

To Preserve U.S. Military Advantage in the 21st
Century:

**WE ACTUALLY KNOW THE (MOST
IMPORTANT) FUTURE
& “TAIL” IS MORE IMPORTANT
THAN “TOOTH” FOR U.S.**

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-At first glance, these two points seem unrelated. But they are connected because they both are critical factors on force structure decisions.

-When I say that we “know” the future, I do not mean that we can predict a specific event (although that maybe possible under certain circumstances).

-We do know the likely trends and the likely wild cards and human nature. There are “known unknowns,” but there are no “unknown unknowns” except for those who are not paying attention to the former.

-The belief that we have routinely been “fooled” or “had intelligence failed” in the past is wrong, or at best, overstated.

-Example: In 1941, we knew that a war with Japan was likely and likely to begin with a surprise attack; we just didn’t expect it at Pearl Harbor.

-Evidence of expectation—today’s very first panel: War Plan Orange/serious Rainbow Plans

- We constantly hear concern about “tooth to tail” ratio and how the cost of the tail cuts into resources available for our warfighting teeth. Tail is considered a “bad thing” in our acquisition, acquisition, acquisition-minded DoD. But for our global posture and our advantage as a global military power, I would argue that “tail” (as will be defined later) is more important than “tooth.” That is not to denigrate warfighting—we need to beat our enemies. But other militaries can fight too—regionally. Our “tail” gets us there and sustains us there—everywhere.

Two Choices of Focus for Future Joint Forces

• Wars of Necessity

1. China
 - Force against Taiwan, others
2. Russia
 - In the NATO, semi-NATO "near abroad"
3. Iran
 - Versus the west of the Gulf
4. North Korea
 - "Gottterdammerung" as the North regime collapses

• Wars of Choice

1. Counterinsurgencies
 2. Counter-proliferation
 3. Promotion of democracy, stability, etc.
 4. Responsibility to protect
- Etc, etc...

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- We can have two "different" futures, with two different force structure requirements. But one is critical to the survival of America as a global power in a world where others will challenge it. The other consists of the global messiness and "instability" that bothers the conscience of liberal democracies.
- In my studies of the future security environment and on anti-access warfare I refer to them as wars of choice and wars of necessity. Since the 1991 Fall of Communism and the Gulf War, we have involved ourselves in wars of choice.
- Whether wise or not, the problem is that the joint military force structure optimized for wars of choice is not the structure optimized for wars of necessity. It used to be that we assumed that if we could handle the high end fight, we could handle low end operations. Now, I would argue, we have optimized our forces for the low end fight assuming they can handle the high end. Both are bad assumptions, but I rather make the first than the second.
- Up to 1991, our global advantage incorporated a wars of necessity force structure—but that's not the trend now. (A naval example is LCS.)
- Since our political leadership (and everyone else too) don't want to have to fight a war of necessity, we start pretending they are not possible (or at least highly unlikely)—so it is tough to argue for a higher end force structure; that's swimming against a political tide.
- But we do know the "big" future. We know that there are only four possible wars of necessity. Why? Because as the political science number-crunchers have inadvertently/surprisingly demonstrated (quote George Modelski) real democracies do not fight real democracies. Authoritarian governments, however, will always be opponents in some degree because the existence of successful democracies is always a threat to their hold on power. Why bow to a single party when democracies are as powerful and economically successful as your authoritarian state?
- By the way, the way we teach international relations is wrong: it is not the nature of the system that causes conflict, it is the nature of the regimes.
- We need to deter wars of necessity. But to have credible deterrence, one must have credible forces and the will to contemplate it and plan.

Wars of Necessity have three parts:

1. The Deterrence Campaign

- Probably best outcome if successful

2. The Anti-Access Campaign

- Might be able to end the war then & there if the anti-access network crumbles
- This is an attrition battle

3. The Decisive Force Campaign

- To the extent needed
- If #2 Anti-Access Campaign is not successful you will never get to #3

Needed most: on station forward with mobility/survivability; readiness; redundancy; ability to operate in restricted C2; deception; ASATs; dominant strategic nuclear deterrent

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- If #1 is successful, #2 and #3 don't have to happen.
- If #2 is successful, the war might end before #3.
- But if #2 is not successful, #3 will never happen.
- So what should we be prioritizing right now if we want to deter wars of necessity?
- We should be prioritizing "tail"! Tail that supports/facilitates/incorporates the requirements on the bottom of the slide.

What do I mean by tail and what are our advantages?

1. U.S. global alliance network
 - Have to constantly work at supporting allies and partners
 - Tailored security cooperation, joint exercises; constant reassurance; act as if foreign events are important; ditch ITAR for allies
 - What not to say: "We take no position on territorial claims (in the Pacific region)..."
2. Logistics capability to globally move and sustain force against opposition
 - See next slide
3. Maintenance, inventory, personnel, "portfolio of capabilities" (vice acquisition, acquisition, acquisition, acquisition...)

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•When I talk about tail, I am not talking about food or fuel service. I am talking about the things that give us global access.

•The number one global advantage is our network of alliances and partnerships. It is what allows us to have forces ashore too. As a naval officer, I certainly have no problem with sea basing. But the ability to be visibly on the ground there is necessary to be a global power. We need to do everything we can to preserve this web of alliances.

•And, no, the PRC is not going to be our partner, even if we invite them to exercises and they send ships to the Horn of Africa.

•Moving the force in combat is the capability that provides for the global alliance network. They are not our allies just because they like our rhetoric...they remain our allies even when they don't like our rhetoric—if we can deploy to help protect them.

•For years we have sacrificed maintenance for acquisition—that is what is hollowing out our force. The Navy has started to recognize that.

•And please...how can we say people are our most important assets and our priority and turn around in a second and say their health care costs are killing DoD. We have the most creative, self-initiative force—do we really want to constantly tell them they are too expensive?

•My view is that DoD leadership sees one thing—acquisition. That's what makes the big news. That's what looks shiny. But that is not what gives us a GLOBAL advantage.

Logistics capability to globally move and sustain force against opposition



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
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- Without the assets on the left, the assets on the right become pointless. Any major state can have a fourth generation fighter force; any major state can have a coastal or sea denial navy. But since they can't project power beyond their region, we will retain an advantage denied them...as long as we invest in the left as much, and in some cases, more than the right.
- Wars of necessity will require us to fight to get there—that is what anti-access is really about. But our advantage is that we can choose the axis and time. Wars of choice generally do not require our fighting to get there...so we forget about how hard it is and become determined to sacrifice much to acquire the latest promising tooth program.
- This obsession is such that we buy without testing because we want economies of scale. We fund programs with 10 unproven technologies—such as DDG-1000—and wonder why we have massive overruns.
- Wars of necessity require a balanced portfolio—but its hard to see the balance in our current priorities.

Want to know more?



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•Good bargains on amazon.com.

BACK-UPS

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- Back-ups will only be used to answer substantial question on anti-access.

We know the general outlines of the future security environment

- No one can predict a specific event.
- But we do know the likely trends and the likely wild cards and human nature.
- The belief that we have routinely been “fooled” or “had intelligence failed” in the past is wrong, or at best, overstated.
 - Example: In 1941, we knew that a war with Japan was likely and likely to begin with a surprise attack; we just didn't expect it at Pearl Harbor.
 - Evidence of expectation: War Plan Orange/serious Rainbow Plans

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Underlying Motives for A2/AD Strategies

- **Not a new concept – a renewed concept**
- **Lesson learned from *Operation Desert Storm* (1991):**

If you let the Americans/Coalition forces operate on or near your territory, they will inevitably defeat you.

- **Conclusion:**

Neutralize their forces (and allies) in the region; prevent them from returning to region; present a scenario of high attrition

Representative A2/AD Capabilities

- *Physical chokepoints*
- *Capabilities against opponents' homelands*
- *C4ISR*
- *Space assets*
- *Cyber war assets*
- *Ballistic missiles*
- *Naval assets (including mines)*
- *Offensive air assets*
- *Defensive air assets*
- *Asymmetric/irregular warfare advantages*
- *Special operations assets*
- *Espionage and internal penetration of opponents*

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Conclusions For Attacking Force

1. **The key historical factor in success against A2/AD is deception.**
 - As to location of breakthrough operation
 - As to time of breakthrough operation
2. **The primary means of defeating A2/AD weapons systems is through destruction/neutralization of sensors.**
 - Sensors are most vulnerable parts of C4ISR networks
 - Key targets that must be destroyed/neutralized: satellites, OTH radars
 - Expands maneuver space for attacking force
3. **Persistent fires from multiple axes are necessary for overwhelming enemy A2/AD.**
 - Expect enemy A2/AD to survive initial salvos
 - The operation will require a volume of fire "attrition phase"
 - Objective is to identify locations of targets

Conclusions For A2/AD Defending Force

1. **Primary mission of A2/AD remains deterrence / dissuasion.**
2. **Can not wait for attacker to mass strength. Must attrite attacking force at furthest possible ranges.**
 - A strategy of "luring in the enemy" is rarely effective
 - Must balance with maintaining weapons inventory
 - Attrition battle of quantitatively equal forces favors the defender
3. **Own sensors must be defended. Enemy sensors are the initial targets.**
 - Sensors are most vulnerable parts of C4ISR networks
4. **Deception, cover / concealment, and maneuver are essential.**
5. **"Shaking the attackers resolve" by attrition alone is overrated.**
 - Did not stop U.S., Allies in WWII
 - Media is significant factor, but depends on perception of vital/non-vital interest
 - Attack on U.S. homeland is wild card – best tactic, perhaps worse strategy

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