

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ARE PURPLE DOD CIVILIANS IN OUR FUTURE? COMPLETING THE JOINT
DEVELOPMENT IN DOD**

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ABSTRACT

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The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 ushered in the era of jointness. It created an environment that promoted joint exchanges, training, and operations. Joint experience became a requirement for senior military leaders who wished to reach the general officer level. This forced exposure throughout the services has fostered an appreciation for each service's unique capabilities as well as the need for the further development of improved interoperable systems and procedures. This is critical in an environment of limited personnel and budgetary constraints. Despite these breakthroughs towards a joint vision for those that serve the military in uniform, the Department of Defense (DoD) civilians who proudly serve were not included in the required push towards joint operations. In addition to joint combat operations, over the past 20 years the military has continued to move forward in the development of joint operations in the areas of logistics, installation management, intelligence, and contracting; but the structure of the DoD civilian workforce has failed to keep pace. This paper looks at the current structure of the DoD civilian workforce and the efforts underway to address many of these shortfalls and proposals to streamline the workforce to better support the military in the future.

ARE PURPLE DOD CIVILIANS IN OUR FUTURE? COMPLETING THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT IN DOD

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 ushered in the era of jointness. It created an environment that promoted joint exchanges, training, and operations. Joint experience became a requirement for those senior military leaders who wished to reach the general officer level. This forced exposure throughout the services has fostered an appreciation for each service's unique capabilities as well as the need for the further development of improved interoperable systems and procedures. This is critical in an environment of limited personnel and budgetary constraints. Despite these breakthroughs towards a joint vision for those that serve the military in uniform, the Department of Defense (DoD) civilians who proudly serve were not included in the required push towards joint operations. In addition to joint combat operations, over the past 20 years the military has continued to move forward in the development of joint operations in the areas of logistics, installation management, intelligence, and contracting; but the structure of the DoD civilian workforce has failed to keep pace. This paper looks at the current DoD civilian workforce structure efforts underway to address many of these shortfalls and proposals to streamline the DoD civilian workforce to better support the military in the future.

While recent wars have shown the undeniable effectiveness of US joint military operations, the Secretary of Defense rightly recognizes that much still needs to be done to transform the US military:

As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces, but also the Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking.¹

Rumsfeld has stated time and time again that DoD must develop and apply a different force and capability if it is to be ready for what the future holds. This force must have the agility to respond to an ever changing enemy and develop genuine interoperability between all services and governmental agencies.² Transformation encompasses not only the uniformed military, but also the tremendous support structure that sustains them.³

While America's business have streamlined and adopted new business models to react to fast-moving changes in markets and technologies, the Defense Department has lagged behind without an over arching strategy to improve its business practices...It will require new rules for hiring and managing

personnel...Toward this end, DoD will develop a strategic human resources plan for military and civilian personnel.⁴

The transformation of the DoD civilian workforce is vital to achieving DoD's overall strategic objectives of "joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace."⁵ With almost 700,000 members, DoD can not leave this workforce behind and still sustain the forward momentum of transformation.⁶ Unfortunately, until very recently that is just what DoD has done with the personnel system.

The essence of the current DoD personnel system was devised in 1949, based on the principle of classifying job series system.⁷ The US government strove to achieve equal pay for equal work. Though the goal was admirable, the system itself has evolved over time into a cumbersome bureaucratic maze. A personnel system with 2,000 job classifications is difficult to sustain and is long overdue for a complete overhaul.⁸

Currently DoD is having difficulty hiring and retaining qualified personnel. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report," attributed the problem to several areas. DoD competes with a private sector which offers competitive options with many times more pay. The defense hiring process is difficult and lengthy, often compounded by security clearance procedures. The employment landscape has altered as well. It is no longer the norm to stay with a single employer throughout one's career and it is becoming passé.⁹ To make matters worse, within the next year 50% of the overall DoD workforce will qualify for retirement. This wave of retirement could create a significant gap in talent and experience. This is a gap that may not be fixed by aggressive hiring alone.¹⁰

The rigidity and complexity of the personnel system is counterproductive to fostering creativity and limits the accessibility of those outside of DoD. This can be substantiated by the resistance of college graduates to entering DoD ranks. Rather than appealing to quality young people entering the workforce who are motivated to make a difference in the country's future, DoD represents itself as a stifling, narrow career path that overly restricts those who do not wish to stay doing the same skill set for 40 years.¹¹ In a 2002 survey of 1,011 college juniors and seniors conducted by Penn, Schoen, and Berland Associates, 50% believed that the government affects their lives daily, and 6 out of 10 believed that the work in government is in fact important. Unfortunately, a majority of respondents saw a career in government as unappealing. They did not consider it a possible career move due to perceptions that government employers are not in tune with the needs of their employees, and a career in government service limited their potential for professional growth.

DoD clearly has a reputation problem, the source of which is the personnel system's complex layers of rules and regulations. College graduates felt the hiring system was difficult and structured in a manner that limited the diversity of applicants. The hiring process was viewed as extremely time consuming, discouraging most from even applying.¹² This view stems from lengthy and impersonal application process that can take six months to a year from start to finish, and even longer if a security clearance is required. The lack of youth in the system speaks for itself. Currently, 67% of the DoD civilian workforce is over 40 years of age, and only 10% are below the age of 30.¹³

Just as the lack of youth in the workforce limits the flow of fresh ideas into DoD, so too does the lack of incentives to diversify career experience limits the exchange of ideas within the DoD. There are no bonuses, recognition, or promotions tied directly to joint, interagency, or private sector experience.¹⁴ Innovative corporations today encourage employees (and in some cases require them) to jump from one area of a business to the next in order to provide a better understanding of the entire company. The broad-based skill sets that result enhance the employee's interoperability within the organization and result in better managers for the future.¹⁵ A civilian employee transfer between service branches, such as from the Army to the Navy, is rare.¹⁶ The result is a workforce that is clearly stovepiped and greatly hindered from the kind of intra-departmental exchange of ideas that would enhance jointness. Unlike their military counterparts, there are no requirements for further joint education for DoD civilians at any level or any incentive systems for those who broaden their joint experience or training.¹⁷ This lack of fluid movement between services has naturally resulted in service-specific systems of logistics, intelligence, training, C4, personnel management, and other programs. Efforts to break this paradigm began in 1986 with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, and have continued with mixed results ever since.

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) continued the push for jointness that began in 1986, by emphasizing the need for US forces to be jointly trained and interoperable, as well as able to work more closely with nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and coalition partners.¹⁸ Although it recommended the "development of doctrine, education, training, organization, and materiel to support truly integrated joint operations," the '97 QDR seemed to focus more on the technological aspects of achieving jointness than the human side.¹⁹ One of the key tenets of the '97 QDR, for example, was exploiting the "Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA)": incorporating the best practices of US business into how the DoD accomplishes its mission. However, of the five components of the RBA outlined in the '97 QDR, only two had anything to do with human resources. The first was

the vague need to reduce “unneeded standards and specifications,” a requirement that could apply equally to human as well as technical aspects. The second, the need to increase outsourcing and privatization, was focused on what functions DoD people would or would not perform, not necessarily on how the existing DoD personnel should be managed.²⁰ “Achieving a 21st Century Defense Infrastructure,” according to the ‘97 QDR, was about reducing the quantity of that infrastructure through elimination, consolidation, and outsourcing; yet the ‘97 QDR said nothing about improving the quality of those civilians who would remain. At a time when the US business sector was radically transforming how it managed people, the US military seemed to be focusing exclusively on technology.²¹

If the ‘97 QDR was aimed at achieving a 21st Century Defense Infrastructure, the 2001 QDR sought to revitalize and streamline the entity that resulted. Rather than paying lip service to the importance of human resources to national defense (as the ‘97 QDR seemed to do), the 2001 QDR tackled head-on the shortcomings of the DoD’s management of civilian personnel: “Improving the skills of the existing workforce and recruiting, training, and educating new people” became a strategic priority for the DoD.²² Recognizing that the transformation of uniformed forces was only part of the solution, the 2001 QDR called for a transformed support structure that was equally agile and adaptive. Towards this aim, the 2001 QDR directed the development of a “strategic human resources plan for military and civilian personnel” that capitalized on the latest civilian business practices in areas such as recruiting, pay, training and education, and career planning and management.²³ By consistently emphasizing the importance of human resources, and by specifically citing civilian career planning and management as a shortcoming in the DoD establishment, the 2001 QDR clearly attaches strategic significance to the management of DoD civilians.

The 2001 QDR further exhorted the establishment to break down interservice boundaries, promote cooperation, and “institutionalize change” throughout the Department.²⁴ Recruiting, classification, evaluation, and compensation of civilians should likewise recognize no particular service boundaries; but should rather be structured in a way that allows DoD personnel managers (uniformed and civilian) to match the right skill sets with the appropriate task. DoD has recognized that the 21st century battlefield does not beckon a particular service over another, but rather calls for a leaner joint force to match the right unit at the right time against a given problem. It naturally follows that picking the right civilian for a given job – regardless of what service he or she works for in a structure that promotes and rewards creativity and performance– is a strategic imperative. The 2001 QDR identified this:

A transformed U.S. force must be matched by a support structure that is equally agile, flexible, and innovative. It must be a structure in which each of DoD's dedicated civilian and military members can apply their talents to defend America.²⁵

A key outcome of the 2001 QDR is the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), a clear step in the right direction towards the 2001 QDR vision. It is a management tool that links individual performance and organizational goals with the overall mission and outcomes. NSPS also places a greater emphasis on training and professional development: "NSPS is designed to value talent, reward contribution, and promote excellence."²⁶ NSPS addresses many of the challenges of the old system and reinforces those elements that are well worth retaining. It removes the general schedule of 2000 classifications and replaces it with market-based pay bands that base the pay progression on performance and competencies, and not on duration of service. The broad pay bands permit employees within the Department to shift across a wider range of opportunities than the restrictive work descriptions of the past.²⁷ This mimics the current positive trend in corporate America. NSPS is not a new idea in the government. The pay banded system was implemented in other agencies in the past. It was met with some resistance when fielded, but over time the employees have embraced it as part of their organization's culture.²⁸

DoD will begin fielding NSPS in FY06. Though there has been some resistance from unions and personnel within the system, such resistance is to be expected with any major change. It is important to maintain the momentum of NSPS to demonstrate just how committed DoD is to the 2001 QDR's joint vision and the inclusion of the DoD civilians in this vision. Without the tools that a fully implemented NSPS promises, it will enable skeptics to slow or stall the vision for whatever reason they oppose the change. The challenge will be to overcome those that are wedded to the old system and are unwilling to risk change for the sake of DoD transformation.²⁹

One way to push through these challenges to the DoD transformation is supporting the importance of training and the professional development of our civilians. The lack of understanding of the significant role that civilians play in DoD and on a grander scale, their interaction with other national security agencies, can not be understated.³⁰ To capitalize on these changes greater emphasis needs to be made in the area of joint development and interagency interoperability training. To carry this effort forward the following are recommendations to the DoD civilian work force utilization and structure. These proposals will support the current National Defense Strategy and the projected strategic utilization policy for the future, and should be incorporated into NSPS.

To further DoD civilian development beyond the application of NSPS, DoD civilian managers should mimic the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, specifically the chapter that outlined the criteria for officers in joint duty positions by establishing procedures for selection, education, and assignments.³¹ With the ever increasing emphasis on joint operations and support strategy, the next logical step is to incorporate DoD civilians in this process. The preparation of civilians for their joint role could begin at the GS-13 thru 15 equivalent levels with the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP), a program that develops high potential candidates for SES level promotions and the Policy Career Development Program (PCDP). Currently both of these programs are under funded and have such low participation from DoD personnel for the programs to have any real impact.³²

CSIS also endorsed the concept of required further education for DoD civilians by recommending a follow on assignment abroad or with another national security agency in order to enhance career experiences for the future leaders of the civil service. CSIS further recommended the establishment of a civilian pool of personnel much like each of the military services that allows the programming of personnel into education slots without compromising missions in the field.³³ Currently there are no requirements for or any incentive systems for this program or any other programs that broaden employees' joint experience or training. In fact, it is often considered a distraction by their supervisors.³⁴ A required joint assignment incorporated into the training program would fit well into the preparation for the SES career path.

Another step towards joint strategic leadership practices is joint diversification of DoD civilians at the SES level as a requirement. According to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, in order to be considered for selection as a general, an officer must complete a three year tour to a joint duty assignment or serve in their first assignment as a general officer in a joint assignment.³⁵ This requirement for DoD civilians could be slightly modified but the experience should be mandatory. With the advent of joint facilities and consolidation of logistics and other forms of support in the future, the importance of this effort can not be understated. This proposal is also supported by recent publications. During an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) survey of the entire government, only 9% of SES's had career experience outside their current agency, despite the fact that 45% thought that such experience would make a significant positive impact on their job performance.³⁶

The application of this joint requirement would require recoding of many positions to provide enough opportunities for the joint experience. A review of all SES positions is required to determine if the slot could be converted to a joint assignment (this would be done with an even exchange of personnel between the services) or remain the same with no joint affiliation.

The position could also remain coded as a specific SES billet but coded as joint because the slot is in a joint capacity. For example, of the 1,217 SESs' in DoD, the Army has 286 SES positions, of which only seven are identified as joint (all in the area of information management). Of the remaining positions, approximately 10 are located within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organizations and therefore should be coded as joint under this proposal.³⁷ One can anticipate great resistance throughout the SES, just as there was great resistance to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act throughout the services; but the value of this change is undeniable. It supports the combination of operational activity to have a clear strategic focus, and facilitates the transformation of defense.

Unfortunately, understanding how each agency and service functions within DoD is only half the battle; understanding the rest of the national security agencies is just as important. Further changes should be made to allow for interagency exchanges and transfers between DoD civilian personnel and other national security agencies to facilitate better understanding, communication, and interoperability. Rumsfeld stated in a speech to Congress:

The first is that this struggle cannot be won by military means alone. The Defense Department must continue to work with other government agencies to successfully employ all instruments of national power...We can no longer think in terms of neat, clear walls between departments and agencies, or even committees of jurisdiction in Congress. The tasks ahead are far too complex to remain wedded to old divisions.³⁸

DoD wins the nation's battles but it takes the whole government to win the war. For DoD to succeed in breaking down interagency barriers, the interdepartmental/service cross-training should become commonplace in the future. Joint and interagency experience should be encouraged and rewarded and is the natural next step beyond the expansion of the DoD civilian's joint capabilities. A critical aspect of these exchanges is how we treat the participants. The willingness to explore and train with other agencies should reflect on the individual's performance evaluation and awards as well as their promotion to the next level. With a better understanding of each other's service and the roles of other national security agencies comes the ability to recognize efficiencies and eliminate duplication.

One of these duplications is the DoD civilian personnel system itself. DoD needs to carefully look at the civilian personnel systems within each of the services to identify stovepiped or redundant management practices or processes and capitalize on the momentum of the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). With the implementation of NSPS, there will likely be a tendency on the part of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to tailor the personnel system to fit the perceived uniqueness of each service. Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) must avoid this tendency, since three individual systems will inevitably dilute the jointness of the NSPS. Currently DoD civilians are all hired, trained, and managed separately under each of the military services, creating separate and redundant civilian personnel systems. Although the adoption of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) standardized some practices across DoD, several key functions (such as the implementation of the hiring; evaluations system; and award systems development) remain service specific, thus continuing the individual personnel systems and programs. DoD needs only one system for all aspects of personnel management. The consolidation of these management tools for DoD civilian personnel would reduce the cost of each service developing or modifying current systems and better support the NSPS implementation. The merger of several services under one command structure to support all of the services is not new. There are recent studies recommending the merger of support roles, such as logistics or joint facilities under one joint command. This will make a completely joint personnel system as well as the joint training and experiences not only a nice-to-have but almost a necessity for daily operations.

The 2003 Joint Defense Capabilities Study (JDCS) lays out several recommendations that will necessitate the move of DoD civilian career development and management system toward a more holistic path of jointness for the future. Two specific outcomes of the JDCS that necessitate a joint civilian workforce are the Centralized Logistics/Joint Command and the Joint Facilities Directorate. The goal of these new organizations is the enhancement of "...warfighter support and readiness by consolidating management of key department logistics capabilities."³⁹ The organizations will be critical parts of the planning process for strategy, operations, and capabilities.⁴⁰

The move toward joint logistics has also been endorsed by the Secretary of Defense. In testimony to Congress, Donald Rumsfeld called for "...further centralized logistics planning and management by establishing one single Logistics Global Supply Chain Organization (Joint Command/Agency) with oversight and decision authority for all defense materiel, maintenance, movement, and transportation."⁴¹ Consolidation of personnel is critical for effective and efficient planning and management if this proposal to succeed. The trend for centralized logistics was also recommended in the 2005 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase Two Report when they discussed the need for a Centralized Logistics/Joint Command or US Logistics Command.⁴² This would eliminate some of our continued *ad hoc* bridges and duplications that are necessitated by a fragmented logistics structure that is divided by multiple military supply chains and stovepipe agencies.⁴³

The second organization, the Joint Facilities Directorate, will develop and publish appropriate directives to manage joint infrastructure requirements. One of the advantages to this structure is the reduction in excess and overuse of resources. The development and operation of these directorates has the potential to enhance the DoD installation management personnel with exposure to joint experience.⁴⁴

The influence of the Joint Facilities Directorate is now reflected in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) List. This list joins through site relocation various types of support activities such as industrial, intelligence, medical, supply and storage, training, and installation management. The collocation of the Armed Forces within each others' posts or bases is nothing new. Air Force and Army units have worked together and coexisted both in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for many years. Joint basing, in which two different service installations are merged and are supported by one centralized joint service support structure, is new. The 2005 BRAC recommends the realignment of several military installations as single joint bases. The strategic integration/merger of these service unique facilities is intended to gain efficiencies by reducing duplicated installation functions located in the same geographical area. This would also contribute to the overall DoD strategic goal of increasing warfighting effectiveness by increasing interoperability and enhancing the joint culture. Civilians play a key role in the day to day operations of military installations.⁴⁵ This will undoubtedly require an "...agile, flexible, and innovative..." workforce, composed of a mix of cross-service resources under the management of one service.⁴⁶ The most efficient and effective systems are chosen from each of the participating services. Working knowledge of the various service systems by a joint qualified DoD civilian can only serve to enhance this process.⁴⁷

The purpose of all these recommendations is to develop an understanding and appreciation of each services' capabilities for better applications in the future. But is cross-training within DoD and interagency exchange programs to develop a joint DoD civilian workforce enough? Will this adequately support the movement towards joint management and commands on an ever increasing scale? Is this enough to reduce the duplicate personnel requirements and redundant systems that should be eliminated to save on manpower and funds? The end state will be an efficient effective workforce and a consolidation of systems to derive a streamlined cost effective system. But is this really enough? If manpower, funds, and most importantly productivity and quality can improve by the merger of the civilian personnel systems under one standard system, then why stop there?

This separation and redundancy should not stop at the civilian personnel management system. The final recommendation is the consolidation of the all DoD civilians in support of the services. Contracting, finance, military personnel systems, medical, installation management, signal, intelligence, and logistics all operate separately within each of the services. This separation creates a propensity to stove-pipe ideas and support systems, creating an inherent inability to interconnect each of these service systems without additional patch systems when operating in a joint environment. These particular areas are very civilian dependent and serve much the same function for each of the services.

DoD needs to consider the merger of all DoD civilians into one "Professional Corps." This idea was mentioned in the first Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report but there were no details on how this would look or to what level. Unfortunately CSIS later retracted the concept in the second report with no reason given. Many continuing challenges would be solved by this Corps if it consisted of no service or agency labeling for the personnel. The technology is here to support this change and still provide each service with proper support. This merger will remove the stove-piping within each of the services and ultimately develop a series of cohesive and interoperative systems in the many areas of support listed above.⁴⁸

Despite recommendations for this type of personnel merger in logistics going as far back as 1949 and the post WWII era, DoD military and civilian personnel continue to make the best out of multiple systems by forming more organizations and systems to bridge the gaps. This requires more people and more complex systems to overcome the resistance to flatten the organizations. The formation of a Deployment Distribution Operational Center in Kuwait is just one of these bridges. Its 63 member team was constructed to unify TRANSCOM, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and each of the service logistics elements. It was extremely successful. But would this organization be needed if we had a US Logistics Command? DoD is very good at treating the symptoms in the attempt to overcome the disease. "Supply chain management, as practiced by commercial industry, is fundamentally based on the full integration of the management of transportation and warehousing functions, often under a single organization."⁴⁹ This is done to eliminate seams, reduce redundant manpower requirements, and ultimately reduce the operating costs. The corporate world looks to reduce the requirement because they value efficiency greater than parochialism. Their success is not only based on the success of the mission to get the part to their customer but also on the cost of doing business as well.⁵⁰ The merger of DoD personnel under one Corps to support these combined logistics commands will be challenging for the services. They must adapt to the lack

of independent service flexibility but would be well worth the redesign effort in a dwindling personnel and resource climate.

Transformation and consolidation of the DoD civilian workforce should take place over a specified timeline to better support the joint and interagency initiatives. DoD should use the civilian merger initiative to consolidate the systems used by each of the services. Review boards should be formed to examine the various systems and processes used in the areas of civilian personnel, contracting, military personnel systems, finance, medical, installation management, signal, intelligence, logistics, and others within each of the services. The end state of these boards is the adoption of a DoD-wide standard in each of these areas.

The first to merge would be NSPS. DoD needs to use the momentum brought by the new NSPS and capitalize on these changes with the merger and standardization of one system from hiring to evaluations and award systems. Each service should have a voice in the development of the standardization of the different systems. The advantage of merging the separate service workforce into a single DoD workforce is the forward movement of DoD civilians and each of the services they support in the development of a truly joint structure.

One of the advantages to a single civilian personnel structure is the single hiring, training, and management tool for the ever increasing number of joint commands. Those who are in service specific commands such as FORSCOM and ARNORTH will benefit from this action as well because it will give them the flexibility and potential experience to interact with their joint and interagency counterparts. This will help in the future blending of the various support systems from each of the services into highbred systems which support all of the services. Another advantage is the standardization of the evaluation and award process so all can be evaluated and rewarded fairly for their work. Currently, under the same command you could have several individuals doing the same task at the same level but since they work under different services the awards they receive could vary greatly due to funds available for each service. The burden of management will be eased by using one system instead of up to three.

The consolidation of the civilian workforce under one system has one more advantage. As the military becomes a joint force in most if not all operations, it is important for the officers and leaders to focus on understanding each services unique capabilities and not on all the different systems used to do the same thing for each service.

Career civil servants and some within the military could resist the merger, because they are comfortable within their current stovepipe service systems. The merger of the DoD civilians into one Corps workforce will cast uncertainty into their futures. One must ask oneself: as DoD attempt to flatten the structure and reduce manpower, can DoD afford to continually be

counterproductive by adding bridging organizations and structures to overcome our unwillingness to change? Can DoD afford to have multiple systems that require additional systems just to communicate when it is clear budget cuts loom in our future?

Politicians may also greatly resist the change because it will result in long term loss of jobs for their constituencies. In this respect, this merger is not different than the cancellation of a major weapon system. One possible way to overcome congressional resistance would be to sell the short-term training initiatives as a way of compensating for the immediate loss of jobs.

The DoD Reorganization Act was the catalyst for the military to move toward a joint environment. Now DoD finds itself almost 20 years later with a civilian workforce structured from a system designed in 1949. To achieve the strategic vision of a transformed U.S. force with "...an equally agile, flexible, and innovative..." support structure to match, the DoD civilian workforce must go beyond the implementation of NSPS and seize this moment to create bridges, roads, and networks that will weave DoD together. All DoD personnel need to understand the urgency of this transformation. This can be done through an extensive DoD joint training and assignment program at multiple levels; removal of those tendencies to go back to the old ways of parochial systems of management; and fully embracing the opportunities of interagency activities and exchanges. While the DoD has the right people in position to lead change with a developed articulated vision and strategy for the future, it is time to implement these recommendations.⁵¹

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2003), 1.

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 1997), 49.

³ *Transformation Planning Guidance*, 1.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2001), 49-50.

⁵ *Transformation Planning Guidance*, 1.

⁶ David M. Walker, "Defense Transformation: DoD's Civilian Personnel Strategic Management and the Proposed National Security Personnel System," testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 1 May 2003, available from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03741t.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2005.

⁷ The Act of 1949 was repealed by PL 89-554 in 1966 and was later reenacted under US Code Title 5; but the same job families and series as well as 15 pay grades and 10 steps are still used. Mike Vajda, email to author, December 2, 2005. Vajda is the Director of the Civilian Human Resources Agency (CHRA) located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. He was appointed a member of the Senior Executive Service in April 2002.

⁸ The basic structure DoD has used is made of 250 job series in 36 job families within the Federal Wage System alone. There are 422 individual job classifications and 23 job groups for the General Schedule. With the different grade levels in most classifications, these equate to more than 2,000 different classifications of jobs in DoD.

⁹ Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flourney, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 1 Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 52.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Morale and Quality of Life Study*, 13 June 2001, available from <http://www.comw.org/qdr/jeremiah061301.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2005.

¹¹ Linda J. Blimes and Jeffrey R. Neal, "The People Factor: Human Resources Reform in Government," in *For the People Can We Fix Public Service?* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 117-118.

¹² Blimes and Neal, 113-117.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Civilian Workforce Statistics; DoD Demographics, January 2006 Edition, available from <http://www.cpms.osd.mil/regmod/demographics/Jan2006.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006, 19.

¹⁴ Murdock, Flourney, Williams, and Campbell, 53-54.

¹⁵ Blimes and Neal, 117-118.

¹⁶ Vajda.

¹⁷ Murdock, Flourney, Williams, and Campbell, 55.

¹⁸ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (September 1997), Sec. iii, 6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

²¹ Blimes and Neal, 117-118.

²² *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (September 2001), 50.

²³ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

²⁵ Ibid., 49.

²⁶ Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Employee Fact Sheet": Final National Security Personnel System Regulations, October 2005, available from <http://www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/pdf/GeneralFactSheet102705.pdf>; Internet; accessed 4 December 2005, 1.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ The CIA implemented the performance based banding system. During the first 5 years it transition met with little resistance from the personnel approval was high though cost exceeded predictions initially. Over the next 20 year there was an explosion in the telecommunications and technology. The Performance-based banded system had the reward structure to provide the incentives for those who developed the new skill. Currently the banding has become part of the culture. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, "Grade Banding in the Central Intelligence Agency," n.d., available from <http://www.opm.gov/comproconf/Postconf00/broadbnd/seacord.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2005.

²⁹ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 104-106.

³⁰ Murdock, Flourney, Williams, and Campbell, 53.

³¹ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 312.

³² Murdock, Flourney, Williams, and Campbell, 54.

³³ Ibid., 55.

³⁴ Ibid., 53.

³⁵ Blimes and Neal, 117-118.

³⁶ Murdock, Flourney, Williams, and Campbell, 54-55.

³⁷ *How the Army Runs*, 329.

³⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, "Testimony before the Senate House Armed Services Committee," 17 February 2005, available from <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2005/tr20050217-secdef2126.html>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2005.

³⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Final Report*, December 2003, available from <http://www.paxriver.org/files/ACF1223.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2005.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Rumsfeld.

⁴² Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flourney, Kurt M. Campbell, Pierre A. Chao, Julianne Smith, Anne A. Witkowsky, and Christine E. Wormuth, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Defense*

Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2005), 100-101.

⁴³ Ibid., 103.

⁴⁴ Rumsfeld.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Realignment and Closure Report*, Volume 1, Chapter 2, 8 September 2005, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/brac>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2005.

⁴⁶ The phrase "...agile, flexible and innovative..." is a direct quote from the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 49.

⁴⁷ Kenneth J. Krieg, Undersecretary of Defense, "Precepts for Joint Basing Implementation Roadmap," a memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, 19 July 2005.

⁴⁸ Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell, 54-55.

⁴⁹ Murdock, Flournoy, Campbell, Chao, Smith, Witkowsky, and Wormuth, 100-101.

⁵⁰ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 49.

⁵¹ Ibid.