

**To Preserve U.S. Military Advantage in the 21st
Century:**

**WE ACTUALLY KNOW THE (MOST
IMPORTANT) FUTURE**

**& “TAIL” IS MORE IMPORTANT
THAN “TOOTH” FOR U.S.**

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Two Choices of Focus for Future Joint Forces

- **Wars of Necessity**

1. China

- Force against Taiwan, others

2. Russia

- In the NATO, semi-NATO
“near abroad”

3. Iran

- Versus the west of the Gulf

4. North Korea

- “Gotterdammerung” as the
North regime collapses

- **Wars of Choice**

1. Counterinsurgencies

2. Counter-proliferation

3. Promotion of democracy,
stability, etc.

4. Responsibility to protect

Etc, etc...

Wars of Necessity have three parts:

1. The Deterrence Campaign

- Probably best outcome if successful

2. The Anti-Access Campaign

- Might be able to end the war then & there if the anti-access network crumbles
- This is an attrition battle

3. The Decisive Force Campaign

- To the extent needed
- If #2 Anti-Access Campaign is not successful you will never get to #3

Needed most: on station forward with mobility/survivability; readiness; redundancy; ability to operate in restricted C2; deception; ASATs; dominant strategic nuclear deterrent

What do I mean by tail and what are our advantages?

1. U.S. global alliance network



- Have to constantly work at supporting allies and partners
- Tailored security cooperation, joint exercises; constant reassurance; act as if foreign events are important; ditch ITAR for allies
 - What not to say: “We take no position on territorial claims (in the Pacific region).”

2. Logistics capability to globally move and sustain force against opposition



- See next slide

3. Maintenance, inventory, personnel, “portfolio of capabilities” (vice acquisition, acquisition, acquisition, acquisition...)

Logistics capability to globally move and sustain force against opposition



Want to know more?



BACK-UPS

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We know the general outlines of the future security environment

- No one can predict a specific event.
- But we do know the likely trends and the likely wild cards and human nature.
- The belief that we have routinely been “fooled” or “had intelligence failed” in the past is wrong, or at best, overstated.
 - Example: In 1941, we knew that a war with Japan was likely and likely to begin with a surprise attack; we just didn’t expect it at Pearl Harbor.
 - Evidence of expectation: War Plan Orange/serious Rainbow Plans

Underlying Motives for A2/AD Strategies

- **Not a new concept – a renewed concept**
- **Lesson learned from *Operation Desert Storm* (1991):**

If you let the Americans/Coalition forces operate on or near your territory, they will inevitably defeat you.

- **Conclusion:**

Neutralize their forces (and allies) in the region; prevent them from returning to region; present a scenario of high attrition

Representative A2/AD Capabilities

- *Physical chokepoints*
- *Capabilities against opponents' homelands*
- *C4ISR*
- *Space assets*
- *Cyber war assets*
- *Ballistic missiles*
- *Naval assets (including mines)*
- *Offensive air assets*
- *Defensive air assets*
- *Asymmetric/irregular warfare advantages*
- *Special operations assets*
- *Espionage and internal penetration of opponents*

Conclusions For Attacking Force

1. **The key historical factor in success against A2/AD is deception.**
 - As to location of breakthrough operation
 - As to time of breakthrough operation
2. **The primary means of defeating A2/AD weapons systems is through destruction/neutralization of sensors.**
 - Sensors are most vulnerable parts of C4ISR networks
 - Key targets that must be destroyed/neutralized: satellites, OTH radars
 - Expands maneuver space for attacking force
3. **Persistent fires from multiple axes are necessary for overwhelming enemy A2/AD.**
 - Expect enemy A2/AD to survive initial salvos
 - The operation will require a volume of fire “attrition phase”
 - Objective is to identify locations of targets

Conclusions For A2/AD Defending Force

- 1. Primary mission of A2/AD remains deterrence / dissuasion.**
- 2. Can not wait for attacker to mass strength. Must attrite attacking force at furthest possible ranges.**
 - A strategy of “luring in the enemy” is rarely effective
 - Must balance with maintaining weapons inventory
 - Attrition battle of quantitatively equal forces favors the defender
- 3. Own sensors must be defended. Enemy sensors are the initial targets.**
 - Sensors are most vulnerable parts of C4ISR networks
- 4. Deception, cover / concealment, and maneuver are essential.**
- 5. “Shaking the attackers resolve” by attrition alone is overrated.**
 - Did not stop U.S., Allies in WWII
 - Media is significant factor, but depends on perception of vital/non-vital interest
 - Attack on U.S. homeland is wild card – best tactic, perhaps worse strategy

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