



USAWC KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST 2013-2014

PART I: ARMY PRIORITIES FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE: ARMY IMPERATIVES

1. Provide Modernized and Ready, Tailored Land Force Capabilities to meet combatant commanders' requirements across the range of military operations.

Near-Term Objectives:

a. *Train for Operational Adaptability*

1) Evaluate current and previous efforts of Security Sector Reform/Defense Sector Reform (SSR/DSR) as conducted through the Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD), and international partners. Assess where positive and negative outcomes have occurred. Drawing on such findings, recommend a potential model or framework through which the Army could improve support to SSR/DSR. (Point of Contact (POC): Ms. Rachel Smith, Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) G-3/5/7, International Affairs, rachel.m.smith.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-9587)

2) What are the key skills and attributes the Army must sustain to retain the capability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, and how will the Army develop and sustain those skills and attributes? Civil Affairs? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQ G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)

3) ***Can the significant amount of vertical lift capability resident in the Army be integrated into emerging Air-Sea battle doctrine? What are the requirements for a combat aviation brigade (CAB) to train for sea-based operations, especially in an anti-access/area denial environment? How can Army Aviation complement Marine capabilities in sea-based helicopter operations? (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-1634)

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b. *Continue to Increase the Integration between Conventional Forces and Special Forces*

4) In order to positively shape the operational environment for unified action, the Army must effectively employ strategic Landpower. Historically, Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) have focused efforts on human interaction. Army Conventional Forces (CF) have specialized in combined arms maneuver with less regard for the impact of human interaction. Given the current level of uncertainty in the strategic environment along with the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept, analyze how SOF and CF might become more interdependent across each operation plan phase, and describe some ways and means through which SOF and CF can efficiently increase their capabilities through interdependent actions. (POC: COL David Bolduc, HQDA G-3/5/7, Special Operations Division, david.r.bolduc.mil@mail.mil, 703-695-8490)

c. *Integrate Lessons Learned and Capabilities Gained in Recent Operations*

5) During the past decade-plus of conflict, the U.S. Army has faced numerous types of asymmetric threats from adversaries seeking to evade U.S. Army overmatch capabilities on the battlefield. The Army responded by developing rapid and adaptive processes to counter and defeat these new threats. However, with the coming reduction of Army personnel and funding, there is significant risk of the erosion of the capabilities and knowledge gained over the course of these operations. How can the Army best institutionalize the lessons learned over the past decade, or should the Army make the deliberate decision to relearn these capabilities in future conflict? Should the Army adjust its policies and procedures in response to the last conflict or deliberately decide to allow future Army leaders to innovate to solve their specific problems of the day? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-4916)

6) Based upon the experiences of the past decade of conflict, especially in regard to Army and DoD efforts to counter the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, should the Army institutionalize a Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)-like organizational ability to identify and address future asymmetric threats as they emerge? If so, what capabilities and resources would such an organization require, and where should it reside? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-4916)

7) After the United States departs Afghanistan, opportunities to gain experience in coalition missions may be limited. How valuable is coalition experience to the U.S. Army? How can the Army sustain the knowledge gained through the coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan? (POC: COL Thomas Moffatt, HQDA G-3/5/7, Military Observers Group, thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-7150)

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d. *Continue to Maintain a Global Stabilizing Presence*

8) How does U.S. Army support for international/United Nations (UN) operations enhance U.S. national security? The policy governing command and control of individual soldiers assigned to international and UN operations is over 40 years old. How should the U.S. Army conduct command and control of these personnel? (POC: COL Thomas Moffatt, HQDA G-3/5/7, Military Observers Group, thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-7150)

9) How do we institutionalize lessons learned in building partner capacity since September 11, 2001 (9-11) and then apply them as we go forward?

10) Due to the increased emphasis on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC), how can we develop metrics and a net assessment to determine that shaping and engagement actions work? Develop recommendations to measure and assess these actions and prioritize where the Army needs to focus its efforts?

11) How much can we increase our reliance on new and traditional friends and allies? How do we encourage our friends and partners to carry a larger (more proportionate?) share of the international security responsibility? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)

e. *Adapt the Army Force Generation Model*

12) Should the Army continue to utilize the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) as a core process versus its use of a temporary wartime procedure? How does the Army's Title 10 requirement to generate forces change based on conditions and demand? (POC: COL Todd Key, HQDA G-3/5/7, War Plans, todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-7458)

f. *Regionally Align Forces*

13) ***Determine courses of action (COAs) to equip the RAF concept:

- Should the Army build Table of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) that correspond with RAFs?
- How can/should the Army Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) structure best support RAF?
- Should the Army build RAF equipment sets to support rotation of forces?
- How do you support the logistic requirements for this equipment set?

(POC: COL Michael Linick, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, michael.e.linick.mil@mail.mil, 703-693-3240)

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14) As the Army moves towards implementation of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, what is the best way to implement Army Aviation within RAF? An aviation task force to support a RAF may have to operate in multiple types of environments. How does this potential impact Army Aviation's ability to adequately support RAF? Are environmentally qualified Aviation units more effective than regionally-aligned units? (POC: LTC David George, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation-Current Operations, david.a.george.mil@mail.mil, 703-695-0209)

15) Due to the increase in the operating tempo (OPTEMPO), reduced resources and efforts of the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the recently released DoD Initiative (DoDI) 5111.20, assess the feasibility to incorporate the State Partnership Program as integral to the RAF. (www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511120p.pdf, State Partnership Program). (COL Lorelei Copen, USAWC, PKSOI, Lorelei.e.copen.mil@mail.mil, 717-245-3740)

16) How can the RAF concept be implemented to benefit the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Alliance? Moreover, what is the optimal role of the RAF? (POC: MAJ Matthew Yiengst, Eighth U.S. Army, Strategic Planner, matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil)

g. Institute Army Total Force Policy

17) The Militia System and the Creighton Abrams experiment may have run their course. Should the Army rethink force mix and component roles? Part of this may include focusing the ARNG on homeland defense as part of the Department of Homeland Security. What other important Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) mix issues should be examined as the Army draws down. (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HDAQ G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)

18) Due to the increasing tempo of operations and need for responsiveness, is it time to reexamine the "Abrams doctrine" and look at the possibility of going to war without the RC and operate for a period of time solely with the AC? Does deploying the RC really influence public support?

h. Set Theaters via Capable Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and Theater Support Forces

19) ***Explain the doctrinal and operational relationships between "Building Partner Capacity," "Security Cooperation," "Security Assistance," and "Security Force Assistance." Describe how the Army currently contributes to each of these, if the contributions are the "right" efforts at the appropriate levels, and ways that the Army can improve on its contributions. (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Strategy and Programs, mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7807)

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20) What should the roles and missions of corps and ASCCs be? Are they duplicative? (Dr. John Bonin, USAWC, CSLD, john.a.bonin.civ@mail.mil, 717-245-3457)

21) The U.S. Army cannot prevent and shape conflict everywhere. Within each geographic combatant command, where are the key places the Army needs to engage in order to best support U.S. national security objectives? What advice should the Army provide to civil leadership on the engagement-risk tradeoff? (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-9450)

22) How can Army Air and Missile Defense improve the balance between Army, Joint and Combatant Command (COCOM) priorities in a fiscally constrained environment? (POC: LTC Kurt Johnson, HQDA G-3/5/7, Air and Missile Defense, kurt.w.johnson6.mil@mail.mil, 703-607-1203)

23) What is the Army role in supporting evolving U.S. policy towards Africa (post Libya, Mali, Algeria, etc.) and possible expansion of U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) role in helping secure/promote U.S. interests on the continent?

24) The Security Cooperation mission crosses over agency boundaries—principally a State department lead, with military support, dominated by Foreign Military Sales (FMS). What are the missions, roles, and responsibilities of the various stakeholders? There are numerous stakeholders within the Army who conduct security cooperation activities. Is there a need to have a single Army proponent for Army security cooperation to better synchronize holistic security cooperation efforts (to include security assistance) in order to support Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) end states? (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Strategy and Programs, mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7807)

25) What are the long term benefits and risks of land forces on Korea, in North East Asia, in the Asia-Pacific region? (POC: MAJ Matthew Yiengst, Eighth U.S. Army, Strategic Planner, matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil)

26) Interoperability is often cited as a key way to enhance the benefits and effectiveness of multinational operations. Even after over a decade of coalition operations, there is a lack of cohesion in efforts to increase interoperability between the United States and its allies and partners. Discuss what interoperability is and its components and what it means to a participating nation. Describe a potential overarching interoperability policy that accounts for minimum standards for interoperability, that sets criteria for countries with which the United States should be interoperable, and recommends means, methods and/or processes (existing or needed) to achieve such interoperability and increase coherency of efforts. (POC: Ms. Alicia Weed, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Programs, alicia.g.weed.civ@mail.mil, 703-693-1989)

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i. *Provide Ready and Trained Forces for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Forces for Operations in the Homeland*

27) ***How can the Army best integrate and synchronize the functions included within what DoD terms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) across the Army Staff, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), and subordinate commands? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)

28) Many active CBRN forces are on orders/Prepare To Deploy Orders (PTDO) to support Homeland Defense missions. Given the magnitude of this mission, they are considered unavailable for overseas contingency missions. Assess if the active force requirements to support potential Homeland Defense and Domestic Response missions are adequate. Are these active CBRN forces able to meet future overseas contingency operations given the domestic requirements? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)

29) Army General Purpose Forces (GPF) are a critical for the success of the Joint Force Counter-WMD operations. Is the current Brigade Combat Team (BCT)-organized force more effective than the Division-based force for supporting Joint Forces CWMD operations as the major component (and lead) for Unified Land Operations? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)

30) Joint and Army strategic planning guidance documents clearly identify Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) as a means to train foreign forces to support regional coalitions. Likewise, disaster relief and consequence management forces that are regionally-based can offer a quicker response to a disaster/humanitarian incident. How could U.S. Consequence Management/CBRN forces be employed to train regional forces in this technical mission? What are the costs and requirements to initiate such a BPC program? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)

j. *Balance Active and Reserve Component Force Readiness*

31) ***If we do not plan to engage in “long wars,” and we do not plan to “mobilize for the duration,” then how should the Army change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC and how to utilize them? Is the RC too large? Should it be larger? What is the “right mix” of force allocation between the AC and RC? (POC: COL Michael Linick, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, michael.e.linick.mil@mail.mil, 703-693-3240)

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32) What is the Army's responsibility to provide a strategic reserve? In the context of the on-going drawdown, what is the capacity of the Army to provide a strategic reserve? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)

33) Sustaining the aviation fleet remains a top priority for the Army. The OPTEMPO and resources of the past decade have permitted high states of readiness and maintenance. Given the impact of budget constraints on aviation readiness, how must sustainment evolve in order to ensure the health of the fleet? Describe some ways to properly incentivize more efficient sustainment of Army aircraft. (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-1634)

34) What is the appropriate composition of aviation assets across the AC, the RC, and National Guard (NG)? For example, does the NG have a requirement for AH-64s and/or does it make more sense that greater lift capability reside in the RC? (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-1634)

35) Section 12304a of Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense authority to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the army Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days to provide assistance in response to a major disaster or emergency. Discuss the various issues at stake when USAR elements are mobilized to conduct homeland support operations. Develop a potential strategy through which the Army can efficiently execute such an order. (POC: LTC Deborah Scott, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil, 703-693-8982)

36) Section 12304b of Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense authority to order any unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in Title 10, Section 10143a) to active duty for not more than 365 consecutive days to augment the active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command. Discuss the various issues at stake when USAR elements are mobilized to augment a combatant command. Develop a potential strategy through which the Army can efficiently execute such an order. (POC: LTC Deborah Scott, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil, 703-693-8982)

37) Trace the series of presidential executive orders that have mobilized the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to active duty from Operation DESERT STORM through the present day. Considering this history as well as the missions conducted by the Ready Reserve beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, outline a potential strategy for the future of U.S. AR and NG mobilization. What is the value of the Ready Reserve as an operational force? What is the value of the Ready Reserve as a strategic reserve? Recommend ways in which the Army can leverage the RC to balance the concepts of

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scalability and responsiveness in the future. (POC: LTC Clayton Gardner, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, clayton.e.gardner.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-2002)

Mid-Term Objectives:

k. *Modernize Equipment to Prepare for Future Challenges*

38) The new Defense Guidance directs a transition from a narrow to a broader focus for the Army as it prepares for future potential conflicts and adversaries represented by a complex and interconnected global operational environment, as articulated in the Army's Equipment Modernization Strategy. Considering the expected likely future strategic environment how should the Army balance force protection, mobility and fire power in its vehicle fleet? As part of this consideration, what is the future role of the two variants of Stryker-equipped brigades? Also, what are the advantages and disadvantages of a Bradley-based replacement for the M113 family? (POC: COL Richard Holdren, HQDA G-3/5/7, Experimentation and Testing, richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-4363)

1. *Increase the Combat Power of Army Formations*

39) ***Given the rise of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), especially those at the platoon level, how might the area of operations of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) change? How might such a change impact the overall force structure of the Army? How have previous technological advancements impacted force structures in the past? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G-3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems, james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil, 703-693-3552)

40) Consider the current measures of Army readiness. What are the relationships between readiness, capacity, and capability? How can readiness measures evolve to increase their value to the commander with respect to a unit's mission set? (POC: COL Matthew Ferguson, HQDA G-3/5/7, Army Readiness, matthew.j.ferguson12.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-5998)

41) What are the implications of current technology on the Army's BCT structure? What are the dimensions of battle space that a modern BCT covers? Do these dimensions differ significantly across the potential operational environments? Recommend a new force structure that leverages scalability and responsiveness to contingencies. (POC: COL Richard Holdren, HQDA G-3/5/7, Experimentation and Testing, richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-4363)

m. *Ensure that Forces are capable of Joint Entry Operations*

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42) Evaluate the tradeoffs of power projection, prepositioning, and forward stationing.

43) What role do ground forces play in defeating an adversary's anti-access/area-denial strategies?

44) Given previous work with respect to anti-access/area denial in space—Tactical Space Protection Study, National Security Strategy for Space, National Military Strategy for Space Operations, DoD Definition for Space Resilience—and the Joint Operational Access Concept, what might be the best way for the Army to assure its space-dependent warfighting functions in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment where space systems are degraded for substantial periods of time? How could the Army reduce the degree and/or duration of degradation through implementation of various alternate space and nonspace means? Some examples of such mitigation include the deployment/employment of tactical satellite constellations, use of high-altitude long-loiter orbits, and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)/UASs. (POC: COL Jeffrey Farnsworth, HQDA G-3/5/7, Space, jeffrey.a.farnsworth.mil@mail.mil, 703-607-5889)

n. *Protect Friendly Mission Command Systems and Impede Enemy Information*

45) The relationship between Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare is described as one of convergence, but in reality the two are, and should remain, inextricably linked but separate. Understanding the relationship between Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare is essential to sufficiently exploit opportunities and defend vulnerabilities within these related areas. Analyze the symbiotic nature of their relationship, articulate the separation and the similarities of the two, and describe the impact of conducting Cyber Operations and Electronic Warfare to achieve national security objectives. (POC: COL Charles Ekvall, HQDA G-3/5/7, Electronic Warfare, charles.j.ekvall.mil@mail.mil, 703-614-6795)

46) The recent establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) directs the Commander to also serve as Director, National Security Agency, leaning toward an intelligence-centric mission. Yet, the associated Service Cyberspace mission is to build, operate, and defend the network which is primarily a communication-centric mission. Given USCYBERCOM's mission to direct operations, defend networks, and, on order, conduct full spectrum operations, has DoD appropriately framed the command and control of military cyberspace forces? (POC: COL Carmine Cicalese, HQDA G-3/5/7, Cyber/Information Operations, carmine.cicalese.mil@mail.mil, 703-695-1864)

Long-Term Objectives:

o. *Develop the Plan for Mission Tailored Force Packages*

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47) The Defense Strategic Guidance from January 2012, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, states that “Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.” For Army forces, develop a definition of “denying the objectives of . . .” and consider how the Army might contribute to such a “deny” mission. (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-9450)

48) The Defense Strategic Guidance from January 2012, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, states that “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” For Army forces, define “low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” and suggest how the Army might contribute to such an approach. (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-9450)