

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
IS THE ADMINISTRATION EFFECTIVELY HARNESSING
INTERNATIONAL POWER?**

by

Lieutenant Colonel David C. Weston
United States Army

Colonel Peter Atkinson
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 18 MAR 2005	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE An Analysis of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America Is The Administration Effectively Harnessing International Power?		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) David Weston		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 28	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel David C. Weston
TITLE: An Analysis of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America: Is the Administration Effectively Harnessing International Power?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 28 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, clearly identifies the necessity for pooling international resources, across all elements of power, to achieve national objectives in the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The national strategy is broad in scope, and requires collective international power to accomplish all the Bush administration has set out to do. Failure to achieve significant international cooperation has unbalanced ends, ways and means, and increased risk to achieving the stated strategic objectives. The international community should be able to harness far more resources for combating terrorism than one nation can alone. There is much debate as to the administration's effectiveness in this endeavor. This paper assesses the performance of the Bush administration in applying means, through ways, to achieve GWOT ends, and identifies imbalances in the strategy that have increased strategic risk in Iraq; finds failure by the U.S. to adequately invest in improving its other elements of power to a level that matches its strategic dominance in military power, and to effectively harness international power; and recommends actions the U.S. should take to improve its strategic balance, unite international efforts in the GWOT, and achieve success in reaching national objectives.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... iii

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
IS THE ADMINISTRATION EFFECTIVELY HARNESSING INTERNATIONAL POWER? 1

BACKGROUND 1

STRATEGIC ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS 1

AFGHANISTAN VERSUS IRAQ 2

STRATEGIC IMBALANCE 3

ELEMENTS OF POWER 3

MILITARY POWER 5

DIPLOMATIC POWER 6

ECONOMIC POWER 10

INFORMATION POWER 11

RECOMMENDATIONS 13

CONCLUSION 14

ENDNOTES 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY 21

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: IS THE ADMINISTRATION EFFECTIVELY HARNESSING INTERNATIONAL POWER?

We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions.

—President George W. Bush¹

The President's words are a clear articulation of strategic concepts (ways), and take account of the fact that the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) will require the pooling of resources (means) by many nations to accomplish U.S. national objectives (ends). This thread of international cooperation is woven throughout the National Security Strategy (NSS), with three of the eight concepts listed in the overview focused on strengthening alliances, working with others, and developing agendas for cooperative action.² Through cooperative efforts, the international community of nations should be able to harness far more resources to put towards combating terrorism than one nation can alone. Despite the clarity of the NSS, there is much international debate as to how effectively the administration has pursued those concepts.

An analysis of the administrations actions thus far, will find that while their strategy is correct, they have performed poorly in harnessing the power of the international community for action against terrorism. The administration appears to have taken a rather narrow approach in its proclivity to focus on the military element of power. This over reliance on military power, particularly to the detriment of international cooperation in other elements of power, resulted in unbalanced ends, ways and means, and consequently increased the risk to achieving the stated strategy. For the U.S. to effectively implement its NSS, it must successfully employ the full spectrum of national power against global terrorism.

BACKGROUND

STRATEGIC ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS

An effective strategy implements balanced ends, ways and means to accomplish strategic aims. As stated in the NSS, U.S. ends (defeat global terrorism) and ways (collective international power) appear reasonable. However, they must be taken in context with the finite means available to do the job. The administration's clear enunciation in the NSS of the requirement to maximize collective efforts to accomplish strategic GWOT objectives

demonstrates an understanding of the shortfalls in U.S. means (military force structure) available to do the job. President Bush's first term presidential campaign speeches inferred that he already viewed the military as over-stretched by the Clinton administration's proclivity for nation building and peace operations.³ As the administration calculated means available for advancing the war on terrorism from Afghanistan to Iraq, they received clear advice from then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki's estimate of several hundred thousand soldiers,⁴ and RAND Corporation's estimate of 500,000,⁵ for post-conflict operations. The administration's leadership appeared to be well advised of the significant force requirements required to undertake their ambitious course of action. However, they appear to have lost sight of that significant aspect as they started down the road to war with Iraq.

AFGHANISTAN VERSUS IRAQ

Building a coalition for the attack on the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan was straightforward. With the attacks of September 11 still fresh in everyone's mind, U.S. allies immediately signed on to support the efforts to bring the perpetrators of those attacks to justice. With little diplomatic effort, the administration built a coalition of forces from within existing alliances around the world. Additionally, the availability of the Northern Alliance and Pashtun Tribes in Afghanistan meant that the U.S. could fight that campaign with a limited commitment of U.S. forces.⁶ The campaign by most accounts was a huge success, with relatively little civil unrest following conflict termination, and continued global commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan. Perhaps this initial success, and the relative ease with which the world rallied around the nation's cause, gave the administration too much confidence as they approached their next campaign in Iraq.

Before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the administration's leadership put forth significant diplomatic efforts to obtain a supporting resolution through the United Nations (UN) Security Council to gain legitimacy for its preemptive campaign in Iraq. This time they were less successful - something was different. Although the linkages between the attacks of September 11 and Afghanistan were clear, many in the world community did not see the same linkages to Iraq. Worldwide debate raged during the months leading up to March 2003, and continues today about the merits of preemptively going to war to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein, and liberate Iraq. This paper will not discuss the merits for the respective sides to the argument; it will instead look at the results as they apply to the means available to accomplish the strategic objective.

STRATEGIC IMBALANCE

It is imperative that strategic leaders understand the clear relationship between ends-means, and the inherent risks associated when there is imbalance between them. The Department of Defense's June 2002 fact sheet listed more than fifty countries providing overt support to the U.S. led GWOT.⁷ It is noteworthy that only twelve of the fifty provided support to OIF, while all supported Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).⁸ These numbers have, and will continue to fluctuate over time, but they clearly remain heavily skewed towards supporting OEF. That disparity speaks volumes about the limited level of global commitment gained by the administration's diplomatic efforts. When you view this discrepancy in light of the previously cited troop estimates, the noticeable impact of this diplomatic failure is telling. There is a disproportionate over commitment of U.S. military ground forces (not to mention U.S. dollars) to an operation that many would argue, should be a collective burden shared by most nations. The inability of the administration to achieve diplomatic success increased the imbalance of U.S. means available for stability and support operations (SASO) in Iraq, and increased risk to the success of the operation, as clearly hi-lighted by the growing insurgency.

U.S. diplomatic failures have actually reduced commitments from some nations. Many members of the international community now view U.S. intentions as imperialism, where they should see instead an overwhelmingly united international counter-terrorism agenda.⁹ The perception that the U.S. has "Iraqified" the war on terrorism, followed by subsequent attacks against OIF contributors like Spain, led many governmental leaders of normally friendly nations to go out of their way to distance themselves from U.S. GWOT efforts for fear that their countries will suffer a 9/11-like attack on their homelands.¹⁰

These outcomes are indicative of the administration's failure to effectively employ diplomatic power to achieve a united international effort. The combination of over commitment of U.S. forces and significant erosion of international cooperation for the war on terror will make it more difficult to execute future campaigns that serve U.S. interests. While the administration remains committed to achieving its long term goals in Iraq, it could have avoided this predicament if it had applied more international assets to the problem set up front. Perhaps more importantly for future campaigns in the war on terrorism, the U.S. lost the initiative in building international momentum towards fighting the GWOT.

ELEMENTS OF POWER

A strategy applies resources across broad concepts to achieve objectives. At the national level, these broad concepts are known as elements of national power, which are

exhibited in a nation's diplomatic, information, military, and economic policies, programs, and actions. Every nation uses these elements of power to pursue their national strategic ends. While some nations have a good balance among their elements of power, most have real strength in only one or two areas. The world recognizes U.S. strength in military and economic power, as it applies significant national means to ensure its strength in those areas. However, it has not expended the same level of resources to achieve similar strength in diplomatic and information power.

The U.S. must transform those elements of power, as well as reassess the extent to which it applies economic power directly towards improving the economic viability of those regions that foster the growth of terrorist manpower. The principle way a government does that is through investing more budgetary dollars in those programs. The fiscal year (FY) 2001 U.S. budget contained \$291 billion for Department of Defense spending, or 15.6 percent of the total budget. By comparison, the State Department was allocated \$7.4 billion, or 0.4 percent, and International Assistance Programs received \$11.8 billion, or 0.6 percent. While budget supplements increased military budgets for FY2002 through FY2004 (peaking at 18.8 percent in FY2004), it is projected to level off at approximately 16.5 percent between FY2006 and FY2009. Notably, the other categories are flat lined throughout the same period.¹¹ While these numbers do not account for line item programs within each department that may represent crossover spending, they represent department level budgets that provide the reader a reasonable reference point for gauging national commitment.

Over the past 25 years, the U.S. invested heavily to achieve a dominant military capability, clearly demonstrated in operations like Just Cause, Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. To what extent does the U.S. need to invest in similar capabilities for the State Department (diplomatic and information power) and International Assistance (economic power) to win the GWOT? At current rates, the U.S. invests 39 times more in its military programs than its diplomatic programs, and 26 times more than its international assistance programs. As a comparison, during the early 1960s in the Cold War, U.S. military spending was approximately 45 percent of the budget, or 112 times more than the Department of State, which was still only allocated 0.4 percent.¹² One could argue that diplomacy conducted during the Cold War, with standing allies unified against a common, conventional Soviet military threat, was less expensive to execute than diplomacy requirements in a GWOT environment that requires increasingly repetitive efforts to gain legitimacy and unite partners into new coalitions. If the GWOT is a different kind of war, a war of ideas, with seeds sown by ideologies and economic disadvantages, then accordingly, the U.S. should increase funding significantly for its diplomatic

and international assistance programs. In so doing, the U.S. may find another way to enlist the support and cooperation of other states and international organizations, increasing the means to achieve U.S. objectives.

MILITARY POWER

Though recent results seem pessimistic, there are also some positive outcomes representing real opportunities to move forward in the war on terror. One of those opportunities is the acceleration of the U.S. military transformation effort.¹³ The immediate impact of the September 11th attacks, and subsequent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, resulted in significant budget increases for the U.S. Armed Forces. There are opportunities to leverage these additional funds to accelerate transformation actions within the services. The Army for example, is rapidly transforming its combat formations to a brigade combat team centric structure, which will increase its current strength of 35 brigades to at least 43 more deployable, more lethal brigade combat teams over the next 4 years, and greatly improve the Army's strategic flexibility.¹⁴ Transforming U.S. military forces will make them more efficient, and in a sense increase the means available to fight the nation's wars. However, OIF has made it clear that the U.S. will have to continue to rely on other nations to provide military means/capabilities to the problem set if it is to achieve its national objectives. Traditionally, the U.S. has built and maintained formal alliances and informal coalitions to do just that.

The U.S. needs to reassess alliances to ensure that they meet changing national requirements. The nation's current alliance structure was formed to meet national interests built around the containment of the Soviet Union and China. Kurt M. Campbell, writing "The End of Alliances? Not So Fast," *The Washington Quarterly*, categorizes those relationships as the nuclear family (nations protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, on the front lines with the Soviet Union/China), the extended family (nations that provided a long term foothold in regions to blunt Communist expansion), and friends and acquaintances (nations that provided opportunities to limit Communist encroachment on a transitory basis).¹⁵ With the breakup of the Soviet Union, and China's current state of affairs, the U.S. is no longer focused on blocking Communist expansion. Nonetheless, the U.S. has not succeeded in reshaping its alliances to meet the requirements of the GWOT. The U.S. needs to retain those alliances that still have merit as structured, transform those that are capable of adapting to GWOT requirements, and discard those alliances that are no longer relevant, nor willing to change, as a drain on precious resources.

NATO is an excellent example of a transforming U.S. alliance. The growth of NATO member states, and NATO's willingness to expand into roles and missions beyond their normal geographical boundaries, as it has in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now in Afghanistan, applies more military means to achieve U.S. and international interests. The U.S. should look at other traditional current and past regional alliances like the Organization of American States and the now defunct Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, and work to transform, reinvigorate, and employ them in a similar manner. The U.S. should also look to form new relationships with other regional entities like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which successfully deployed soldiers under its monitoring group (ECOMOG) to Liberia last year to conduct peacekeeping operations, relieving the international community of much of that burden.¹⁶

While those potential gains are important, they are military power centric, and are not the sole solution. Despite current international animosity with respect to the invasion of Iraq, significant opportunities to increase means through growth in international cooperation in the other elements of power are present. These opportunities will require a significant shift on the part of the administration to begin to restore balance to the means and ways at hand. Specifically they must invest considerably more resources to increase the scope and use of the diplomatic, economic, and information elements of power.

DIPLOMATIC POWER

Spurred by the U.S.'s limited multi-lateral approach to the invasion of Iraq, there is significant movement in the world community to find and fix systemic flaws in the UN's structure. This movement has occurred at international and regional levels in governmental organizations such as the UN and the European Union (EU), as well as in think-tank institutions such as the East-West Institute. If the U.S. can capitalize on that movement, the administration can make considerable strides in rebuilding international cooperation for the counterterrorism effort.

Most countries, and importantly many people within those countries, view the UN as a legitimate international organization. "The UN has the moral authority to focus global attention, establish consensus goals and summon the international community to respond."¹⁷ It is for that reason alone that the U.S. should not discard it as an institution. In fact, the Bush administration understands very well the capabilities and limitations of the UN, and works within that framework to achieve national interests. Recent developments in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan highlight the important role the UN plays as a legitimate international organization. The U.S. continues to work through the Security Council to curb nuclear ambitions in Iran, and

help resolve the humanitarian crises in Sudan. In Afghanistan, the U.S. successfully sought UN expertise in establishing and executing their first free elections. These are but a few examples of the administration using its diplomatic power to influence the UN, an international body, to achieve national goals. The administration must exert more diplomatic power in the coming years to develop international support (transformed into international action) to allow the nation to reduce, and ultimately eliminate its military role in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When viewed from this perspective, the UN has been, and must continue to be a key component of U.S. strategies for any future military operations.¹⁸ The necessity of leveraging UN assistance in achieving U.S. interests is clear. It is also clear that the UN is not currently functioning efficiently to handle the complexities of the GWOT, and its non-state actors.

The growth in this realization has created common themes across a broad spectrum of organizations. There is apparent consensus that the UN as a body is apathetic towards finding real solutions to the terrorism problem. From failing to agree to a common definition of terrorism, to giving more attention to the excesses of counterterrorism actions, many view the UN as abdicating its role as a world leading organization.¹⁹ A March 4, 2004, roundtable conference co-hosted by the United Nations Foundation, the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, and the Academic Council on the United Nations System noted, "The conscious or subconscious choice of the United Nations not to be a 'centerpiece' of counterterrorism presents an unfortunate situation as the solution to combating terrorism has to derive from international cooperation."²⁰ To respond to this perception, Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan formed the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to reassess their performance thus far in leading efforts to counter the growing problems of worldwide terrorism, and recommend changes to ensure they remain relevant for the future.²¹ The panel, with an experienced international membership (former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft served on the panel), was chartered to assess threats to international security, evaluate current UN policies and institutions, and recommend changes for shaping the UN to provide collective security in the future.²²

In December 2004, the UN published proposed reforms designed to better enable the organization to deal with modern security challenges to include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, poverty and violence.²³ Their recommendations represent a strategy for reducing/eliminating global security threats by addressing them comprehensively as interconnected events. The report provides wide ranging recommendations for improving UN and member state effectiveness in eliminating poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation; conflict between and within states; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological

weapons; and terrorism. Similarly, it addresses transnational organized crime, use of sanctions, rules and guidelines for using force, peace enforcement and peacekeeping capabilities, post-conflict peace building, and protecting civilians. It also includes comprehensive recommendations for reorganizing UN institutions and the UN Charter to address more efficiently and proactively those areas of concern.²⁴

In the area of terrorism, the report outlines measures to promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, improve the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, assist member states in meeting counter-terrorism obligations, and establish sanctions for state non-compliance with counter-terrorism resolutions.²⁵ Importantly, it offers for the first time a uniform definition that describes terrorism as

. . . any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.²⁶

This definition is significant because it eliminates caveats that permitted some member states to give "freedom fighter" status to entities recognized by most of the world as terrorists. It should lead to an internationally recognized, uniform list of known terrorist organizations, enable the international community to unite against those entities, and lend legitimacy towards any nation that acts against them.

Another key proposal in the report is the proposed methodology for authorizing "anticipatory self defense" through the Security Council. The report acknowledges that the nature of terrorist attacks and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has created a new problem where threats, though not imminent, are still significant and real. In an effort to curb unilateral actions though, it proposes the Security Council act as an authorizing agent, viewing the issue from the perspectives of seriousness of the threat, proportionality of the response, exhaustion of alternatives, and balance of consequences.²⁷ This proposal requires serious consideration, as it offers a way to pursue preemptive war and achieve international legitimacy through the authority of the UN Security Council. Many states in the international community view any preemptive war as illegitimate because the current UN Charter does not specifically authorize such measures. Had the charter been amended as proposed, the U.S. might have achieved greater support for legitimizing OIF from member nations that adhere strictly to the wording of the charter. Of course, the obvious down side to this proposal is the current right of veto, allowing

this mechanism to be stalled by a member state with veto authority, leading us to the same impasse seen before OIF anyway.

In "The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane put forth an alternative proposal for dealing with the issue of preemptive war that merits serious consideration and provides a mechanism for a nation to proceed in acting on its own interests despite the right of veto in the Security Council. This proposal requires a Security Council vote of approval or disapproval of preemptive actions, with each voting member's actual vote binding them to a contract for post combat operations reconstruction costs. An independent review committee, appointed by the Security Council, would review the preemptive action after the fact, and determine if the reasons initially put forth to the Security Council remained legitimate (were the reasons put forth prior to the preemptive action validated by the action). If the review committee found the action to be legitimate, then those nations voting against the preemption authorization would be obligated to pay a disproportionate share of the reconstruction costs, or other appropriate monetary penalties. If the action were deemed illegitimate, then those that voted to authorize the action would pay the disproportionate share of costs or appropriate penalties.²⁸ This proposal is unique in that it formulates a way for nations to pursue consensus within the Security Council before executing preemptive actions, with no actual veto authority to stop the action. Instead, it would require every voting member to commit their resources to the outcome of their vote. This would force nations to view the issue purely from a legitimacy standpoint, which would clearly decrease the likelihood of a political impasse as seen before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The two proposals merit serious consideration, as they offer concrete methods for solving the current problems of executing preemptive actions to protect a nation from the real threats posed by terrorist actions.

International momentum for achieving change is growing, as there are calls from most regions of the world to adapt the UN Charter to achieve a more proactive organization for implementing intervention strategies against terrorism.²⁹ While the UN member states have not yet adopted the recommendations contained in the High-level Panel's report, they are reviewing it with a potential vote for adoption by September 2005. This report represents unique opportunity to restructure the UN to reduce bureaucracy, improve the ability to act proactively in confronting global issues, and avoid future OIF-like failures to achieve consensus. With many (if not most) countries requiring UN authorizations to legitimize their actions abroad, the U.S. needs to take a leadership role, move quickly to take advantage of that momentum, and achieve real, constructive changes to the UN's structure. The nation cannot afford to miss this

opportunity to reshape the UN into an organization positioned to successfully address future security threats.

ECONOMIC POWER

Using the economic element of power for combating terrorism is another emerging common theme. Most people and governments understand that the recruiting grounds for terrorism are predominantly nations that are severely disadvantaged economically. Currently, less than one percent of the U.S. budget goes to foreign aid. The 2003 budget included approximately \$11.4 billion in economic assistance to other nations, and another \$4.3 billion to the UN for peacekeeping operations and other military support.³⁰ Not only do organizations external to the U.S. support boosting economic aid to countries in need, but domestic support has grown as well. A 2002 University of Maryland study indicated that 81 percent of Americans support increasing foreign aid to assist in the fight against terrorism. The 2003 budget spent one dollar on foreign aid for every 19 dollars on defense. That same poll indicated that most Americans wanted to spend closer to one dollar on foreign aid for every three dollars on defense.³¹ Increasing U.S. foreign aid and encouraging other wealthy nations to do the same will increase the effective use of global economic power to eradicate the economic seeds of terrorism.

Awareness within the international business community of their role in contributing to defensive economic power in the battle against terrorism is growing. In November 2003, more than 300 business leaders met in Brussels at an East-West Institute conference on worldwide cooperative efforts to improve security against the threats posed by terrorism. As infrastructure owners, the international and transnational business participants looked for security solutions in the areas of cost sharing, infrastructure upgrades, and improved business processes.³² These business leaders understood the collective economic power they bring to the table, and appeared committed to assisting governments in the defense against terrorism. This represents a unique opportunity for the U.S. and other governments to leverage private investments to expand the economic element of power and increase its effectiveness in defending against terrorism.

As the world's largest economic power, the U.S. should lead the effort to pursue international and regional agreements that best use collective economic power to multiply the effectiveness of its efforts against terrorism. The administration should foster government/business partnerships to share costs while achieving solutions for defending against terrorism. Maximizing the means available to develop functioning economies in failing

states is critical to eliminating a key recruitment motivator for terrorists. The U.S. needs to set the example by increasing national expenditures on foreign aid considerably, and then push the international community to formulate a common strategy for solving the economic disparity of disadvantaged states. Success in increasing effects of economic power should reduce the current necessity for military power solutions in the long term.

INFORMATION POWER

There is a great need for the U.S. to communicate its intentions and goals, and to share GWOT intelligence information more effectively. There are many parts of the world (including the Middle East) that are suspicious of U.S. intentions, and are therefore not very receptive to U.S. information campaigns. However, the U.S. can do better, even in those tough-to-sell regions. Surely, the nation that successfully manipulated public opinion behind the Iron Curtain can figure out a way to communicate with equally repressed audiences in the Middle East and other depressed regions of the world.³³

Evidence that the administration is not communicating its foreign policies very well is abundant. At a recent East-West Institute conference, American, European, and Russian participants expressed concern with the lack of clarity to key points of U.S. foreign policy. One U.S. participant for example, questioned whether the administration really knew what its goals are in Iraq, as its policies seemed to be in a continuous state of flux.³⁴ Part of the administration's communications problem stems from the use of the term "war" when speaking about terrorism. Many U.S. allies, particularly European and Middle Eastern, do not think of themselves as being in a "war" on terrorism. They focus predominately on how to "contain" terrorism, not defeat it.³⁵

The U.S. should lead the effort to establish a set of international standards, or a common language. As previously mentioned, the UN High-level Panel's proposal would codify terrorism in a manner that does not allow the perception of terrorism as a legitimate form of resistance or freedom fighting. With this definition, the UN sends a strong message to states and international actors that it will no longer quibble on the issue of terrorism. If the UN were to adopt, and enforce this definition through resolutions, sanctions, and use of force authorizations, it would achieve a unity of effort against the global terrorism movement. That in and of itself would be quite an accomplishment, and would enable the international community to speak with one voice and focus on the adversary. This unity would create a powerful message that can help those nations and organizations sitting on the fence in the GWOT to lend legitimacy to their decisions to join international efforts to fight global terrorism. The more nations that get off that

fence on the correct side of the GWOT, the more means will be contributed internationally to help achieve the nation's strategic ends.

Perhaps not surprising to those who have examined international perception of U.S. actions in the GWOT, the September 2004, Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication Report gave current U.S. information operations a poor grade.

Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative.³⁶

This report describes the complexity of information operations in an environment where non-state actors are involved at all levels. It notes that strategic communications "requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on 'doable tasks,' develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success."³⁷ In addition to tripling the funding of strategic communications programs, this comprehensive report recommends to the President seven positive actions to transform national strategic communications capabilities, including:

- Issue a presidential policy directive, establishing a permanent strategic communication structure within the National Security Council (NSC).
- Work with congress to establish legislation and funding for an independent strategic communication research and development center.
- Redefine the role of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy.
- Raise public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State to the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary.
- Designate the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as the DOD focal point for strategic communication.
- Require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components.³⁸

The intent of those recommendations is two fold. First is to increase the precedence and funding levels of strategic communications positions within the government. Second, and most important, is to increase the ability of the NSC to synchronize policy, diplomacy, military operations, and communications operations, achieving synergy across the spectrum of national

power. This is imperative if the U.S. is going to halt the downward spiral of domestic and international perceptions towards U.S. actions abroad in general, and more specifically with respect to the GWOT. In a global battle of ideas, information operations may well be the U.S.'s true main effort.

One only has to recall the 2004 presidential campaigns to understand that national leadership knows very well how to use the power of information. The U.S. should work to harness that same level of energy across the full spectrum of information operations in the GWOT. By doing so, the nation's leaders can certainly manage to put forth a more coherent, persuasive, and unifying message to the international community. Increased information power will enable the international community to motivate nations to contribute their fair share towards achieving a solution to terrorism, and de-motivate those nations that sponsor terrorists. If the international community begins to speak to terrorism problems/solutions with a unified voice, then the message received by terrorists will be one that foreshadows a unified approach towards their destruction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to rebalance NSS ends, ways, and means in the GWOT, the U.S. must regain international support for its efforts, and provide considerable resources to harness the international community's diplomatic, economic, and information power. To that end, the U.S. should:

- Increase significantly the funding for diplomatic and international assistance programs to strongly signal the international community of U.S. commitment to solving the underlying support structures of the global terrorist movement.
- Reassess current alliances to ensure that they meet changing national requirements. Retain those that still have merit as structured, transform those that can change to meet GWOT requirements, and discard those that are no longer relevant, or are not willing to change.
- Capitalize on the momentum in the world community, and the UN High-level Panel's recommendations for changing the UN, and lead the effort to transform the UN into a viable international organization capable of meeting international security challenges.
- Support the UN's proposed definition of terrorism, establishing a set of international standards, or a common language, and enhancing global unity of effort against terrorism.
- Capitalize on its position as the world's largest economic power to lead the effort in building international and regional cooperation to maximize collective economic power, multiplying the effectiveness of international efforts against terrorism.

- Increase U.S. foreign aid and encourage other wealthy nations to do the same, thereby increasing global economic power as an effective instrument for the eradication of the economic seeds of terrorism.
- Foster cost sharing partnerships between governments and international/transnational businesses to achieve economical solutions for improving security of critical infrastructure against terrorist attack.
- Adopt the recommendations of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communications to unify national information operations under one umbrella, and apply significant resources towards halting the downward spiral of perceptions towards U.S. actions abroad in general, and more specifically with respect to the GWOT.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. is the most capable country in the world when it comes to having the means to exercise power, whether military, diplomatic, economic, or information. Even so, those means are not without limits. The NSS clearly articulates a plan for achieving victory in the GWOT, by making it an international collective effort. Unfortunately, the administration has not succeeded in achieving international support and action, resulting in a significant reduction in available international resources. The administration, like those before it, has also not fully invested in, nor employed all the elements of national power to achieve a balanced effect. This imbalance in ends, ways, and means has stalled the international communities unified efforts against terrorism that were so prevalent immediately following the September 11 attacks, reduced the effectiveness of U.S. actions, particularly in Iraq, and increased the risk of strategic failure in that country. If the U.S. fails in Iraq, it will lose its initiative in the current war on terrorism, and credibility in its ability to lead the international community in future efforts.

The U.S. can rebalance its strategy and reenergize the international community by increasing its commitment to its other elements of power through increased investment of resources. The U.S. must harness the diplomatic power of the international community by working to constructively change the UN, reform common ties with traditional allies, and create new alliances/coalitions where necessary to eliminate the growth of terrorism. The administration must increase focused foreign aid expenditures, work with other wealthy nations to do the same, and leverage the cost sharing capabilities of international/transnational businesses to enable disadvantaged nations to achieve some semblance of economic prosperity and stability. National leadership must also harness international information power to communicate more effectively, articulate clear strategic goals and intentions, develop an international common language that speaks of terrorism with one voice, and motivate other nations to do their fair share in the war on terrorism.

The administration must not only act in congruence with its national strategy, but must also work harder to legitimize that strategy in the eyes of the international community. If the nation rebalances investment in all its elements of power, and the President can get the international community's elements of power working collectively, harnessing their vast resources, the effects can be exponential, and the defeat of global terrorism assured.

WORD COUNT= 5955

ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), Opening Letter.

² Ibid., 3.

³ Nadia Schadlow, "War and Governance," *Core Curriculum Course 2: War, National Security Policy & Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy U. S. Army War College, 25 August - 22 October 2004), 286.

⁴ Rowan Scarborough, "Wolfowitz Criticizes 'Suspect' Estimate of Occupation Force," *Washington Times*, 28 February 2003; available from <<http://www.drumbeat.mlaterz.net/Jan%20Feb%202003/Wolfowitz%20critical%20of%20occupation%20estimate%20022803a.htm>>, accessed 5 October 2004.

⁵ Kenneth M. Pollack, "After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq," *Core Curriculum Course 2: War, National Security Policy & Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy U. S. Army War College, 25 August - 22 October 2004), 312.

⁶ Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," *Core Curriculum Course 2: War, National Security Policy & Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy U. S. Army War College, 25 August - 22 October 2004), 164.

⁷ Department of Defense, *Fact Sheet - International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 7 June 2004), 1-13.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Academic Council on the United Nations System, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, and United Nations Foundation, *Curbing Terrorism - Ingredients of Effective International Action* (New York: 4 March 2004), 4.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables, Fiscal Year 2005* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 76 and 81; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 1 December 2004.

¹² Ibid., 77.

¹³ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Transformation Planning Guidance* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 2003), 1.

¹⁴ Peter J. Schoomaker, *Remarks to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services*, 108th Cong., 28 January 2004, 4-5.

¹⁵ Kurt M. Campbell, "The End of Alliances? Not So Fast," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 156.

¹⁶ Department of State Fact Sheet, *Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)*, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, July 31, 2001), 1; available from <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/4454.htm>>, accessed on 16 December 2004.

¹⁷ Timothy E. Wirth, William Luers, and Robert Edgar, "Why the U.S. Needs the UN More Than Ever," *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 October 2004, p. A.15 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 16 November 2004.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Academic Council on the United Nations System, 4 and 5.

²⁰ Ibid., 5.

²¹ The Stanley Foundation, *The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Security Threats - Maximizing Prospects for Success* (New York: January, 2004), 2; available from <<http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org>>, accessed 26 September 2004.

²² Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* (United Nations, 2004), vii.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 98-115.

²⁵ Ibid., 103.

²⁶ Ibid., 104.

²⁷ Ibid., 106.

²⁸ Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, "The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal," *Ethics & International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2004): 13-17.

²⁹ East-West Institute, *American, European and Russian Cooperation on Post-Saddam Iraq - The Way Ahead for America, Europe and Russia* (Washington D.C.: 27 February 2004), 8; available from <<http://www.ewi.info/programs/publications.cfm?title=Publications&l1=Programs&l2=Global%20Security&l3=&l4=&view=detail&pubid=248>>, accessed 26 September 2004.

³⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, *Terrorism Questions and Answers* (Washington D.C.: 2004); available from <<http://www.terrorismanswers.org/policy/foreignaid.html#Q3>>, accessed 11 October 2004.

³¹ Ibid.

³² East-West Institute, *Conference Report - Toward Worldwide Security - Building the Transatlantic Agenda*, (Brussels: 11 December 2003), 5-7, available from <<http://www.ewi.info/publications.cfm?title=Publications&l1=Publications&l2=&l3=&l4=&view=detail&pubid=223>>, accessed on 26 September 2004.

³³ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Report of the Defense Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2004), 3-5; available from < http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf>; Internet; accessed 1 December 2004.

³⁴ East West Institute, *American, European and Russian Cooperation on Post-Saddam Iraq - The Way Ahead for America, Europe and Russia*, 1.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁶ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 6-9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Academic Council on the United Nations System, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, United Nations Foundation. *Curbing Terrorism - Ingredients of Effective International Action*. New York: 4 March 2004.
- Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O. Keohane. "The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal." *Ethics & International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2004): 1-22.
- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
- Campbell, Kurt M. "The End of Alliances? Not So Fast." *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 151-163.
- Council on Foreign Relations. *Terrorism Questions and Answers*. Washington D.C.: 2004. Available from <<http://www.terrorismanswers.org/policy/foreignaid.html#Q3>>. Accessed 11 October 2004.
- East-West Institute. *American, European and Russian Cooperation on Post-Saddam Iraq - The Way Ahead for America, Europe and Russia*. Washington D.C.: 27 February 2004. Available from <<http://www.ewi.info/programs/publications.cfm?title=Publications&l1=Programs&l2=Global%20Security&l3=&l4=&view=detail&pubid=248>>. Accessed 26 September 2004.
- _____. *Conference Report - Toward Worldwide Security - Building the Transatlantic Agenda*. Brussels: 11 December 2003. Available from <<http://www.ewi.info/publications.cfm?title=Publications&l1=Publications&l2=&l3=&l4=&view=detail&pubid=223>>. Accessed on 26 September 2004.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E. "A Flawed Masterpiece," *Core Curriculum Course 2: War, National Security Policy & Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy U. S. Army War College, 25 August - 22 October 2004.
- Pollack, Kenneth M. "After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq," *Core Curriculum Course 2: War, National Security Policy & Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy U. S. Army War College, 25 August - 22 October 2004.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Transformation Planning Guidance*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 2003.
- Scarborough, Rowan. "Wolfowitz Criticizes 'Suspect' Estimate of Occupation Force." *Washington Times*, 28 February 2003. Available from <<http://www.drumbeat.mlaterz.net/Jan%20Feb%202003/Wolfowitz%20critical%20of%20occupation%20estimate%20022803a.htm>>. Accessed 5 October 2004.
- Schadlow, Nadia. "War and Governance." *Core Curriculum Course 2: War, National Security Policy & Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy U. S. Army War College, 25 August - 22 October 2004.

- Schoomaker, Peter J. *Remarks to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services*. 108th Cong., 28 January 2004.
- The Stanley Foundation. *The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Security Threats - Maximizing Prospects for Success*. New York: January, 2004. Available from <<http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org>>. Accessed 26 September 2004.
- UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility." *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change*. United Nations, 2004.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Fact Sheet - International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism*. Washington D. C.: Department of Defense, 7 June 2004.
- U.S. Department of State. *Fact Sheet - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)*. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, July 31, 2001. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/4454.htm>>. Accessed on 16 December 2004.
- U.S. Office of Management and Budget. *Historical Tables, Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. Available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf>>. Internet. Accessed 1 December 2004.
- U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. *Report of the Defense Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2004. Available from <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 1 December 2004.
- Wirth, Timothy E., William Luers, and Robert Edgar. "Why the U.S. Needs the UN More Than Ever." *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 October 2004, p. A.15. Database on-line. Available from ProQuest. Accessed 16 November 2004.