The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
The U.S. has made little effort to meaningfully engage North Korea over the last decade. What can be done to increase the U.S. understanding of the situation in North Korea and our ability to influence the actions of the North Korean leadership?
North Korea’s criminal conduct—smuggling, trafficking and counterfeiting—is well known, but the portion of the government, Office Number 39, which directs it, is understudied or overlooked. This shadowy part of an already opaque government is examined to reveal how it conducts its activities and supports the longevity of the regime.
For a number of reasons, many of which are self-induced, the United States is in danger of losing, or may have already lost, the strategic initiative in Korea to the People's Republic of China. Given time, the ramifications of ceding the initiative to China may result in a unified Korea tilted toward Beijing.
North Korea has never officially abandoned its objective of “completing the revolution in the south” and has continued an alarming military buildup. The ballistic missile inventory now totals about 800 road-mobile missiles, including about 200 Nodong missiles that could strike Japan.
The February 13, 2007 Joint Agreement accelerates multilateralism to which all states of Northeast Asia must adjust. The United States needs a regional strategy to prepare for the high stakes in the end game of the nuclear crisis.
North Korea’s foreign relations are a blend of contradiction and complexity. They start from the incongruity between Pyongyang’s highly touted policy of juche, or self-reliance, and North Korea’s extended and heavy reliance on foreign aid and assistance over the 6 decades of its existence.
Although North Korea remains an economic basket case that cannot feed and clothe its own people, it nevertheless possesses one of the world’s largest armed forces. Whether measured in terms of the total number of personnel in uniform, numbers of special operations soldiers, the size of its submarine fleet, quantity of ballistic missiles in its arsenal, or its substantial Weapons of Mass Destruction programs, Pyongyang is a major military power. North Korea’s latest act to demonstrate its might was the nuclear test on October 9, 2006.
The clash between the rise of increasingly divergent nationalisms in post-Cold War East Asia represent new challenges for U.S. policy there. How might the United States respond to the history disputes and rising nationalisms in the region to promote stability and peace?
Efforts to resolve the threat posed to Northeast Asia's security by North Korea's nuclear proliferation through six-party negotiations are proceeding with great difficulty. As in any multilateral process, a major problem is understanding the goals and perspectives of each of the participants.
Since 1998, Pyongyang's foremost policy has been declared as "military-first." Military leaders in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are very powerful and influential figures. Who are they? What kind of power and influence do these leaders wield, and how do they exert it? How do KPA leaders interact with dictator Kim Jong Il and their civilian counterparts?
North Korea is both a paradox and an enigma because on one hand, it appears to be a very powerful state—possessing the world's fourth largest armed forces, a sizeable arsenal of ballistic missiles, and a worrying nuclear program—but on the other, it is an economic basket case in terms of agricultural output, industrial production, and foreign trade exports.
North Korea poses a key challenge to the global community of states. Sometimes viewed as primarily a nuclear or proliferation challenge, Pyongyang actually presents the United States and other countries with multiple problems. As the 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United States notes, these challenges include "traditional, irregular, and catastrophic." While each dimension of these threat capabilities are fairly clear and, with the exception of the third, readily documented, North Korea's intentions are a much more controversial subject upon which specialists reach widely disparate conclusions.
In November 2002, the Chinese Communist Party held its 16th Congress and formally initiated a sweeping turnover of senior leaders in both the Party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The meeting heralded not merely a new set of personalities in positions of political and military power, but also the emergence of a new generation of leaders. Who are these individuals, and what does their rise mean for the future of China and its military?
The future shape and effectiveness of U.S. missile defense will depend to some extent on the attitude and participation of America's key ally, Britain. This new monograph traces the history of British attitudes towards missile defense, and examines the UK's current policy on the subject.
Since the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which emerged in October 2002, the United States and other countries have pinned high hopes on Chinese efforts to moderate and reason with North Korea. Yet, as the author points out, it would be unrealistic to raise one's expectations over what China might accomplish vis-à-vis North Korea.
On October 18-20, 2001, the 16th Annual Conference of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies was held in Washington, DC. U.S. commitments had not been shifted or weakened; the U.S. ability to militarily uphold its commitments had not been affected; and the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance again had been demonstrated through South Korea's strong support for the war on terrorism.
With the change of administrations in Washington, current U.S. policy toward North Korea will naturally undergo review and scrutiny. The essays in this volume offer an option to the current engagement approach. The authors suggest an alternative strategy for promoting peace and security in the Korean peninsula different from the ones contemplated or implemented by Washington in recent years.
The principal focus of the papers collected in this book is the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance, the effects of the alliance partners' interaction with North Korea, and the economic pressures that affect the alliance. Each of these papers reflects the enduring historical forces, geopolitical realities, and national interests that affect Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula, and the ROK-U.S.
The United States and the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an unprecedented framework agreement in October 1994 to halt the latter s nuclear weapons program, establish low-level diplomatic contacts between Washington and Pyongyang, and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula.
North Korea's nuclear program is the greatest current threat to U.S. and Northeast Asian security. The outcome of negotiations over this program will have a tremendous impact on the future of the Korean peninsula and on the vital interests of the United States and neighboring states to North and South Korea: China, Japan, and Russia.