

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**IS THE BUSH DOCTRINE THE RIGHT  
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY  
FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY?**

by

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## ABSTRACT

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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the world and the way America views today's global security environment. The events of that day have led to a national security strategy that is referred to as the Bush Doctrine. At its core, the Bush Doctrine relies on preemptive military force against actors who choose to threaten the United States with terror tactics or weapons of mass destruction. The aim of "preemption" is to negate national security threats anywhere in the world "before they are formed." The Bush Doctrine continues to be very controversial both at home and in the international political environment. This paper evaluates the global security environment and the Bush Doctrine to determine if this strategy is right for America. The author contends the Bush Doctrine was the correct response following 9/11 and continues to be right for America with one adjustment.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....vii

**IS THE BUSH DOCTRINE THE RIGHT AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE  
BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY? ..... 1**

**GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY AND US CHALLENGES ..... 1**

**NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY .....3**

**HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF UNITED STATES' NATIONAL SECURITY  
STRATEGY.....4**

**DEBATE OVER THE BUSH DOCTRINE.....5**

**THREE COURSES OF ACTION .....8**

**WHERE IS AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY; THE BUSH DOCTRINE? .10**

**RECOMMENDATION: STAY THE COURSE WITH THE BUSH DOCTRINE WITH  
ADJUSTMENT .....11**

**RISK ASSESSMENT.....13**

ENDNOTES ..... 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....21



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## IS THE BUSH DOCTRINE THE RIGHT AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY?

The greatest danger our nation faces is at the cross roads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared they have weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. . . . We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are formed. . . . History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is action<sup>1</sup>

- George W. Bush

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) changed the world and how the United States (US) views today's global security environment. These attacks led to a national security strategy (NSS) that is referred to as the "Bush Doctrine".<sup>2</sup> The Bush Doctrine continues to be very controversial both at home and in the international political environment. At its core, the Bush Doctrine relies on preemptive military force against actors who choose to threaten the US with terror tactics or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The aim of "preemption" is to negate national security threats anywhere in the world "before they are formed."<sup>3</sup> This paper evaluates the global security environment and the Bush Doctrine to determine if this strategy is right for America.

### GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY AND US CHALLENGES

Before advocating a national strategy, one must understand the complexity of our global strategic environment. This is especially important when advocating a NSS strategy that is right for the US, as this is the country the free world looks to for help and support in virtually every area thinkable from financial aid, humanitarian aid, regional security, military entanglements, and the list continues indefinitely.

America, at this point, is challenged to provide a vision for the world worthy of the power they wield. The US holds the primacy of military power, and is the wealthiest and most economically robust economy in the world.<sup>4</sup> Terrorism has soared, beyond any doubt, to become US' top national security priority. This priority shift has occurred with full support from Congress, the media, and the American people.<sup>5</sup> In the infancy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, multiple dreadful historical events occurred such as: terrorist attacks on US, Spain, Russia, Egypt, and Israel. The US has difficult near term challenges that must be addressed. China, Japan, and India, are among countries whose future decisions concerning WMD, military force, economic,

and environmental issues could harm or improve regional and global stability. Iran and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear weapon development programs.<sup>6</sup> Recently, in the first 2004 presidential debate, both US presidential candidates (Senator John Kerry and President George W. Bush) indicated they would use force if necessary to rid North Korea of nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup> The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to escalate violence and threatens hope of establishing stability in the Middle East.<sup>8</sup> Middle East stability is further complicated by American military presence and ongoing stark resistance to the new governance in Iraq. African states are among the world's poorest and are refuge for terrorist groups. These states are further weakened by declining life expectancy rates, the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) / human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic and internal conflicts. In Darfur, a region of Sudan, 30,000 people have already died in what many have labeled an act of ongoing genocide.<sup>9</sup>

Arguably, the US will have at least one future global competitor that will have influence on shaping the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The People's Republic of China looms as a rising and future competitor to US' superpower status--economically, militarily, and politically. Over the past 25 years, Chinese economic growth has been so rapid and successful that a quarter billion Chinese have been pulled out of poverty, and China has surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy.<sup>10</sup> China's booming economy has and will continue to impact the world's energy resources. In 2003, China surpassed the US and became the world's largest steel importer, Chinese oil consumption increased by 33 percent, and China's energy consumption is expected to double by 2020.<sup>11</sup>

Last year China accounted for nearly one-fifth of the growth in world trade and its imports grew 40 percent. Furthermore, "China has 480 billion dollars of United States Treasury securities in its international monetary reserves, the result of large trade surpluses with the United States. China's huge financial reserves, if switched substantially out of the dollar into the euro or yen, could put upward pressure on American interest rates".<sup>12</sup> Also, China has developed a transitional system postured for continued global interdependency of free trade and open markets. In 2001, China's acceptance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) signals its growth in political and economic stature.

India's ability to effectively govern has achieved much success although a necessary focus for domestic affairs is poverty and population. India's one billion plus population is growing and may pass China as the world's most populated nation by the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>13</sup> India's move to discard socialistic control of industry has opened the door to forging investment and international trade. India's high tech industry helped propel her economy to the

world's 12th largest by 2001, with a growth rate potential to join China as US' next global economic power competitors.<sup>14</sup> The US led coalition attack on Iraq in March 2003 drew much criticism, even condemnation from some European Union (EU) member leaders to include France, Germany, and Russia. Economically, the collective EU rivals the US as world economic superpowers. Per-capita income, trade interdependency, and trade levels are remarkably similar. US and EU dependence on exports and imports of goods and services, account for nearly 25 percent of their 10 trillion dollar (each) economy.<sup>15</sup>

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) continues to be costly in more than dollars and trust with the United Nations (UN) and UN member governments. Recent evidence has surfaced accusing some UN leaders and member nations of grafting billions of dollars from the "Oil for Food" program.<sup>16</sup>

Peace and stability in South West Asia (SWA) is seemingly more elusive. An effective American NSS in SWA must include three primary multinational initiatives--continue an assault of grave consequences for anyone or nation that supports, trains, or harbors terrorism; derail the ongoing proliferation of WMD; and support open legitimate governments that strive to provide goods and services to their citizenry.

The global strategic environment is the primary basis for developing the US NSS. US NSS was not always actively shared with Congress or the American public. The modern era requirement for the President to produce a formal NSS document is congressionally mandated. The purpose of this document is to communicate with Congress the President's strategic strategy in how he intends to interact within the global strategic environment to best represent American values and interests.

### **NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

How does a nation achieve its national purpose and national objectives? Nations employ a strategy as the way to achieve two primary intentions--security and prosperity.<sup>17</sup> Any NSS must support the nation's purpose (enduring beliefs, values, and ethics). The US national purpose is grounded in its constitution and concerns itself with the commitment to protecting basic human rights; freedom of speech and worship, to choose who shall govern, to own property, and to enjoy the benefits of labor.<sup>18</sup>

The most fundamental task that drives NSS development is defining our country's national interests. National interests are ultimately defined by how a state employs its foreign policy and military strategy.<sup>19</sup> Strategy is a tool on how (ways) leadership will employ the power (means or resources) available to the nation to exercise control over the sets of circumstances to achieve

objectives (ends).<sup>20</sup> President Bush's NSS document outlines and identifies America's national interests. This document outlines a policy to work with other nations and international organizations to defuse regional conflicts. It is clear--preemptive military power may be used to prevent enemies from using WMD against the US, allies, and friends. The NSS calls for the US to promote a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; to expand the development of open societies; to promote democracy and the observance of basic human rights; to reduce the toll of infectious diseases; and transform the US military to meet 21st century challenges.<sup>21</sup>

## **HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF UNITED STATES' NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

A comprehensive historical study of NSS is well beyond the scope of this paper; however, when discussing US' NSS one should have a basic historical understanding of three premises: Our NSS' fundamental purpose, its roots, and the basis or source of present day NSS formulation. Our NSS' fundamental purpose is to calculate a balanced relationship among ends, ways, and means of all elements of national power to achieve a unified position that provides for security, and promotes a way of life based on American values and interests. The result of this effort leads to a series of national and foreign policies articulated in a unified document which serves as US' NSS.

The roots of the NSS process dates back to post World War II (WW II). After WW II there was much controversy and disagreement on the roles between the executive and legislative branches of government. Also, there was much internal disagreement within the War Department on the roles and use of the Airpower Division between the Army and Navy.<sup>22</sup> The enactment of the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 created the American modern national security structure. This act was revolutionary in establishing a host of new agencies, across the entire spectrum of national power; to include: the National Security Council (NSC), National Security Resources Board, Department of Defense (DoD), Central Intelligence Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSA's primary goal was to revitalize a collapsed peacetime planning process and generate a unified structure that would coordinate defense policy and reconcile diplomatic and military commitments.<sup>23</sup> In 1949, the NSA was amended to give the Secretary of Defense more power over the individual military departments and their service secretaries. President Truman made additional structural changes in the NSC in late 1950 and in 1951. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) was the most comprehensive defense reorganization package since the 1947 NSA.<sup>24</sup> Goldwater-Nichols had two primary objectives: to improve the quality of military advice provided to the

President and achieve greater integration among the military departments. Goldwater-Nichols was intended to transform DoD from a structure dominated by the Armed Forces to an effective corporate entity.<sup>25</sup> One of the most profound changes in Goldwater-Nichols required the President to submit an annual report to Congress that detailed the US's NSS, thus the advent of our current day NSS formulation.<sup>26</sup> Although this process has stood the test of Presidents and time protecting the US, through dramatic changes in domestic and international landscapes, there is no overreaching consensus on determining an appropriate grand strategy for the US.<sup>27</sup> This lack of consensus provides the fuel for debate on what strategy is best to guide the US in achieving her goals, protecting her citizenry and interests, and how to apply foreign policy.

## **DEBATE OVER THE BUSH DOCTRINE**

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the US has been in search of a new and coherent NSS.<sup>28</sup> Despite US status as sole global superpower, the horrific 9/11 attacks on America and President Bush's proclamation of a GWOT demonstrated more than ever the need for the US to take a very different view of the global security environment.<sup>29</sup> The Bush Doctrine was developed from a realist selective engagement strategy toward a strategy of American primacy with a willingness to use preemptive military force to engage threats vital to US national security.<sup>30</sup> Both conservative and liberal orthodoxies are in dispute.<sup>31</sup> The Bush Doctrine has received vast criticisms, praise, and debate, questioning its validity as the right strategy for America in the beginning of the 21st century.

President Bush and the Bush administration, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, recognized more than ever before the need for the US to take a very different look in the security environment we face; and indeed they did. The Bush administration opted to move toward a NSS of Primacy, employ preemptive military action to protect national vital interests, and use a "coalition of the willing" when UN support was less than expected.<sup>32</sup> Much controversy and discussion emerged at home and abroad after the Bush administration released their September 2002 NSS.

The thought of US primacy drive people to take-up one of two extremes. Proponents believe the US is an honorable liberator and true protectionist against chaos and evil. Opponents view her as "the all powerful root of evil."<sup>33</sup>

More specifically, Bush Doctrine opponents view US' use of "Primacy" as excessive rhetoric and the illegitimate justification to use preemptive military strikes when America chooses.<sup>34</sup> In other words, opponents view the Bush Doctrine as arrogant, overaggressive, and bully-ish.<sup>35</sup>

Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Authors of *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq*, said this about US' preemptive action and America's political rift with European nations--"By the time the war actually began in March 2003, the Iraq crisis was no longer just the result of transatlantic differences, but a significant cause of them."<sup>36</sup> "Critics point out that the practice of preemption is not new, however turning it into doctrine weakens international norms and encourages other countries to engage in risky actions. Similarly, they argue, American primacy is a fact, but there is no need for rhetoric that rubs other peoples' faces in it."<sup>37</sup>

Addressing criticism from abroad, Bush Doctrine supporters contend that Europeans have a difficult time with reasoning in favor of the logic of American primacy, and their willingness to use preemptive military action to protect vital national interest. Europeans find themselves frustrated by the seemingly invincibility of American power. "The French for example both lament and wonder at American hyperpuissance."<sup>38</sup>

The 2002 NSS framed preemptive military action as a legitimate action to counter dangerous technology threats "before they are formed."<sup>39</sup> Proponents view this position as necessity because there is nothing more chilling than allowing terrorists to gain control of technologies that allows them to threaten or use WMD, and no longer can America take a wait and see approach to derailing terrorism. The supporters of the Bush Doctrine "say it is precisely his [Bush's] willingness to go it alone and take preemptive action that has encouraged other nations to seek diplomatic solution before the US launches a preemptive strike."<sup>40</sup> Moreover, supporters like Kenneth Adelman, a member of the Reagan administration, contend Iran's increased willingness to participate in dialog and Libya's WMD concessions "show the peripheral benefits of preemption."<sup>41</sup>

Many (in my limited research the vast majority) of the critics concerning Iraq and preemption leave out several important facts. First, the President went to Congress. Both the House of Representatives and the US senate overwhelmingly authorized the use of military force by votes 296-133 and 77-23 respectively.<sup>42</sup> Second, "[d]uring weapons inspections which ended in 1998, Iraq already admitted to possession of large quantities of chemical and biological weapons, including 3.9 tons of VX gas, 2,850 tons of mustard gas, 1,800 tons of nerve agents, 8,500 liters of anthrax, 19,180 liters of botulinum toxin, and 10 liters of ricin."<sup>43</sup> Even with knowledge of these facts, critics claim that WMD did not exist and that America went to war on flawed intelligence. However, no one, no agency, nor any government can show one thread of evidence that these chemical and biological weapons were destroyed or explain what happened to these WMD. As for "going it alone", President Bush, Secretary of State Powell,

along with other international leaders sought action from the UN. On 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council approved UN Security Council Resolution 1441 giving Iraq a final opportunity “to comply with WMD disarmament obligations or face serious consequences.”<sup>44</sup> On 19 March 2003, 35 nations actively contributed in a variety of ways to disarm Hussein, put a stop to his murderous rule, and liberate the Iraqi people.<sup>45</sup>

Conceptualizing a national vision that will determine a righteous strategic approach to provide long-term security and prosperity is never certain nor without debate. Scholars and foreign policy experts are vastly divided on how similar or different the Bush Doctrine is from past NSSs and whether its tenets are right for America. The Bush administration’s NSS has been both praised as a clear, farsighted, and an impressive response to the dangerous threats America now faces, and it’s been criticized as a radical and troubling departure from American foreign policy tradition.<sup>46</sup>

Professors, G. John Ikenberry Princeton University and Charles A. Kupchan Georgetown University, contend “[t] The Bush administration’s foreign policy is a radical departure from the traditional of liberal realism that guided the US throughout the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.”<sup>47</sup> In their twelve page commentary “Liberal Realism”, they argue liberal realism has clear advantages for America’s role in the world over the approach of the Bush administration.<sup>48</sup> Joseph Ney’s, Dean of Harvard School of Government, views the Bush 2002 NSS “reveals a document that articulated a dramatic change in its foreign policy outlook after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.”<sup>49</sup> On one hand, Ney gives credit to Bush’s response to the “deep trends in world politics illuminated by the terrorist attacks” by stating “the response was correct in many ways because transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are the greatest threats we face.” On the other hand, he criticizes the Bush administration’s approach to these threats stating “[t] The US has done far better identifying the means than the ends.”<sup>50</sup>

The idea that the exercise of American power goes hand in hand with the promotion of democratic principles is not new and articulated in policy pronouncements of Presidents from Wilson, to Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton.<sup>51</sup> However, the Clinton NSSs do not use the word “preemptive”. Instead, the Clinton administration issued seven NSSs during his two-term presidency that pronounced the right and willingness “to do whatever it takes” to include the use “unilateral and decisive military action” to protect “vital national interest” and the “vitality of our national entity.”<sup>52</sup>

Professors Keir A Lieber of the University of Notre Dame and Robert J. Lieber of Georgetown University acknowledge the fact that the Bush Doctrine is a bold and candid proclamation; however, the majority of the document reaffirms America’s traditional beliefs in

democracy, human dignity, global economic prosperity through free trade and free markets, and develops agendas for cooperative and humanitarian actions with other nations. They believe, “[t] The [Bush] NSS is broadly consistent with American strategic tradition while setting forth a coherent grand design for American policy in the face of new and dangerous threats.”<sup>53</sup>

### **THREE COURSES OF ACTION**

There are several strategy options available that a nation can employ to pursue its national purpose and national interests. Strategy is not timeless and must be reviewed often, must be flexible enough to be employed differently in different parts of the world, and “developed with the particular features of time, place, and personality of different strategies in involved.”<sup>54</sup> I have purposely limited this paper to three viable strategies worth consideration that the US could employ as its NSS.

One course of action is “Primacy”, sometimes referred to as “Domination”,<sup>55</sup> with the right to use preemptive military force as its strategic concept or way to meet national objectives.<sup>56</sup> The ideological concept of primacy is to preserve peace through an imbalance of power and to maintain global supremacy by outdistancing any competitor--politically, economically, or militarily.<sup>57</sup> The national power or means necessary for a primacy strategy requires a large and continuous investment in manpower, technology, and budgetary commitment to maintain a dominant military force without a major competitor. The political means employed to discourage nations from pursuing dominance is expressed by Posen and Ross, in their 1996 article *Competing Visions for United States Grand Strategy*. Posen and Ross argue nations must demonstrate that their leadership can convince future competitors that they need not aspire to achieve a greater role or a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.<sup>58</sup> Other active political and economic means are used to prevent the rise of competitors and regional hegemony by promoting international law, democracy, and economic interdependencies. Another important means of a primacy strategy is to stay involved and exercise influence in regional security decisions. One example is the use of political influence through international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for European security issues.<sup>59</sup> The means of national power necessary to maintain primacy is heavily dependant on military requirements. Research and development, and modernization costs place immense burdens on a nation’s gross national product. Robert J. Art, well known for his published works on strategy formulation, highlights “[t] The cost of strategy is mainly dependant on deployment cost. . . . Domination is prohibitively expensive.”<sup>60</sup>

The strategy referred to as “Selective Engagement” has proponents as a viable NSS for America.<sup>61</sup> Selective engagement principals employ statesmanship to work with expanding nations establishing structured rules through international organizations such as the WTO, UN, and NATO.<sup>62</sup> Selective engagement is a strategy of flexibility that allows a nation to choose how, when, and where to engage.<sup>63</sup> Great powers use selective engagement as a way to accomplish national objectives with intervention as a means to assure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential. Selective engagement as a strategic concept requires a nation to retain a strong and modern military to deny victory to an aggressor. The cost of the military structure to accomplish this function is expensive; however, not as expensive as primacy. Selective engagement concerns itself as a middle course between primacy and cooperative security. This strategic concept is neither overly restrictive nor expansive of national interests and strives to strike a balance between doing too little or too much militarily.<sup>64</sup> Selective engagement has a softer power perception than primacy. Intervention (economic, information, military, or politically) in regional military, security, and humanitarian contingencies is at the providers’ will. Selective engagement allocates political attention and material resources to vital interests first, but holds out hope that desirable interests can be partially realized.<sup>65</sup> For example, the discriminating focus of selective engagement pursues data on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, plus powerful militarily postured nations.<sup>66</sup> On other issues, selective engagement does not retain a standard criterion or provide structured guidance on which “minor” issues have implications to require a nation’s involvement. Intervention in minor contingencies requires decisions on a case by case basis and public debate.<sup>67</sup> This situational dependant decision process may be argued as a strength of the selective engagement strategy. Selective engagement allows for the preemptive use of force to protect vital national interests. The selective engagement decision process favors a full risk assessment and favorable public support prior to intervention.

A third alternative NSS is “Cooperative Security”, in which a nation provides for its security requirements through multilateral cooperation and collective consensus through international organizations. This strategy, to varying degrees, is dependant on other nations to provide for another nation’s security requirements. The philosophy supporting cooperative security is that nations reduce the potential for war by limiting military capabilities of states. “[I]t is to be all for one and one for all.”<sup>68</sup> States share the spectrum of recourse, power, and military cost among participants. Proponents advocate that there is a cost savings for self-interested states to support military intervention for peace purposes in distant regions.<sup>69</sup> Political means are used to

reach military alliances, treaties, secure use of facilities, coordinate weapon transfers, and negotiate economic policies.

#### **WHERE IS AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY; THE BUSH DOCTRINE?**

NSS must be employed to effect the strategic environment in ways most likely to calculate a balanced relationship among all elements of national power to achieve a unified position that provides for security, and promotes national values and interests. I contend that American traditional beliefs in democracy, human dignity, global economic prosperity through free trade and free markets, and agendas for cooperative and humanitarian actions with other nations have remained, to a greater degree, constant before and after the US rose to great power status. This remains the case with the Bush Doctrine. Except for tone and boldness to use preemptive military force to protect the US against terrorist and actors that threaten the US with WMD, the Bush and Clinton administrations NSS vary little.<sup>70</sup> With that said, the global strategic environment is clearly complex and ever changing and our NSS must be capable of the same. American NSS has undergone several changes over time enabling the US to prioritize and interact with the changing demands of the global environment.<sup>71</sup>

Upon entering the White House, the Bush administration made two major strategic adjustments in the first half of their first term. Led by the President, their intent was to distance America from Clinton Administration's deep involvement of liberal international affairs and move toward a more realist selective engagement approach to international affairs. The Bush team intentions emphasized military preparedness, world leader statesmanship, and national interests.<sup>72</sup> This approach successfully held in spite of divisions within administration supporters and criticism from democrats.<sup>73</sup>

The terror attacks of 9/11 made very clear US' catastrophic vulnerability to terrorist and asymmetric threats. The actions of that day shocked the American public, US foreign policy makers, and people across the globe. Discussions that followed went further than the huge loss of life, property, and economies, and brought to the fore the potential for these threats and threats of WMD that could attack metropolitans and western democracy.<sup>74</sup> After 9/11, the Bush administration gravitated from a realist view of selective engagement toward a new grand strategy, one of primacy willing to use of all disciplines of national power to include preemptive military action when necessary.

## **RECOMMENDATION: STAY THE COURSE WITH THE BUSH DOCTRINE WITH ADJUSTMENT**

I contend we stay the course of the Bush Doctrine. Our current NSS has shown the versatility to shift in time of crises and pursue adversaries that threaten US security interest.

The Bush Doctrine is not just about force and critics rarely discuss successes of this NSS; which there are volumes. Here are just a few: dialog with China as lead government on North Korea's nuclear weapons stand off, Libya's willingness to disarm, and recent elections in Iraq are significant. The US is the world leader in humanitarian actions. One example most recently is the efforts and reaction of the Bush administrations response to the devastation created by the tsunami along Indian Ocean littoral. The US pledged 350 million dollars and pulled the majority of relief and rescue efforts employing US Armed Forces. President Bush rallied past Presidents, Bush-41 and Clinton, to team up and lead in a call for US business and individual donations. The US will continue funding support for international non-governmental organizations, longer term relief, and rebuilding efforts.<sup>75</sup>

The Bush Doctrine does not operate within a single dimension; but one of selective engagement that leans toward primacy out of ability and necessity. The Bush administration's NSS showed great durability and flexibility in its first term; a period of opposition and new threats which became horrific realities. This NSS has served America very well in our complex global environment. David Trachtenberg brings to the fore an impressive record of success for the Bush Doctrine that are lost in the shadow of the efforts and difficulties of securing the peace in Iraq.<sup>76</sup>

...including the winning of the war itself. The Administration has scored major success in the global war on terror; revitalized the NATO alliance; created new "coalitions of the willing" to tackle common security problems; challenged attempts to eviscerate U.S. freedom of action through international quasi-judicial means; solidified positive relationships with Cold World adversaries; developed a new strategic relationship with Russia; negotiated a landmark arms control treaty with Moscow; reinvigorated our deterrence strategy; withdrew from the ABM treaty; and decided to employ missile defenses to protect all Americans. These actions represent a forest full of successes. Unfortunately, critics of the Administration's policies can not see the forest for the trees.<sup>77</sup>

It is this proven success and versatility that demonstrates much promises that this NSS will continue to use all elements of national power to provide for security and support America's traditional beliefs in democracy, human dignity, and prosperity in today's and tomorrows complex global environment. As proven in the first term, the Bush Doctrine will enable America to exploit opportunities for continued economic growth and facilitate growth in citizenry standards of living.

Selective engagement principals imbedded in the Bush Doctrine will continue to provide for America's security through ongoing capability based transformation initiatives. These are the vary principals necessary that will allow other capable nations to pickup more of the security and humanitarian intervention actions that the US have bore for decades. The Bush Doctrine has the ability to move toward Primacy in time of crises. A sole policy of Primacy or domination is not feasible or sustainable for America or any future competitor. A practice of sole primacy would rally other nations to form alliances to balance against a nation with the sole interest of primacy or domination. Furthermore, the cost of indefinitely maintaining primacy is prohibitive and beyond any nation's resources.<sup>78</sup>

Cooperative security is appealing because it relies heavily upon the political and economic instruments of power. It pursues dialogue and international cooperation to thwart aggression. Cooperative security has the unacceptable risk for two primary reasons. First, the cooperative security strategy is reliant on other nations to provide partial security requirements and to come to aid in time of crisis. The US cannot be dependant on other nations for security assistance when vital interests are at risk. Second, this security philosophy holds the belief that great powers are not a generic security risk. States with nuclear biological or chemical weapons have great power and pose serious security risks. History has shown arms control, verification, and enforcement has been problematic for nations that employed a cooperative security strategy.<sup>79</sup>

Indeed America should stay the course with the Bush Doctrine with one adjustment. The use of "preemptive action" or "preemption" in the 2002 NSS was bold and I contend appropriate in 2002-2004.<sup>80</sup> The next NSS should not include preemption language. Two reasons are provided for this adjustment. First, President Bush made it very clear in his 2005 State of the Union Address to the Nation (and address to the world) that the US was going to continue the fight to destroy terrorism anywhere on the globe. Also he delivered a clear message, naming specific countries, that the US will confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder. The President made very clear America's position on terrorism and WMD without using controversial terms of preemption. Second, using language of preemption in the 2002 NSS document backed up by decisive action did achieve its desired result. The world has been placed on notice that the US will not stand for the loss of life or liberties without a grave retaliatory response. Finally, European jealousy or astonishment of American power or not—they must work with the US and we must with them. Removing the term preemption which the European nations have vastly criticized may provide dividends in political theatrics.

In this authors' opinion, the adjustment must reflect the US willingness and intention to continue to take "decisive action" and continue to "take the fight to the enemy". It should be

clear that a terrorist attack on Americans anywhere in the world is an attack on America and the US will respond with unequalled force of all its elements of national power. No statement in the NSS should hint that the US will not use preemptive military force. Preemption must remain a viable option in our national security thought process to protect America's vital interests. And, we as a country should not shy from preemptive action when vital interests are at stake. Our actions in history will measure our fortitude, not just the printed words. To re-quote George W. Bush "history will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act."<sup>81</sup>

## **RISK ASSESSMENT**

The Bush Doctrine is a policy vastly shaped with selective engagement principles which can quickly adapt to principals of primacy when national interests at risk. The Bush Doctrine has proven its ability to fulfill the requirements necessary to protect America's interests identified in the September 2002 NSS. Our current NSS is very much on the mark, with the one adjustment addressed earlier, leaning more forward toward primacy vs. a more reliant cooperative security strategy. National security strategy by its nature yields risk. Continuance of the current Bush Doctrine, with minor adjustment, retains our national security risks within acceptable boundaries.

Selective engagement is a "shaping" strategy that retains US alliances, an equitable military presence in Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf to influence regional affairs.<sup>82</sup> A primary risk is for American and allied security today is reduced forward presence for deterrence and immediate response. The lack of immediacy would only become significant in a large scale terrorist situation with the potential for multifaceted or multi-repetitive attacks, or a WMD contingency. These risks are minimized due to our military superiority and the degree of speed and capability we have to quickly move forces to any region in the world. Selective engagement principals hold that military power is a fungible tool for statecraft to help shape the international environment which is more congenial to American's political and economic interests.<sup>83</sup> The Bush Doctrine is meeting this challenge with the help of other nations negotiating with Iran and North Korea and achieved success with Libya. If successful negotiations are not achieved, the flexibility the Bush Doctrine is far superior to other strategies discussed. The Bush Doctrine allows the US to maintain superpower status and does not rule out preemptive force to protect vital national interests.

What are the second and third order risk effects? National security strategy can fail if the three objectives are not met—America must have citizenry support, employ intelligent statecraft, plus Europe and Asia must allow peacetime basing of US forces.<sup>84</sup> The majority of the

American public supports the Bush Doctrine because it is "selective"; America does not need to be involved in virtually every global contingency. Second, the cost of the selective engagement is not cheap, but not as expensive as a sole primacy strategy. American forces in Europe and Asia are scheduled to be reduced; however, the American presence and capability will remain. Finally, our statesmen and women are intelligent and being employed throughout the world. Their strategic approaches allow reason and will enhance political efforts when the US decides to be involved with troubled states, states needing humanitarian aid, and growing nations. The Bush Doctrine meets the values of American democracy and is of sound basis for this risk assessment which considered immediate, second, and third order effects.

Strategy is all about the way leadership uses the power (means or resources) available to achieve national objectives (ends).<sup>85</sup> None of the three strategies presented can be adopted in pure form. However, The Bush Doctrine, a strategy widely comprised of selective engagement principals, can and must incorporate elements of primacy to meet US' national purpose and support a collective security posture for other global regions.<sup>86</sup> Finally, selective engagement, as presented here is a strategic concept that is feasible, acceptable, and suitable for America as we enter the 21<sup>st</sup> century--it is balanced, reflective of American's national interests, and offers efficient choices and appropriate means to provide for America's security and prosperity.<sup>87</sup> In the absence of that approach, the US global prominence will fall, and in the opinion of this author, at an unrecoverable cost and risk to the security, prosperity, and well being of this country and the world.

WORD COUNT =5977

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>2</sup> Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, "The Bush National Security Strategy," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, December 2002 [journal on line]; available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm>>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Bush, 15.

<sup>4</sup> Jim Garrison, *America as Empire: Global Leader or Rouge Power San Francisco* (San Francisco: Berrett Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2004), 7, 27.

<sup>5</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 26 July 2004), 361.

<sup>6</sup> Economist.com . "Nuclear Proliferation. Proliferating Worries," 1 March 2004; available from The Economist Global Agenda <<http://www.economist.com/agenda>>; Internet; accessed 7 December 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Commission on Presidential Debates, "The First Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate," 30 September 2004; available from <<http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2004.

<sup>8</sup> John Felton, *Global Connections: America's Role in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), 346.

<sup>9</sup> John Shattuck, "US Can Help End Darfur Genocide," *Boston Globe*, 15 July 2004; available from <[http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial\\_opinion/oped/articles/2004/07/15/us\\_can\\_help\\_end\\_darfur\\_genocide/](http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2004/07/15/us_can_help_end_darfur_genocide/)>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2004.

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<sup>11</sup> Jim Yardley, "China "R" US: China's Skyrocketing Energy Needs Threaten Environment," *Daily Grist*, 15 March 2004; available from <<http://www.grist.org/news/daily/2004/03/15/>>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Francis .

<sup>13</sup> Felton, 151.

<sup>14</sup> Felton, 152, and Yasheng Huang and Tarun Khanna, "Can India Over Take China," *Foreign Policy* 137 (July/August 2003): 74, 81.

<sup>15</sup> Fred C. Bergsten and Caio Kouch-Weser, "Executive Summary: The Transnational Security Group on Economics, From Alliance to Coalitions—The Future of Transatlantic Relations" (Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2004), 53.

<sup>16</sup> Claudia Rosett, "Oil-for-Terror?" *National Review* on-line; 18 April 2004 available from <<http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rosett200404182336.asp>>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Art, 82.

<sup>18</sup> Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.

<sup>19</sup> Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 45.

<sup>20</sup> J. B. Bartholomees, Jr., ed., *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 283-284.

<sup>21</sup> Bush, 1-31.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas P. Reilly, "The National Security Strategy of the United States: Development of Grand Strategy," in *A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change*, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2004), 331.

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<sup>24</sup> Reilly, 324.

<sup>25</sup> "Senate Rpt. 108-359 – National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004: II Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," 2004; available from <[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&db\\_id=cp108&r\\_n=sr359.108&sel=TOC\\_17008&](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&db_id=cp108&r_n=sr359.108&sel=TOC_17008&)>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Reilly, 324.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 326-339.

<sup>28</sup> Andrew L. Ross, "Book Review of Lawrence J. Korb's A New Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorist and Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass: Three Options Presented as Presidential Speeches," *Ross Review* Summer/Autumn 2005; available from <<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2004/SummerAutumn/br3-sa04.htm>>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005.

<sup>29</sup> Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security," *The National Interest* 71 (Spring 2003): 19.

<sup>30</sup> Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternative in American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004," *Review of International Studies*, 30 (October 2004): 511, 523-532.

<sup>31</sup> Zelikow.

<sup>32</sup> Bush, inside cover page, 11, 15.

<sup>33</sup> "Show Me the Hegemony," *Foreign Policy* 131 (July August 2002): 1.

<sup>34</sup> Joseph S. Ney, "US Primacy Is Fact-So, Now, Work on Soft Power of Persuasion," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 April 2004, p.10.

<sup>35</sup> Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs*, 83 (March/April 2004), II, 65-72.

<sup>36</sup> Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War America Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 2, 3. Both Gordon and Shapiro are Fellows in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution, one of Washington's oldest think tanks, is an independent, nonpartisan organization devoted to research, analysis, and public education with an emphasis on economics, foreign policy, governance, and metropolitan policy.

<sup>37</sup> Ney, 9.

<sup>38</sup> Thomas Donnelly, "The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine" (Washington, D.C., National Security Outlook, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1 February 2003, 2; available from <[http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15845/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp)>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Bush, 2.

<sup>40</sup> Dana Milbank, "The Bush Doctrine Experiences Shining Moments," *The Washington Post*, 21 December 2003, sec. A, p. 26.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>45</sup> George W. Bush, "President Bush Addresses the Nation," Washington D.C., The White House, 19 March 2003; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html>>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2005.

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<sup>47</sup> G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Liberal Realism," *The National Interest*, 77 (Fall 2004): 16-38. Ikenberry is the Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Kupchan is the Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 16, 38-40.

<sup>49</sup> Ney.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Lieber and Lieber.

<sup>52</sup> William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994), 10. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1995), 12. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996), 18, 23. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997), 9. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), 15. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1990), 19. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (Washington, D.C.: December 2000), 19.

<sup>53</sup> Lieber and Lieber.

<sup>54</sup> Bartholomees, 279.

<sup>55</sup> Art, 10, 82.

<sup>56</sup> Dueck. 511.

<sup>57</sup> Barry, R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Vision for US Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21 (Winter 1996/97): 32.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>59</sup> Art, 215- 216.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 223, 233.

<sup>62</sup> Posen and Ross, 6,17, (table 1).

<sup>63</sup> Karen A. Feste, *Intervention: Shaping the Global Order* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 23.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>65</sup> Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated, the Policy of Selective Engagement," in *America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader*, rev. ed., ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, July 2000), 142-143.

<sup>66</sup> Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, 133.

<sup>67</sup> Posen and Ross, 22.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>70</sup> Robert H. Dorff, "The Current US National Security Strategy: A Brief Appraisal," in *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 22.

<sup>71</sup> Dueck., 527, 534-535.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 534.

<sup>74</sup> George W. Bush, "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation," Washington, D.C., The White House, 1 September 2001; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2005. George W. Bush, "Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Washington, D.C. United States Capital, 20 September 2001; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2005.

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<sup>78</sup> Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, 133.

<sup>79</sup> Posen and Ross, 24, 31.

<sup>80</sup> Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 15.

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<sup>82</sup> Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, 223.

<sup>83</sup> Feste, 71.

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