

also Vernon Loeb, "'Guerrilla' War Acknowledged," *Washington Post*, July 17, 2003; and David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle For the Future of the United States Army*, New York: Crown, 2009, pp. 127-128.

6. A government facing an insurgency undertakes counterinsurgency. Outsiders like the United States provide counterinsurgency support.

7. Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq*, New York: Public Affairs, 2008, p. 14.

8. *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress in Accordance With the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007*, November 2006, p. 17.

9. *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress in Accordance With the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007*, March 2009, p. 19.

10. "Victory in Iraq," *New York Sun*, July 18, 2008. Other examples of the same idea are Jeff Jacoby, "Bush's 'Folly' Is Ending in Victory," *Boston Globe*, March 25, 2009; and, "Quiet Victory in Iraq," *National Review*, February 2, 2009. The online edition of the *Weekly Standard*, which was always at the forefront of advocacy for American involvement in Iraq, stated that "Obama has inherited victory in Iraq" (available from *weeklystandard.com*, posting by Michael Goldfarb, January 20, 2009). Rush Limbaugh referred to "the surge that led to victory in Iraq" (e.g., transcript of July 1, 2009 broadcast.) Speaking on Fox News on February 15, 2009, commentator Oliver North opined, "Today, the campaign against radical Islam in Iraq is won."

11. This stress on the symbolic content of security issues is a characteristic of dominant powers. All of history's great states and empires recognized that other nations drew cues from the way they interacted with enemies and allies. Lesser powers, which play a smaller role in determining the rules of behavior for regional or global security systems, are less concerned with the symbolism of their actions and more with the tangible outcomes.

12. *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, Washington, DC: National Security Council, 2005, p. 1.

13. "Press Conference by the President," Washington, DC, August 21, 2006.

14. This reflected an intellectual tradition that can be traced back to the philosophy of history developed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and codified in Ronald Reagan's thinking. In *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*, I argue that President Bush was driven by a desire to emulate Reagan. This made him receptive to the Reaganesque portrayal of history as a great struggle between freedom and its enemies, and the United States as the champion of freedom.

15. "President's Address to the Nation," Washington, DC, September 11, 2006. This assertion was never seriously questioned, demonstrating the degree to which the 9/11 attacks had skewed American thinking about security and made any assertion about terrorism credible.

16. Peter D. Feaver, "Anatomy of the Surge," *Commentary*, April 2008, p. 25.

17. Letter to President Bush signed by Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Dick Durbin, Steny Hoyer, Carl Levin, Ike Skelton, Joe Biden, Tom Lantos, Jay Rockefeller, Jane Harmon, Daniel Inouye, and John Murtha, July 31, 2006.

18. Robin Toner and Jim Rutenberg, "Partisan Divide on Iraq Exceeds Split on Vietnam," *New York Times*, July 30, 2006, p. 1.

19. Jeffrey M. Jones, "Bush Quarterly Average Establishes New Low: 29%," *Gallup Report*, July 17, 2008.

20. Adam Nagourney, Jim Rutenberg, and Jeff Zeleny, "Democrats Turned War Into an Ally," *New York Times*, November 9, 2006, p. A1.

21. Quoted in Michael Grunwald, "Opposition to War Buys Democrats," *Washington Post*, November 8, 2006, p. A31.

22. David S. Cloud, "Senator Says U.S. Should Rethink Iraq Strategy," *New York Times*, October 6, 2006, p. A12.

23. Chuck Hagel, "Leaving Iraq, Honorably," *Washington Post*, November 26, 2006, p. B7.

24. "Rumsfeld's Memo of Options for Iraq War," reprinted in the *New York Times*, December 3, 2006.

25. Robin Wright, "Bush Initiates Iraq Policy Review Separate From Baker Group's," *Washington Post*, November 15, 2006, p. A16.

26. See Steven Metz, "America's Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and Political History," *Defence Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 1-25; and Frederick W. Kagan, *Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy*, New York: Encounter, 2006.

27. *An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq*, Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, September 3, 2003.

28. The most comprehensive treatment of this was Thomas Donnelly and Frederic W. Kagan, *Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power*, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008.

29. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution and Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute have been among the most persistent in calling for an increase in the size of the Army. See, for instance, O'Hanlon's "Breaking the Army," *Washington Post*, July 3, 2003; "The Need to Increase the Size of the Deployable Army," *Parameters*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 4-17; and *Defense Policy for the Post-Saddam Era*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005; and Kagan's "The Army We Have: It's Too Small," *Weekly Standard*, December 27, 2004; "Army Needs More Strength in Numbers," *New York Daily News*, August 24, 2006; and "The U.S. Military's Manpower Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4, July/August 2006, pp. 97-110. Other organizations and individuals took a similar line. In January 2005, for instance, the Project for the New American Century sent a letter to leading members of Congress. The letter included a call for increasing the

number of U.S. ground forces. The signatories included defense experts from both ends of the political spectrum, retired senior military leaders, and former officials of the Clinton and George H. W. Bush administrations.

30. Mark Sappenfield, "Dueling Views on Army Size: Congress vs. Rumsfeld," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 17, 2005. In early 2004, a bipartisan group of 128 members of the House, led by Heather Wilson (R-NM), called on President Bush to increase the Army's overall size—called end strength—and to reduce the time reservists must spend on active duty. In October 2004, the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Act increased Army end strength by 20,000 and Marine Corps end strength by 3,000 with additional increases authorized in future years. For background, see Edward F. Bruner, *Military Forces: What Is the Appropriate Size for the United States?* Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, May 28, 2004. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163) authorized an active duty end strength for the Army at 512,400 and 179,000 for the Marine Corps. Additional authority also was provided in section 403 of that Act to increase the active duty end strength for the Army by up to 20,000 and Marine Corps active duty end strength by 5,000 during fiscal years 2007 through 2009.

31. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "New Model Army," *Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 2004.

32. Esther Schrader, "Army Says It Has Enough Troops For Three More Years," *Los Angeles Times*, June 16, 2004.

33. Quoted in Ann Scott Tyson, "Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military," *Washington Post*, March 19, 2005.

34. For instance, see James Fallows, "The Hollow Army," *Atlantic*, March 2004, pp. 29-31.

35. Ann Scott Tyson, "General Says Army Will Need to Grow," *Washington Post*, December 15, 2006, p. A1.

36. Thom Shanker, "Joint Chiefs Chairman Looks Beyond Current Wars," *New York Times*, October 22, 2007.

37. See Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, New York: Simon and

Schuster, 2006, pp. 440-491; Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History*, New York: Encounter, 2009, pp. 3-26; and Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq*, New York: Random House, 2008, pp. 64-172.

38. Bob Woodward, *The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008, p. 7.

39. West, p. 198.

40. Cloud and Jaffe, p. 169.

41. West, pp. 164-165; Kagan, *The Surge*, pp. 11-15; and, Catherine Dale, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009, pp. 69-70. Then-Major General James Thurman, commander of the Multi-National Division-Baghdad, described Operation TOGETHER FORWARD as “an Iraqi-led operation . . . to reduce the sectarian violence in focused areas identified by the Iraqi government” and with a strategy of three parts: clear, hold, and build. (DoD News Briefing with Major General Thurman from Iraq, September 22, 2006).

42. Information technology and the profusion of media have exacerbated this since the public now sees American troops as individuals rather than simply statistics.

43. Kagan, *The Surge*, p. 32.

44. Hadley’s pessimistic memo was quickly leaked and reprinted in several media sources.

45. Bob Woodward, “CIA Said Instability Seemed ‘Irreversible’,” *Washington Post*, July 12, 2007. A CIA spokesman later disputed Woodward’s account but other sources confirmed it. The testimony itself was never made public.

46. West, p. 198.

47. Woodward, *The War Within*, p. 22; Bradley Graham, *By His*

Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld, New York: PublicAffairs, 2009, pp. 624-625.

48. West, p. 160.

49. Woodward, *The War Within*, p. 170.

50. West, pp. 217-218.

51. Robinson, p. 36.

52. President's Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007.

53. Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, Vol. 85, No. 3, May-June 2005, pp. 8-12. From 2007 to 2009, Sepp served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations Capabilities.

54. Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004.

55. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005; and David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2006-07, pp. 111-130. Both Nagl and Kilcullen were also Ph.D.s.

56. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "How to Win in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5, September-October 2005, pp. 87-91.

57. See *Report of the National Defense Panel*, Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, 1997.

58. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

59. Krepinevich, "How to Win in Iraq," pp. 88-89 .

60. Steven N. Simon, *After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Disengagement From Iraq*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, February 2007; *idem*, "America and Iraq: The Case for Disengagement," *Survival*, Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 61-84;

and Lawrence J. Korb and Max A. Bergmann, "How to Withdraw Quickly and Safely," *Boston Globe*, September 9, 2007. Also see Rosa Brooks, "Abandon Iraq to Save It," *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 2006, p. A35 .

61. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "It Is Time to Plan for an American Withdrawal From Iraq," *Financial Times*, April 19, 2006, p. 15; and William E. Odom, "Cut and Run? You Bet," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 154, May/June 2006, pp. 60-61.

62. The Iraq Study Group was chaired by James Baker, George H.W. Bush's Secretary of State; and former Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton. Its members included former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, former Republican Senator Alan K. Simpson, business executive Vernon Jordan, Jr., former White House Chief of Staff (and current CIA Director) Leon E. Panetta, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, and former Democratic governor and Senator Charles S. Robb.

63. See *The Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2, 2006, pp. 32-62.

64. Robinson, p. 32; Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 131-132; and Graham, pp. 636-640.

65. West, p. 218; Robinson, p. 33.

66. Frederick W. Kagan, *Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq*, Phase I Report of the American Enterprise Institute Iraq Planning Group, n.d., p. 5. The AEI Group included Frederick W. Kagan, Jack Keane, David Barno, Danielle Pletka, Rend al-Rahim, Joel Armstrong, Daniel Dwyer, Larry Crandall, Larry Sampler, Michael Eisenstadt, Kimberly Kagan, Michael Rubin, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Thomas Donnelly, Gary Schmitt, Mauro De Lorenzo, and Vance Serchuk.

67. *Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 1-23.

68. See, for instance, David S. Cloud, "Senator Says U.S.

Should Rethink Iraq Strategy," *New York Times*, October 6, 2006, p. A12; and Chuck Hagel, "Leaving Iraq, Honorably," *Washington Post*, November 26, 2006, p. B7.

69. See Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*, pp. 101-138; and Barton Gellman, *Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency*, New York: Penguin, 2008, pp. 131-253.

70. Gellman contends that Cheney's influence was waning by 2006.

71. Woodward, *The War Within*, p. 20.

72. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, "Iraq and U.S. Policy," testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2005.

73. Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 31-33. While Woodward had extensive access to key administration officials, no other source to date has independently verified his depiction of this process.

74. Title 10 U.S. Code, Chap. 5, § 151 states:

(b) Function as Military Advisers. —

(1) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subsections (d) and (e).

(c) Consultation by Chairman. —

(1) In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of—

(A) the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and

(B) the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(2) Subject to subsection (d), in presenting advice with respect to any matter to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be, of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to that matter.

(d) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman. —

(1) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.

(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(e) Advice on Request. — The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.

75. *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, Washington, DC: National Security Council, 2005, p. 1.

76. West, p. 217.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

78. General Casey also believed Maliki could be an effective national leader. See Cloud and Jaffe, p. 253.

79. Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 190-92.

80. West, p. 202.

81. For instance, General Abizaid continued to warn that the American military was stretched too thin to sustain a long-term troop increase in Iraq. See Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazzetti, "General Warns of Risks in Iraq if G.I.'s are Cut," *New York Times*, November 16, 2006, p. A1.

82. Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 232-233.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

84. This is a persistent problem in counterinsurgency support. It was also evident in Vietnam and today has reappeared in Afghanistan.

85. See, for instance, General Abizaid's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, November 15, 2006.

86. *The Iraq Study Group Report*, p. 48.

87. It was actually more a refinement of the existing strategy than a new one.

88. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 133-135.

89. Cloud and Jaffe, pp. 264-265.

90. See Austin Long, "The Anbar Awakening," *Survival*, Vol. 50, No. 2, April-May 2008, pp. 67-94.

91. Robinson, p. 106. Of course, the full story of the high value targeting campaign will not be publicly available for many years. For conceptual treatments of high value targeting and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism, see George A. Crawford,

Manhunting: Reversing the Polarity of Warfare, Baltimore, MD: PublishAmerica, 2008; *idem*, *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare*, Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2009; and Steven Metz, "Strategic Decapitation: The Dynamics of High Value Targeting in Counterinsurgency," paper prepared for the RAND Corporation Insurgency Board, July 2008.

92. The notion of victory pushed by some on the political right may be premature, the possibility of renewed civil war and disintegration remain as the American role—and ability to influence events—diminishes. See, for instance, Ernest Londono and Greg Jaffe, "Iraq Carnage Shows Sectarian War Goes On," *Washington Post*, August 20, 2009. Iraq may eventually face what might be called a "resurgency"—an insurgency that appears defeated or goes into hibernation and later reappears if the root causes are not addressed.

93. See FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006; and *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009.

94. West, p. 223.

95. Cloud and Jaffe recount Maliki's congratulations to General Petraeus after his September 2007 congressional testimony, suggesting that the Iraqi leader was well aware of the importance of support for his regime in Washington. See Cloud and Jaffe, p. 277.

96. British Lieutenant General (Ret.) Graeme Lamb makes this same point in Dexter Filkins, "Stanley McChrystal's Long War," *New York Times Magazine*, October 18, 2009.

97. See James Kitfield, *War and Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power*, Washington, DC: Potomac, 2005; Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008; and Charles A. Stevenson, *SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense*, Washington, DC: Potomac, 2006, pp. 159-180. Bradley Graham cites former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman as indicating that Rumsfeld tended to be

more deferential to the regional combatant commanders than the Service chiefs or Joint Staff. See pp. 641-642.

98. Cloud and Jaffe, p. 171.

99. For instance, Myers's memoirs make no mention of direct, private conversations with the President. See Richard B. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security*, New York: Threshold, 2009. In *State of Denial* and *The War Within*, Bob Woodward describes a few meetings between General Pace and President Bush but does not suggest that these were decisive or even important in shaping the administration's Iraq policy.

100. Vice President Cheney, though, did reach down into the bureaucracy and deal directly with second tier officials. See Gellman, p. 196.

101. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*, New York: HarperCollins, 1997, pp. 328-329. Like John Nagl's *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* and Andrew Krepinevich's *The Army and Vietnam*, McMaster's book began as a Ph.D. dissertation while he was serving on the faculty of the U.S. Military Academy.

102. In describing the role of CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks during the planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Thomas Ricks entitled a section of his book *Fiasco*, "Franks Flunks Strategy." This was not an isolated phenomenon.

103. Another example of important innovation emerging from the "upper middle" level is the role that Douglas Macgregor's *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*, New York: Praeger, 1997, played in helping the Army move to a brigade-based organization.

104. Quoted in Woodward, *The War Within*, p. 197.

105. General Casey's tour in Iraq was extended three times to allow this. See Cloud and Jaffe, p. 193.

106. See, for instance, Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberley Kagan, "In Afghanistan, Real Leverage Starts With More Troops," *Washington Post*, November 27, 2009. Following President Obama's December 1, 2009, speech on Afghanistan at the U.S. Military Academy, Senator Joe Lieberman said he was encouraged by the announcement of a troop increase because, "It's the strategy that worked in Iraq." Quoted in Susan Page and Kathy Kiely, "Dems Balk at Deployment Plan," *USA Today*, December 2, 2009. For an assessment of using Iraq as a model for Afghanistan, see Charles D. Allen, "The Danger of Déjà Vu: Why the Iraq Surge Is Not a Lesson for Afghanistan," *Armed Forces Journal*, December 2009/January 2010, pp. 30-41.

107. Sarah Palin, interviewed by Katie Couric on CBS News, September 24, 2008.

108. This observation was inspired by comments by Mary Kaldor of the London School of Economics at a September 2009 conference at the U.S. Naval War College.

109. It might be possible to use the Iraq conflict as a model for *leader* development since this is less context-dependent than force or strategy development.

110. See Jeffrey Record, *Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq*, Washington, DC: Potomac, 2009.

111. This section builds on Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.

112. Gian P. Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army," *Parameters*, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 2009, pp. 5-17.

113. While dealing with combatant commanders rather than commanders of counterinsurgency efforts specifically, there is excellent analysis in Jeffrey B. Jones, Daniel T. Kuehl, Daniel Burgess, and Russell Rochte, "Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol 55, 4th Quarter, 2009, pp. 104-108.

114. On this concept, see Daniel Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.

115. David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 36.

116. Dana Milbank, "Rumsfeld's War on 'Insurgents,'" *Washington Post*, November 30, 2005. General (Ret.) Jack Keane told *Washington Post* reporter Bradley Graham that when he sensed the beginning of an insurgency in the summer of 2003, General Myers advised him to avoid such talk with Rumsfeld. See Graham, p. 424.

117. Graham, p. 427.

118. Gompert and Gordon suggest "early," "medium," "late," and "never" capabilities that U.S. advisers and trainers should impart to partner states fighting an insurgency (*War by Other Means*, pp. 209-210). Whether their particular construct is the correct one, clearly some capabilities must take priority.

119. See Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Major General Robert M. Williams
Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.**

**Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II**

**Author
Dr. Steven Metz**

**Executive Editor
Colonel John R. Martin, U.S. Army (Retired)**

**Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce**

**Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

**Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil**