The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are increasingly proving their ability and willingness to unite to halt and prevent conflict and to further regional economic and political objectives. USAFRICOM is uniquely positioned to strengthen REC capacity as a first step in a longer-term Pan-African integration process for enhanced continental stability and security.
Western thinking on counterinsurgency seems to be that success in countering insurgencies depends on a perception of legitimacy among local populations. However, it may be more correct to consider the identity of who governs, rather than on how whoever governs governs.
Following the overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi, Libya’s National Transitional Council inherited a difficult and volatile domestic situation. The new leadership faces serious challenges in all areas of statehood. Libya’s immediate future is of critical importance, consequently, it is especially important for Libya's interim government to build the political institutions for a functioning modern democratic state.
What lessons can be learned from the occupation of Germany after World War II and from Iraq after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM? This Carlisle Paper analyzes both the similarities and differences between the occupations of both countries and suggests how lessons learned from both can be applied to the future.
Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. This book explores shortfalls in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and the mechanisms for interagency coordination of effort that have contributed to this situation, as well as reforms needed to meet emerging 21st century national security challenges.
This monograph considers both the future of Iraq and the differences and similarities between events in Iraq and the Arab Spring states. Serious and expanding mistakes by new governments are possible in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolutions, and any lessons that can be gleaned from earlier conflicts will be of considerable value to those nations. Moreover, U.S. Army officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) may often have unique opportunities and unique credibility to offer advice on the lessons of Iraq to their counterparts in some of the Arab Spring nations.
Intended to facilitate dialogue between academic experts, military leaders, policymakers, and civilian practitioners, this edited volume provides a state of the art analysis of current whole of government (WoG) approaches and their effectiveness for coordinating stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. It explores the question: Can “smart power”—using the right tool for each operational context—successfully shift the burden of stability operations to civilian actors and enable the timely scaling-down of military deployments?
This paper reviews the broad dimensions of the George W. Bush administration policy and strategy regarding Afghanistan and the fact that it was multilateral, encompassing extensive political, economic, and military efforts, and multinational during the entire period of the administration. It provides broad documentation of the concrete progress made in the country between 2001 and 2008 and addresses the ongoing challenges.
Stabilization operations have been present across the globe for centuries in many forms. But how have the command, leadership, and management of these operations manifested themselves, and what are the success attributes within this field of study?
Learning from the armed forces of Iraq and Lebanon might not seem the first instinct when it comes to improving post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Yet, the two cases offer useful insight into these processes, what to avoid and what to emphasize.
This conference was designed to outline strategies for coping with the threat posed to international stability by fragile, failing, or failed states. Presentations outlined various strategies for identifying and ameliorating the security challenges that result from state failure in contemporary international environments.
Military retirees in many African countries face uncertain futures. The author suggests that USAFRICOM should include robust engineering programs as a part of its training approach for the region, thereby providing valuable opportunities for retiring service members, improving civil-military relationships, and enhancing economic development and stability.
The authors investigate how the full range of law enforcement capabilities available to the U.S. Government has been applied in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives in Panama, Colombia, and Kosovo. This analysis identifies a number of lessons to be learned about the use of such capabilities (in a holistic sense) in current and future international operations.
A widely accepted and understood definition of "transition" is necessary to enable U.S. military, interagency, and multinational planners to foster greater collaboration and unity of effort as operations move toward a “clear, hold, build, transition” strategy.
David Galula’s ideas are reflected in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and in nearly every speech that American commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq give, but until now, almost no biographical information was available about him. Arguably the greatest writer on counterinsurgency, Galula led a fascinating, although all too brief, life that gave him a bird’s eye view of most of the great conflicts of the second half of the 20th century.
Stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to be challenged by the lack of effective local police forces to secure the civilian population from insurgent infiltration and criminal violence. Given U.S. government legal and organizational shortfalls to train and advise foreign police forces, coupled with an operational environment characterized by local police corruption and abusiveness, this monograph proposes a way ahead for effective community based policing despite these adverse circumstances.
Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war.
On June 24, 2009, in Washington, DC, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College conducted a conference on Leadership and Government Reform. Two panels discussed "Leader Development in Schools of Public Affairs" and "Leadership, National Security and 'Whole of Government' Reforms." The authors in this volume are from universities and policy institutes focused on international affairs, history, foreign policy, intelligence, and national and homeland security.
In this monograph, the author argues that rampant crime and violence have led to a full-blown crisis of the democratic state in Guatemala. He discusses the various criminal groups active in that country, and outlines a strategy for improving public order, strengthening government institutions, and combating the root causes that inform criminal activity.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. This Paper describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan.
In this anthology, students in the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 critically examine the emerging 21st century security environment and offer diverse and innovative thoughts on how military power should be applied in situations short of general war.
West Germany’s and South Africa’s experiences remind U.S. policymakers of the tremendous obstacles and challenges that confront states as they attempt to install liberal, democratic political institutions.
State-owned enterprises affect stability in conflict-prone environments, and decisive control of them creates positive or negative conditions. However, it is a challenge to know how and when to use these enterprises, and a good set of metrics is necessary to measure their effectiveness.
Iraqis are debating the desirability of atomic power for their country. U.S. and international policymakers will have to consider Iraqi views as they shape policy to manage the process of an orderly, safe, and peaceful nuclear reintegration of Iraq in the civilian sector while guaranteeing safeguards against both accidents and any future diversion of a nuclear program for military purposes or terrorist exploitation.
A primary catalyst in achieving our strategic ends in Iraq is through the formulation of a consolidated and cooperative strategic health care policy to enable the successful operation of the Iraqi health care system. An often-cited criticism of U.S. policy, however, is that after the end of major hostilities and transition into stabilization operations, we fall short in post-conflict planning and execution. This analysis highlights some of these operational deficiencies, and it provides recommendations for achieving a more coordinated, functional, and thereby synchronous strategic health care policy. These proposals will enable the U.S. Government (USG) to address health policy operations in stabilization and transitional phase contexts currently and in the future.
The security and stability of Africa has recently become an important national issue. However, to be effective this growing interest must be rooted in the desire to overcome centuries of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions and people of Africa.
Colombia has experienced conflict for decades and, as the author observed, was a “paradigm for a failing state” in that it was replete with terrorism, kidnapping, murder, corruption, and general lawlessness. But today it is much safer through the imposition of the "Rule of Law."
Afghanistan was America’s first attempt at conducting formalized Security Sector Reform. This case study offers readers an opportunity to learn whom the United States saw as key actors in the process, what institutions were slated for reform, and how well the United States and its partners met the typical challenges of SSR.
The authors provide a set of principles and operational guidelines for peacekeepers to help a country restore public infrastructure and services. The extent to which public sector reconstruction takes place is a function of the mission, the level of resources, expertise of the troops, and the host country context. This guide provides courses of action to both planners and practitioners in executing these operations and supplements existing and emerging documents.
Added September 25, 2009
Type: Letort Papers
A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts. Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski, Colonel Brian J. Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Donovan, Ms. Karma Job, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Kolasheski, Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., Brigadier Simon "Don" Roach, Colonel Sean P. Swindell, Colonel Curt A. Van De Walle, Colonel Michael J. McMahon.
Security Force Assistance may be a new term but the activities are familiar and are related to how the Department of Defense trains, advises, and assists foreign partners' security establishments to accomplish common objectives. Recommendations to improve U.S. performance are provided.
Military commanders and diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan have been meeting with important local officials since the inception of those conflicts. These engagements have aided commanders and diplomats alike in furthering their objectives by establishing productive relationships with those who know and understand Iraq’s complex human terrain best—the Iraqis. However, these engagements frequently take place on ad-hoc bases and are rarely incorporated into other counterinsurgency operations and strategies. In some cases, unit commanders fail to see the utility of using these engagements at all--an oversight that contributes to deteriorating security situations and loss of popular support.
The current age of state building may be traced back at least to U.S. involvement in the various Balkan conflicts. But with the advent of the Global War on Terror and the subsequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military, especially the Army and the Marines Corps, has been faced with an unprecedented challenge to reestablish entire countries and rebuild their institutions.
Understanding between the Departments of State and Defense is critical to ensuring national security. Nonetheless, these two key internationally-oriented agencies take different paths to arrive at the same goals--paths that must ultimately cross in order to heal the wounds of conflict.
With thousands of negotiations being conducted by U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—the aggregate effect of successful or failed negotiations has an impact on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplish its mission there as well as meet American strategic goals. The author argues that the military’s strategic success in the future may increasingly depend on an expanded range of training that includes negotiation skills and practice. By analyzing the negotiating experience of U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers in Iraq, he offers recommendations to improve negotiating effectiveness and predeployment negotiation training.
One of the basics of strategy is understanding the foe and the type of war in which a nation is involved. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does not fit easily into the mold of war, but that is because of too much comparison with conventional wars; the Cold War may provide a better model. This report chronicles the panels and resulting papers from the Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, in April 2006.
The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy. Debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies.
The meeting highlighted the urgency of the Colombian crisis and the need for a comprehensive response by Colombia, the United States, and the regional community of nations. Much of the dialogue developed the principal subthemes of the conference: the sources of violence; the role of the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers; the institutional capabilities and responses of the Colombian government and armed forces; and the role of the United States.
Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, who served as Special Envoy to Somalia provides an honest and compelling look at that controversial operation. In the second paper, Dr. David Tucker dissects the arguments to develop criteria which might be used for and against engagement in humanitarian operations in an attempt to guide U.S. policymakers. Ambassador Oakley and Dr. Tucker both agree that the United States, as a great power, will be engaged in intervention operations of all kinds all over the world.
This report provides an historical analysis of lessons from one of the most important wars of the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan. After reading this study, you will better understand the nature of operations "other than war" in multiethnic states. Many fear that these wars will set the paradigm for wars in the 1990s and will exert pressure on U.S. forces to conduct peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations in especially dangerous areas.
The author examines the bases of American military participation in the array of Third World activities falling under the general rubric of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The author then examines the effects of these actions on the principle of sovereignty. He next turns to the emerging roles of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement and the conceptual and practical differences between them, and concludes with some cautionary lessons for the Army.