The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
This is a case study of a cavalry squadron struggling with operational adaptability. Through this struggle, the study provides a means for analyzing the complexity of organizational leadership in the contemporary security environment. The case study provides an example where hard fought lessons learned resulted in a more holistic approach to leadership, because the leader transcended that of simply being an authority figure, and instead, become a real leader who provided a safe and creative learning environment where the organization was able to tackle and solve complex problems.
The author concludes that, in an effort to operationalize Clausewitz's signature concept, the U.S. military probably limited its utility. The Center of Gravity is best applied as an abstract, rather than as a practical, concept.
This paper describes ARFORGEN, discusses some of its critical assumptions related to reserve component (RC) units, and explains what changes are required at the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Army (DA), and the individual RC levels so that the Army can integrate its RC units fully into ARFORGEN. The paper details needed changes at both the institutional and operational level at DA and DoD.
The author makes the case that U.S. strategy demands the U.S. Armed Forces build a force with greater capacity for conducting stabilization operations concurrent with combat operation. He traces the strategic roots of the stabilization requirement, develops a warfighting concept for "progressive stabilization," and makes judgments on whether the Army's current Modular Force effort will generate the right type of force. He concludes by making some recommendations on where the Army should adjust its current modernization effort to make the force more relevant.
America has three basic options regarding the basing of ground troops in Europe--complete withdrawal, annual rotations, and restructuring the Alliance to accommodate a smaller U.S. presence. Restructuring NATO to nine integrated multinational divisions permits greater burden sharing and an expeditionary capability.
The trends in the strategic environment in the development of the Future War/Future Battlespace suggest that traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The strategic environment can be classified into four strategic battlespaces, within which future adversaries will operate to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives.
America's novel use of special forces, precision weapons, and indigenous allies has attracted widespread attention since its debut in Northern Afghanistan. Many think it caused the Taliban's sudden collapse. For them, this "Afghan Model" represents warfare's future, and should become the new template for US defense planning. Critics, however, see Afghanistan as an anomaly.
The author analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection.
Will economic development enhance China s comprehensive national power and thus contribute to some of China s more unhealthy goals, such as dominating the South China Seas, seizing Taiwan by force, or grabbing the Senkaku Islands from Japan? Is the China-Taiwan economic dynamic strong enough to offset military adventurism?
Lieutenant Colonel Dallas Owens analyzes current integration programs and initiatives and evaluates them for their potential to resist transformation's possible threat to AC/RC integration. He provides conclusions about the current and future state of AC/RC integration and offers recommendations to overcome transformation s challenges to integration.
Army transformation has many dimensions with change in technology, operational methods, and organizations. So far, the focus of organizational transformation has been on the redesign of tactical units such as the interim brigade combat teams. But corps--the Army's operational level organizations--must also be transformed.
Throughout U.S. history the American military services have had an unfortunate penchant for not being ready be the next war. American military institutions have been surprisingly optimistic in weighting their preparedness as they embarked on the nation's wars. Military institutions have always had considerable problems in adapting and innovating during inter-war periods.
One of the most important elements of U.S. military strategy for the past 10 years has been the belief that a force able to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars of the DESERT STORM type would be capable of dealing with the full gamut of security challenges that the United States is likely to face.
While there are arguably sufficient reaction forces to support NATO Ministerial Guidance, there are numerous weaknesses that would, and have, inhibited the efficient and effective deployment of land forces in crises. There are insufficient deployable reaction headquarters, both at the corps and component command level that would support a commander of a NATO Combined Joint Task Force.
During the early decades of the 21st Century, the Army of 2025 will differ from today's Army in two distinct ways. First, it will achieve unprecedented strategic and operational speed by exploiting information technologies to create a knowledge-based organization. Second, it will exhibit tremendous flexibility and physical agility through streamlined, seamlessly integrated organizations that use new tactics and procedures.
The authors believe there is a mix of extant and near-term combat systems and technologies that will allow the Army to create a number of "aero-motorized" divisions within likely budgetary constraints by the end of the next decade. These medium-weight combat units would exploit the large investment the Air Force is making to modernize its strategic and theater airlift fleets during the first decade.
Jeffrey Record examines what he believes is a half-century-old and continuing recession of large-interstate warfare and, since the World War's demise, the unexpected and often violent disintegration of established states. The author's critical analysis leads him to propose significant and controversial changes in planning standards, force structure, and defense spending.
These student papers are largely focused on present problems which must be solved before movement toward the future can make much progress. If they are not dramatically futuristic in approach, they are nevertheless set against a future backdrop which is still in the process of being defined.
The theme for the U.S. Army War College's Ninth Annual Strategy Conference (April 1998) is "Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?" Dr. Robert J. Bunker of California State University, San Bernardino, answers the question with an emphatic "yes."
Promoting U.S. national interests through shaping the international security environment also will become a major role for the U.S. military. To fulfill its multiple roles, the Army's force structure and design must provide the capabilities necessary to operate across a broad spectrum of conflict in peacetime, crisis, and war.
The two MRC framework constitutes a logical scheme for organizing U.S. defense planning efforts. New approaches to planning scenarios and the operational concept for employing forces offer the potential for such adjustments concerning the "ways" of the strategic paradigm, while force thinning and modernization are two important categories for adjusting the affordability of the strategic "means."
Only after the future roles of the U.S. military have been determined can the Department of Defense turn to the other important issues posed by Congress. Dr. William T. Johnsen concludes that the U.S. military will continue to perform its traditional roles: deterrence, reassurance, compellence, and support to the nation. The method and manner of carrying out those roles, however, will change.
A year ago the Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the Army After Next Project (AANP) as a means of stimulating constructive thinking about the Army's future throughout the service. AANP has quickly developed into a primary vehicle for long-range planning.
Armies historically have been criticized for preparing for the last war. Since the early 1980s, however, the U.S. Army has broken this pattern and created a force capable of winning the next war. But, in an era characterized by a volatile international security environment, accelerating technological advances (particularly in acquiring, processing, and disseminating information), the emergence of what some are calling a "revolution in military affairs," and forecasts of increasingly constrained fiscal resources, it seems ill-advised to plan only for the "next Army."
Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.
The monograph illuminates the critical series of events that resulted in the development of the National Military Strategy of the United States and the "base force."
The author provides a set of plausible scenarios against which users can build policies and decisions while anticipating and judging their consequences before implementation.