The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
This book is a follow-on to our earlier book published in 2011 and represents a detailed look at various aspects of cyber security. The chapters herein provide an integrated framework and a comprehensive view of the various forms of cyber infrastructure protection.
Sharing Power examines alternative U.S. grand strategies. It argues that, while retrenchment is prudent, new strategies will also have to cope with dilemmas that can be mitigated but cannot be avoided.
Cyber is now recognized as an operational domain, but the theory that should explain it strategically is very largely missing. As the military establishment accepted the revolution in military affairs as the big organizing idea of the 1990s, then moved on to transformation in the early-2000s, so the third really big idea of the post-Cold War Era began to secure traction—cyber. However, it is one thing to know how to digitize; it is quite another to understand what digitization means strategically. With respect to cyber power, Dr. Colin Gray poses and seeks to answer the most basic of the strategist’s questions, “So what?”
The increasing diffusion and application of expertise acquired by jihadists in fabricating “improvised explosive devices” and the extent to which local jihadist cells in the West may or may not be connected to veteran terrorist groups and networks in other countries and regions are vital concerns for Western military forces and security and intelligence agencies as they relate to these veteran terrorist groups and networks in other countries and regions of the world.
The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, making understanding the new dynamics an important factor in a broader national security context.
Russia’s best troops are to be found in the Airborne Forces. These were the only Russian troops to emerge with their reputation intact after the conflict with Georgia in 2008. They can represent a formidable foe. This monograph examines the current state of the Airborne Forces and why they might be seen as "formidable."
What are the prospects for further progress in the reset policy with Russia regarding arms control and nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Iran? This monograph attempts to postulate where we are, and possibly where we should be going, or will be going, with respect to these issues.
The Western way of war has come full circle. After centuries, indeed millennia, of evolution toward increased totality and brutality, it has turned back once again to the ritualistic and restrained methods of primitive warfare.
This book answers several essential questions: What is cyberpower; how do we deal with emerging threats in cyberspace; what are the lessons that have already been learned; and where are the current cyberspace vulnerabilities?
Having the right "who" to devise strategy is critical to success in counterinsurgency or any asymmetric, cross-cultural encounter. This monograph contends that if we do not get the "who" right, none of the "whats," in terms of what we do, matters.
The author explores the centrality of Human Intelligence in meeting the needs of the U.S. Army, as well as the Department of Defense, and the whole of government, for relevant information and tailored intelligence essential to creating a national security strategy; for defining whole of government policies that work in harmony; for acquisition of the right capabilities at the right price in time to be useful; and for operations, both local and global.
In this anthology, students in the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 critically examine the emerging 21st century security environment and offer diverse and innovative thoughts on how military power should be applied in situations short of general war.
Terrorist attacks are media events designed to draw the attention of the press since, without a larger audience, a terrorist attack will have accomplished very little. Shaping the attitudes and perceptions of the public can undermine the public will to fight. This is done by shaping media coverage.
Education in strategy is feasible and important. Few would-be strategists are beyond improvement by some formal education. However, for such education to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, and the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance.
The China Dragons of the 28th Combat Support Hospital deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from September 2006 until November 2007. Their service epitomizes the strides that have been made in military combat medicine.
The author outlines eight principles for a risk management defense strategy. He argues that these principles provide “measures of merit” for evaluating the new administration’s defense choices.
The author addresses the subject of the multifaceted nature and predominant role of gangs operating as state and nonstate proxies in the modern unbalanced global security environment. In every phase of the process of compelling radical political change, agitator-gangs and popular militias play significant roles in helping their political patrons prepare to take control of a targeted political-social entity. As a result, gangs (bandas criminales or whatever they may be called) are important components of a highly complex political-psychological-military act—contemporary irregular asymmetrical political war.
Given the wide-ranging and deep impact of counterinsurgency, the participants in the "Future Defense Dilemmas" seminar conducted by The Brookings Institution and the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, explored two key questions: (1) Is the United States pursuing and executing the right strategy? And (2) Does the military’s focus on counterinsurgency detract from other defense and security needs?
With thousands of negotiations being conducted by U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—the aggregate effect of successful or failed negotiations has an impact on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplish its mission there as well as meet American strategic goals. The author argues that the military’s strategic success in the future may increasingly depend on an expanded range of training that includes negotiation skills and practice. By analyzing the negotiating experience of U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers in Iraq, he offers recommendations to improve negotiating effectiveness and predeployment negotiation training.
The author examines why, despite devoting decades of research to developing countermeasures against biological agents, the Department of Defense has few products in its arsenal. She concludes that the military requires significant change in program structure and management to begin fielding protective drugs and vaccines for the warfighter efficiently.
While naval forces often are out of sight and out of mind to land forces engaged in expeditionary operations, their contribution is vital and becoming much more so. But they face major challenges, which if not resolved may mean the end of what has been called the "expeditionary era."
Dr Antulio J. Echevarria II critiques the theory of fourth-generation warfare, examining its problematic assumptions and logical flaws. He argues that this theory is hopelessly flawed and that its proponents undermine their credibility by subscribing to it.
The author argues that pseudo operations in which specially trained government troops--preferably supported by guerrilla defectors--infiltrate guerrilla groups have been very effective in previous operations. If used with care, such operations can be useful in future counterinsurgency campaigns.
The author reviews the basic concepts related to "deception," defining terms, providing historical examples, and discussing problems associated with deception.
Modern insurgency warfare presents fresh challenges for the United States, which must re-conceptualize its approach to fighting such conflicts. Because the dominant characteristics of insurgency--protractedness and ambiguity--effectively stymie the American military's approach to war, the United States needs to reorient its strategic thinking.
The author identifies the political-strategic challenges of modern unconventional conflicts, with a focus on the political complexity of insurgency. This report comes at a time when U.S. and other world political and military leaders have been struggling with the "new" political-psychological aspects of insurgency/terrorist war.
The author introduces a new approach to learning about the different ways of strategic thinking and interaction in Chinese culture. It is through learning the Chinese board game called go,that is a living reflection of Chinese philosophy, culture, strategic thinking, warfare, military tactics, and diplomatic bargaining. The author suggests that a little knowledge of go will take U.S. leaders a long way in understanding the essence of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy.
This monograph addresses trends in American strategic thinking to the war in Iraq. It argues that the American way of war is really a way of battle and offers some recommendations for change.
Insurgencies in the 21st century are different than the Cold War era ones that generated existing doctrine and strategy, and which shaped the way that most American strategists think about insurgency. This monograph assesses the growing insurgency in Nepal with its potential to further destabilize an already volatile region.
U.S. policymakers, officials, and writers on defense have employed the terms "asymmetric" or "asymmetry" to characterize everything from the nature of the threats we face to the nature of war and beyond. The author challenges the utility of using those terms to characterize the threats we face, one element of the broader debate over the nature of war, U.S. strategy, and the threats confronting us.
The trends in the strategic environment in the development of the Future War/Future Battlespace suggest that traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The strategic environment can be classified into four strategic battlespaces, within which future adversaries will operate to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives.
Globalization—the spread of information and information technologies, along with greater public participation in economic and political processes—is transforming every aspect of human affairs. What is not yet clear, however, are the impacts of these trends, especially how they might affect the nature of war. This monograph argues that the Clausewitzian trinity—hostility, chance, purpose—is still a valid way of looking at the nature of war in the 21st century.
This book represents some of the thinking by students at the U.S. Army War College, considering the nature and direction of transformation. They consider how the transformed joint services of the United States should employ force in the 21st century. The services are exploring concepts such as Effects Based Operations and Rapid Decisive Operations to move swiftly and strike vigorously to secure vi
Asymmetric guerrilla war--insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs)--are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The author draws from the lessons of the recent past to better prepare today's civilian and military leaders to meet the unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenges that face the United States and the rest of the intern
The authors examine the challenges of the 21st century international security environment to which future strategic leaders and policy practitioners will need to respond.
Throughout U.S. history the American military services have had an unfortunate penchant for not being ready be the next war. American military institutions have been surprisingly optimistic in weighting their preparedness as they embarked on the nation's wars. Military institutions have always had considerable problems in adapting and innovating during inter-war periods.
In order for institutional reform to succeed, it will have to be guided by a coherent and compelling national strategy, which must, in turn, be anchored in widely-accepted national interests.
The following two articles were written during and immediately after the war in Kosovo. The first is an adaptation of an earlier work written after a trip to Asia in 1998. In that essay, I suggested that foreign militaries were beginning to perceive our fixation on a firepower-centered way of war as an exploitable weakness. In fact, some states, armed with experience gained against us in real war, had already begun to evolve a doctrine to counter our superiority in precision.
The author makes it clear that he is not interested in throwing out the old tried and true existing Principles of War, he only wants thought given to their expansion to include a principle of Flexibility. After all, the hallmark of the course of instruction at the U.S. Army War College is the new environment in which its graduates should expect to operate--an environment that we at the War College characterize as vague, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. In such an environment, the author argues, Flexibility must be an operating principle, and it would serve all the services well to recognize it as such.
The meeting highlighted the urgency of the Colombian crisis and the need for a comprehensive response by Colombia, the United States, and the regional community of nations. Much of the dialogue developed the principal subthemes of the conference: the sources of violence; the role of the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers; the institutional capabilities and responses of the Colombian government and armed forces; and the role of the United States.
During the early decades of the 21st Century, the Army of 2025 will differ from today's Army in two distinct ways. First, it will achieve unprecedented strategic and operational speed by exploiting information technologies to create a knowledge-based organization. Second, it will exhibit tremendous flexibility and physical agility through streamlined, seamlessly integrated organizations that use new tactics and procedures.
In placing land power in context, we can spark an enlarged debate about land power, the strategic and operational versatility it offers policymakers, and its interrelationships with air and sea power. Additionally, we can examine the growing interdependence among the components of national and military power.
The Army operates within a global strategic environment. The parameters of warfare now and into the 21st century are much more complex. Today there is a great deal of talk about focusing on high end threats and relying on one dimension of military power, air power, to halt set-piece attacks by any would-be aggressor.
Professor Douglas Lovelace articulates the exigent need to begin preparing the U.S. armed forces for the international security environment which will succeed the post-Cold War era. He defines national security interests, describes the future international security environment, identifies derivative future national security objectives and strategic concepts, and discerns the military capabilities
In March 1996, Colonel Jim Blundell of the Association of the United States Army's Institute for Land Warfare and Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., of the U. S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute envisioned a symposium that would bring all the services together for an open and honest meeting aimed at defining the complex issues that will face the services individually and the Department of Defense corporately during the Joint Strategy Review and Quadrennial Defense Review process.
For nearly two centuries, the principles of war have guided practitioners of the military art. During the last 55 years the principles of war have been a key element of U.S. Army doctrine, and recently they have been incorporated into other Service and Joint doctrines. The turn of the 21st century and the dawn of what some herald as the "Information Age," however, may call into question whether principles originally derived in the 19th century and based on the experience of "Industrial Age" armed forces still hold. Moreover, despite their long existence, the applicability of the principles of war at the strategic level of warfare has not been the subject of detailed analysis or assessment.
Every year the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) prepare current assessments for their particular areas of interest. These assessments become the bedrock of the annual SSI Study Program. This year's assessments are crucial given the complexities of the post-Cold War world. Russia remains an enigma wrapped in a riddle with Russian national interests very much paramount in the Kremlin's thinking.