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U.S. Army War College >> Strategic Studies Institute >> Faculty Directory and Bio Sketches >> Dr. Conrad C. Crane
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CONRAD C. CRANE is currently the Director of the U. S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA. He joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000 after 26 years of military service that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and published articles on military issues in such journals as The Journal of Strategic Studies, The Journal of Military History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian, as well as in a number of collections and reference books. Dr. Crane holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.
*The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI.
Authored by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Dr. Conrad C. Crane.
The questions of how to empower the Iraqis most effectively and then progressively withdraw non-Iraqi forces from that country is one of the most important policy problems currently facing the United States. The authors seek to present the U.S. situation in Iraq in all of its complexity and ambiguity, with policy recommendations for how that withdrawal strategy might be most effectively implemented.
Authored by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill.
In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions.
Authored by Dr. Conrad C. Crane.
The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars.
Authored by Dr. Conrad C. Crane.
The author analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection.
Edited by Dr. Conrad C. Crane.
The ideas and issues presented in this collection of papers from the Twelfth Annual Strategy Conference conducted by the U.S. Army War College in April 2001 will educate and inform anyone interested in the past and future course of American defense reform.
Authored by Dr. Conrad C. Crane.
The author analyzes the role of landpower in the 170 smaller-scale contingencies conducted by the United States during the last decade. The author especially emphasizes the recurring problems in the planning, execution, and force structure for stabilization tasks, including nation-building.
Authored by Dr. Conrad C. Crane.
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies convened a conference on "Alternative Military Strategies for the United States" to highlight the key issues that will have to be analyzed by the QDR and the new administration's security planning. This report summarizes the presentations from a distinguished group of patrons.