

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**HARD AND SOFT POWER: THE PARADOX OF
"WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS" IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick A. Henry
United States Army

Doctor David Jablonsky
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 18 MAR 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Hard and Soft Power The Paradox of				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Frederick Henry				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 28	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Frederick A. Henry

TITLE: Hard And Soft Power: The Paradox Of "Winning The War Of Ideas" In The 21st Century

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 28 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The effectiveness of how America communicates its ideas and uses its power is a measurement of how United States (U.S.) policy makers comprehend and appreciate the embryonic relationship of systems within the new strategic environment. The complexity of the new environment is attributable to the growing interdependencies that have resulted from globalization and the explosion of information technology. These two events, although not exclusively the single factor in this changing environment, have had a profound impact on how the United States uses its influence to shape an international community that can ensure prosperity for itself, its allies and developing countries seeking to improve their economic viability. However, in order to achieve this aim America must recognize that the international environment is becoming progressively more interconnected, convoluted and multidimensional. Therefore, if policy makers propagate a grand strategy that is one dimensional, then it is less likely to be enduring and could result in a gratuitous expenditure of resources.

The purpose of this study is two fold. The first goal is to discuss how the changing dynamics associated with globalization and information technology complicate the use of power in the international environment. The second is to demonstrate that the most effective way to deal with this new environment is to address it on a three dimensional basis that allows for the symbiotic combination of hard and soft power in the formulation of strategy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONSvii

HARD AND SOFT POWER: THE PARADOX OF “WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS” IN THE 21ST CENTURY..... 1

SPECTRUM OF POWER 1

 HARD POWER..... 2

 SOFT POWER 3

NEW STRATEGY ENVIRONMENT 4

 WORLD OPINION..... 4

 GLOBAL ECONOMY..... 5

 OPPOSING IDEOLOGIES..... 6

 MEDIA..... 7

THREE- DIMENSIONAL CHESS BOARD MODEL 7

 HARD POWER ADVOCACY..... 9

 SOFT POWER ADVOCACY 11

WAY AHEAD..... 12

CONCLUSION 14

ENDNOTES 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY 19

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 12
FIGURE 2.....8

HARD AND SOFT POWER: THE PARADOX OF “WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS” IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments of power, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace...¹

- B.H. Liddell Hart

The effectiveness of how America communicates its ideas and uses its power is a measurement of how United States (U.S.) policy makers comprehend and appreciate the embryonic relationship of systems within the new strategic environment. The complexity of the new environment is attributable to the growing interdependencies that have resulted from globalization and the explosion of information technology. These two events, although not exclusively the single factor in this changing environment, have had a profound impact on how the United States uses its influence to shape an international community that can ensure prosperity for itself, its allies and developing countries seeking to improve their economic viability. In order to achieve this aim however, America must recognize that the international environment is becoming progressively more interconnected, convoluted and multidimensional. In such a milieu, if policy makers propagate a grand strategy that is one dimensional, it is less likely to endure and could result in a gratuitous expenditure of resources.

The current strategy that America has implemented to project its power has stimulated myriad debates both at home and aboard concerning the use of Hard Power (military and economic) in relation to Soft Power (attraction of culture, values, and foreign policy) to achieve its strategic aims. These debates by academics and senior policy officials demonstrate the divergent ideological views and challenges concerning how America formulates its foreign policy strategy.

The purpose of this study is two fold. The first goal is to discuss how the changing dynamics associated with globalization and information technology complicate the use of power in the international environment. The second is to demonstrate that the most effective way to deal with this new environment is to address it on a three dimensional basis that allows for the symbiotic combination of hard and soft power in the formulation of strategy.

SPECTRUM OF POWER

There is not a clearly defined or perfect correlation between SP and HP. Figure 1 depicts the relationship of power along a spectrum from command to co-option and the most likely

resources required to influence desired behavioral outcomes. The spectrum is divided into two spheres of influence: Hard Power (HP) and Soft Power (SP).²

Spectrum of Power

	Hard Power		Soft Power	
Spectrum of Behavior	Coercion Command	Inducement	Agenda Setting	Attraction Co-opt
Most Likely Resources	Force Sanctions	Payments Bribes	Institutions	Values Culture Policies

Source: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*

FIGURE 1

Figure 1 illustrates that in moving along the spectrum of power there is a direct relationship between desirable behavior outcomes and the application of resource stimuli. The figure also demonstrates the necessity of knowing the desirable behavioral end state prior to the allocation of resources. Within each sphere of influence (HP and SP), each sub component (coercion, inducement, agenda setting, and attraction) requires certain resource attributes to stimulate a preferred behavioral output.

HARD POWER

The HP sphere of behavior is comprised of two components: coercion and inducement. Coercion is referred to as the threat or use of military force and or enforcement of sanctions to alter desirable behavior. Often referred to as the “stick” analogy, coercion is an essential component of foreign policy. During the first Gulf War, the use of military force and the enforcement of sanctions were aimed at coercing Saddam Hussein’s regime to conform to acceptable international standards of behavior. Although the use of military force was a notable success, the enforcement of sanctions by the United Nations (UN) Security Council proved to be more problematic. Part of the failure in applying sanctions was the inability of the UN to agree on how to impose sanctions directed at altering the behavior of the Iraqi regime without causing unnecessary hardships for the Iraqi people.

Inducement is referred to as the use of a “carrot” to bribe and influence desirable behavior. Inducement is an essential element of HP because it requires less expenditure of more costly resources required to influence behavior by coercion. The US, for example, is using the “carrot” approach in execution of foreign aid programs aimed at addressing some of the root

causes of terrorism. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is designed to be a contract with recipient countries that requires certain eligibility requirements to be met before the disbursement of funds. Recipient governments must demonstrate effective policies to effectively govern; invest in their people and promote economic reform.³

SOFT POWER

SP is an indirect means to co-opt an actor into acquiescence so that he acts in conformity with the wishes of a different actor without the use of force. The premise of SP is that actors must have the ability to attract others to their particular viewpoints, which are perceived as being legitimate and credible. When an actor can attract others to its viewpoint, it will minimize the need to use more costly HP resources. The power of attraction is an essential characteristic of the SP spectrum of behavior and is comprised of two components: agenda setting and attraction.

The ability to influence agenda setting is directly related to the attraction of an individual actor's espoused values and the credibility of its policies. For example, the more the US is capable of influencing agenda setting at institutions such as the UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the greater the contribution by partner countries in codifying international norms and institutions of governance. Agenda setting not only requires attraction by others towards an actor's articulated policies, but it also requires the actor to accept the potential of compromise, which is a natural evolution in the process of consensus building.

The SP spectrum (figure 1) depicts three sources of attraction: Culture (attractive to others), Political Values (consistency at home and abroad), and Foreign Policy (seen as legitimate and having moral authority).⁴ These three sources are not necessarily independent of each other. For example, attractiveness of US culture permeates throughout the world and is a major source of trend setting. However, any positive gain by the attraction of American culture is undermined by US foreign policy decisions that have contributed to unprecedented levels of anti-Americanism. This trend is currently so pervasive that it threatens to weaken America's ability to influence agenda setting as well as to apply its hard power inducement and coercion resources.

Both HP and SP advocates recognize the importance for the United States to be able to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The basic disagreement between the two parties is how America should use its resources at the policy level to achieve its goals. If the US is to "win the war of ideas", then it must champion an ideology that will resonate in an international environment already saturated with an abundance of information and opposing ideas. This is

the paradox of HP and SP and further highlights the complexity of formulating a grand strategy in the new strategic environment.

NEW STRATEGY ENVIRONMENT

Globalization, the information revolution, eroding nation-state authority, and the changing nature of conflict are the 21st century realities upon which and in response to which the framework for an American grand strategy must be constructed⁶

- Former Senator Gary Hart

The major influences on the current strategic environment are globalization and the information revolution. Globalization, although credited with being an American invention, can not be controlled by America or anyone else. This phenomenon has caused the world to become smaller because of the convergence of financial, educational, and other institutions. The interdependencies created by this convergence, particularly, the financial sector has created what Thomas Friedman refers to as the electronic herd phenomenon.⁶ Globalization has required nations to don the "Golden Straightjacket" to obey the rules and conditions set by the global market, which in turn is influenced by the international banking and investment community. The proliferation of low cost information technology has accelerated the rate of information empowered to individuals. The principle of Moore's Law, which states that micro processing chips will either halve in price or double in power every 18 months, has been an accurate predictor of technology trends over the past 30 years.⁷ Today, computing power costs less than one percent of what it cost during the 1970's.

To "win the war of ideas" in an environment already saturated with opposing ideas requires vision, humility, patience and a general appreciation for dynamics associated with the new environment. Negative events that occur within the environment or restricted strategies can undermine attraction power and may plainly demonstrate to the global audience a lack of perception or just plain indifference to some of the factors influencing the environment such as world opinion, global economy, ideology, and media.

WORLD OPINION

World opinion does matter with regard to America's being able to promulgate a foreign policy strategy. Governments of nations must respond to public opinion, whether it is demonstrated in the voting booth or in the streets. It is therefore not in America's national interest to create conditions that cause foreign countries to become unsupportive of US policy, whether it concerns the collaboration of intelligence on terrorist activities, staging facilities and

overflight rights, or the distribution of American products. This phenomenon was clearly apparent during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) when the Turkish parliament decided not to support America's request to permit transit of the 4th Infantry Division to Iraq through Turkish territory because of Turkish public opinion. The world has become too small and too dangerous for America to ignore the impact of its own global policies or to misunderstand those of others. Growing anti-Americanism is a serious problem. It is deep and systematic and cannot be "managed" with a quick fix, nor with an episodic, defensive, crisis-driven approach.⁸

To improve the image of America in the international community is the responsibility of the Department of State (DoS). As part of a critical public diplomacy offensive, that department is responsible for spreading American values and culture throughout the Middle East.⁹ But as reported by a major independent study, public diplomacy is not an integral part of foreign policy formulation and usually comes as a "must promote" or a response to criticism after the fact.¹⁰ One solution is for the United States to improve its capacity to listen to foreign publics in order to monitor world opinion trends in terms of their impact on foreign policy. Currently, the U.S. government spends between \$5-10 million annually on foreign public opinion polling. In comparison, American businesses spend nearly \$6 billion on such foreign polling.¹¹

GLOBAL ECONOMY

As the global economy continues to expand, there will be increased demand for natural resources, particularly natural gas and petroleum. In 1999, the United States had a daily petroleum consumption rate of approximately 19,500,000 barrels per day (bpd), which was almost equal to all of Central and South America, Eastern Europe, the former USSR, Middle East and Africa combined.¹² These levels are not sustainable, given that rapidly developing nations such as China and India are increasing the purchasing power of their citizens, which means greater fuel consumption requirements. In fact, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) reports that by 2020 the expanding global economy will increase demand for raw materials by 50 percent, with the greatest demand being petroleum.¹³ The global economy will make access to petroleum and natural gas a vital interest for the economic viability of advanced and developing nation states, which will cause increased tension in the international environment. This tension will be further increased by the presence of large multinational corporations operating in the global arena. In such circumstances, if America uses its hegemonic power to promote a strategy that appears to reflect only internal self interest, while marginalizing the resource concerns of weaker powers, the credibility, legitimacy and influence of US policy will

be undermined. As a consequence, weaker powers may organize their resources in order to promulgate counter strategies in an effort to limit America's attraction and influence.

America's growing deficit also creates challenges for policy makers as well as the global economy. As the American economy goes, so goes the world economy. The international community is a major holder of U.S. Treasury Bills, which helps to finance the current deficit. In fact, in the 2nd quarter of 2003, 45% of the American deficit was financed by China and Japan alone.¹⁴ This type of relationship creates a very tenuous dynamic in the international marketplace. If there were to be a precipitous sell off of dollars for Euros, the global market would in essence collapse.

OPPOSING IDEOLOGIES

The Webster dictionary defines ideology "as the study of ideas, their nature and source...the body of ideas on which a particular political, economic, or social system is based". A body of ideas can, of course, be a unifying entity. But as Samuel Huntington has pointed out, clashes can occur along fault lines resulting from opposing religious, culture and value systems that feed into different ideologies.¹⁵ Many of these clashes are a consequence of globalization. Although the US generally perceives globalization as a vital step towards a more stable world, it is also acknowledged that the process can have serious adverse implications for American foreign policy.¹⁶ For example, globalization has become a major theme in the Arab media, and it is almost always raised in connection with the soft power aspects of American economic and cultural penetration.¹⁷ America's domination of the global trafficking of information and ideas through its music, movies, television and software that enables it to reach literally everywhere in the connected world. This ability to reach out to influence the tastes, lives and aspirations of a nation is not always viewed favorably. Even such western allies as France and Canada have passed laws to prohibit the satellite dissemination of certain foreign – meaning American – programs across their borders and into the homes of their citizens. Their explicit objective is to keep out American and other alien political views, mores and, as it is called in some parts of the Middle East, "news pollution".¹⁸

America's ideas can't be "pushed down" on someone with the expectation that there will be immediate acquiescence. The acceptance of different ideas takes time to achieve because it requires a cognitive shift in behavior from previous policy road maps. Once ideas are institutionalized into rules and norms, they become the fundamental beliefs that help to explain policy outcomes, particularly those relating to foreign policy.¹⁹ When an ideology is institutionalized, it can survive as a form of "folk wisdom" in the repositories of culture – the

family, the school, clubs, churches and places of work.²⁰ This is a challenge at the transnational level where, for example, radical Islamic ideology is easily promulgated through pervasive information technology means. To defeat an opposing ideology requires a coherent strategy that uses all instruments of power within the strategic environment. "America is not in a war that ultimately needs to entail large number of American forces," the Central Command Combatant Commander points out in this regard, "but it's a war where intelligence, economic, political and diplomatic power needs to come together to defeat the ideology of al-Qaeda, Zarqawi, al-Islam, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, etc."²¹

MEDIA

The explosion of low cost information technology devices such as the cell phone (camera ready), laptops, television, and satellite dishes and the internet has empowered individuals with a communications capability that was not commercially viable just 5-10 years ago. This phenomenon has created a new landscape in which media is both ubiquitous and manipulated.

Today, internet cafes are abundant and can be found in some of the most remote parts of the world. This low cost of information dissemination means that there is little to no barriers of entry. Anyone with the gift of writing, a digital camera and access to the internet can send his story around the world in a matter of seconds. Images have the ability to provide an immediate reaction, because they aid people in conceptualizing the magnitude of an event. An image is worth more than a thousand words, because it becomes locked into the minds of the viewer and can change the operational environment. One case in point is the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison being used as part of a negative information operation campaigns. There are many other examples in Iraq that could also contribute to negative information campaigns. The United States can increase its attraction by countering adverse media propaganda with truthful and timely responses that undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the source of negativity. Truth without confidence, as BG Brooks, Chief Army Public Affairs explains, is the genesis of doubt.²²

THREE- DIMENSIONAL CHESS BOARD MODEL

A state which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy and future²³

- B.H. Liddell Hart

In order to deal with this new environment, the simple one dimensional application of power will not work even if both the hard and soft varieties are used in tandem. Only by using

both varieties in what is in effect a three dimensional chess board will a hard and soft power symbiosis support an effective pattern of decision making at the highest level. This is a lesson that both hard and soft power advocates need to learn. ²⁴

Figure 2 begins as a reminder that the strategic environment is influenced by globalization and information technology in addition to strategic environmental factors such as public opinion, the global economy, opposing ideologies and the media. This complex and interdependent environment demands a multidimensional approach to the distribution and application of power. That approach is illustrated by the three dimensional model depicted in the figure.




FIGURE 2

The chessboard model is comprised of three dimensions: military, economical and transnational. Each dimension requires specific power attributes and resources linked to hard power and soft power in order to achieve desired political ends. In the military dimension, America is a hegemonic power and because there are no rival nations in this dimension, the United States can set the rules and establish the agenda. In the middle economic dimension, America is not a unipolar power and must coordinate with other multipolar powers to set the agenda and create conditions favorable for US interests. For example, the US is unable to obtain a trade agreement without the cooperation of the nations in the World Trade

Organization; and Jack Welch could not merge General Electric and Honeywell without the approval of the European Union Commission.²⁵ In the bottom transnational dimension, power is distributed in a chaotic fashion, requiring a focus on global issues ranging from international money laundering, border crossings, and drug trafficking to global terrorism and world poverty. This dimension requires the greatest amount of soft power and also offers the greatest risk to America and the International community.

US Power Distribution in the Three-Dimensional Model

Dimension	Power Distribution	Primary Power Resource	Secondary Power Resource	Remarks
Military	Unipolar	Hard Power	Soft Power	SP – Public diplomacy; IO campaigns
Economic	Multipolar	Hard Power (-)	Soft Power (-)	SP – Agenda setting; consensus building
Transnational	State and non-state actors	Soft Power	Hard Power	HP - Threat of coercion; use of resources to support SP initiatives

TABLE 1

Table 1 further demonstrates how HP and SP are distributed for the United States at each level of the three-dimensional model. HP attributes are most widespread throughout the military domain. Although these attributes are still required within the economic domain, they are less dominating because of the balancing effect caused by the emergence of other economic powers. HP attributes are even less dominant at the transnational level, simply become complementary attributes. The use of military resources to support humanitarian efforts in response to the recent tsunami in Asia is an excellent example of this complementary relationship between SP and HP. Conversely, SP attributes are most enduring at the transnational level, but decrease in authority within the economic domain. Within the military domain, SP is more likely to be used in a complementary role such as in support of an information operation campaign that capitalizes on American SP attraction.

HARD POWER ADVOCACY

HP supporters argue that America should use its unipolar and hegemonic power to promulgate an ideology which creates conditions in the international community that favor America's national interest. Furthermore, HP advocates argue that weakness invites the provocation of weaker nation states to manipulate the strategic environment.²⁶ Secretary of

State, Condoleezza Rice, for instance, has written that, “power matters, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of others to exercise it”.²⁷ Other advocates also argue that America’s domination of military and economic power (e.g. HP) allows it to set conditions in all dimensions within the three-dimensional model despite the grumblings and misgivings of our allies. After all, Robert Kagen points out in this regard, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.²⁸ Finally, these advocates also believe that America has a moral responsibility to promote its values because they have universal appeal and that America should not allow itself to be constrained by multilateral agreements or international institutions.²⁹

HP champions emphasize that America should use its HP resources at the military and economic dimension of the three-dimensional model to prevent the re-emergence of a new HP rival. Specifically, there are three objectives in achieving American domination. First, the United States must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their national interest. Second, in non-defense areas the United States must account for the interests of advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging America’s leadership or seek to overthrow established political and economic order. Finally, the United States must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from aspiring to larger regional or global roles.³⁰ Furthermore, HP advocates generally believe that American should “push down” solutions as a means to solving world problems because the international community, particularly Europe, does not share the same board view for how the world should be governed, the role of international institutions and international law, the balance between the use of force and the use of diplomacy in international affairs.³¹

As the three-dimensional model illustrates there are potential policy implications when HP is used to buttress a foreign policy strategy targeted at the transnational dimension. As witnessed by the ongoing events in the Middle East, there must also be an attraction component of America’s foreign policy strategy. HP assets, such as the military, are very costly when used over an extended period of time and could unknowingly create conditions that undermine SP attraction – just the opposite of the symbiotic effect both elements can produce. Current Department of Defense (DOD) estimates are that the annual cost of OIF is in the order of \$160-320 billion and by 2010 the total cost could reach approximately \$1-3 trillion.³²

However, the weakness in this argument, particularly with respect to the three-dimensional model, is that it negates a critical component of power distribution at the

transnational dimension – co-option by way of attraction. It also minimizes the impact of the new strategic environment and its ability to undermine such a policy if it is viewed to be US interest centric and not reflective of world views and opinions. As the National Intelligence Council report indicates, there is already the beginning of a paradigm shift at the economic dimension of the three-dimensional model. In addition, the growing dependencies for resources such as petroleum and natural gas, will force nations to make access to these resources a strategic and vital interest. This will inevitably come in conflict with core HP arguments.³³

SOFT POWER ADVOCACY

The strongest argument made by SP supporters is that America's attraction in the world is based on the perception of legitimacy and credibility of US policies at home and abroad. Although America reserves the right to use preemption as an underpinning to the war on terrorism, the credibility and legitimacy of this policy was severely undermined by the lack of WMD discovery in Iraq, which has caused major concern throughout the international community. The consequence of such policies results in America's being increasingly seen as an outlier – invoking international law when convenient, and ignoring it when not; using international institutions when they work to its advantage, and disdaining them when they pose obstacles to U.S. designs.³⁴

SP advocates argue that the global element of terrorism necessitates a global solution - not a unilateral solution. The consequence of American unilateralism is that it could undermine the ability to “win the hearts and minds” and thereby decrease America's attraction power (SP). Unilateralism further risks isolating America as it prosecutes a global campaign on terrorism while the rest of the world observes from the sidelines.

SP sponsors argue that America's conventional military superpower status does not give it transparency at the transnational dimension where power is distributed in a chaotic fashion and where military problems are increasingly seen as asymmetric. The concepts of common security, shared prosperity and global governance are undermined when America implements a one dimensional resolution that relies almost exclusively on US military coercion resources. This type of solution can expose America's economic weaknesses and undercut the international institutions of global governance needed to govern an increasingly complex world economy.³⁵ SP advocates argue that the world's greatest threats and opportunities are increasingly integrated and transnational and will increasingly require integrated responses that transcend the boundaries of national sovereignty.³⁶ At the transnational dimension, individual terrorist and

groups are able to operate as virtual cells. Aided by the low cost of information technology, these cells can be established anywhere in the world.

America's attraction power (SP) within the three-dimensional model is significantly prejudiced by how others view America's attraction attributes such as culture, political values and foreign policy. Therefore, when a negative event occurs in the strategic environment that affects the military dimension such as Abu Grraib or the transnational dimension such as the US condemnation of the Kyoto Accord, the value of America's SP attraction attributes decline. The reduction of SP and thereby overall power as a consequence of a one-dimensional HP strategy is the paradox of power distribution within the three-dimensional model.

When the world is attracted to America it gives America increased persuasion power, particularly at the transnational dimension. This unique persuasive attribute enables America to expand its influences without the expenditure of more costly military and economic power resources. By formulating a balanced HP and SP strategy the United States is less exposed to vulnerabilities in the new strategic environment that can be exploited at the geo-political level.

The major limitation of the SP argument is that soft power as a resource can not be controlled by the government and is difficult to measure. Additionally, the co-option attribute of SP requires that the recipient undergo a cognitive shift in their behavior. To achieve this shift usually requires a sustained effort over an extended period. When an unfavorable event occurs in the strategic environment that is associated with American values, culture and or policies, however, then the value of America's SP attraction dwindles and can take a considerable amount of time, if ever, before SP can once again be a source of co-option and ultimately acquiescence. This predicament is further complicated by the proliferation of information technology and the deliberate manipulation of ideas and images in cyberspace to support information operation campaigns aimed at undermining America's influence.

WAY AHEAD

The United States must take actions based on the philosophy inherent in the three-dimensional chess board to improve its policy formulation in this new and dynamic strategic environment. First, America must do more to develop multidimensional policy makers who understand the relationship of systems and entities within the new strategic environment and who are capable of conflating both HP and SP attributes into a coherent foreign policy strategy. As discussed in this study, there are dire consequences when one-dimensional policy makers manipulate the policy formulation process to orchestrate a strategy that is not reflective of the

changing dynamics associated with the complexity, interdependences and multidimensional aspects of the new strategic environment.

Second, the US should strive to achieve the perception of legitimacy and credibility in its foreign policy. This perception is essential for SP to have any measurable effect. “Those who seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it”, one critic points out, “and those who invoke international law must themselves submit to it”.³⁷ If America’s public diplomacy is to be attractive, it must be able to pass a litmus test of legitimacy and credibility. This litmus test is measured not only by the support of an American audience, but that of the international community which has generally viewed the US in the past as a key contributor to international governance.

Third, in order to truly have a balanced HP and SP strategy, it is imperative that the actors in the interagency process understand the dynamics of the power distribution in the three-dimensional model. As illustrated in table 1, power attributes change within each dimension of the three-dimensional model. From this perspective, the interagency process needs to focus on defining desirable endstates and the means required to achieve and sustain those desired endstates. Furthermore, the interagency actors should consider the consequences of public diplomacy erosion prior to the commitment of HP resources. One solution is for the US government to reallocate sufficient funds and resources to the DoS to improve performance of critical public diplomacy roles and functions, a crucial aspect to effective use of soft power. In this manner, the DoS can develop regional analysts that understand the dynamics of power distribution in a fluid multidimensional environment. Equally important, the DoS can use the new resources to explore the possibility of collaborating with US businesses to share non proprietary research polling data that can be used to support the formulation of foreign policy strategy. The three-dimensional model demonstrates that when a predominately one dimensional military approach becomes the face of US foreign policy in a multidimensional environment, the potential consequences are ends-means mismatch, the loss of attraction at the transnational dimension, and the expenditure of more costly hard power resources.

Lastly, as the three-dimensional chessboard demonstrates, US policy makers must recognize that in the economic and transnational dimension the US is not a unipolar power and must collaborate with the international community in order to achieve international governance and norms and victory in the war of ideas as well as a more effective application of strategic ends, ways and means. America’s ability to influence agenda setting is enhanced when US policies are perceived as attractive and credible. As a military hegemon, if the US communicates to the international community an ideology that is pretentious, condescending,

bellicose and reflective only of internal self-interest, no amount of American soft power will prevent the further decline of US attraction.

CONCLUSION

How America adopts its foreign policy will have a profound impact on the expenditure of HP and SP resources. When America's policies are seen in a negative light, they risk a backlash in world opinion. The result can be the depletion of SP attraction and the concomitant in the long-term erosion of America's ability to influence the international community. Conversely, if America's policies are attractive, they can become a vehicle to co-opt behavior in order to achieve desirable policy outcomes with less expenditure of costly HP resources.

Adopting a one-dimensional strategy in a multidimensional environment is shortsighted as well as costly and will continue to place increased stress on the military and further exacerbate the current deficit. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have stretched DOD to the point that decisive military operations against an adversary like North Korea and Iran are increasingly unlikely. At the same time, constrained funds and program slashing to achieve deficit reduction goals hinder America's ability to completely resource many global goodwill initiatives within the transnational dimension that could facilitate an increase in SP attraction.

As demonstrated in the three-dimensional model, the transnational dimension has a chaotic distribution of power and needs the leadership and resources of the United States to support the international community in establishing acceptable levels of governance. The recent tsunami that struck Asia was a clear example of America's enormous capacity and compassion. It is this compassion and willingness to tackle global issues such as world poverty, illiteracy, hunger, diseases and human rights that have made America a role model for the rest of the world. But the enormity of these problems means that without international commitment, cooperation, and resources, many of America's transnational goals will be difficult to attain. Even worst, the voids left by American inaction may be filled by other emerging powers within the international community in an effort to reduce US attraction power in order to contain America's ability to dictate agenda setting terms for the international community.

WORD COUNT=5487

ENDNOTES

¹ Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Penguin Group, 1991), 322.

² Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004), 8. Nye's spectrum of power demonstrates the spectrum of behavior and the resources associated at achieving desirable behavioral outcomes. When a country suffers economic and military decline it's likely to lose not only hard power resources, but also the ability to shape the international agenda and some of its attractiveness.

³ Colin Powell, "No Country Left Behind," *Foreign Policy*, no. 146 (January/February 2005): 31.

⁴ Nye, 9.

⁵ Gary Hart, *The Fourth Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 6-7.

⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 112.

⁷ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (September/October 1998). In 1965 Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, noted that the number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated circuit was invented. Moore predicted that this trend would continue for the foreseeable future. In subsequent years, the pace slowed down a bit, but data density has doubled approximately every 18 months, and this is the current definition of Moore's Law, which Moore himself has blessed. Most experts, including Moore himself, expect Moore's Law to hold for at least another two decades.

⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy* (New York: U.S. Office of Publications, 2003), 18 and Clyde Prestowitz, *Rogue Nation* (New York: Perseus Book Group, 2003), 16.

⁹ U.S. Department of State, *USAID Strategic Plan: Fiscal Year 2004-2009*, available from <<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23506.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2004.

¹⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, 8.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 10.

¹² Energy Information Administration, "World Petroleum Consumption, 1990-1999," available from <<http://www.strata.geol.sc.edu/petroleum/world-pet-consump-90-99.html>>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2005.

¹³ National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project* (Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2004), 12.

¹⁴ Sherle Schweeninger, "Revamping American Grand Strategy," *World Policy Journal* 20 (Fall 2003): 36.

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996), 208.

¹⁶ David Rothkop, "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism? Effects of Globalization of Culture," *Foreign Policy* (22 June 1997); available from <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/globcult.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2004.

¹⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 113.

¹⁸ Rothkop.

¹⁹ Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 12.

²⁰ Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 13.

²¹ NBC News' Meet the Press, "Transcript from Interview with General John Abizaid," 26 September 2004; available from <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6106292.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2004.

²² Conference on "Winning the Hearts and Minds: Information Warfare in the Global War on Terror," speakers BG Vincent Brooks and Robert Kaplan, the *Atlantic Monthly*, C-SPAN, 8 December 2004. The discussion was a subset to a larger theme titled "Winning the Hearts and Minds: Information Warfare in the Global War of Terror."

²³ Liddel Hart, 353.

²⁴ Nye, 136-137.

²⁵ Joseph Nye, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in Global Politics," Los Angeles World Affair Council, 8 April 2004; available from <<http://www.lawac.org/speech/Nye%202004.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2005.

²⁶ Davis Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil* (New York: Random House, 2003), 16.

²⁷ Condoleeza Rice, "Campaign 2000," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000); available from <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org.2000101faessay5/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promotingthenationalinterest.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2005.

²⁸ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Random House, 2003), 1.

²⁹ Rice.

³⁰ Paul Wolfowitz, "Excerpts from 1992 Draft *Defense Planning Guidance*," *Frontline*; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>; accessed 22 January 2005.

³¹ Kagan, 37.

³² Larry Goodson, "The Persian Gulf after Operation Iraqi Freedom," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 28 February 2005.

³³ *Mapping the Global Future*, 10-12.

³⁴ Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson,, "Iraq and U.S. Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83 (November/December 2004), 32.

³⁵ Schweeninger, 38.

³⁶ Hart, 60-61.

³⁷ Dan Fromkin, "Bush Speech: Resolute or Clueless," *Washington Post*, 22 September 2004; available from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/adminstration/whbriefing.html>>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2004.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Conference on "Winning the Hearts and Minds: Information Warfare in the Global War on Terror," speakers BG Vincent Brooks and Robert Kaplan, the *Atlantic Monthly*, C-SPAN, 8 December 2004.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. *Post Conflict Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 May 2004.
- Council on Foreign Relations. *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy*. New York: U.S. Office of Publications, 2003.
- Energy Information Administration. "World Petroleum Consumption, 1990-1999." Available from <<http://www.strata.geol.sc.edu/petroleum/world-pet-consump-90-99.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2005.
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Anchor Books, 2000.
- Froomkin, Dan. "Bush Speech: Resolute or Clueless," *Washington Post*. 22 September 2004. Available from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/administration/whbriefing.html>>. Internet. Accessed 22 September 2004.
- Frum, David, and Richard Perle. *An End to Evil*. New York: Random House, 2003.
- Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Kehane. *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Goodson, Larry. "The Persian Gulf after Operation Iraqi Freedom." Briefing slides. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 28 February 2005.
- Hart, Gary. *The Fourth Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Hart, Liddell B. *Strategy*. New York: Penguin Group, 1991.
- Hunt, Michael. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone Books, 1996.
- Kagan, Robert. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York: US. Random House, 2003.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York: Modern Library, 2003.
- National Intelligence Council. *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project*. Pittsburgh, PA.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2004.

- NBC News' Meet the Press. "Transcript from Interview with General John Abizaid." 26 September 2004. Available from <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6106292.html>>. Internet. Accessed 1 October 2004.
- Nye, Joseph, and Robert Keohane. "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age." *Foreign Affairs* 77 (September/October 1998).
- Nye, Joseph. "Soft Power: The Means to Success in Global Politics." Los Angeles World Affairs Council. 8 April 2004. Available from <<http://www.lawac.org/speech/Nye%202004.html>>. Internet. Accessed 15 January 2005.
- _____. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004.
- Powell, Colin. "No Country Left Behind." *Foreign Policy*, no. 146 (January/February 2005): 31.
- Rice, Condoleezza. "Campaign 2000." *Foreign Affairs*. January/February 2000. Available from <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org.2000101faessay5/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promotingthenationalinterest.html>>. Internet. Accessed 17 January 2005.
- Rothkopf, David. "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism? Effects of Globalization of Culture." *Foreign Policy*. 22 June 1997. Available from <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/globcult.html>>. Internet. Accessed 23 December 2004.
- Schweenninger, Sherle. "Revamping American Grand Strategy." *World Policy Journal* 20 (Fall 2003): 25-44.
- Tucker, Robert, and David Hendrickson. "Iraq and U.S. Legitimacy." *Foreign Affairs* 83 (November/December 2004): 18-32.
- U.S. Department of State, *USAID Strategic Plan: Fiscal Year 2004-2009*. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23506.html>>. Internet. Accessed 23 September 2004.
- Wolfowitz, Paul. "Excerpts from 1992 Draft *Defense Planning Guidance*." *Frontline*. Available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>>. Internet. Accessed 22 January 2005.