The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
Stabilization operations have been present across the globe for centuries in many forms. But how have the command, leadership, and management of these operations manifested themselves, and what are the success attributes within this field of study?
Learning from the armed forces of Iraq and Lebanon might not seem the first instinct when it comes to improving post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Yet, the two cases offer useful insight into these processes, what to avoid and what to emphasize.
The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism examines the roles which armed forces have been required to perform by democratic governments involved in combating terrorism, and the problems which can occur as a consequence. It also describes the conditions necessary for successful military engagements against terrorist groups.
Institutional defense establishments guide the development of national military capabilities. Recent experience suggests that the orthodox approaches that they have evolved to perform this function in nominal peacetime are insufficiently responsive for contemporary threats and challenges.
This conference was designed to outline strategies for coping with the threat posed to international stability by fragile, failing, or failed states. Presentations outlined various strategies for identifying and ameliorating the security challenges that result from state failure in contemporary international environments.
David Galula’s ideas are reflected in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and in nearly every speech that American commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq give, but until now, almost no biographical information was available about him. Arguably the greatest writer on counterinsurgency, Galula led a fascinating, although all too brief, life that gave him a bird’s eye view of most of the great conflicts of the second half of the 20th century.
Stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to be challenged by the lack of effective local police forces to secure the civilian population from insurgent infiltration and criminal violence. Given U.S. government legal and organizational shortfalls to train and advise foreign police forces, coupled with an operational environment characterized by local police corruption and abusiveness, this monograph proposes a way ahead for effective community based policing despite these adverse circumstances.
In this anthology, students in the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 critically examine the emerging 21st century security environment and offer diverse and innovative thoughts on how military power should be applied in situations short of general war.
The authors provide a set of principles and operational guidelines for peacekeepers to help a country restore public infrastructure and services. The extent to which public sector reconstruction takes place is a function of the mission, the level of resources, expertise of the troops, and the host country context. This guide provides courses of action to both planners and practitioners in executing these operations and supplements existing and emerging documents.
Added September 25, 2009
Type: Letort Papers
A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts. Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski, Colonel Brian J. Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Donovan, Ms. Karma Job, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Kolasheski, Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., Brigadier Simon "Don" Roach, Colonel Sean P. Swindell, Colonel Curt A. Van De Walle, Colonel Michael J. McMahon.
Security Force Assistance may be a new term but the activities are familiar and are related to how the Department of Defense trains, advises, and assists foreign partners' security establishments to accomplish common objectives. Recommendations to improve U.S. performance are provided.
This authors argue that the idea of an operational level of war charged with the planning and conduct of campaigns misconceives the relationship between wars, campaigns, and operations, and is both historically mistaken and wrong in theory. They conclude that its incorporation into U.S. doctrine has had the regrettable impact of separating the conduct of campaigns from the conduct of wars and consequently marginalized the role of politics in the direction of war. In essence, they argue that the idea of the campaign has come to overwhelm that of strategy.
This monograph seeks to analyze military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant—the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.
The question of "whether formations and units organized, trained, and equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted well enough and fast enough to dissuade or co-opt them—or, more significantly, to build the capacity of local security forces to do the dissuading and destroying"--is central to the on-going debate over whether the Army has the proper structure and training to perform full spectrum operations.
The author discusses the traditional importance of unity of command in American doctrine and practice from World War I until now, and how this principle has been forsaken in the evolution of military command for Afghanistan. He argues for a renewal of understanding of the importance of unity of command and recommends amending the Unified Command Plan to invest one "supreme commander" with responsibility for the current Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Joint Operations Area.
Contributors to this volume agree that climate change is a threat deserving of serious attention. They stress the need for greater planning and coordination and for further research as well as the utility of engagement—military to military and state to state—on environmental issues. They differ as to whether the Armed Forces should play a leading or supporting role, but agree that they can—and already do—make a valuable contribution.
The author evaluates the extent to which America’s principal military ally, the United Kingdom, has been able to transition to effects-based operations and the implications this has for the United States.
The contemporary challenges underpinning interagency cooperation within the U.S. Government are not entirely new. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination.
The culture of irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier. Since World War II, the wider military has lost this expertise. Given the variety of political environments in which today’s conventional soldiers may find themselves and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new old realities of irregular war.
One of the basics of strategy is understanding the foe and the type of war in which a nation is involved. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does not fit easily into the mold of war, but that is because of too much comparison with conventional wars; the Cold War may provide a better model. This report chronicles the panels and resulting papers from the Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, in April 2006.
The trends in the strategic environment in the development of the Future War/Future Battlespace suggest that traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The strategic environment can be classified into four strategic battlespaces, within which future adversaries will operate to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives.
The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy. Debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies.
Asymmetric guerrilla war--insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs)--are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The author draws from the lessons of the recent past to better prepare today's civilian and military leaders to meet the unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenges that face the United States and the rest of the intern
The topic of homeland security includes a broad array of missions and mission areas ranging from national missile defense to military assistance to civil authorities. The topic has recently attracted a great deal of attention due to the public's heightened awareness of the variety and nature of emerging threats and of the United States vulnerabilities to them. The Army Staff was assigned to investigate the Army's role in homeland security from a strategic, rather than a legal or procedural perspective.
U.S. strategy in the Balkans and the Army's role there is examined. The author recommends continued U.S. involvement, consideration of a long-term American military presence in the region, and some significant changes in role of the U.S. Army.
The author analyzes the role of landpower in the 170 smaller-scale contingencies conducted by the United States during the last decade. The author especially emphasizes the recurring problems in the planning, execution, and force structure for stabilization tasks, including nation-building.
The book is organized as an anthology of the best of a series of excellent symposium presentations, revised in light of the discussions that took place there, and complemented by an explanation of the strategic interests of the United States in Latin America and an overview.
In placing land power in context, we can spark an enlarged debate about land power, the strategic and operational versatility it offers policymakers, and its interrelationships with air and sea power. Additionally, we can examine the growing interdependence among the components of national and military power.
Only after the future roles of the U.S. military have been determined can the Department of Defense turn to the other important issues posed by Congress. Dr. William T. Johnsen concludes that the U.S. military will continue to perform its traditional roles: deterrence, reassurance, compellence, and support to the nation. The method and manner of carrying out those roles, however, will change.
Armies historically have been criticized for preparing for the last war. Since the early 1980s, however, the U.S. Army has broken this pattern and created a force capable of winning the next war. But, in an era characterized by a volatile international security environment, accelerating technological advances (particularly in acquiring, processing, and disseminating information), the emergence of what some are calling a "revolution in military affairs," and forecasts of increasingly constrained fiscal resources, it seems ill-advised to plan only for the "next Army."
Security professionals and strategists are discovering the post-cold war world is as rife with persistent, low-level violence as its predecessors. In fact, many regions are experiencing a rise in the amount of conflict in the absence of restraints previously imposed by the superpowers.
Effectiveness in multinational peace operations has become an important issue for the Army. In addition to traditional peacekeeping to monitor cease-fires and truces, the Army is now involved in activities such as peace enforcement and the reconstruction of failed states. While the Army has well-established procedures for traditional peacekeeping, it clearly has much to analyze and learn about these new types of multinational peace operations.