological operations, or PSYOP). CA/CMO thus have significant value as information sources for intelligence: "Timely and actionable intelligence, together with early warning, is the most critical enabler to protecting the United States at a safe distance."³⁸ Beyond early warning, CA/CMO can detect "opportunities for democratic transformation".³⁹ In nation assistance missions, CA can contribute to early warning in failing or trouble states, as a by-product of its presence and area assessments in cooperation with country teams.

Last but not least, CA has considerable impact on information operations (IO) and the "war of ideas", not only due to its "key leader engagement" of indigenous public opinion makers and international civilian relief and reconstruction managers at the tactical and operational

centers of gravity, but through generation of “good news stories” on relief and reconstruction progress gained through its civil-military coordination and information management activities, thus feeding both strategic communications and IO efforts at the tactical, operational, strategic centers of gravity.⁴⁰ Moreover, the growing civil information management role of CA and its longstanding civil-military operations center (CMOC) and CMO estimate best practices can facilitate interagency unity of effort at all levels.

In all these respects, properly utilized strategically, CA and CMO can deal with strategic threats and opportunities at the generative stage in nation assistance or TSC missions, not just when the conflict or crisis breaks out, which is more risk-laden and expensive and where hard power becomes the Hobson’s choice.

CA has been the most expedient and cost-effective means the military has to execute U.S. political-military strategy and win the peace on the ground. America’s capability to conduct this increasingly vital mission is little more than 6,000 CA soldiers in the Army and Marines. (About 96% are in the RC – itself in a dynamic state of transformation, mainly because they are best suited for intense interaction with civilians and because of civilian knowledge and skills they have or can access – and cannot be duplicated in the AC without great expense.)⁴¹ Less than one half of one percent of the U.S. force structure is thus dedicated to leveraging non-military power and winning the peace – and the budget share is even smaller. In many ways, CA is the low-tech solution to the low-tech problem – perhaps why it gathers little attention in a strategic culture predisposed to hard power and vested in the military industrial complex.

As proof of its worth, since the early 1990s, demand for CA has escalated and then, following 9/11, skyrocketed. According to the Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), over 90% of all deployable Army and Marine CA personnel have been sent at least once to Iraq and Afghanistan – among the busiest specialties in the military. This does not include 500-600 more CA personnel deployed since 9/11 to over 20 other countries, including many TSC missions in support of U.S. interests worldwide. Wholly deployable CA units no longer exist – units have been cobbled together using “fillers” from the remnants of others, as well as fleshed out with Air Force and Navy Reserve personnel now being sent to Ft. Bragg for pre-deployment crash courses in CAO/CMO.

CA is hard pressed to support both the burgeoning CMO mission and interagency nation-building. One reason, in truth, is because CA’s traditional comparative advantages in particularly language and cultural knowledge, as well as its nation-building functional specialist proficiency, have dwindled over time for a number of reasons. Under-resourced and understaffed, USACAPOC has been addressing issues related to doctrine and force design, as it

lobbied for assistance from higher commands. It may be too little, too late, as the chain of command (and advocacy) changes from special operations to the “Big Army”. While intense discussion at the DoD, SOCOM, and Army levels ensued over whether CA should stay in SOF, more important issues of doctrine, force management and operational tempo, CA employment in theater, CA education and training, etc., received less attention.⁴² As the Defense Science Board (which did not recommend moving CA out of SOF) noted in late 2005:

Perhaps, more important than organizational reporting is proper sizing, recruitment, retention and motivation of the best people to actually perform Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs is largely a reserve activity, and we think that is good insofar as it provides a window on the private sector where the skills required by the stability operations mission can be found in abundance. However, the reserve recruitment process for Civil Affairs is the overall reserve recruitment process and may not tap into the private sector communities with the special skills needed by Civil Affairs. Further issues regarding Civil Affairs involve how they are fielded, i.e. coupled to maneuver units, and whether that leads to the best use of the special capabilities of Civil Affairs units. We also need to consider the rotation policy for Civil Affairs reservists and the mobilization policy, and tailor same to the special needs for Civil Affairs. Finally, in light of the likely size of future stability operations, we have to consider whether the overall size of that reserve capability is adequate: quantity has a quality all its own.⁴³

Although the value-added of CMO and CA, as the military exemplar of strategic ways and means to synergize civil-military power is becoming more apparent, CA as a strategic capability may be on the verge of collapse. There is no single DoD executive agent for CA (and PYSOP). It is currently split between the Army Reserve Command for RC force management and U.S. Army Special Operations Command for AC force management and doctrine/schools. Beyond USACAPOC's efforts, the Army Reserve is looking at revitalizing CA functional specialty capabilities through better recruiting and retention policies, a warrant officer program for CA specialists, and Army-paid industry and public administration internships for them.⁴⁴ Another idea is for DoS, as it stands up S/CRS Advanced Civilian Teams, an Active Response Corps, and a Standby Ready Reserve – as counterpart to CA functional specialists, to look to DoD, especially the Army Corps of Engineers, for its initial capability in deploying civilians and developing its own expeditionary culture.⁴⁵

In any case, however, these civil-military capabilities issues must be addressed in a comprehensive context for synergizing civil-military power that applies to both communities.

A Context for Synergizing Civil-Military Power

A unifying national strategic context for synergizing civil and military elements of power can be found: first, in a hierarchy of strategic concepts; and second, in identifying strategic

principles for CMO and CA – not only in order to understand how this synergy can take place horizontally across the elements of power represented in the interagency process, but perhaps most importantly, how it can be translated vertically from the strategic to the operational and tactical levels, for both civil and military components.

Elements of a strategic hierarchy of civil-military concepts already exist, albeit not developed and linked holistically – starting with interagency “unity of effort”, the principles for which are being further developed.⁴⁶ (In truth, “unity of effort” may be too tall of an order, as understood by the military. More realistic, in most cases, may be “unity of purpose” – more agreement on basic goals and objectives than on common ways and means.) Cascading down the strategic scale, “unity of effort” (or purpose) could flow into the “unified action” systems framework articulated in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO), the bridging document between national security and military strategies and joint doctrine.⁴⁷ Unified action aims to achieve unity of effort (or purpose) among all elements of power in order to engage better both the threats and opportunities of today’s complex operational environment, which increasingly emerge from the civil-military dimension, where many lines are blurred. Appendix D of the CCJO goes beyond traditional phasing, as in the joint planning process, and specifies the same “phases” as “lines of effort”, stressing simultaneous activities rather than a linear approach. The first is Phase 0 (Shape), while the last two are Phases IV and V. All of these look to leverage civil and soft power through CMO and IO.

This suggests understanding the civil-military relationship in international interventions with the military as an “enabler”. Enabling, however, is not co-opting. If DoD is to help build interagency capacity, even in enlightened self-interest, it must do so with respect to the organizational cultures of more austere agencies often with narrower focus – an operational common denominator approach that applies the military principles of simplicity and unity (of command). Moreover, the military must discard the attitude that “synchronizing military power with other instruments of national power substantially improves the joint force’s strategic capabilities”⁴⁸, as if non-military and soft power were “force multipliers”. Especially in Phases 0, IV, and V, military power is the shaping action, while civil and soft power is decisive. Military-led Phases II and III (Seize Initiative and Dominate) are but steps to fulfillment of the political end state. With respect to unified action and EBO:

Military operations are a part of that. International civilian policing and stability functions are part of it. Transitional governance is part of it. The rule of law is part of it. Economics is part of it. Development of a civil society is a component of it. The Department of Defense has control over only one small portion of it. And what we have come to recognize is the Department of Defense as had its so-called effects-based planning... what is the effect that you want to achieve? If the

effect that you want is sustainable peace, you need that full spectrum of capabilities and where you're going to get that, the majority of those capabilities, is from the civilian world.⁴⁹

These lines of effort may also be understood within a broader conceptual relationship between modes of policy and force in a continuous loop. Policy may give way for a moment to a mode of force (in conflict) but policy prevails. Evoking Clausewitz as such can serve to “remind leaders that force is not an end in itself.”⁵⁰ Nested within this unifying civil-military continuum, the loop of lines of effort between policy and force, are CMO and CA, whose operating principles, within this strategic context, may be identified as follows:

- CMO and CA are synergistic and integrative as ways and means. They leverage civil and (particularly informational) soft power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to create conditions for civil-military transition and minimize the costs and risks of military and hard power. By enabling more proactive use of civil and soft power, they employ the military principle of offense. By preserving military and hard power, they employ the principle of economy-of-force. CMO are also inherently enabling and moderating, promoting unity of effort or purpose while managing expectations – they draw together disparate players towards a medium of cooperation largely through the soft power of information and CMO’s coordinating function.

- CMO and CA are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. They promote unity of effort or purpose and unified action, and facilitate EBO in the joint, interagency, and multinational environments.⁵¹ Because CMO cut across both vertical lines at strategic, operational and tactical levels and horizontal lines among civil and military players, they are a *de facto* joint function (which should be reflected in JP 3-0 and JP 5-0), as well as an Army “battle operating system” (which should be reflected in FM 3-0), and should be integrated as such into the concept of EBO. (Former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks listed CMO as one of seven major lines of operation in his guidance to planners for the invasion of Iraq.)⁵² Task-force interagency approaches to CMO such as the PRT concept or the full-spectrum operations concept of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad employ other military specialties, such as engineers, to perform tasks more traditionally coordinated by CA.⁵³ In fact, Army CA doctrine has streamlined CA missions and functional specialties – 20 of the latter were present in the 1992 version of FM 41-10; 16 in the 2000 version; and only six in the

current draft. This is for two reasons: first, the greater capabilities found among civilian organizations to perform them (as they should); and second, greater involvement of non-CA military specialists as these missions move more to the center of particularly non-combat operations, or (as in stability and counterinsurgency operations), greater integration with combat operations. The Secretary of Defense's decision to re-assign USACAPOC (minus the AC units) from SOCOM to FORSCOM is, in a sense, tacit recognition of CMO as more than a special operation. That being the case, and the inherent joint/interagency/multinational nature of CMO/CA, perhaps JFCOM (or some joint command) should eventually become the single executive agent for CMO/CA, with appropriate Title 10 program and budget authorities.

- Applied CMO and CAO involve a strategic, enabling style of leadership. CMO and CA are predisposed for a strategic style of leadership and decision-making support due to the greater emphasis on political bargaining, collaboration, consensus and relationship-building, as well as access to civil and soft power. Another way to describe the strategic leadership style is "leading from behind" – creating conditions for the success of others so the full menu of power options may be brought to bear (and blood and treasure spared). Another approach is to see CMO as a "customer service" activity, with civilian partners as clients. Above all, this kind of leadership, in information-intensive strategic and operational environments, should emphasize managing expectations all-around.

Changing the Strategic Civil-Military Culture

While policy, doctrine, and programs must continue to evolve, most importantly, the strategic culture of the United States and the organizational cultures of both civil and military components must continue to change. At the national policy and interagency levels, the bias towards the responsive use of hard power must find balance in more opportunistically leveraged soft power – in policies and in ways and means:

Within the U.S. Government, there will need to be a change in the culture of cabinet departments, other than DoD, which are largely focused on policy... The nature of the inter-agency process has to change to be more than coordination; to be an orchestration of all the instruments of U.S. power. Where there is separation of statutory authorities from capabilities and resources, we will need to reconcile those differences without undue acrimony.⁵⁴

It also begins with transforming interagency civil and military cultures into learning organizations, separately and together, through the education and training of leaders and in

policies for professional development and career management that reward experience in civil-military and interagency coordination.⁵⁵ An interdisciplinary, civil-military training and educational center of excellence program, for example, would not only offer economy of scale to draw the participation of important but less capital-rich players (e.g., NGOs), it would help bridge the vertical gaps between policy and implementation simultaneously with the horizontal gaps of interdisciplinary and international cooperation and coordination.⁵⁶ Specifically in the military:

Future professional development should incorporate knowledge areas such as police actions, foreign internal defense and interagency/joint/coalition operations. Skill sets or competencies must include cultural awareness, civil-military operations, intelligence, and information operations.⁵⁷

Because of its still-predominant role in international interventions, the military – more than any other organizational culture – must inculcate, from the ground up and the top down, a new consciousness of civil-military power, in order to win the peace and the “war of ideas” as well as mitigate strategic cost and risk. War-winning must take precedence over war-fighting, opportunities over threats, capabilities over forces, and the military as an enabling and not just implementing source of power. While the scroll is indeed mightier than the sword, both are mightiest in unison. This synergy, more than anything else, will help ensure that America and its allies will chart their own destinies more than become orphans of the storm.

Endnotes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87, and B.H. Liddell Hart, “Grand Strategy”, in *Theory of War and Strategy* (Vol. 1), ed. James A. Helis, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 29 August 2005), 15.

² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press), 1971), 77.

³ See UN General Assembly Document GA/10444, “Creation of of Peacebuilding Commission, Emergency Response Fund Highlights, As 60th General Assembly Takes First Steps Towards Major UN Reform”, Department of Public Information, 27 December 2005. Note the establishment of a Central Emergency Response Fund, set at \$3.79-billion for 2006-07, enables Security Council instruments to respond more rapidly and effectively to crises, at times preventatively, as well as better transition to peace-building. Ambassador Bolton’s comments are in U.S. Mission to the UN Press Release # 265 (05), “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador John R. Bolton, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Peacebuilding Commission, in the General Assembly”, 20 December 2005.

⁴ Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare”, *Parameters*, Spring 2004, 23. See also John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

⁵ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response", November 2004, in *Theory of War and Strategy* (Vol. 3), ed. James A. Helis, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 29 August 2005, 440.

⁶ Lt. Col. Michael F. Morris, "Al Qaeda as Insurgency", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 39, 4th Quarter 2005, 41-50.

⁷ The FY2006 discretionary budget authority of the Department of Defense is \$419.3-billion, 5% more than the previous year; the FY2006 discretionary budget authority of the Department of State is \$13.3-billion, an 18% increase from FY2005 (this does not include \$18.5-billion in international assistance programs – a rise of 14% over the last year). See U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), available from: www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/budget/html; Internet; accessed 12 December 2005.

⁸ General information is available at: www.state.gov; www.usaid.gov; www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/index.html; Internet, accessed 12 December 2005.

⁹ A strident discussion of American over-reliance on technology can be found in Ralph Peters' "The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs", *Weekly Standard*, 6 February 2006, 18.

¹⁰ Security Assistance figures are from the DoD Security Cooperation Assistance briefing: *FMS, Foreign Military Construction Sales, & Military Facts*, (Washington, D.C.: DSCA, Department of Defense, 30 September 2004).

¹¹ For a comprehensive discussion on soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: BBS Public Affairs, 2004).

¹² Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2002, 94-95.

¹³ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1-2.

¹⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 22 July 2004), available at www.9-11commission.gov; Internet, accessed 12 December 2005. See especially Chs. 12 and 13.

¹⁵ Congress provided nearly \$1-billion in initial funding for FY04 and \$1.5-billion for FY05. The President requested \$3-billion for FY06 and pledged to increase annual funding for the MCA to \$5-billion. Available at: www.mca.gov; Internet, accessed 12 December 2005.

¹⁶ General information is available at: www.opic.gov; Internet, accessed 12 December 2005.

¹⁷ Clark A. Murdock, ed., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (Phase I Report), (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 9. See also the Phase II Report, July 2005. In addition, see Office of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2001). Page vii, notes that “[u]nity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with non-governmental organization (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and among nations in any alliance or coalition”.

¹⁸ Office of the Spokesman, Department of State Fact Sheet 2006/64, “Transformational Diplomacy”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Spokesman, Department of State, 18 January 2006), available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm>; Internet, accessed 8 February 2006.

¹⁹ The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, Aligning Diplomacy and Development*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and USAID, 2003), provides a strategic planning framework for a more integrated DoS-USAID response to commonly identified challenges related to the War on Terrorism; but, it does not explain how respective departmental capabilities are coordinated and is not a holistic interagency document. See also George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”, (Washington, D.C: The White House, 7 December 2005), NSPD-44 provides such impetus – within at least the context of reconstruction and stabilization activities. See also Office of the Spokesman, DoS Special Briefing 2005/1168, “President Issues Directive to Improve the United States’ Capacity to Manage Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Spokesman, Department of State, 14 December 2005); available at: www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/58067.htm; Internet, accessed 15 December 2005.

²⁰ Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military”, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2002, 29-30.

²¹ Gen. Peter Pace, “The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff – Shaping the Future”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 2005), 4. Italics added.

²² Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 85.

²³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 28 November 2005), 3. A precedent document is Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vols. I and II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1996), which discusses how to facilitate coordination and cooperation with U.S. government agencies, and intergovernmental, non-governmental, and geographical security organizations – but from a DoD/military perspective. More recent is Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet, *U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*, (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, 1 December 2005), prepared by both S/CRS and the Joint Warfighting Center. It is the first of a series of documents to improve civil-military coordination at the interagency level in such operations, provide a planning framework, and identify metrics to measure USG performance.

²⁴ DoD Directive 3000.05, 3.

²⁵ Gen. Richard B. Meyers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, August 2005), 1.

²⁶ See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Revision Third Draft [3].10, (Washington, D.C. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2005).

²⁷ See Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7, *Operational Implication of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, 17 November 2004).

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual FM-1, *The Army*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2005), 2-2.

²⁹ U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual FM 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 2001), 5-5.

³⁰ Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004), iv and 171. In the same citation, the DSB identifies three areas where “the secretary’s effort could have considerable impact: The secretary can accelerate the institutionalization of an effective pan-government strategic planning and integration process... The secretary should lend his support to the efforts of other departments and agencies as they undergo transformation, particularly in their approach to instituting management discipline for contingency planning and for maintaining contingency capabilities. Finally, the secretary should urge the establishment of an effective national strategic communication capability and lend DOD’s resources and capabilities to this effort, as appropriate.”

³¹ See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP-3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2001), especially GL-6.

³² See Department of the Army Field Manual-Interim FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 October 2004) [expires 1 October 2006], especially Ch. 3.

³³ See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2001), as well as U.S. Marine Corps MCWP 3-33.1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 7 April 2003).

³⁴ Andrew Scutro, “Navy Enhancing the Role of Foreign Area Officers”, and Christopher Munsey, “Seabees Tasked to Take on New Civil Affairs Role”, *Navy Times*, 1 August 2005, 20 and 22, respectively.

³⁵ Maj. Vanessa Dornhoefer, USAF Air Mobility Command CMO instructor at McGuire AFB, NJ, email messages to author, 16 December 2005 and 1 March 2006. Contingency Response Groups (CRGs) are provided basic CMO training at the Air Mobility Operations School of the

USAF Air Mobility Command Air Mobility Warfare Center at McGuire AFB, while the Advanced Air Mobility Operations Course (AAMOC) there incorporates training on the roles of both NGOs and CA/CMO. In addition, the USAF Special Operations School at Hurlburt AFB, FL features courses in CMO, and USAF JAGs, which are trained at Maxwell AFB, AL, have received pre-deployment CMO instruction, though it has not become part of the standing curriculum. In addition, according to USACAPOC, USAF (and Navy) Reserve volunteers are receiving CA/CMO training at Ft. Bragg, NC prior to deployment with Army CA units in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

³⁶ See Robert D. Kaplan, "How We Would Fight China", *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2005, available at: www.theatlantic.com; Internet, accessed 14 October 2005.

³⁷ See Robert D. Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth", *The Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2003, available at: www.theatlantic.com; Internet, accessed 14 October 2005.

³⁸ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, June 2005), 23

³⁹ See John D. Negroponte, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 2005), especially 1-2 on use of intelligence in identifying "opportunities for democratic transformation".

⁴⁰ For a more detailed explanation of this idea, see Christopher Holshek, "Integrated Civil-Military and Information Operations: Finding Success in Synergy", *The Cornwallis Group IX: Analysis for Stabilization and Counter-Terrorist Operations*, (Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2005), 137-165.

⁴¹ See remarks by Lt. Gen. James Helmly, Chief of Army Reserve, regarding CA and the challenges to the RC in Jen DiMascio, "Army Reserve May Take Over Civil Affairs", *InsideDefense.com*, 1 March 2006; available at: www.INSIDEDEFENSE.COM; Internet, accessed 5 March 2006.

⁴² For more on the CA in SOF issue and the future of CA, see Michael J. Baranick, Christopher Holshek, and Larry Wentz, "Civil Affairs at a Crossroads", in *Transforming the Reserve Component*, Defense & Technology Paper 10, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, February 2005, especially 31-47. Also see: Tom Breen, "Uncivil Affair: Army Resists Push to Move Nation-Builders Out of SOCOM", *Armed Forces Journal International*, March 2005, 20; Lt. Col. R. Christian Brewer, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs and the Fate of Reserve Special Forces in Support of Current and Future Operations", (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Paper, March 2004); and Sandra I. Erwin, "Civil Affairs: As Demand for Nation-Building Troops Soar, Leaders Ponder Reorganization", *National Defense*, May 2005, 20-21.

⁴³ Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DoD*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department of Defense, September 2005), 46.

⁴⁴ See DiMascio, "Army Reserve May Take Over Civil Affairs".

⁴⁵ See Dr. James J. Hearn, "Departments of State and Defense – Partners in Post-Conflict Operations, Is This the Answer for Past Failures?" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Project, March 2006).

⁴⁶ See Martin Lidy, "Emerging Interagency Doctrine for Interventions" [draft], (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 4 January 2006).

⁴⁷ See Gen. Richard B. Meyers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, August 2005).

⁴⁸ FM-1, 3-2. See especially Para. 3-9.

⁴⁹ See DoS Special Briefing 2005/1168.

⁵⁰ Karen Guttieri, "The Civil Dimension of Strategy", in *Humanizing Our Global Order*, eds. Obiora Chindedu Okafor and Obijiofor Aginam, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 93.

⁵¹ Based the author's 14 October 2005 inputs to U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations* [initial draft], (Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, August 2005).

⁵² Gen. Tommy Franks, with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier*, (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 336-340.

⁵³ See: United States Institute of Peace Special Report 147, *Provisional Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations in International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, September 2005), available at: www.usip.org; Internet; accessed 12 December 2005; and Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations", *Military Review*, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, July-August 2005), 4-17, available at: www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV; Internet, accessed 12 January 2005.

⁵⁴ *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DoD*, 6.

⁵⁵ See Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994). For a detailed explanation of what a learning organization is, see especially Part II. See also Karen Guttieri, "Unlearning War", in *Organizational Learning in the Global Context*, M. Leann Brown, eds. Michael Kenney, and Michael Zarkin, (London: Ashgate, 2006).

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⁵⁷ Col. David G. Paschal, "Irregular Warfare: Impact on Future Professional Military Education", (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Project, March 2006), 23.

