

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MORAL POWER AND A HEARTS-AND-MINDS  
STRATEGY IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

by

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## ABSTRACT

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Cases of post-conflict operations provide insights into the role soldiers' behavior played in the success or failure of that operation. Patterns emerge which show that the thoughts and conduct of soldiers directly relate to the positive progress (or deterioration) of the operation. Sources of soldiers' thoughts and conduct come from values inculcated from and by society, culture, education and training. Another factor of positive progress exists in the mutual respect and rapport between soldiers and the local populace. This social-cultural dimension in post-conflict operations points to the existence of a new element of national power, called moral power. This element can be incorporated into policy and strategy formulation.

This paper reviews post-conflict operations in Japan, West Germany, and South Korea at the end of the Second World War and elsewhere. It focuses on the conduct of soldiers and the resulting rapport that existed with the populace. It looks at the factors characterizing relationships established between soldiers and populace and traces the importance that winning hearts and minds has with the successful outcome of post-conflict operations. Following the analysis of historical post-conflict operations cases, this paper provides recommendations for soldiers, military leaders, policymakers and strategy formulators to positively influence the outcome of present and future post-conflict operations.



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## MORAL POWER AND A HEARTS-AND-MINDS STRATEGY IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Human skills may change as technology and warfare demand greater versatility. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is the Soldier who must exploit these tools to accomplish his mission. The Soldier will remain the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter.<sup>1</sup>

- United States Army Posture Statement, 6 February 2005

Boots on the ground matter during post-conflict operations.<sup>2</sup> However, the conduct of the individuals wearing those boots matter the most. Post-conflict operations in Japan, West Germany, South Korea, and elsewhere reveal a pattern: soldiers' thoughts and conduct directly relate to the positive progress (or deterioration) of the operation. The sources of thoughts and conduct of soldiers come predominantly from the values inculcated from and by society, culture, education and training. Another important factor of positive progress lies in the degree of mutual social and cultural respect and rapport between soldiers and the local populace. There may be other socio-cultural dimensions that remain, but winning hearts and minds not only matters, but is the most critical factor for the successful outcome of post-conflict operations. The importance of this social-cultural dimension in post-conflict military operations is that it points to the existence of a new element of national power, moral power, which the United States military should incorporate into its policy and strategy formulation.

### **MORAL POWER**

Various scholars have viewed moral power as a significant contributor in military and political endeavors throughout history. Clausewitz expounded on the virtues of moral factors on the battlefield in *On War*. He noted that moral qualities of an army can influence the situation and objective in myriad ways.<sup>3</sup> One must not underestimate the potential of moral elements, including "the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit."<sup>4</sup> Non-physical in nature, moral elements possess no numerical value, but they are crucial in any consideration of an army's real strength.<sup>5</sup> One recent commentator has underlined the importance of moral power in *Foreign Policy*. He argues that vital dimensions of power include not only material resources, but also faith and psychological factors.<sup>6</sup> As material resources become more dispersed, they become less of a power determinant.<sup>7</sup> Highlighting the Pope's influence to speed communism's downfall, he argued that one should not underestimate the enduring power of ideology and religion. A political entity's legitimacy, judged by its own individual members, and its credibility, determined by others, represent the most crucial elements of power.<sup>8</sup> These elements determine the ability to project power.<sup>9</sup>

Moral factors give organizations stamina and influence morale.<sup>10</sup> Believing in themselves, occupying forces can build their credibility by performing actions endearing to the occupied populace. By their behavior, forces to a large extent control and influence the degree that hearts and minds are won. Winning hearts and minds gives the occupiers credibility, even more strength, and eventual achievement of their objectives.<sup>11</sup> "Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age."<sup>12</sup>

Moral power differs from soft power. Moral power is an active, or at least, a semi-active form of power. Moral power has more of an edge than soft power. An entity can choose the degree of moral power it wishes to apply in various situations. It can adjust this degree depending on current assessments. For instance, an occupation force, a strategizing entity, determines its power application processes. Soldiers, components of this force, actively pursue some end state. Contrasting with soft power, the entity does not maintain the same level of control. Soft power is a passive form of power and its influence cannot be easily controlled. The United States cannot control the amount of goodwill generated overseas through proliferation of its commercial products, such as popular sodas, fast foods, clothing, and miniaturized entertainment accessories.<sup>13</sup> Soft power co-opts rather than coerces people.<sup>14</sup> Soft power finds its sources of strength in institutions, values, cultures and policies.<sup>15</sup> An occupying force finds its sources in the conduct, behavior and actions of its people. They coordinate efforts to harness good moral power. Otherwise, they fail to coordinate and lose the capability to apply moral power in a positive manner.

National power, strong or weak, derives its existence through many, if not limitless sources. Many commonly define the elements of national power through the use of the DIME model, representing diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements. Others have utilized the MIDLIFE model, delineating the elements as military, information, diplomatic, legal, intelligence, finance and economic. Although these elements encompass many facets of national power, they still limit the scope encompassing national power. One major element missing in either model is the moral element.

### **SOLDIERS MAKE THE DIFFERENCE**

In general it is believed that the reasons for the change in the feeling of the inhabitants are to be found in the actions of the American troops of occupation. Many of the matters complained of are inseparable from an occupation, but many are entirely separable therefrom. It is the latter that must be corrected, not because of what the Germans may think of us but because of our own self respect and of the good name of our country.<sup>16</sup>

- G-2 Conclusion on American Representation for Occupied Germany, 1920-1921

Soldiers' behavior, constantly scrutinized by an occupied populace, can influence either the success or failure of post-conflict operations. Representing the occupying power, troops comply with directives governing their mission and perform actions in accordance with the civil-military. Conduct of troops is important because even though major operations are over, victory remains illusive without follow-up; tending to the defeated populace's state of being is vital.<sup>17</sup> The occupiers must factor in the "fears, interests and, not least, the honor of the defeated peoples."<sup>18</sup> They must treat the defeated with respect.<sup>19</sup> Although "decisive" combat power may win the fighting phase, it is usually not enough to secure the strategic objectives and win the peace.<sup>20</sup> Success depends on the transformation from combat to peace and stability. To achieve this result, "an occupying power must win the hearts and minds of the occupied population. Hearts and minds can be won with both coercive strategies, such as arresting citizens loyal to the pre-occupied regime, and cooperative strategies, such as promises of aid."<sup>21</sup> Troops are usually the first on the scene to carry out efforts related to economic and psychological recovery. Troops reassure, comfort and persuade. They develop confidence, trust, deterrence and overall regional stability.<sup>22</sup> They are the military instrument that generates lasting change.<sup>23</sup>

The people wearing the occupation forces' boots make up a vital part of the army. "The army is people."<sup>24</sup> Similar values, selfless service, sacrifices and experiences bond the army and create a unique culture.<sup>25</sup> In this culture soldiers are rigorously trained, disciplined and empowered with vital responsibilities for lives.<sup>26</sup> Properly trained, soldiers develop strong loyalties, pride and self-confidence.<sup>27</sup> They also gain a "sense of superiority" over civilians.<sup>28</sup> Fulfilling one of its core competencies, the army shapes the security environment through its presence.<sup>29</sup> Pertaining to occupation duty in Okinawa, Lt Gen Ferdinand Unger praised American ambassador to Japan Alex Johnson saying "he understood the important role that the military played in the conduct of our country's international relations around the world. He understood power and the feelings of foreign peoples toward power."<sup>30</sup> With other services, soldiers conducting post-conflict operations influence events both in theater and at the international level.<sup>31</sup>

Post-conflict operations can be defined as actions derived from all elements of national power that resolve issues, support civil authorities, strengthen infrastructures, rebuild institutions, promote peace and deter war.<sup>32</sup> The range of military activities in these operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, shows of force, raids, strikes, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation operations, nation assistance, counterinsurgency, freedom of navigation, counterdrug, humanitarian assistance, protection of shipping and civil support.<sup>33</sup>

Post-conflict activities are designed to transition dominant control back to civilians.<sup>34</sup> When post-conflict operations take the form of an occupation, they have several objectives. These objectives include stabilizing the occupied land.<sup>35</sup>

A historical study of post-conflict operations can provide insight into factors fundamentally related to their success or failure. This paper will review various historical post-conflict operations to discern the role moral power, as expressed through the thoughts and conduct of soldiers and the mutual respect and rapport that existed with the local populace, played in the success or failure of that operation. Identifying moral power's role, I will suggest ways which could ultimately influence the course of events either positively or negatively. Elucidating the existence, the employment, and the role of moral power in the outcome of post-conflict operations will also suggest specific ways to mobilize moral power for current and future post-conflict operations.

### **CASES OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS**

Our policy here must for every reason of justice and righteousness be founded on scrupulously correct conduct towards all inhabitants of the Occupied Territory.<sup>36</sup>

- Commanding General's Policy for Occupied Germany, 1920-1921

Having studied 24 separate occupations, David M. Edelstein determined that the longer military occupations last the more likely that they will be successful.<sup>37</sup> The longer an occupation lasts, the more probable "impatience" will set in and risk its success.<sup>38</sup> Reducing risk and elevating the likelihood of success is done by breaking down the resistance of the occupied people in three ways: ensure they understand the need for the occupation, ensure they realize that threats exist from which the occupying force can protect it, and offer credible assurances that the occupier will ultimately withdraw and hand back sovereignty.<sup>39</sup> Troops leverage a nation's strength in a powerful manner. Troops' presence in an occupying role facilitates active control over the population's social, political and economic structures more so than any other instrument of national power.<sup>40</sup> Positive first steps for troops are to behave in ways to establish law and order, supply basic requirements, and avoid abuses against the populace.<sup>41</sup>

The behavior of Americans occupying Germany in 1918 created both positive and negative impressions. Kindly-mannered American troops were disciplined in their behavior and dressed sharply to endear the curious Germans to their cause.<sup>42</sup> The Germans also liked the respectful way that American officers treated their enlisted troops.<sup>43</sup> Simply marching in formation, "clean-cut" troops impressed the occupied residents.<sup>44</sup> Germans appreciated newly

arriving soldiers that extended a sign of friendship by distributing chocolate to children. Germans also admired the troops' firm but fair policies.<sup>45</sup> Strictly enforcing regulations, Americans provided a secure environment which comforted the occupied people.<sup>46</sup> This civil stabilization improved relations by enhancing German feelings of friendship and respect.<sup>47</sup> Alternatively, American troops received adverse reactions when they acted immorally or drunkenly, requisitioned excessive billets, and failed to provide needed food in a timely manner.<sup>48</sup> Perceived to have been afforded overly comfortable billeting and entertainment arrangements, soldiers unintentionally grew resentment among the defeated and deprived Germans.<sup>49</sup> Many Germans felt overcrowded in the Rhineland and distressed in their daily affairs during the occupation.<sup>50</sup> Overall, American soldiers created more trust and cooperation when they behaved and meant well.

Second World War era occupations also indicate ways in which building rapport with the occupied people hinder or facilitate the soldiers' mission. This rapport, coupled with soldiers' conduct, relate to the success or failure of the post-conflict operation.

#### OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (28 AUGUST 1945 – 28 APRIL 1952)

Post-conflict operations by American troops in Japan have been hailed as successful.<sup>51</sup> The United States gained credibility and legitimacy during the occupation. Its troops and other agencies eliminated a resurgence of Japanese militarism and reconstructed political, economic and social structures.<sup>52</sup> A "bitterly hostile foe" was turned into a "polite and amazingly cooperative friend."<sup>53</sup> Fear of the Americans turned into dependency, dependency turned into admiration.<sup>54</sup> As a result, the United States secured Japan as an ally in the Cold War.<sup>55</sup> Troops' behavior played an instrumental role in these positive outcomes. Capably, willingly and sincerely, troops built respect, mutual understanding and cooperation amongst the Japanese.<sup>56</sup> Other factors also caused the success of the operations, including the nature of the Japanese people and the prior planning of the Americans.

Troops' behavior influenced the respect that the Japanese had for the United States. Japanese citizens formed their opinion of their occupier based on their contact with American troops.<sup>57</sup> The behavior of American troops was the single most influential factor in building a pro-American sentiment.<sup>58</sup> Recognizing the strategic implications of troop behavior, the United States educated its soldiers on the importance of conduct. It supplied occupation forces with a pocket guide which specified "your actions, your conduct, both as a member of the Armed Forces, and as an individual, will be the yardstick by which they judge the U.S."<sup>59</sup> It further noted "your individual contacts will mean more in shaping their ideas about America and

democracy than all the speeches of our statesmen or all the directives put out by the HQ. You are the salesman of democracy."<sup>60</sup> Troops acted with confidence, inculcated with a military culture devoid of defeat.<sup>61</sup>

Chivalrous, generous and naturally friendly, American troops created favorable impressions<sup>62</sup> and immediately dispelled the myth bred by Japanese leaders that Americans were "monsters"<sup>63</sup> and "savages."<sup>64</sup> Soldiers treated the "exhausted," "bewildered" and "suspicious" Japanese<sup>65</sup> more leniently than they had envisioned.<sup>66</sup> They facilitated communications between the occupied and occupiers which mitigated "distrust, ignorance and non-cooperation."<sup>67</sup> Soldiers' friendliness brought the Japanese out from hiding.<sup>68</sup> Handing out candy and gum, they turned many youngsters into enthusiastic supporters.<sup>69</sup> Cigarette offering soldiers pleased their recipients.<sup>70</sup> Cheerful American soldiers comforted Japanese adults and children alike<sup>71</sup> and gave them "warm feelings of affection and gratitude."<sup>72</sup> Strikingly different than typical Japanese whose etiquette demanded courtesy to those of higher status, soldiers assisted citizens without prejudice. For example, soldiers helped them get on and off streetcars and reverently gave up seats to women or elders.<sup>73</sup> These acts broke language, cultural and social barriers. When bad conduct or invasion behavior occurred, commanding officers brought troops under control by administering penalties to guilty soldiers.<sup>74</sup> Keen soldiers providing security and food helped create a radically uncharacteristic friendliness that the Japanese extended.<sup>75</sup> Women soldiers served as secretaries, drivers, wireless operators, intelligence operatives, engineers, nurses, doctors, hospital administrators and logistics specialists.<sup>76</sup> Other women served in the civil education branch of local military government teams, teaching Japanese women about their rights under the new societal construct and encouraging them to use their democratic freedoms.<sup>77</sup>

American occupation forces relieved internal aggression built up amongst the Japanese; their mere presence equated to essential security, stability and authority.<sup>78</sup> Aggression formed because the Japanese leadership could not provide enough food and it failed to protect its people from either the constant threat of bombardment or actual aerial bombardment.<sup>79</sup> Vital rice imports had fallen by 50 percent in 1943, 70 percent in 1944 and 100 percent by 1945.<sup>80</sup> A black market provided food opportunities only a few rich could afford.<sup>81</sup> A population increase of over 5,000,000, loss of former food source providers including Korea, Formosa and Manchuria, loss of storage facilities, lack of fertilizer, and transportation breakdowns compounded food shortages.<sup>82</sup> Troops closed the sustenance gap between starvation and survival.<sup>83</sup> As America's relative strength during the war became apparent, the Japanese questioned their national leadership's "sincerity and sanity" for having gotten them involved in a war with such a

powerful foe.<sup>84</sup> Failing to prepare their people for the possibility of defeat, Japan's military leaders caused widespread resentment among its population.<sup>85</sup> Once the occupiers took over, fear from bombardment vanished along with any corresponding hatred.<sup>86</sup> Without troops to build a viable economy, violence and political collapse was imminent.<sup>87</sup> Troops provided necessary political stability during periods when the Japanese underwent "complete mental reconstruction," "psychological demilitarization" and "psychological rehabilitation."<sup>88</sup> With substantial strength, troops' mere presence negated coordinated drives of Japanese radicals or Russian revolutionaries.<sup>89</sup> Uniformly, the Japanese accepted the Americans.<sup>90</sup> In fact, 75 percent of the Japanese residents surveyed from November 1945 to December 1945 during the United States Strategic Bombing Survey felt satisfied with the American occupation.<sup>91</sup>

Leading the occupation, General MacArthur desired and usually received cooperation from Japanese officials. The Japanese respected him almost as much as they did the emperor, partly due to his tactful methods and humane treatment.<sup>92</sup> Reform-minded Japanese welcomed new projects the democracy-building military government began.<sup>93</sup> "Orderly" and "compliant" dispositions characterized the majority of Japanese.<sup>94</sup> Although the Japanese found rapid issuances of military government directives confusing and misaligned, they generally carried them out with a cooperative effort.<sup>95</sup> Collaboration became the norm during the occupation.<sup>96</sup> Military soldiers refrained from beginning corrective action on their own accord if they discovered Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers' (SCAP) policies being circumvented by the Japanese.<sup>97</sup> A Japanese official did not appreciate the way reformers used mass media to broadcast important directives. He felt that occupation officials "were prone to ignore the feelings, history, and tradition that influenced equally well-intentioned Japanese officials."<sup>98</sup> Regardless, the Japanese received the democratization processes, such as demilitarization, freedom for women, land ownership reform, freedom of the press, liberalization of education, and encouragement of trade unions well.<sup>99</sup> Less well received actions which the Japanese accepted with skepticism included "decentralization of political and economic controls" and elimination of ethics from school texts.<sup>100</sup> Americans aimed to defeat nationalist movements with these efforts.<sup>101</sup> MacArthur kept the military instrument or "Yankee bayonets" always ready to enforce his demands.<sup>102</sup> Military presence ensured progress even though "military government personnel in the field frequently exceeded their mandate, intervening directly in local affairs."<sup>103</sup> For instance, in October 1946 soldiers forcibly made sure a settlement between union workers and management at Toshiba Electric Corporation was quickly resolved. They "locked out all but a handful of negotiators until a settlement was reached."<sup>104</sup> In January 1947 United States soldiers displayed their machine guns at a labor rally to "dissuade local miners

from striking” and to preempt continuance of their grievances against management.<sup>105</sup> Issuance of the “MacArthur Letter,” depriving Japanese government servants the right to strike, caused sympathetic university students to revolt against “Americanization and colonization of Japanese education.”<sup>106</sup> The military government guarded against lengthy occupations which by their nature “elicit nationalist reactions that impede success.”<sup>107</sup>

Japanese people reacted differently to others depending on the race, nationality, gender and amount of money one had to spend. African American soldiers experienced extreme morale problems and related better to the defeated Japanese than their white counterparts. Until General Matthew B. Ridgeway took over the occupation and implemented Presidential Directive Executive Order 998, which established equality for all troops without regards of race, color, religion or national origin, commanders segregated them.<sup>108</sup> The Japanese even found the Indians, part of the British and Indian troops Japan more congenial than their fellow Caucasians. The Indians exhibited more sympathetic behavior towards the Japanese<sup>109</sup> and friendships developed more readily. “The Gurkhas proved popular with Japanese women.”<sup>110</sup> The greater the custom or racial difference, the less enticing the relationship to the Japanese.<sup>111</sup> Japanese openly solicited soldiers who had money to spend.<sup>112</sup> Also, considerable attitude differences existed among four Japanese groups, namely peasant farmers and fishermen, organized labor, industrialists and intellectuals.<sup>113</sup> For instance, the intellectuals negatively reacted when “punishment of acts prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation” was not enforced by the Americans or when SCAP policy, perceived to be inconsistent or high-handed, was put into effect.<sup>114</sup> Superior American troops created a “sense of oppression in minds of Japanese.”<sup>115</sup> This sense was felt strongest in the intellectuals, scholars and students and weakest in the farmers and small business owners.<sup>116</sup> Interfering with Japanese traditions agitated the populace. Taking away land to expand the Tachikawa airfield for the military occupiers destroyed the ability for farmers to grow crops and hand down this land to future generations.<sup>117</sup> This expansion did make some Japanese happy, as it created new jobs.<sup>118</sup>

Other factors made post-conflict operations successful, including the nature of the Japanese. The Potsdam terms required the Japanese government to comply with the occupiers.<sup>119</sup> “Intelligent,” “industrious,”<sup>120</sup> “literate” and “resilient” characterized the Japanese.<sup>121</sup> They worked well in teams and lived in closely-knit families.<sup>122</sup> They revered the Emperor, their spiritual leader. Still in “power” under post-conflict rules, he ordered his people to cooperate.<sup>123</sup> He told them to “work to regain the trust and faith of the world; to contribute to world civilization through the establishment of a peaceful Japan.”<sup>124</sup>

Another factor related to the success of operations included the advance planning conducted by the United States. The Territorial Subcommittee operated from 1942 to 1943 and an Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East organized from 1943 to 1944.<sup>125</sup> The War Department and Navy Department established military government schools in May 1942 and January 1943, respectively. The Navy also organized the Office of Occupied Areas during this time.<sup>126</sup> In March 1943 the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) began planning for a military administration of occupied areas. By the summer of 1944, CAD had established Civil Affairs Training Schools for young military officers at Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Stanford, Michigan and Northwestern Universities. Leading authorities on Japan, like Harvard's Serge Elisséff, the first Westerner to graduate from Tokyo Imperial University, and Sir George Sansam, taught officers.<sup>127</sup> With the aim of benevolent occupation, other specialists on Japan assisted, such as Hugh Borton and Joseph C. Grew. They formed an "enlightened moderate approach" by the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee to Policy for the occupation of Japan.<sup>128</sup> Planning efforts made possible formulations of on-target guidance for soldiers' conduct by way of subsequently written rules, regulations and guides. Planning efforts resulted in a "detailed master plan for occupation tailored to Japanese precise conditions and requirements" which MacArthur just had to carry out.<sup>129</sup> Planning payoffs occurred throughout the occupation. One became evident in the first months of 1948 when the Japanese displayed more fortitude and a take charge of their future attitude concerning the reconstruction.<sup>130</sup> Amidst continuing food shortages and overpopulation, they sought loans to help themselves economically rather than relying on handouts.<sup>131</sup> By 28 April 1952, Japan had matured into the role of a stable ally of the United States, and the occupation ended.

#### OCCUPATION OF OKINAWA (7 SEPTEMBER 1945 – 15 MAY 1972)

Passive popular resistance and large costs characterized lengthy but overall successful post-conflict operations in Okinawa.<sup>132</sup> While controlling this territory for its geostrategic advantages and instituting a democracy,<sup>133</sup> the United States developed a fragile relationship with the populace. Favorable troop behavior led to mission accomplishment. Negative behavior created tension between Okinawans and the occupiers. Other factors such as the occupation forces' land acquisition program and slow progress to rebuild deteriorated Okinawan receptivity. Overall, trepid Okinawans appreciated their new freedoms secured by the Americans.

Troop conduct varied throughout post-conflict operations. Brigadier General William E. Crist, appointed Deputy Commander for the Military Government after the island's capture, set an unpopular tone stating "we have no intention of playing Santa Claus for the residents of

occupied territory."<sup>134</sup> To achieve military objectives at the least possible cost, he employed a harsh but mission oriented attitude.<sup>135</sup> Using racially charged language degrading Japanese intelligence and dependability, he won no admiration from his Japanese translators.<sup>136</sup> As a selfish leader, micromanager and souvenir hunter, he won little praise from his subordinates either.<sup>137</sup> Regardless, troops initially had "good spirits" and importantly a "clear mission," which included securing rear areas, ensuring against Japanese uprising, and developing staging areas for operations against the Japanese mainland.<sup>138</sup> They disdained Okinawans, having just completed months of intense fighting,<sup>139</sup> but showed empathy toward noncombatant women and children killed in combat.<sup>140</sup> To minimize civilian interference and maximize their own safety, troops put civilians in crowded detention centers. On occasion, muddy roads choked the troops' movement of supplies and food, and strained relations.<sup>141</sup> Troops, viewed as "overbearing," used brute force to prevent or terminate strikes.<sup>142</sup> They acted with dignity, kindness and rationality.<sup>143</sup> Atrocities occurred in Okinawa but some overstated soldier involvement.<sup>144</sup>

With the passing of time, morale amongst American troops waned affecting their relationship with the Okinawans.<sup>145</sup> Americans delayed construction of permanent buildings resulting in soldiers living in tents and huts unsuited to the typhoon prone climate.<sup>146</sup> Firm segregation policies between white and African American troops raised tensions; these tensions had a tendency to spill over onto the Okinawans.<sup>147</sup> Although American troops had an "amicable and generous nature," some troops acted against the law, drastically undermining friendships.<sup>148</sup> The Okinawans wanted fair treatment and punishments to fit the crime. "Veneer thin" friendships developed not only because of criminal behavior, but because of the perception that subsequent punishments were light, considering the crimes.<sup>149</sup> In one case, a soldier found guilty for rape received such an insubstantial sentence it enraged Okinawans. The judge in the case reasoned, ironically, that to give the American soldier a heavier sentence would strain or break the American-Okinawan friendship.<sup>150</sup> Four years after combat operations stopped in Okinawa, the populace lived in absolute poverty and burdened the American taxpayer.<sup>151</sup> The conditions for the troops did not improve much either. Occupation assignment became the worst of all duties for American soldiers. Okinawa became a "dumping ground for incompetents."<sup>152</sup> Lowered pride and professionalism degraded soldiers' influence with the Okinawans and made mission accomplishment much tougher.

Okinawans initially applauded American's efforts to free them from oppression but this optimism wore down over time "due to US Military Government style of neo-colonial rule."<sup>153</sup> Okinawans used their new freedoms guardedly, having been empowered to act constructively or immorally.<sup>154</sup> Poor and confined, Okinawans watched their society virtually evaporate with

the destruction of 90 percent of the island's buildings.<sup>155</sup> Okinawans relied on Americans for everything from food to clothing.<sup>156</sup> Many blamed not the Americans for their predicament, but blamed the Japanese leadership "allowing" foreign rule.<sup>157</sup> Americans strained their relationship with Okinawans because they took over a large percentage of prime land while restricting actions on land they allowed Okinawans to keep. In the summer of 1945, American military identified 85 percent of the island for base and airstrip development.<sup>158</sup> Land ownership, a primary Okinawan livelihood, comprised its identity and encompassed its ancestral values.<sup>159</sup> A deep hatred of the Americans evolved as they expanded their airfields and land possessions, and further restricted Okinawans from constructing buildings within a one mile radius of military billeting or dependent housing projects with greater than one hundred people.<sup>160</sup> The greatest threat to the Okinawans had to do when they tried to rid themselves of American rule by demanding reversion to Japan in 1948.<sup>161</sup> Soldiers' professionalism persevered through this troubled time and others to stabilize operations until the occupation ended 15 May 1972.

#### OCCUPATION OF WEST GERMANY (8 MAY 1945 – MAY 1952)

Success earmarked the American's occupation of West Germany. The United States secured Germany as ally against the Soviets. Troops helped reconstruct political, economic and social institutions. Some social reform barriers and the abandonment of denazification constituted some failures of the occupation.<sup>162</sup> In post-conflict activities, American troops found success acting professionally and diplomatically. Projecting a good image also mattered. Good relations stressed under the pressure of economic and social issues as time progressed.

With beneficial results, American troops showed their mettle from the start of post-conflict operations. As often as they patrolled towns with bayonets fixed,<sup>163</sup> they jogged through the same neighborhoods to get exercise.<sup>164</sup> Although many troops passionately loathed the Germans,<sup>165</sup> they behaved in a professional and reassuring manner. They judged Germans to be "thrifty", "workmanlike," "cooperative," "friendly" and "steady."<sup>166</sup> To uproot the enemy's government, troops engaged themselves with the public, especially with the youth.<sup>167</sup> Soldiers treated enemy prisoners with dignity. With guarded trust, they treated the populace fairly.<sup>168</sup> The typical American soldier acted in a "civil way."<sup>169</sup> Diplomatic soldiers generated goodwill. A soldier confidently responded to an accusation made by a young German girl that American bombs ruined her beautiful country. His remark that American planes attacked only military targets of importance enlightened the civilian and mitigated animosity.<sup>170</sup>

Recognizing that soldiers' image played an important part in the potential success of post-conflict operations, the United States Army solicited individuals of the highest caliber for their

newly established Constabulary, known as the Lightning Bolt.<sup>171</sup> It sought 38,000 men functioning as soldiers and policemen to provide general military-civil security.<sup>172</sup> The unit's task was described as the "most delicately difficult any command has had since the war's end."<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, the task demanded "definite standards of physique, education and background" and troopers trained "in a way that surpasses any previous military conditioning program."<sup>174</sup> Appearance became a major element of the Constabulary. Outfitted in a "Sam Browne Leather belt," "smooth surfaced combat boots," "olive drab blouse with matching trousers," and "golden scarf," the Constabulary man promised to be the "sharpest dressed" GI in the Army.<sup>175</sup> Projecting such a positive image boosted the army's prestige and generated "an obedient or cooperative attitude" from the German populace.<sup>176</sup>

During post-conflict operations, Germans had mixed thoughts. They guarded them carefully.<sup>177</sup> At times, they trusted the troops, as highlighted by the following story. An American company reoccupied the same town it had occupied a month earlier. Preparing for another displacement, a civilian family loaded wagons with their household goods. Upon recognizing the troops who were again going to inhabit their home, these family members "unloaded their possessions and returned them to the house. They were confident these guys would leave their house in decent condition as they had before."<sup>178</sup> Germans did not like Americans fraternizing with their population. When American troops' conduct deteriorated, German complaints and crime against troops escalated.<sup>179</sup>

As the occupation lengthened, economic and social pressures coalesced into stressed relations. Failing to reduce food shortages and to raise the standard of living soon enough, troops faced constant resentment.<sup>180</sup> Likewise, when the military government segregated waiting rooms, hotels, shops, transportation, theaters and stages, resentment spiraled.<sup>181</sup> Disrespect for American authority took the form of contemptuous sneering and open defiance to soldiers. The youth of the occupied population became the most arrogant and rebellious.<sup>182</sup> Former good relations with indigenous persons employed with the military government began to fade.<sup>183</sup> Amidst a resentful populace, troop discipline and morale waned.<sup>184</sup> A soldier felt unsuited to his mission writing "it's one big rat race" and "when they clear out the soldiers and start responsible civilians running things (American civilians) things will shape up to pattern."<sup>185</sup> He also wrote "the Army can fight a war but after that they just fool around and wait for another war."<sup>186</sup> Occupation soldiers each had their own stories to tell. Many promoted the success of post-conflict operations with their good conduct and rapport with the Germans.

## OCCUPATION OF SOUTH KOREA (8 SEPTEMBER 1945-15 AUGUST 1948)

American troops achieved a mixed outcome with both success and failure during post-conflict operations in South Korea.<sup>187</sup> Many problems confronted the troops, including demobilizing the Japanese military forces and establishing a civil government.<sup>188</sup> Massive migrations of people to and from Korea compounded these problems.<sup>189</sup> Unfavorable factors outweighed favorable factors.<sup>190</sup> After operations ended, the United States finally earned a reliable friendship with South Korea.<sup>191</sup> The Korean War solidified this alliance.<sup>192</sup> Failures included having to fight this war and having to counter the population's strong resistance to post-conflict operations in the first place.<sup>193</sup>

Due to the "primitive nature" of South Korea, troop behavior required toughness, ingenuity and patience to succeed.<sup>194</sup> Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of the Headquarters United States Army Military Government in Korea, provided sympathetic leadership to oversee the challenging occupation.<sup>195</sup> The attitudes and actions of the Koreans and their leaders reflected an educationally deficient and organizationally unprepared society.<sup>196</sup> Although untrained in technology, Koreans had an "industrious," "intelligent" and "adaptable" character.<sup>197</sup> Many were "capable" and "energetic" but lacked experience caused by decades of Japanese suppression.<sup>198</sup> The language barrier and lack of interpreters caused intense strain between the Americans and Koreans.<sup>199</sup> Koreans considered the use of Japanese interpreters "extremely distasteful," further increasing tensions.<sup>200</sup> Morale issues resulted in an investigation into troop conditions in South Korea in early 1947.<sup>201</sup> A survey team conducted 169 visits to 84 different locations and attributed low morale to high turnover rates, inexperienced soldiers, flawed basic training, leadership quality, land conditions and poor climate.<sup>202</sup> By March 1948, lengthy tours of duty caused some soldiers to consider the occupation as hopeless.<sup>203</sup> These soldiers disrespected Koreans, stereotyping them as "stupid, lazy, dishonest, or completely disinterested."<sup>204</sup> In contrast, follow-on troops brought optimism to the occupation, feeling that Koreans possessed helpful skills and were honest.<sup>205</sup>

Political, economic, social and cultural factors strained behaviors of both the occupied people and the occupiers. Newly acquired freedoms of civil rights gave rise to political activism amongst the South Koreans. Their political directions diverged when "union of the mind and spirit were most needed."<sup>206</sup> By March 1948 political parties totaled approximately 450.<sup>207</sup> In contrast, Koreans neglected to prioritize economic programs to assist in their recovery.<sup>208</sup> Persistent inflation and unemployment escalated the economic problems.<sup>209</sup> The National Economic Board, an agency of the military government, stepped in and planned the national distribution of controlled commodities.<sup>210</sup> It provided fair allocations to the provinces and a

centralized policy of distribution.<sup>211</sup> Its actions prevented starvation. Social problems included continuous crime and homelessness.<sup>212</sup> Soldiers executed “sincere” and “sound” efforts to keep law and order.<sup>213</sup> Sensitive to building goodwill with the Koreans, troops refrained from obtaining billets at their expense.<sup>214</sup> Also, they acted humanely, attending to the health and clothing needs of millions of displaced people.<sup>215</sup> Troops’ fair and equal treatment of Koreans elicited some cooperation and good relations. Regardless, some Koreans chose to take opportunistic directions for themselves which opposed operational success.<sup>216</sup> After 40 years of Japanese repression, the Koreans suspiciously viewed American occupiers as tyrants.<sup>217</sup> Troops overcame this cultural barrier by establishing freedoms of speech and writing, as well as improving public health, sanitation, road, railroad and educational infrastructures.<sup>218</sup>

Other negative and positive factors affected troop success. An undefined American policy confused the occupiers and Koreans alike.<sup>219</sup> Under an uncertain American government, economic reform stagnated.<sup>220</sup> The Russians, occupiers of Korea north of the 38th parallel, severed the flow of important goods to the south, including lumber, fertilizer, coal and minerals.<sup>221</sup> Positive factors included having a large labor pool and a slightly modernized economy.<sup>222</sup> Amidst austere conditions, American’s “generosity and humanity” prevented the population from starving to death and enabled the creation of the Government of the Korean Republic on 15 August 1948.<sup>223</sup>

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Soldiers conducting post-conflict operations must not only be equipped with suitable hardware, but they must also be prepared with knowledge, excellently trained and led.<sup>224</sup> Utilizing the most advanced weaponry, materials or supplies does guarantee ultimate mission success. Technical proficiency with their equipment enables soldiers to fiercely wage battle and get to post-conflict situations soonest. Proficiency combined with knowledge of situational subtleties gives the populace assured feelings that a secure climate exists. The security created protects both soldiers and the populace, limits radicals’ ambitions, and stymies insurrection opportunities. Preparing soldiers with knowledge includes giving them training grounded in moral values. Soldiers must have the conviction to act with equity and humanity. Training regimens must not only focus on combat but they must concentrate on a curriculum entailing military operations other than war (MOOTW). In MOOTW, soldiers have the capability to deter adversary’s action based on their physical presence or their potential employment. They “facilitate achieving strategic goals.”<sup>225</sup>

Soldiers' training must include noncombat and nonlethal aspects. This complementary training enables soldiers to conduct themselves in line with national objectives. Author Max Boot says the United States has been slow to field nonlethal weapons. He says this may have the overall effect of costing lives which are taken by the standard, lethal ways that we conduct policing activity and insurgencies.<sup>226</sup> Ready soldiers can prevent compromising situations. They can responsively answer populations' questions or explain snafus, thereby promoting goodwill. Training should equip soldiers with the capacity to perceive situational changes and to make logical decisions regarding the necessity to apply or not apply force. Based on current events, Boot suggests that our government should institute the production of "high-quality general purpose forces that can shoot terrorists one minute and hand out candy to children the next."<sup>227</sup> Providing protection in this fashion, soldiers begin to win the occupied people's favor.

Additionally, soldiers need the fullest appreciation of the cultural, economic, political and societal scenery if they want to attain beneficial strategic results. Applying Sun Tzu, soldiers that know their former enemy and know themselves will never be in danger.<sup>228</sup> Not knowing the enemy heightened danger for British officers trying to keep order in Malaya. Unable to differentiate between Indian, Chinese or Malayan, they afforded the cunning insurgents great advantage.<sup>229</sup> Directives need to protect the occupying forces; however, they must not place at risk safe access for the soldiers to interact with the occupied populace. Understanding socio-cultural-moral forbearances<sup>230</sup> can lead to successes, such as those found by the pathfinders and mountain men of the United States Army. They succeeded against the Indians in the last part of the 19th century.<sup>231</sup> Also, soldiers become more effective when armed with intimate knowledge of the occupied people. For example, American soldiers in Iraq feel empowered as difference makers and they are determined to win the peace, shown in "their compassion for each other and for the Iraqi people."<sup>232</sup> With proper equipment, knowledge and training, soldiers can win hearts and minds and souls.<sup>233</sup>

Soldiers must demonstrate their capacity and willingness to assist occupied populaces in order to facilitate post-conflict operations success. Although "reluctance to put boots on the ground looks weak to friends and foe like,"<sup>234</sup> failing to put well-behaved people in boots on the ground would be more detrimental. Suspicious of occupying soldiers, occupied populaces first require their basic needs be met. They guardedly watch the occupation forces' methods and behaviors conducting operations. Soldiers must employ sound human relations techniques.<sup>235</sup> They must act considerately and put forth maximum effort. They must carefully plan their actions to not offend and maintain constant contact with them.<sup>236</sup> This behavior facilitates communication while eliminating distrust and ignorance.<sup>237</sup> Hatred toward soldiers disintegrates

as soldiers demonstrate their ambitions not to be self-centered, but fair and beneficial for the good of the occupied people. Until the occupied populace has the capacity to protect, feed and govern itself, the soldiers, along with any subsequent agencies assigned, must provide these services. In this way, soldiers rid themselves of the populace's negative preconceptions, build confidence, and encourage cooperation. Soldiers' actions and mere presence disarms occupied populations of their hatreds. Once protected and nourished, occupied populaces start to become a positive force for the rebuilding of the occupied society and its institutions. Good rapport with populaces of varying abilities can overcome many barriers, such as rebellion, which may prevent progress.

Potential of occupied people to rebel can be controlled by the behavior of occupation soldiers. Soldiers, enchanting the Japanese by their generous, friendly and human nature, made friends out of disbelievers, not enemies. Entrenched for the long run, soldiers warded off deleterious uprisings of domestic, radical and revolutionary nature in Japan. In Germany, soldiers appeased the populace through professional behavior, interaction and dialog early on. Later, when Germans perceived soldiers getting unfair, special privileges, they became openly defiant and rebellious. Generous soldiers providing food, health and clothing gradually helped create conditions for a strategic alliance between South Korean and the United States. Certainly, soldiers should prepare for revolts. Enforcing new rules and directives in association with the development of new institutions during any post-conflict operation will inevitably create tension. Giving the populace more freedoms, as in South Korea where political parties multiplied, may also tend to give rise to rebellion. However, soldiers' behavior can help keep a lid on potential unrest.

Soldiers must act with extreme professionalism or risk creating barriers for operational or strategic success. In Okinawa, failing to project professionalism made the difficult task of taking over private land for military uses even tougher. Recently in Iraq, United States Marines, attempting to take Fallujah with a minimum of civilian casualties, took street by street, block by block, consciously choosing the right shot every step of the way.<sup>238</sup> This tactic eased political pressures. Utmost professional conduct helps thwart insurgents. Unpredictable insurgents complicate the occupier's mission. They may realize the strength of the occupiers and lie dormant. They may realize the futility of creating any skirmishes or execute suicidal efforts to weaken the occupation. Regardless, soldiers need to build positive relationships, trust and respect with the occupied population who may know insurgents best. Goodwill between the forces and various agencies or representatives of the population will generate crucial insurgent information. Soldiers should also aim to team up with the local populace. An occupied-occupier

alliance formed against the insurgents would mitigate their effect or eliminate them altogether. Acting professionally means soldiers carry through on projects promised. Otherwise they fracture the relationships and generate frustration detrimental to the post-conflict operations.<sup>239</sup> The military's behavior becomes more restricted as societies become more liberated, such as those in the Middle East.<sup>240</sup> The media of occupied territories send out to the world their own interpretations of troop action and conduct. These interpretations are formed by their own "prejudices, passions, and insecurities which emerge out of their own historical and geographical experience" and transformed by their "hopes, dreams, and exaggerations of their respective societies."<sup>241</sup>

Soldiers must train occupied populaces to take over responsibilities associated with newly established security and governmental infrastructure. Occupied people may lack the experience, as in South Korea, but they desire employment, have the intellect and adaptability to assist security efforts, and eventually must take over to terminate the occupation. Effective ways soldiers can "embrace" the population include "train with them all day, watch videos with them at night, go out with them," and quarter with them.<sup>242</sup> Soldiers and populace must bond.<sup>243</sup> Specialized forces can go into the villages to explore and discover the needs, desires and fears of the population. Offering humanitarian assistance and collecting intelligence all the while, they quickly dispel "monster" myths and appear to the population as caring individuals.<sup>244</sup> Indigenous people providing security has advantages. Recently, a United States Marine-trained Iraqi soldier shot and killed an incognito insurgent attempting to enter a mosque for afternoon prayers. The Iraqi soldier recognized that the "worshiper" used an improper accent and intuitively shot the grenade-laden terrorist without asking further questions.<sup>245</sup> The British and French prefer to operate indirectly, letting the indigenous people do the shooting for them.<sup>246</sup> The British indirectly controlled the military government set up in their occupation zone in Germany at the end of the Second World War. German administrators put in place followed the British letter of the law. This "creatively functioning indigenous" organization demonstrated the British liberal approach.<sup>247</sup> The British did not shrink from public criticism and were firmly guided by their belief that democratic principles practiced over time would become second nature. The skeptical Germans could be conditioned and "educated" to adopt democracy.<sup>248</sup> Also, the British military relies on thorough training vice fear or coercion to effect good discipline and morale. They believe that "production of good morale is the most important object in military training."<sup>249</sup>

A nation must not complicate its ability to utilize moral power in achieving its objectives by going it alone. To win hearts and minds, a nation must not be insensitive to building the

strongest consensus and coalition possible to preserve its influence.<sup>250</sup> For instance, the United States presently emphasizes a pre-emptive war strategy codified in the Bush doctrine. The administration's decision to proceed into a war with Iraq, without United Nations support, has solidified a negative perspective of the United States held by many. Some believe that the United States is an "arrogant superpower that is insensitive to the concerns of other countries in the world."<sup>251</sup> Subsequently, the United States has diminished its capability to project influence, regardless of boots on the ground.<sup>252</sup> If viewed by others as a mistake to go it alone in this fashion, the United States has done much in its post-conflict operations to change the world's attitude. The end state sought by the United States, a constituted democracy operating in Iraq, "brings moral clarity and cures deluded populaces of their false grievances and exaggerated hurts."<sup>253</sup> Democracies promote stability, demonstrated by a Germany's peaceful, non-expansive nature and Japan's contentment securing resources in the marketplace today.<sup>254</sup>

The value of moral power increases significantly with advance planning for post-conflict. Years of planning in preparation for the occupation of Japan gave the United States tremendous leverage. Reputable authorities participating on committees, in military government schools, and in civil affairs schools engineered an excellent plan to rebuild Japan. Their visions became reality. Planning maximized the probability of soldiers' success in Japan and practically guaranteed for the United States a long-lasting strategic partnership. Inadequate planning will weaken any post-conflict security situation, as the recent Iraq example shows. Following the combat phase, the occupying power continues to lose many lives, time and credibility.<sup>255</sup>

Occupying soldiers need a clear mission and campaign plans need to have strategies that "makes it easier for an occupying power to install a stable and sustainable government."<sup>256</sup> Policy must be known and understood by all soldiers. They can then properly represent their countries and discipline themselves accordingly. Performing tasks in coherence with policy, soldiers build and sustain good character. An unclear policy in Okinawa fostered soldiers' tensions and morale degradation which spilled over onto the Okinawan populace. Soldiers suffering from subsequent morale problems feel less inclined to be merciful, compassionate, sincere or rational. This tends to delay the attainment of operational and strategic goals as it widens cultural, societal, political and economic gaps.

Incorporate moral power, an element of national power, into United States military policy and strategy formulation. Begin the education process by including moral power as a distinct element in the DIME and MIDLIFE models. Introducing DIME-M and MIDLIFE-M type models into developmental education curriculums will stimulate military leader thinking and highlight the vital importance of this national element. Future military operations must be conducted only

after thorough analysis of the ways moral power, expressed through the thoughts and conduct of soldiers and the mutual respect and rapport with the populace, could be utilized. Proper application of moral power could gain leaders efficiency, advantage and ultimate victory. Considering the strategic effects that moral power application produces must become second nature to all military leaders.

## **CONCLUSION**

The most critical factor for the successful outcome of post-conflict operations consists of moral power, expressed through the thoughts and conduct of soldiers and the mutual respect and rapport with the populace. In Japan, soldiers' conduct transformed a formidable enemy into an accommodating ally. Soldiers' behavior bridged the significant cultural gap leading to a strong strategic partnership. Okinawans' receptivity of occupation soldiers varied in conjunction with those soldiers' behavior. Soldiers overcame difficulty, their conduct facilitating success. The soldiers secured Okinawans' freedoms and established a democracy. Soldiers' conduct created a lasting friendship with Germany, valued to this day, and set in motion the reconstruction of political, economic and social institutions. Troop conduct in South Korea overcame formidable conditions, including food shortages, language barriers and massive migrations of people. Soldiers' humane conduct led to successful demobilization of the Japanese and establishment of a civil government.

Battles for occupied peoples' hearts and minds are the battles that we need to win during post-conflict operations. Within the constraints of dictated policy during post-conflict operations, soldiers should conduct themselves in ways endearing to the occupied populace. In direct contact with occupied populaces, they wield substantial strength through their conduct and rapport. Providing basic needs, showing respect and instituting fairness into their activities, soldiers dispel suspicions, earn credibility, and attain their goals more readily. This leads to favorable strategic results. Limitless success awaits military leaders and nations who reassure and comfort occupied people in present and future post-conflict operations.

COUNT=7,852



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<sup>78</sup> "Japan's Stability Depends on Military Occupation," *Intelligence Review* no. 84 (25 September 1947): 57.

<sup>79</sup> Henry, 20.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> U.S. War Department General Staff, G-2, "Food-The Major Problem in Japan's Occupation," *Intelligence Review* no. 95 (11 December 1947): 49-57.

<sup>83</sup> "Japan's Stability Depends on Military Occupation," 57.

<sup>84</sup> Brumbaugh, 1434.

<sup>85</sup> Hilgard, 344.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 343.

<sup>87</sup> "Japan's Stability Depends on Military Occupation," 57.

<sup>88</sup> Henry, 51.

<sup>89</sup> Brumbaugh, 1434.

<sup>90</sup> Hilgard, 344.

<sup>91</sup> Henry, 19.

<sup>92</sup> Donnelly, 896.

<sup>93</sup> Eiji, 116.

<sup>94</sup> Robert E. Ward and Frank J. Shulman, comps. and eds., *The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1974), 716.

<sup>95</sup> Bowles, 279.

<sup>96</sup> Eiji, 115.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 117.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>99</sup> Bowles, 278.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Eiji, 116.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 116, 119.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 119-129.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Bowles, 279.

<sup>107</sup> Edelstein, 50-51.

<sup>108</sup> Eiji, 129-130.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 135-136.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Tadashi, 30.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Bowles, 278.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 279.

<sup>115</sup> Tadashi, 35.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>119</sup> Eiji, 116.

<sup>120</sup> Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, *Economic and Political Conditions in the Far East: Japan, China, Korea; Report of William Montgomery McGovern* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), 8.

<sup>121</sup> Donnelly, 837.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Henry, 23

<sup>124</sup> Charles A. Willoughby, "Occupation of Japan and Japanese Reaction," *Military Review* 26, no. 3 (June 1946): 4.

<sup>125</sup> Eiji, 202.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 206.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 725.

<sup>129</sup> Eiji, 210.

<sup>130</sup> Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, 2, 8.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Edelstein, 87.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>134</sup> Eiji, 443.
- <sup>135</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>136</sup> Sarantakes , 29.
- <sup>137</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>138</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>139</sup> Eiji, 441.
- <sup>140</sup> Sarantakes , 30.
- <sup>141</sup> Ibid., 29.
- <sup>142</sup> Eiji, 442.
- <sup>143</sup> Sarantakes , 30.
- <sup>144</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>145</sup> Ibid., 32.
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>147</sup> Eiji, 442.
- <sup>148</sup> Sarantakes , 148.
- <sup>149</sup> Ibid., 149.
- <sup>150</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>151</sup> Ibid., 47.
- <sup>152</sup> Ibid., 28-29.
- <sup>153</sup> Eiji, 442.
- <sup>154</sup> Sarantakes , 149.
- <sup>155</sup> Ibid., 31, 148.
- <sup>156</sup> Ibid., 31.
- <sup>157</sup> Ibid., 149.
- <sup>158</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>159</sup> Eiji, 445.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 443.

<sup>162</sup> Edelstein, 87.

<sup>163</sup> Franklin L. Gurley, historian for the 100<sup>th</sup> ID Association, "Franklin L. Gurley papers," (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA), 1992, 9 July 1945.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 2 July 1945.

<sup>165</sup> Keith Winston, private first class, Medical Detachment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 398<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, 100<sup>th</sup> ID "A Soldier Named Keith," typescript and wartime letters, box titled: The 100<sup>th</sup> ID papers, box 6, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, 19 May 1945, 277.

<sup>166</sup> Gurley, 20 March 1946.

<sup>167</sup> Joseph H. Hyde, Jr., "Army Services Experiences Questionnaire," Department of the Army, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, n.d., 14.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 13-14.

<sup>169</sup> Winston, 262.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 263.

<sup>171</sup> "Constabulary Forming," *Army and Navy Journal* (6 April 1946): 970.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 971.

<sup>176</sup> "German Attitudes Toward the Occupation," *Intelligence Review* no. 74 (17 July 1947): 33.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>178</sup> Winston, 261-262.

<sup>179</sup> "German Attitudes Toward the Occupation," 30-31.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>184</sup> Hyde, 15.

<sup>185</sup> Gurley, 10 December 1945.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Edelstein, 88.

<sup>188</sup> Duncan Sinclair, "The Occupation of Korea-Operations and Accomplishments," *Military Review* 27, no. 5 (August 1947): 54.

<sup>189</sup> Robert T. Oliver, "The Rebirth of Korea," essay found in the Charles Donnelly papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, box titled Japan and Korea, 1946-1948, folder marked Korea (2), 1947-1948, chapter IV, 2-3.

<sup>190</sup> Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, 20.

<sup>191</sup> Edelstein, 88.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> Donnelly, 866.

<sup>195</sup> "Long Live the Republic of Korea," *The Union Democrat*, 15 August 1948, p. 1.

<sup>196</sup> William F. Centner, "Horizons," address, Columbus, OH, Junior Chamber of Commerce, 7 July 1949, U.S. Army Military History Institute, document, 4.

<sup>197</sup> Oliver, 3.

<sup>198</sup> Sinclair, 55-56.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Donnelly, 869.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., 869-871.

<sup>203</sup> Donnelly, 1.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Oliver, 3.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 4, chapter III, 1.

<sup>210</sup> Headquarters U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, *National Economic Board*, Regulation Number 1 (Seoul, Korea: Headquarters U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, 14 September 1946), 1.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Oliver, 4, chapter III, 1.

<sup>213</sup> Sinclair, 60.

<sup>214</sup> Duncan Sinclair, "The Occupation of Korea-Initial Phases," *Military Review* 27, no. 4 (July 1947): 35.

<sup>215</sup> Centner, 5.

<sup>216</sup> Oliver, 3.

<sup>217</sup> Centner, 3, 5.

<sup>218</sup> Sinclair, "The Occupation of Korea-Operations and Accomplishments," 60.

<sup>219</sup> Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, 25.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., 25

<sup>223</sup> "Long Live the Republic of Korea," 1.

<sup>224</sup> Zabecki, 40-42.

<sup>225</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001), 1-3.

<sup>226</sup> Max Boot, "The Struggle to Transform the Military," March/April 2005; available from <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050301faessay84210/max-boot/the-struggle-to-transform-the-military.html>>; Internet; accessed 14 February 2005.

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<sup>229</sup> Sir George Maxwell and committee comps., *The Civil Defence of Malaya*, (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1944), 88.

<sup>230</sup> Jiyul Kim <jiyul.kim@carlisle.army.mil>, "FW: Robert Kaplan on The New Middle East," electronic mail message to Andrew Cernicky <andrew.cernicky@carlisle.army.mil>, 20 December 2004.

<sup>231</sup> Trudy Kuehner, "Robert Kaplan on the New Middle East," 17 December 2004; available from <<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20041217.middleeast.kaplanr.newmiddleeast.html>>; internet; accessed 20 December 2004.

<sup>232</sup> Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 430.

<sup>233</sup> Ling W. Lee, "War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World," in *Essays 2004*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004), 57.

<sup>234</sup> Zabecki, 40-42.

<sup>235</sup> Harrelson, iv.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., 157.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., 177.

<sup>238</sup> Kuehner.

<sup>239</sup> Henry, 25.

<sup>240</sup> Kuehner.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Greg Jaffe, "A Marine Captain Trains Iraqi Colonel To Take Over Fight," 24 February 2005; available from <[http://www.pwcweb.com/vfwpost1503/hot\\_topics.html](http://www.pwcweb.com/vfwpost1503/hot_topics.html)>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2005.

<sup>246</sup> Kuehner.

<sup>247</sup> “The British Occupation Zone in Germany,” *Intelligence Review* no. 78 (14 August 1947): 48.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle* (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 79.

<sup>250</sup> Lee, 72.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Ibid.

<sup>253</sup> Victor D. Hanson, “Why Democracy? Ten Reasons to Support Democracy in the Middle East,” 11 February 2005; available from <<http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson021105.html>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2005.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

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